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
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Special Warfare
AREA HANDBOOK
for
GUINEA

Prepared by
FOREIGN AREAS STUDIES DIVISION

SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
The American University
Washington 16, D.C.

Operational in direct with the
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

JUN 12 1962

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December 1961

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GENERAL FOREWORD

Planning for psychological operations and unconventional warfare requires an understanding of the likes, dislikes, attitudes, and human strengths and weaknesses of target groups. This Area Handbook presents sociological, economic, political and military background information essential to such understanding. Encyclopedic information available from other sources is included only to the extent that it contributes to an understanding of the people as such. The information presented has been selected to assist in identifying target groups, estimating their probable reactions to given situations, developing applicable techniques of persuasion, and avoiding inappropriate actions.

This Area Handbook is not to be considered a final product since no document can present the final word about human factors. It should, rather, be viewed as a point of departure for the continuous development of further information on which to base special (psychological and unconventional) warfare planning and operations.

Using agencies are urged to submit comments correcting errors of fact and opinion, filling or indicating gaps of information, and suggesting other changes as may be appropriate. Comments should be addressed to:

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FOREWORD TO THE GUINEA HANDBOOK

The Republic of Guinea in late 1961 occupied a special position among the new African states which had emerged out of the rising tide of African nationalism in the years after World War II. In September 1958, it alone of France's West African territories opted in referendum for independence outside the French Community. The choice, which suddenly cut off sorely needed French technical and material assistance, established Guinea in a polar position in African nationalism for which it continues to be a principal spokesman.

The new state's clearest and most persuasive voice is that of its President, Sékou Touré, who is also head of the sole political party. The principles he proclaims for Africa and undeveloped areas generally are: unqualified rejection of all vestiges of colonial control; alertness against what he sees as the threat of "neo-colonial" domination by the Western powers employing economic means; "positive neutralism" in the Cold War; and a doctrine of "popular dictatorship" and socialist economic organization. Guinea projects for Africa a sovereign union of states infused with these principles, and it has joined with Ghana and Mali in establishing the formal nucleus of such a union.

The Guinean position weds a modified Marxism with techniques of one-party rule elaborated by the Communists. In late 1961 there were signs of strain in the country attributable both to the tempo of its efforts to create a modern nation out of traditionalist agrarian African materials and to the pull to the left implicit in the ideology and political methods President Touré has sought to adapt to African ends. The outcome could not be forecast, but whatever it proved to be, its example would be strongly influential elsewhere in Africa.

No comprehensive study has been published on Guinea, and the present survey is based on the numerous but scattered sources available. A brief visit to Conakry and Paris in the spring of 1961 yielded books and documents not then available in the United States and some valuable first-hand insights. The dependence on secondary sources is obvious. The manuscript has been checked by various experts for factual accuracy, but the character and complexity of the data made it impossible that error could be entirely avoided. The pace of events in the country was rapidly dating the study even as it was being written, but it is hoped that it will serve a useful purpose in providing an over-view of a hitherto obscure African country in the process of becoming a nation.

Spelling of African terms and personal names follow the French orthography employed by official Guinean sources. Place names are given as established by the United States Board on Geographic Names.


GUINEA

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Source: Adapted from the British Library map of the Republic of Guinea, 1964.

Figure 1. Guinea.

SECTION I. SOCIOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY

The Republic of Guinea, a former French West African colony, celebrated the third anniversary of its independence on October 2, 1961. The first few years of its national life made it a testing ground and a show case of anticolonialism, and, as such, gave it a political importance far out of proportion to its area, strategic location, population, size and the nature of its economy. Under the leadership of President Sékou Touré, who was personally responsible for the decision of the people voting in referendum to break away from France, the government and the single political party—the two practically synonymous—sought to bring the people into an African form of political socialism and a collectivist economy.

Guinea lies on the great bulge of West Africa between the 7th and 12th parallels north of the equator. With an area of nearly 95,000 square miles, it is about the size of the state of Wyoming. Its estimated population of 2.8 million is densest on the coast near the capital city of Conakry, in the central portion of the interior Fouta Djallon uplands and in the southern part of the Forest Region. Except in the towns and at the few bauxite and iron mining concessions, the people are scattered in agricultural villages. Modern methods and wage labor are employed on a few large plantations, but the villagers farm their lands much as they have done for centuries. Custom, tradition, social organization and language help divide the population into 16 main ethnic groups and—in addition to French, the knowledge of which is being spread through the growing public school system—11 African languages and numerous dialects are spoken. Perhaps 2 million of the people profess Islam; 25 or 30 thousand are Christians—mainly Roman Catholics; the others hold the animist beliefs which have by no means disappeared among the adherents of the other religions.

On September 28, 1958, the Guinean people, with those of the other members of the 12-year old French Union, went to the polls to vote in referendum for or against continued association with France in the newly formed French Community. Alone among the former

French West African colonies, they rejected membership in the Community and voted for complete independence. The government of Metropolitan France had made an offer which, to it, seemed generous and fair. Behind Guinea's response lay not only accumulated resentments against colonial rule but aspirations formed under French influence and political experience gained during the period of colonial reform after World War II.

Guinea acquired its present territorial boundaries early in the twentieth century as a colony of France. Less than 100 years before, the French, pushing down from their older base in Senegal, had established trading posts on the estuaries of its swampy coast, which they called the Rivières du Sud. The Guinean littoral was a minor sector in the whole line of European penetration along the "Guinea Coast," which extended from Senegal to Gabon. The trade was in such products of the hinterland as oil nuts, wild rubber and hides. The favorable conditions for smuggling at the remote anchorages of the Rivières du Sud also fostered the traffic in slaves after it had been prohibited by the European powers.

In the mid-1800's the aggressive colonial policies of France's Second Empire added the motive of military and political expansion to commercial incentive. The advance into the interior in the succeeding decades was a record of military expeditions and treaty-making with local chiefs. In one region after another, trading rights were converted into powers of protectorate and, finally, into outright French sovereignty.

Strong local opposition was sometimes encountered, as from the numerically insignificant but militant Coniagui and Bassari of Middle Guinea and some of the tribes of the Forest Region. Others, like the Toucouleur from Senegal, the Foulah of the Fouta Djallon, and the Malinké of Upper Guinea, with a Moslem warrior-tradition and historical precedents for complex political organization, produced such leaders as El Hadj Omar, Alfa Yaya and Samory Touré who rallied region-wide resistance. In 1893 the area, then under the French administration and pacified except in a few places, was renamed French Guinea. Two years later it became a constituent colony of the new regional system of French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française).

The early French traders, soldiers and civil officials encountered in the Rivières du Sud not a people but peoples. Beyond the obvious similarities of village life, subsistence farming with primitive tools and negro physical type, the population was divided ethnically and linguistically. Social organization varied from the highly stratified class system of the cattle-breeding Foulah to the simple farming communities of some of the coastal groups.

Among the Foulah and the Malinké, a complex hierarchy of hereditary chiefs suggested the centralized and autocratic structure of the early African kingdoms and empires. By contrast, on the coast and in the Forest Region, the authority of the chief did not usually extend beyond the village or cluster of villages, and he was expected to act with the consensus of the community expressed through the council of elders.

The extended family was everywhere important, but the forms of its organization varied with marriage and residence patterns, and, while most groups reckoned descent through the male line, some were matrilineal. Age groups and secret societies, common on the coast and in the Forest Region, were lacking or less important in Middle and Upper Guinea. Most people were, as they are now, nominally Moslem, but the indigenous animist cults prevailed in the forests and locally on the coast.

French rule imposed a unity on this human diversity. Within the arbitrarily drawn boundaries of the colony, the people were not only members of this or that ethnic group or local community, they were also inhabitants of French Guinea and subjects of France. Not until after World War II was any concentrated effort made to develop the colony and it was long a backwater among France's West African possessions, but the European impact, strongest on the coast, was felt throughout the country.

Under the system of direct administration, the chiefs were replaced by the colonial bureaucracy or converted into its agents charged with tax collection, labor and military recruitment and the dispensation of justice in the spheres left to customary law. French, the language of the administration, had to be learned by any who aspired to service on the lower levels of the colonial bureaucracy open to Africans. A French-educated minority—the *évolués*—grew up which was more French than African in culture.

The export of agricultural products to world markets did not much affect the subsistence farming of most of the countryside, but it caused the development of banana plantations on the coast and coffee plantations in the Forest Region, introduced wage labor and commercialized the gathering of forest products. The traditional handicrafts declined with the entry of European manufactures, and there was growing dependence on factory-made cloth and some other necessities. With these developments, money transactions were introduced into an economy in which goods and services had been exchanged almost exclusively by barter or through the traditional forms of cooperation among kinsmen or of obligation of serf or slave to master. The French ban on slavery and feudal tribute finally became effective, and, although barter continued to predominate in the villages, the impersonal money nexus permanently undermined the traditional economic relationships.

The decisive years in the formation of modern Guinea came after World War II. During that period, internal and external events coincided to transform what for half a century had been a colonial unit of the French empire into a national entity. This process, in which the country acquired a political personality and a leadership which was to propel it into independence, was a particular expression of the general rise of African nationalism.

Throughout Black Africa the basic nationalist motive was—and is—self-rule and equality with the former colonial powers. In Guinea that motive was to be translated into political attitudes, concepts and goals which ultimately not only separated it from France but made it a spokesman for nationalism among the new African states. The principles it primarily advocated were “positive neutralism,” which tends to be more infused with indignation against the West than with doubts about the Communist bloc; the rejection of all but the most carefully circumscribed Western economic assistance as “neo-colonialism”; and the creation of an economically self-sufficient union of African states.

Three factors stand out in the country's postwar development: the French modernization program, the grant of self-government and the growth of labor and political activity under French left-wing influence. To these factors must be added Guinea's emergence into the arena of West African politics and the participation of its leaders in interterritorial labor and political organizations and in the parliamentary councils of the region and of Metropolitan France.

In the decade after 1947 France invested about \$280 million in economic development projects in Guinea. New roads were extended into hitherto isolated areas and port construction facilitated the overseas trade. The exploitation of iron ore and bauxite deposits near Conakry in the early 1950's not only provided income for further development but brought into being a small but concentrated industrial labor force and helped to change Conakry in 15 years from a quiet administrative capital of 22,000 to a city of more than 78,000.

An agreement with the company working the bauxite deposits at Conakry projected the exploitation of the huge bauxite reserves near Boké and plans were made for a big power dam on the Konkouré River. The plans—still unrealized in 1961—took high place in the hopes of Guinea's leaders when the country became independent. An agreement with an international consortium, in which an American company was the principal shareholder, brought into operation in 1960 a bauxite and alumina installation at Fria, about 90 miles north of Conakry, which was one of the largest of its kind in the world and made Guinea the leading mineral producer in West Africa. In the realm of agriculture, the number of plantations increased and steps were taken to improve farming methods. Medical facilities were

expanded and new schools were built to give basic French education and occupational training to the increasing number of Guineans needed in government service and private enterprise.

Upon the establishment in 1946 of the French Union, which granted varying degrees of self-government to France's overseas possessions, Guinea and the other French West African colonies were designated Overseas Territories. French control was preserved in the authority of the Ministry of Overseas France and in the appointive governor-general of French West Africa, but a series of elective assemblies on the several levels of the Union hierarchy had considerable advisory, consultative and investigative powers.

African representatives to those bodies were elected from Guinea and—since the Overseas Territories were regarded as integral parts of the French Republic—Africans were also elected to the two houses of the parliament of France itself. Suffrage was limited, and the electoral system strongly favored the French, but Guineans began to acquire practice in the management of their own affairs. In 1950 the higher ranks of the civil service were opened to them; in 1952 the powers of the Territorial Assembly were enlarged. Then, in 1956, a series of measures which granted universal suffrage, abolished the dual electoral rolls, greatly increased the powers of the Territorial Assembly and entrusted local administration to an executive council formed by the assembly, signaled the passage of power from French to Guinean hands.

As the framework of government within which they could act took shape, a new element in Guinean society was preparing itself for the opportunity. It consisted in large part of young men occupying minor positions in the colonial service—clerks, accountants, court assistants, petty supervisors and school teachers. Most of them came from rural families in poor or moderate circumstances, although a few were descended from hereditary chiefs. Almost all of them had had their schooling in Guinea—unlike the *evolués* of an earlier period, many of whom were educated in Dakar or Paris. They spoke acceptable French, but they were less well educated than the *evolués* and their interests turned to the practical and the political rather than to the humanities.

Most important, their self-image was different. They saw themselves, not as Black Frenchmen, but as Africans with a birthright which made them equal and perhaps superior to the French and to Europeans generally. Schooling, work and personal associations with individual Frenchmen gave most of them an abiding respect for French culture—so many elements of which had become their own—but increasingly they spoke of the “African personality,” and more and more emphatically they rejected the right of the French to tutor or rule them.

Power generated in Europe made Guinea a colony; the concepts and organizational techniques which were employed by the young Guineans who led the country to independence were also European. They were acquired under the influence of the French left-wing labor confederations and political parties which became active in French West Africa after World War II.

The early labor unions were modeled on the French confederations with which most of them were affiliated. The strongest proved to be the Communist-influenced General Confederation of Workers (Confédération Générale du Travail—CGT), and it was as leaders of its Guinean branch that Sékou Touré and his closest associates first gained a mass following. With the founding in 1947 of the Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti Démocratique de Guinée—PDG) as a section of the new interterritorial left-wing African Democratic Rally (Reassemblement Démocratique Africain—RDA), they had a political instrument which could reach beyond the town-centered membership of the unions into the general population.

The RDA broke with the Communists in 1950, and Sékou Touré at the head of the PDG asserted the inapplicability of the Marxist class struggle doctrine to Africa and the necessity of freeing the movement of any vestige of European control. Six years later the Guinean unions under his leadership also withdrew from the CGT to affiliate with a purely African confederation, in the formation of which he was the outstanding figure. The climax came in the elections of 1957 when the PDG won 58 of the 60 seats in the Territorial Assembly and culminated the next year in divorce from France and in independence.

The theories, goals and methods of the PDG touch every sphere of public and personal life in the new nation. They are projected directly into the community by the party committees in the villages and towns and indirectly by the government, the labor unions and the other mass organizations, in which party members occupy all the key positions. President Touré, leader of the party and the government, has impressed his thought and personality on the whole structure. He appears, however, as the director of a small collective leadership rather than as a personal dictator. The products of a particular experience of colonial rule, he and his colleagues reveal in what they have done and hope to do the selective utilization of European and African elements for a national purpose.

The organization and discipline of the PDG resemble those of the Communist parties as does the conception of its relationship to the government and to all other institutions. President Touré, however, describes the rule of the PDG as a "popular dictatorship" based on the will of the whole people—all of whom are urged to become party members—and contrasts it with the class dictatorship of the

Communist parties. In rejecting for Africa the concept of class struggle, he asserts that he and the PDG are not interested in any theory but in practical needs.

He nevertheless continues to employ much of the terminology of Marxism and his strictures against Western "imperialism" closely parallel those of the Communists. The stated economic objective of the PDG is a mixed structure of state ownership and cooperatives with comprehensive governmental planning and control. The apparatus of the government itself owes most to the centralized bureaucratic model introduced by the French. The large interest to be served is proclaimed to be African, and Guinean nationalism is framed in a pan-Africanism which aims at a sovereign union of African states which is envisaged as being economically self-sufficient and politically unaligned with any bloc.

Running through the statements of the national leaders and apparent in their reactions in the international sphere are a passion for equality, a sensitivity to real or fancied slight and a readiness to suspect designs upon the country's independence. These attitudes are not generalized but focus on the large Western powers through their association with France. Marxist assumptions about the "imperialist" nature of capitalism provide the formal rationale for their assertion that "neocolonialism"—dominated by economic rather than direct political means—is the inevitable current stage of Western policy. Underlying the rationale, however, is the emotional fact of the rankling memory of the colonial order in which no African, by the circumstance of being African, could be quite the equal of a European. Postwar colonial reforms did not simply come too late to ameliorate resentment, but they heightened them by rousing expectations which always outran what the ruling power was prepared to offer.

After three years of independence, Guinea's leaders could point to progress in various areas. The country had survived the loss of administrative and technical skills, brought about by the punitively abrupt departure of the French in 1958. It had obtained nearly \$150 million in long-term loans, grants and technical assistance mainly from the Communist countries, but also from Ghana, West Germany, and Israel, providing nearly all of the \$157 million it intended to invest within the term of a Three-Year Plan for economic development begun in 1960.

An important aspect of the Plan was the human investment program under which the people were asked to contribute their labor to a wide variety of public projects. About a fifth of the budget of the Plan was allocated to social services, especially education and public health. Achievements by late 1961 reportedly included new roads, port installations, communications facilities, schools and public

buildings and various measures to modernize agriculture and develop industry. The foreign mining companies were shipping iron ore and bauxite, and, although the government's cancellation of the bauxite concessions at Conakry had halted that operation, the new Fria plant was producing both bauxite and alumina.

Social development was difficult to assess, but more than 90,000 Guineans were attending school—about twice as many as in 1958. Vigorous efforts were being made to eliminate adult illiteracy, and a nucleus of persons qualified in professional or technical fields was being created through study abroad or in Guinea in the new schools and at the Fria plant. Aside from programs of formal education, the PDG had had three years in which to mold the attitudes and habits of the population it had so successfully mobilized for independence.

One-third or more of the people had been inducted into the party and almost everyone was a member of one or another of the mass organizations. Once a week in every village and town in the country, the local party committees held public meetings which all were expected to attend. In these sessions, national and local policies were repeatedly explained. General discussion was invited which not only kept the leaders in touch with the people but invoked the traditional African village consensus principle in support of the official program. Similar techniques were employed in the labor unions, the women's groups and the national youth organization—all of which functioned as auxiliaries of the party. There seemed no doubt that the method was effective and that, especially in the younger generation, the nationalist, socialist and secular concepts and values taught by the party were gradually taking root.

The achievements of the new state have involved heavy and continuous pressure on the people to work harder and to adopt new ways and leave old ones behind them. Sacrifices have been imposed by low wages and by shortages created by the severe limitation of imports in an effort to save foreign exchange. Moreover, there has been one serious failure, the attempt to nationalize domestic and foreign trade, which, when it ended in 1961, had produced a scandal of official corruption and had brought the movement of goods within the country almost to a standstill. In addition to these difficulties, certain competing ideological trends in the party and the mass organizations seemed to hold the threat of factional crisis.

Strain was being manifested in the latter half of 1961 with reports of food riots in the Foulah area where the PDG has had most difficulty in overcoming regional particularism. Mid-November brought the summary arrest and imprisonment for subversion of five leaders of the National Union of Guinean Teachers who had circulated complaints and demands in connection with wages and teaching load. A student strike in Conakry in behalf of the union officials and demon-

strations in some other centers were promptly brought under control by the authorities, whose action was supported by the national youth organization. These events, at first officially attributed to "imperialist machinations," were followed by a declaration by President Touré that the disorders had been instigated by a Communist network "reaching out to Dakar in Senegal, to Paris and an Eastern embassy in Conakry."

It appeared that President Touré was confronted both with essentially nonpolitical local dissatisfactions and with an ideological challenge from extreme Leftists within the party leadership who were impatient with the modified Marxism of the PDG and wanted outright alignment with the Communist bloc. There were indications that the extremist group had representatives in the circle of leaders immediately around President Touré, and the danger was further increased by the ability of the numerous Communist-bloc diplomatic and technical aid representatives in the country to give the movement encouragement and support, and by the possibility that it could exploit popular dissatisfactions if these grew.

Whether President Touré could avoid a crisis among his closest associates remained to be seen, but he did not hesitate to move against the leaders of the teachers union and, notwithstanding Communist-bloc economic aid, to charge publicly that an Eastern embassy had been involved in the subversive plot. That he intended to act to remedy sources of popular dissatisfaction within the party and the government was indicated in November and December when he was on a tour of inspection in Upper Guinea and the Forest Region. He denounced various officials for corruption and cruelty, ordered the restitution of funds which higher party bodies had diverted from lower units, and reminded those who had been forcing people to work on human investment program projects that the program was voluntary and must remain so.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL SETTING

The Republic of Guinea attained independence on October 2, 1958, after more than a half a century as part of the French colonial empire. The drive toward independence began only in the closing days of World War II, and then only in the minds of a few leaders, but it swiftly fired the popular imagination and, in the late 1950's, it overshadowed all other public issues.

Guinean nationalism hardly existed in the early 1940's, but it followed closely upon the awakening of a consciousness of a distinct "Guinean personality" in the heady atmosphere of the postwar break-up of colonial empires and grew rapidly in a strong emotional reaction to the arbitrary methods of the colonial administration. It was fostered and developed by a handful of young political leaders who grew out of the leftist-oriented labor movement. One of them, Sékou Touré, came to dominate the political scene in the 1950's. Independence was won under his leadership and Guinean nationalism was indelibly stamped by his personality.

Guinea has no history apart from that of West Africa. It had no separate political existence before the end of the nineteenth century when it was made a French colony with boundaries arbitrarily drawn for administrative convenience. The forebears of the two main Guinean ethnic groups, however, the Malinké and the Foulah (called the Peul by the French), have dominated the whole region for centuries, playing a major role in the history of the western Sudan, of which the savanna area of modern Guinea was a part (see ch. 3, Geography and Population). They attained a high degree of social sophistication and created large political entities. The forest and coastal peoples, who are in the minority in modern Guinea, did not achieve a comparable level of social complexity, their largest political entities rarely transcending the limits of the village or the tribe.

Guineans strongly identify themselves with the history of the whole region and with their Malinké and Foulah ancestors who ruled it. Militant pride in an indigenous African past, shared with neighbors across modern boundaries, is reflected in popular folklore and marks the attitude of Guineans toward their own state, toward their neighbors and toward other countries. This "African" consciousness is assiduously cultivated by the Guinean Government.

West African history, as interpreted by Guineans, provides inspiration for nationalism and the justification for independence, both in its positive assertions and its indictment of French colonial rule. Guinean leaders emphasize the political, social and cultural sophistication of the ancient African empires and native states and make unflattering comparisons with contemporary Europe. The emotional idealization of history has been employed as a weapon to destroy the earlier native acceptance of the European assumption of inherent superiority over the African. Names and memories of past leaders and events, repeated in stories and songs, evoke a popular emotional response. Ancient native states are enshrined as forerunners of modern African statehood, and the national pantheon of heroes includes early African rulers and leaders of resistance to the French rule, such as the late nineteenth-century Malinké chief, Samory Touré, to whom Sékou Touré is believed to be related (see ch. 15, Attitudes and Reactions of the People).

The Sudanese kingdoms and empires, which go back to the beginnings of recorded African history, were tribal in character and were ruled by chief-kings with the advice of tribal elders. In size they went beyond usual tribal limits, however, and the two largest empires extended over whole regions. They nevertheless were basically the expression of the authority of one tribal group over others—as in the case of the Malinké in the Mali Empire, the Bambara of Ségon and Kaarta and the Fula in the Fouta Djallon or in Macina.

The native states reached the peak of their power in the fifteenth century. Agriculture and trade flourished under a system of law enforced by the rulers, and economically and culturally fruitful contacts were maintained with the Mediterranean world. Decline began in the seventeenth century under the impact of the Moorish invasions and the growth of internal dissension. Political chaos and general warfare brought depopulation and economic decline and facilitated penetration by the Europeans who appeared on the West African coast in pursuit of gold, spices and slaves.

The economic pattern of the area was altered when seaborne European trade generally replaced the overland Mediterranean trade. The spread of Islam and beginnings of the European influence brought social change, and the decline of the old tribal monarchies was well advanced in the nineteenth century. Twice in that century political and social movements, which preached Islamic brotherhood and disregarded existing class and tribal barriers, found a ready response among the people. They encouraged the establishment of an authoritarian state under a strong leader—a forerunner of the national state—but the effort came too late to challenge successfully the spread of European domination and to prevent the partitioning of West Africa among European powers.

The eighteenth-century European trading posts were gradually converted into garrisoned settlements, and political penetration inland followed commercial penetration. The French gradually gained control over all of the western Sudan and large parts of the coast. They alternately employed diplomacy and force, utilizing rivalries between the competing native rulers to advantage. This gradual conquest was accomplished without large-scale military operations. By 1900 the French colonial empire in West Africa was consolidated into one large territorial-administrative unit, French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française—AOF), of which Guinea was one of the constituent colonies. French possessions in Equatorial Africa were at the same time consolidated into a similar unit, French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatoriale Française—AEF).

French colonial policy in Africa reflected the influence of two major political traditions of Metropolitan France—assimilation and association. The policy of assimilation was rooted in the universalism of the French Revolution and in the assumption that French culture and institutions were superior to all others. The policy of association accorded with the Napoleonic pattern of paternal administration through a French-controlled and French-educated African elite. In practice both policies merged within the traditional French framework of centralized direct administration by a powerful bureaucracy.

The colonies were run by French career colonial officers who administered locally through a hierarchy of African chiefs. These were not the traditional chiefs, but men chosen by the French for their willingness to accept orders and their ability to carry out French policies. Thus the traditional tribal hierarchy, which received the first blow from indigenous leveling movements of the nineteenth century, was further undermined and, having lost most of its authority, steadily declined in importance. In the process the old tribal identities were blurred, confused and, in some cases, eliminated.

A new African elite emerged, its status determined by its relationship to the French. In the beginning, it consisted mainly of appointed chiefs, clerks and “boys” (servants) who were in direct contact with the French and who acted as middlemen between them and the people. By the 1930’s there had emerged from this group a small body of young people who had received French education on the secondary level and sometimes on a higher level. French in their formal culture, they were known as *évolués* and were admitted to posts in colonial administration and to French citizenship. They played an important role in the social and economic life of the colonies.

The colonies were regarded by the French as sources of raw materials and as markets for home products. In Guinea bananas were found to be a profitable industrial crop and they were the major export of the colony before World War II. The shortage and low

productivity of African labor was a major economic problem there, as in the other West African colonies, and French authorities adopted a policy of labor conscription which was frequently abused and created one of the principal grievances against French rule (see ch. 12, Forced Labor).

World War II and its aftermath brought far-reaching social, economic and political changes. The Free French Government of 1943-44 charted a program of reform for the colonies. Nationalist movements appeared under the leadership of the *évolués* who advocated progress toward self-government while stressing their loyalty to France. These movements spread across colonial boundaries and assumed a unified character throughout French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. In 1946, under the Constitution of the Fourth Republic, a French Union replaced the old colonial empire. The West African colonies were designated Overseas Territories and given a measure of self-government under French hegemony.

The new framework soon proved to be inadequate under the pressure of continuing change. A new African political leadership began to emerge which challenged the *évolués* and, in many places (including Guinea), eclipsed them. It was composed of younger and less educated men who came out of the postwar African labor movement, acquiring in the process a pronounced leftist political orientation. The French government reacted by granting new reforms. The 1956 Loi Cadre extended self-government and universal suffrage to the Overseas Territories. In 1958 the government of General de Gaulle's Fifth Republic replaced the French Union with a French Community—an association of states joined to France by loose political and economic ties.

Prospective members were given the option of voting for or against membership in the Community, with refusal bringing complete independence and severance of ties with France. Guinea voted for independence under the leadership of Sékou Touré and his Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti Démocratique de Guinée—PDG). The step brought Guinea into the forefront of the African nationalist movement and focused on it the attention of the other former French African colonies, all of which had elected to remain in the French Community. French assistance was abruptly withdrawn and Guinea was faced with the formidable task of making its independence work.

After three years of independence, the economy and resources of Guinea were still undeveloped, its people were largely illiterate and most of them lived on a subsistence level as village farmers. Only in the capital city and in the few industrial sites and administrative centers was the pattern of existence different from what it had been for generations. The PDG, which was synonymous with the government, dominated the national scene. The authoritarianism of the govern-

ment had its precedent in the old African pattern and French rule, but it was more immediately the result of policies consciously adopted by national leaders who were impatient with the country's political primitiveness and economic backwardness and who saw its problems and needs and their own role in Marxist terms.

Nationalism and fierce pride combined with hatred for colonialism tended to dominate political thinking. Aspirations to pan-African leadership, spurred by the personal ambitions of President Touré, were strong. Foreign policy was officially neutralist, but since independence the closest economic and political ties had been with the Communist bloc. An atmosphere of dedication, enthusiasm, puritanism and pride permeated the nation's leadership and young militants. The people were mobilized by the party and followed its lead with apparent willingness. The great expectations and hopes for the future had not yet been dampened by failures inherent in the task of building a modern state swiftly in a setting only one step removed from the tribal past. The success or failure of the Guinean experiment, in terms of creating a viable economy, coping with major social problems and of being able ultimately to remain free of dependence on either of two world power blocs, was of great importance to the whole of West Africa. Guinea's progress was watched carefully by its less daring neighbors and its example contributed to the virtual dissolution of the French Community by 1960.

PRE-EUROPEAN PERIOD

Origins

The ethnic origins of the Guineans are obscure. It is believed that the forebears of most of the population came from the northeast, but routes and times of arrival remain uncertain. The absence of natural boundaries in the western Sudan facilitated the free movement of peoples in search of livelihood or bent on conquest and migrations have been a feature of the history of the region into the modern period.

The inhabitants of the country may be divided roughly into three groups: West Atlantic and Mandé-speaking peoples whose ancestors were in the area as far back as it is possible to determine; Mandé-speaking groups which arrived later, of which the Malinké and the Soussou are the most important; and finally the Foulah who, like some of the earliest inhabitants, speak a West Atlantic language.

The first group is found in the Forest Region, on the coast and in the mountainous northwest. It is represented by such peoples as the forest-dwelling Toma, Guerzé and Kissi; by the Landouma on the coast between the Rio Nunez and Conakry; by the Nalon at the mouth of the Nunez; by the Baga in the Boké region; by the Mmani and Temné who live between Conakry and the border of Sierra Leone; and

by the Coniagui and the Bassari in the northwest (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The Soussou-Dialonké were the first of the later-arriving Mandé-speaking people to move into Guinea—at least the first whose date of arrival is known. They retreated into Fouta Djallon from the upper Niger area in the thirteenth century under the pressure of the Malinké of the Mali Empire. Following them, the Malinké moved along the Niger River and into the savanna area of what is now Upper Guinea, an area which they have since dominated. Settling in different localities, various Malinké groups diverged from one another and adopted different names. Like the earlier inhabitants of Guinea, they were agriculturalists (see ch. 3, Geography and Population; ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The Foulah were cattle nomads. Physically they appear to represent a mixture of negro and lighter-skinned Saharan peoples. Whether their ancestry connects them with the Hamites of north and east Africa is conjectural, and nothing certain is known about their origins. The first historical reference to them in the eleventh century reported them in the Termès region where the present boundaries of Mauretania, Senegal and Mali meet. From Termès, the Foulah moved southward and eastward in a stream of migration which at times took on the character of a conquest. They are believed to have arrived in Macina, a region along the northern bank of the Niger River north of Ségon and south of Timbuktu, in the late fourteenth century. From there a large group conquered Fouta Djallon in the seventeenth century, displacing the Soussou-Dialonké. The Soussou went to the southwest and settled on the coast; the Dialonké were pushed southeast (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The earliest migrations seem to have consisted mainly of the slow, peaceful advance of small groups of farmer-hunters moving in search of fertile land and game, halting when they found them, and setting out again when local resources were exhausted. They tended to mix with the people they encountered. The migrations of the Mandé-speaking peoples, on the other hand, involved large groups moving fairly rapidly, and they were accompanied by conquest and displacement of established communities. The early movements of the cattle-herding Foulah involved both small and large groups. In small contingents, the Foulah mixed peacefully with indigenous people; in large groups, they engaged in conquest. Once they had been Islamized, they came in the name of the Prophet, subjugating and exploiting the peoples whose territories they entered.

Both the Mandé-speaking peoples and the Foulah possessed relatively complex political systems and evolved powerful monarchical states. Originally animists, they were converted to Islam through their contacts with the Arabs and the Berbers. They mixed freely

with those around them, and many of the tribes in the area are the result of this mixing (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 10, Religion; ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

Native States

Medieval Moorish and Arab chronicles provide the earliest recorded information on West Africa. The Phoenicians and Carthaginians sailed along the West African coast in antiquity, but they left little evidence of what they found. Berber and Arab traders traveling south of the Sahara were the first to encounter the negro states of West Africa which, before 1000 A.D., had begun to grow up on the trade routes and at meeting points between the agricultural people and the nomads. Some ascendant states were able to assert domination over their neighbors, and a series of negro empires emerged. Their power may be judged by the fact that at certain periods Berber and Arab tribes of Southern Sahara paid tribute to them.

The Ghana Empire

The Ghana (Ouagadougou) Empire (fourth[?] to thirteenth centuries) developed around the trading center of Koumbi in the area northwest of the bend of the Niger River. Its wealth was based primarily on gold found in the Bouré area (see fig. 2). Gradually, under a dynasty which emerged from the Soninké tribe, it extended its sovereignty over neighboring kingdoms, and, at the peak of its power in the eleventh century, it controlled the area from the Atlantic almost to Timbuktu.

The social organization of the Empire was based on clans grouped into tribes, all under a supreme chief or king. The various clans specialized in particular occupations. Most engaged in agriculture, but there were also shepherd, weaving, fishing and iron-working clans. Millet, sorghum and cotton were the principal crops. Foreign craftsmen lived in Koumbi, the capital, which was regularly visited by the caravans of Berber and Arab merchants. The trade routes were protected by an army, composed of contingents from each tribe. Ghana exacted tribute from neighboring states, the most important of which were the Berber state of Aoudaghost in the north, the Toucouleur kingdom of Tékroun in present-day Senegal and the kingdom of Mali on the upper Niger River. Although no part of the area of modern Guinea was a part of the Ghana Empire, Ghana's influence extended far southward into the savanna area of what is now Middle and Upper Guinea.

Under the Almoravide dynasty, the Moors, fired by the Islamizing zeal and the vision of riches, invaded Ghana in the eleventh century and subdued it by 1076. Some tribes, such as the Soninké and the Toucouleur, accepted Islam. A period of chaos, during which various

states strove for ascendancy, ensued and lasted until the thirteenth century.

The Mali Empire

The Mali Empire (eleventh to sixteenth centuries) grew out of a small state on the upper Niger River which was ruled by the Keita, an iron-working clan of the Malinké. A vassel of Ghana, its expansion dates from its adoption of Islam in the eleventh century. The first great king and the founder of the Empire was Sundiata (1230-55) who defeated the rival kingdom of Sosso (of the Soussou-Dialonké) at Kirina (Karima) in 1235. The memory of the battle is preserved in folk tales in Guinea and the Sudan.

The height of Mali Empire's power was reached in the fourteenth century under Mansa Moussa (Kankan or Kango Moussa) who reigned from 1307 to 1332, at which time the Empire's boundaries extended from the Atlantic coast to Agadès in the east (see fig. 2). Koranic schools and mosques flourished under royal sponsorship. Several major cities—Niani, the capital, Djénné, Timbuktu, Gao and Oulata—grew up as a result of the brisk trade with the Mediterranean states, with which the king exchanged regular embassies. The Empire was divided into provinces ruled by governors; peace and order were maintained by an army and by police. The magnificent court, the sound finances and the efficient administration of the Empire were praised by Ibn Battuta who visited Mali as the envoy of the Sultan of Morocco in 1352.

Decline began in the late fourteenth century under the pressure of rising vassals—the Tonaregs, the Foulah of Macina, the state of Gao and others. These gradually threw off Mali's sovereignty and acquired parts of its territory. In the fifteenth century Mali ceased to be an empire and, in the mid-seventeenth century, the last Keita ruler retreated to the home place of the clan at the village of Kangaba where his descendants continued to be chiefs until modern times. The Mali Empire at its peak controlled a major part of modern Guinea, including the Fouta Djallon and the savanna area of Upper Guinea (see fig. 2). The memory of its power is vivid among the Malinké of the western Sudan, including those in Guinea.

The Songhai Empire

The Songhai (Goa, Sonrai, Sonrhay) Empire (fourteenth to sixteenth centuries) centered on the city of Gao on the middle Niger River east of Timbuktu (see fig. 2). It gained independence from Mali under a ruler of the Sonni dynasty, Ali Ber, who conquered a large part of the territory of Mali. It reached its zenith in the fifteenth century under the Askia dynasty, founded by a Moslem general of the Sonni, Mamadou (Mohammed) Touré (1493-1528).

For a time Koranic scholarship, trade and agriculture, protected by a standing army of mercenaries, flourished.

In the sixteenth century the Songhai Empire, weakened by constant warfare and internal discord, fell to *Ili Mansur*, the Sultan of Morocco, in a war over gold and the profits from Sahara salt mines. The Moors occupied Gao from 1591 to 1618 and exercised strong influence in the area until the mid-eighteenth century when Gao was occupied by the Touaregs. Although it was further removed from modern Guinea than the other two empires, the history of the Songhai Empire nevertheless forms part of the historical tradition claimed by the rulers of modern Guinea.

Period of Disorder

No new empire arose on the ruins of Songhai, but numerous small kingdoms emerged. The three centuries between the fall of the Songhai Empire and European colonial conquest constituted a period of continuous warfare between the native states, which contended for territory, for survival and for slaves to be sold to European traders at high profits. The hitherto prosperous economy of the western Sudan declined and its cities fell into ruins. Depopulation caused by warfare and slaving was further aggravated by poverty and disease and by the shortage of food resulting from the decline in cultivation. The flourishing overland trade with the Mediterranean countries fell in abeyance as the direction of commercial exchange shifted towards the Atlantic coast and maritime Europe, but the new trade never equaled the old in either volume or value.

The period of internal disorder coincided with the European arrival. Spurred by the profits to be earned in the slave trade, Europeans established trading posts on the coast and political penetration followed. Most trading European powers were satisfied with coastal enclaves, but the French and the British began to move inland. Their influence was felt increasingly in the affairs of the native states whose quarrels the Europeans fomented to further their own dominion.

Several West African states established themselves in the Sudan after the fall of the Songhai Empire. Most were organized on the old authoritarian monarchical patterns; some were pagan, other Islamized. In addition to states along the middle and lower Senegal River, the most important for the history of Guinea were the two pagan kingdoms established by the Bambara tribe, *Ségou* and *Kaarta*, and the two Moslem Foulah states, *Macina*, along the Niger River north of *Ségou*, and *Fonta Djallon* in present-day Guinea (see fig. 3).

The Bambara, a Malinké group, are believed to have settled along the upper Niger River in the twelfth century. Their chiefs paid tribute to the Mali Empire and later to the Songhai Empire. They gained independence only after the Moorish invasion of 1591-1618,

and then established two rival kingdoms. The kingdom of Ségou had the capital of the same name; the city of Nioro was the capital of the kingdom of Kaarta. The Bambara were at the height of their power in the eighteenth century, when Ségou, then temporarily in control of Kaarta, extended its sovereignty over Macina, Djénné and Timbuktu. Strongly devoted to their animistic beliefs, the Bambara kingdoms formed an effective barrier against the southward spread of Islam.

The historical importance of the Foulah dates from the eighteenth century. Having embraced Islam, they established a number of theocratic states from the mouth of the Senegal River eastward to the Niger River and beyond (see fig. 3). From the Termès region, where they are thought to have first settled in West Africa, the Foulah in the thirteenth century began to move southeast and southwest in small nomadic groups. Some spread along the banks of the Senegal and Niger Rivers; others went into the Fouta Djallon. The arrival of the Foulah in Macina in the fourteenth century seems to have been an organized large-scale movement under the chief, Diallo Maga, whose descendants ruled the Macina Foulah until the nineteenth century.

The Foulah were initially hostile to Islam, but found in it a set of religious and social sanctions that better accorded with the needs of their evolving society than did their earlier animism. Partial settlement and the increased importance of wealth and social prestige deriving from the ownership of cattle favored the establishment of a warrior aristocracy. Islam provided this warrior elite with justification for conquest and the principles for organizing a theocratic state.

Early in their history the Macina Foulah were vassals of the Mali Empire. In the sixteenth century they were conquered by the Songhai Empire, and in the eighteenth century, they came under the rule of the Kingdom of Ségou. In 1810 Bari Hamadou, a Moslem Foulah chief of the Bari (Barry) clan, overthrew the ruling Diallo dynasty of Macina and established a strong centralized state. It levied taxes and maintained a conscript army. In the course of his reign (1810-44) Bari Hamadou conquered Djénné and Timbuktu.

The main influx of the Foulah into the Fouta Djallon came from Macina in the late seventeenth century. Unlike the clans then in power in Macina, the Foulah clans which left for the Fouta Djallon were converts to Islam. They first settled with permission of the local rulers, but shortly seized power from their hosts. The local inhabitants who did not withdraw were subjugated and made to till the land for their conquerors. The new state, divided into semi-autonomous provinces, was ruled by a Moslem aristocracy of warrior clans under an *almamy*, a military, civil and religious leader chosen by a council of clan leaders. Interclan rivalry was vigorous and, by the mid-eighteenth century, the *almamy* was being elected every two years, alternately from the two ranking families, the Alfariya and Soriya.

The provinces (*diwals*) consisted of smaller units, each of which centered around a mosque. The state minted its own coinage, levied taxes and mobilized manpower through forced labor (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

Under their interpretation of the Moslem doctrine of holy war, the Foulah of the Fouta Djallon were in a permanent state of conflict with the surrounding pagan tribes, although they also fought Moslem tribes and sometimes concluded pagan alliances. Their major antagonists in the late eighteenth century were the Dialonké of the Kingdom of Soulimana (on the present boundary between Guinea and Sierra Leone) and the Foulah of Labé. The Senegal Foulah, who were in contact with the Foulah of the Fouta Djallon, adopted a theocratic system and *almamys* ruled in Bondou and Fouta Toro (a mixed Toucouleur-Foulah state on the site of ancient Tékrou).

Cross-Tribal Movements

Economic and social change (brought about by two centuries of constant warfare, the spread of Islam, and early European contact) contributed to the weakening of tribal ties; the nineteenth century brought the leveling, cross-tribal movements led by El Hadj Omar, Saïdou Tall and Samory Touré. Begun in the name of Islam and brotherhood of all believers, these movements led to the creation of authoritarian states each with a powerful mass army under one leader. They destroyed and superseded the entrenched tribal hierarchies, attracting an immense popular following and becoming the focal points of resistance to the Europeans. Both movements started in the savanna area of present-day Guinea.

El Hadj Omar (1797–1864) was a Toucouleur born near Podor who lived for a number of years in Mecca. There he became a member of the Tidjaniya, a proselytizing Moslem brotherhood which treated all believers as equals without regard to social status. El Hadj Omar returned home as the Tidjaniya Khalifa (supreme representative) for the western Sudan. Imprisoned for a time in Ségou, he was released and went on a triumphant tour of Senegal, where his preaching attracted a mass following. In 1850 he established himself in Dinguiraye in Upper Guinea, organized a large army (in which the Toucouleurs formed the hard core) and embarked on a career of conquest. By 1854 he had subdued the native state of Bambouk and the Bambara of Kaarta and then moved on to Fouta Toro, his native region. Only a few chiefs there joined with him, however; the others turned to the French for help.

In 1857 El Hadj Omar was defeated near Médine by General Louis Faidherbe, Governor of Senegal. Turning eastward again, El Hadj Omar subjugated the Bambara of Ségou and the Foulah of Macina in 1861–62. He was unable to crush Foulah resistance, however, and

was killed in a Foulah uprising in 1864. The circumstances of his death gave birth to a legend, still current in the Sudan, that he stepped inside a stone and will reappear as the savior (Mahdi). Toucouleur dominion over Macina was reestablished by Omar's successors and the Toucouleur Empire continued until the final defeat of Ahmadou, Omar's son, by the French in 1893 (see fig. 4).

Samory Touré (*circa* 1840 to 1900), born near Bissandougou in Upper Guinea, was a Malinké peddler and, later, a soldier. In the 1880's, as the leader of an Islamic mass movement, he subdued the minor warring chiefs of Upper Guinea and there established the Ouassoulou Empire with Bissandougou as its capital (see fig. 4). Having adopted the title of *almamy*, he organized his empire into 10 provinces and established a standing army of approximately 10,000 men dressed in uniforms and armed with rifles (see ch. 29, The Armed Forces).


In the 1830's, while at war with the kingdom of Sikasso to the northeast, Samory Touré concluded a series of treaties with the French, including one in 1887 recognizing a French protectorate over the west bank of the upper Niger River. Three years later, however, in alliance with the Toucouleur Empire and the kingdom of Sikasso, he was raiding French outposts there. French counteraction forced him gradually eastward into the Ivory Coast, where he reestablished his domain (see fig. 4). Captured by the French in 1898, he died in exile in Gabon in 1900. Samory Touré, a strong and able man, was an outstanding administrator and military leader, but his efforts at unification came too late. His bravery and military exploits are extolled in legend and song, and he is popularly regarded as a national hero and a symbol of resistance to colonialism.

EUROPEAN PENETRATION

Trade and First Settlements

European interest in West Africa was awakened by the geographic discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The Portuguese, under Prince Henry the Navigator, were the first to round the coast of West Africa, and a papal bull of 1441, respected by others until the Reformation, gave them exclusive dominion there. Representatives of other sea powers of the time also sailed along the West African coast, but only four were major contenders in the area—the French, the British, the Portuguese and the Spanish. The importance of the Portuguese and Spanish decreased in the region with the decline of their national power in Europe.

The early traders sought gold, spices and ivory, but in the sixteenth century the demand for slaves by West Indian plantations increased and slaves eclipsed all other West African commodities. Traders



Source: Adapted from Djibril Tamsir Niane and J. Suret-Canale, *Histoire de L'Afrique Occidentale*, pp. 63 and 89.

Figure 4. Major West African Empires and European Settlements in the Nineteenth Century.

signed treaties with coastal chiefs who obtained slaves from rulers in the interior in exchange for firearms, spirits and gaudy trifles. The early European settlements on the coast gradually drew the attention of the native rulers away from the North African centers on the Mediterranean and from the Saharan routes which had for so long been connected with them.

The earliest recorded French voyage to West Africa took place in 1483. French ships explored the mouth of the Senegal River in 1558 and St. Louis, the first French settlement there, was founded in the mid-seventeenth century. At about the same time the Dutch ceded to the French a settlement at the Ile de Gorée (modern Dakar), and a French mission was founded nearby at Rufisque. The British established themselves at the mouth of the Gambie (Gambia) River in 1664 and in Sierra Leone in 1787. French and British clashed over the possession of Ile de Gorée in the seventeenth century, but the British did not seem much interested in footholds on the coast of present-day Guinea.

The French trade was carried on by chartered private companies, such as the Senegal Company (*Compagnie de Sénégal*) and the Guinea Company (*Compagnie de Guinée*), both organized in the seventeenth century. The private trade monopoly in West Africa was abolished with the French Revolution, however, and the companies were nationalized in 1792.

The activity on the coast stimulated European interest in the interior. In the late eighteenth century two French explorers penetrated the native state of Bambouk from Senegal, but failed to return. In 1791 an Englishman, Major Houghton, set out from the mouth of Gambie (Gambia) River in the direction of the Niger River, but he also disappeared. Mungo Park, another Englishman, traveled from Gambia to Ségon and back in 1795-97. Taking the same route in 1805, however, he did not return. In 1818 Gaspard Mollien undertook to discover the source of Senegal River on behalf of the French Government. He went up the Senegal from St. Louis to Timbo, explored the Fouta Djallon and returned the way he had come. René Caillé, outstanding among French explorers in the region, went in disguise with a trading caravan from the Rio Nunez to Djénné, Timbuktu and Fez in 1827-28. Other major journeys of discovery through the western Sudan followed.

The French established posts south of Ile de Gorée in the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries in what is now Senegal, British Gambia and Portuguese Guinea. It was not until the early nineteenth century that they installed themselves on the coast of modern Guinea—after Ile de Gorée and St. Louis, taken over by the British during the Napoleonic wars, were restored to France under the 1814 Paris Peace Treaty.

The first of the French trading posts in Guinea was located at the mouth of the Rio Nunez (so named, according to tradition, for a Portuguese fifteenth-century adventurer, Nunõ Tristão). The site proved commercially advantageous, since the river provided a route to the interior and the Fouta Djallon. Raided by the Landouma, a coastal tribe, the French sent a punitive expedition. The Landouma, impressed, signed a treaty granting trading privileges in exchange for payments of rents to the chief—a feature which became customary in the later French treaties with coastal chiefs. The Landouma treaty was followed by one with the Nalou, another coastal people. New posts were founded to the south along the coast at the mouths of the Rio Pongo and the Mellacorée River. British and Belgian efforts failed to dislodge the French from the Guinea coast and, by the late 1850's, they were recognized as undisputed masters of the area. The British, nevertheless, established themselves on the Iles de Los in 1818.

A governor of Senegal, the first French Colony in West Africa, was appointed in 1827. Initially all the French settlements were under the authority of Senegal, but in 1845 French possessions were divided into two colonies: Senegal, with its administrative center in St. Louis, and Rivières du Sud, under a naval commander in chief with headquarters at Ile de Gorée. Rivières du Sud included all the French coastal posts to the south of Ile de Gorée; the name, Guinea, was applied to the whole West African coast from Ile de Gorée to Gabon.

The early period witnessed the development of trade with the Africans, primarily in palm oil, peanuts, wild rubber and hides. There was little territorial expansion, but some traders settled permanently on the coast, many of them taking African wives and playing an important part in native affairs. Slaves were a trade commodity from the beginning and, with the favorable conditions for smuggling in the Rivières du Sud, the traffic assumed greater importance after France prohibited it in 1818 and the other European powers took similar action.

Treaties with the local chiefs did not protect the French from violence. The posts were frequently pillaged and the traders massacred in the wars between the Landouma and the Nalou. They were also raided by Foulah caravans descending from the Fouta Djallon. In self-defense the posts were fortified and garrisoned by military detachments. Since the coastal chiefs were vassals of the Foulah of the Fouta Djallon and paid tribute to them, the French attempted to reach an understanding with the rulers of Fouta. An expedition under a Lieutenant Heequart went to the Fouta in 1850. It was well received by the *almamy* but gained no practical advantages, and the relationship between the French posts and the African chiefs remained strained.

French Penetration and Conquest

French colonization of West Africa began in earnest under the Second Empire (1852-70) when purely commercial exploitation began to be aided by political and military expansion. The French authorities now sought to consolidate their control in areas gained by treaties with the chiefs and generally to reduce their power. The movement inland from Senegal and the coastal settlement began under General Louis Faidherbe who was appointed governor of Senegal in 1854. The threat to the French position in Senegal, presented by El Hadj Omar, was averted by his defeat in 1857. Thereafter the Toucouleurs turned eastward, and gradual French penetration along the coast and into the Fouta Djallon proceeded undisturbed.

In 1860 the French sent another expedition into the Fouta Djallon under a Lieutenant Lambert. He prevailed on the Foulah to cede to the French the Boké Plateau and got their promise to send their caravans through Rio Nunez. In the next decade Boké was occupied by a French military detachment, and more trading posts were established along the coast—in Taboria and Boffa on the Rio Pongo, at Dubréka, and in Benty at the mouth of the Mellacorée River.

The establishment of the new posts on the coast was accompanied by treaties with the local chiefs. Some of the treaties provided for outright French rule, others for French protection, and still others for trading privileges only. From the 1870's onward it became customary to grant the local chief a subsidy in exchange for his pledge not to lease land to other European powers. Gradually the trading and military posts became administrative centers, and French residents became *de facto* colonial administrators. In 1859 the colony of Rivières du Sud was placed under the direct administration of Senegal. It was reconstituted as a separate unit under a lieutenant governor, supervised by the governor of Senegal, in 1882.

The consolidation of the coastal possessions was accompanied by further penetration of the Fouta Djallon. An agreement with the Foulah was necessary for the security of coastal trade and efforts to that end were renewed. An agreement to establish a railroad between the Fouta and the mouth of Rio Nunez was first obtained in 1880 from Alfa Yaya, the chief of Labé, by a French adventurer, Aimée Olivier, who called himself Count de Sanderval. Sanderval established trading posts at Kadé and Timbo and, obtaining a grant of land, minted his own coinage and maintained a private army.

An official French mission to the *almamy* also arrived in the Fouta Djallon in 1880. It was headed by Dr. Bayol who later became the first lieutenant governor of Rivières du Sud. Bayol concluded a treaty of friendship with the *almamy* in 1881 in which the Foulah undertook to respect the rights of French traders and promised to

direct their own caravans to French posts in exchange for the payment of rents. In 1888 a treaty between the *almamy* and Joseph Gallieni, then governor of Senegal, provided for a French protectorate over the Fouta, but did not mention payment of rents.

Many chiefs resented the omission, and, with the death of the *almamy* in 1889, a civil war broke out between the pro-French and anti-French Fouta chiefs, the latter being allied with Samory Touré. The anti-French faction, led by Bokar Biro, was defeated with the assistance of a French military contingent. In 1896 French troops occupied Timbo, the capital of the Fouta Djallon, and a pro-French chief was elected *almamy*.

A new treaty, signed by the *almamy* with the French in 1897, gave France actual sovereignty in the Fouta Djallon. The French acquired the right to set up civil and military posts freely. Local chiefs continued to be elected, but they had to have the approval of French administrators and they ruled with French advice. The treaty established local taxes to the amount of 2 francs per head or 10 francs per household. This head tax was later adopted throughout French West Africa (see ch. 25, Public Finance).

Continuing Foulah resistance was gradually put down. Alfa Yaya, chief of Labé, rose in 1905 but was tricked by French into imprisonment. The Coniagui and Bassari tribes of the northwestern Fouta Djallon were brought under control after a prolonged struggle. In 1911 an anti-French religious movement led by the Wali of Goumba was suppressed. Toward the end of the first decade of the twentieth century the pacification of the Fouta Djallon was essentially completed.

French dominion was established over the western Sudan in the 1880's and 1890's. In 1881 El Hadj Omar's son and successor, Ahmadou, signed a treaty recognizing French sovereignty on the west bank of the upper Niger. Later he tried to regain control in the area but was defeated by Louis Archinard who took Ségou in 1891 and Macina two years later.

The last native state to resist the French was that of Samory Touré. By signing treaties with the French in the 1880's, Samory secured a free hand to expand eastward, but in 1890, in alliance with the Toucouleur Empire and the Kingdom of Sikasso, he decided to expel the French from the Sudan. In the military campaign which followed Samory was driven into the Ivory Coast, and the French outposts at Faranah and Kissidougou date from this period. The conflict was renewed a few years later, but Samory was finally defeated in 1898 in an action which extended French sovereignty over the Ivory Coast.

The forest tribes continued to offer resistance, however; the Toma in N'Zérékoré district were not pacified until 1911.

French rivalry with other Europeans in West Africa was resolved in a series of boundary agreements. The frontier between Rivières du Sud and British Sierra Leone was settled in a Franco-British Treaty of 1889 and in subsequent agreements in 1891 and 1895. By a treaty signed in 1904, Great Britain ceded to the French its possessions in the Iles de Los. The boundary with the Portuguese holdings to the northwest was defined by treaty in 1886. In a Convention held in 1885, the Germans, in exchange for concessions farther south, renounced all claims to the coast between the Rio Nunez and the Mellacorée River. The last boundary settlement was with Liberia—the oldest African republic, established by American ex-slaves in 1847—in a treaty of 1911. Foreign treaties expressly recognized the French protectorate over the Fouta Djallon.

French penetration, conquest and pacification were followed by administrative consolidation. In 1889 the lieutenant governor of Rivières du Sud was authorized to report directly to Paris. In 1889 the administration of Fouta Djallon was transferred from Senegal to Rivières du Sud which, in 1893, was renamed French Guinea (Guinée Française). By the early 1900's, with some additions from the Sudan, Guinea assumed the territorial boundaries which it retains as an independent state.

The French possessions in the western Sudan and on the coast were consolidated in 1895 into one large administrative unit, The AOF. Initially, it included the colonies of Senegal, French Guinea, French Sudan, and Ivory Coast; others were added later. With its administrative center in St. Louis, it was headed by the governor of Senegal, designated concurrently governor general of the AOF. In 1902 the two offices were separated, and the center of administration of the AOF was transferred to Dakar. Until 1904 the constituent colonies retained separate administrative services and fiscal systems, but thereafter their powers were reduced and those of the AOF enlarged (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government; ch. 25, Public Finance).

FRENCH RULE UNTIL WORLD WAR II

Evolution of the French Colonial Policy

French colonial policy oscillated between the assimilation and association concepts. Reflecting the universalist and egalitarian ideas of the French Revolution, the assimilation policy was based on the assumption that all men are equal and thus should be treated alike. It condemned slavery and colonial exploitation. At the same time, the content of its universalism was French and its proponents indirectly asserted the inherent superiority of French culture over all others. In practice the assimilation policy in the colonies meant the

extension there of French language, institutions, laws and ways; it recognized no other bar between Africans and Europeans but that of culture.

The policy of association was rooted in the Napoleonic tradition. It affirmed the position of the French as masters in the colonies and entailed a different system of laws and institutions for the French ruling group and for the African subjects. The Africans were allowed to preserve their own customs in so far as these were compatible with French interests. A native elite, trained in French administrative practice, formed an intermediary group between the French and the people.

A few ventures in the direction of assimilation were made in Senegal, but on the whole the association policy prevailed. The assimilationist belief in the superiority of French culture, however, was embraced by the colonial administrators who saw themselves as the instruments of a civilizing mission and felt that the African subjects should be happy to embrace the free gift of French culture when they had reached the stage to do so.

The colonial administration was based on government by decree and was implemented by governors appointed in Paris who generally adopted an empirical approach characterized by the solution of problems on a day-to-day basis rather than by long-range planning. It was a system of direct, centralized administration which made no provision for the training of Africans for eventual self-government.

The two concepts of colonial policy developed through French history since the Revolution. The First Republic (1791-95) abolished slavery and granted French citizenship to inhabitants of French colonies. Under the Directory (1795-99), however, citizenship rights were curtailed. With the ascendancy of Napoleon (the Consulate [1799-1804] and the First Empire [1804-14]), they were abolished, slavery was reestablished, and a system of special laws for the Africans, administered by French officials, was introduced.

The policy of native subjugation continued under the Bourbon Restoration (1814-30), but the July Monarchy (1830-48) revived egalitarian, universalist ideas. They were without practical effect, however, until the 1848 Revolution established the Second Republic (1848-52); then slavery in the colonies was again abolished and the older colonies, including Senegal, were placed under French laws and administration and were given the right to elect deputies to the legislature of Metropolitan France. French-type communes, with elected mayors and councils (*communes de plein exercice*), were created in Senegal.

The fall of the Second Republic and the establishment of the Second Empire (1852-70) brought a return to the Napoleonic pattern and the beginning of another period of colonial expansion in West

Africa. Under the 1852 Constitution the French Senate legislated for the colonies, but government by administrative decree came into practice and continued until the end of World War II. The parliamentary representation granted to the old colonies in 1848 was suppressed.

With the consolidation of French power in West Africa, French officials assumed more and more direct administrative powers. African chiefs were deposed or reduced to the level of low-ranking appointive officials. There was increasing specialization of function within the French colonial administration which gradually became a career service, centralized under the Ministry of Marine and the Ministry of the Army of Metropolitan France.

In the 1870's there was another revival of egalitarian ideas. The rights granted in 1848 were restored to the old colonies, including the four communes in Senegal (Dakar, St. Louis, Rufisque and Ile de Gorée), but all the other colonies remained under special laws and their inhabitants were treated as subjects.

After the closing decades of the nineteenth century, there was no major alteration in colonial policy up to World War II. The aim of the colonial administration was to integrate the colonies into an imperial system which would bring the greatest benefit and glory to the mother country. Businessmen and bureaucrats developed vested interests in the system and successfully resisted any real liberalization of policies, despite the agitation against colonial exploitation which developed in France in the 1930's.

In general, French public opinion was too preoccupied with domestic affairs to take great interest in colonial matters. These were the special domain of the bureaucracy under the Ministry of Colonies which administered all overseas possessions except Algeria (treated as part of Metropolitan France) and the protectorates of Morocco, Tunisia and the Levant. The only concessions made by bureaucracy to the liberal public opinion were minor reforms which led to administrative decentralization, the establishment of consultative councils on which Africans had a few seats, and grants of French citizenship to a few Africans on an individual basis (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

Colonial Administration and Social Change

After 1894 the French colonies were under the direct administration of the Ministry of the Colonies, assisted by several councils. Of these, the Supreme Council for Overseas France (Conseil Supérieur de la France d'Ostre-Mer) was most important for West Africa. The Supreme Council was composed of the small number of parliamentary deputies from the colonies (including one from Senegal),

delegates elected by French citizens in the colonies, and few representatives of African interests nominated by colonial governors. The administration of French West Africa was in the hands of a governor general. He was assisted by a consultative Council of Government (Conseil de Gouvernement) and by various administrative-functional departments and councils (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

The constituent colonies of the AOF were administered by lieutenant governors, directly subordinate to the governor general, who were assisted by executive councils. The colonial service was composed of career officials, divided into higher ranking colonial administrators and lower ranking colonial agents. No color bar obtained in the lower ranks. The colonies were divided into districts (*cercles*), each under a district commandant (*commandant de cercle*), who held the supreme power in the area. French Guinea had 18 *cercles* in 1938. The *cercle* was sometimes subdivided into smaller units, each headed by an assistant officer. Within a *cercle* the commandant ruled through a hierarchy of African chiefs who were chosen and appointed by him and could be dismissed at will (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

The power of the chiefs derived solely from the French administration. There were three administrative classes of native chiefs: village chiefs, canton chiefs and provincial chiefs. Most chiefs in the two higher categories were appointed by the French administration and were, in effect, only lower functionaries whose duty it was to supervise the collection of taxes, labor and military conscription and the execution of other administrative measures. They were, for the most part, recruited from among the graduates of French schools, notably the School for the Sons of Chiefs and Interpreters founded in St. Louis by General Faidherbe. Usually they started as clerks and interpreters in *cercle* headquarters. The village chiefs, on the other hand, often represented the real native authority in their villages which, unlike the *cercles* created by administrative fiat, were living communities. Some village heads, however, were only "straw chiefs," chosen by the real chiefs and elders to represent the village to the French. The device served as a face-saving one for the real local leader when unpopular French directives had to be accepted (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government; ch. 17, Political Dynamics; ch. 5, Social Structure).

Under the law the inhabitants of the colonies were divided into two groups: French citizens by birth or naturalization and French subjects. French civil and criminal codes were applied by French courts to French citizens, although French citizens who were Moslem could elect to go to Moslem courts in civil cases. Native customary law or Moslem law applied to subjects in civil and criminal matters and was administered by native tribunals presided over by French

administrative officers. The latter also had discretionary powers to apply minor disciplinary penalties known as the *Indigénat*. The *Indigénat* was among major grievances against the French administrators.

Civil and criminal decisions of native tribunals could be appealed to higher courts. For Guinea, there was a Colonial Court of Appeal in Conakry. The highest Supreme Customary Court of Appeal (*Chambre d'Annulation*) was in Dakar (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government; ch. 18, Public Order and Safety).

At each level the executive officer had almost supreme power. Administrative control over his activities was exercised through the sporadic visits of inspectors who reported directly to Paris, but the only real check on his powers was provided by French economic interests. French West Africa was within the French tariff system, and French imports and exports received preferential treatment. Businessmen were organized in powerful associations which enjoyed considerable political influence in France. Because of the climate, however, few of them actually settled in French West Africa. Most of the French and other Europeans living in Guinea were people of working age who came to the colony as officials or merchants and retired to the mother country. They usually left their families at home. In 1938 it was reported that there were 1,697 Europeans in Guinea, of whom only 260 were settlers: the great majority were civil officials, military men or merchants.

Among the strong African grievances against the French administration were military conscription and the use of conscript labor for public works and public services. The Africans also resented certain highhanded methods of French officials and such public insults as face-slapping.

French rule did, however, end the constant warfare of the past, and it established a rudimentary system of transportation and initiated health services and primary education. A substantial number of African children attended French primary schools, many of them run by missionaries, and so were able to become junior clerks, assistant teachers or technicians. Some of them succeeded in going on to the few French secondary schools in West Africa, of which l'Ecole Normale William Ponty in Dakar was the best known. It is mainly from their ranks that the *évolués* emerged.

The French initiated economic and social changes which gradually transformed West Africa. The process was most rapid in the towns which became centers of attraction for the new French-educated Africans. In Guinea change was accelerated by the introduction of such commercial crops as bananas. In a reversal of the pre-European pattern, the interior lagged behind the coastal areas. The colonial administrative system destroyed the traditional structure of authority.

The new African elite adopted European knowledge and values, and its status rested on the degree of its French education and culture. Having in effect culturally become Frenchmen, however, its members were frustrated by the absence of outlets for their abilities in the rigidly stratified colonial order.

In the 1930's some of the educated Africans began to form professional associations. Many, especially among teachers, were influenced by the socialist ideas disseminated by some of the French in the colony. Student clubs and associations of alumni of the few secondary schools were also formed, and, although officially nonpolitical, they were deeply concerned with political issues. It was in such associations that the *évolués* gained their first organizational experience (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

The Impact of World War II

With the outbreak of World War II, the fall of France and the creation of the German-allied Vichy government in France, the French colonies were faced with the problem of declaring their loyalty to Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, who headed the Vichy regime, or of choosing the Free French under General Charles de Gaulle with headquarters in London. Pierre Boisson, governor general of the AOF, remained personally loyal to Pétain, and all of his subordinate lieutenant governors, including Giacobbi in Guinea, followed suit. The colonies of the AEF, under the influence of Félix Éboué (a negro governor of the Chad colony who, in 1941, became governor general of the AEF), favored the Free French and by November 1940 had declared their loyalty to General de Gaulle.

Under Vichy the AOF was subjected to German-inspired policies of economic exploitation and racism. In Guinea the people particularly resented being forced to collect the wild rubber required by the Germans and suffered under racial discrimination in the hands of Vichy French administrators.

After the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942, Governor General Boisson, on the orders of Admiral François Darlan, came over to the Allied side, declaring on November 25, the allegiance of the AOF to the French Provisional Government in Algiers. A French consultative assembly was called by the government to Algiers in early 1943 and convened in an atmosphere of reform.

The war contributed to the growth of African nationalism. In West Africa especially the resentment engendered by Vichy policies increasingly sought political outlets. Positive hopes for greater autonomy were awakened by President Franklin D. Roosevelt's sympathy for North African nationalism, voiced by him to the Sultan of Morocco at the time of the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.

An African separatist movement began to develop in the French colonies south of the Sahara. Negro intellectuals became increasingly preoccupied with African culture in a strong reaction to the French assimilation policy. They also came increasingly under the influence of Marxist ideas which had active proponents in the anti-Nazi movement and among French teachers and labor organizers in Africa. In 1943 branches of an organization known as Communist Study Groups (Groupes d'Etudes Communistes) were established in the principal cities of West Africa, including Conakry. In these groups, native intellectuals discussed African problems in communist terms. Many of the participants were to become prominent as postwar nationalist leaders.

In early 1944 René Plevin, Commissioner of Colonies, called a conference of governors of French Black Africa to Brazzaville. The Brazzaville Conference considered a program of reform. Far-reaching political, social and economic recommendations were made, but in overall character they were a compromise between the old assimilationists and the new federalist points of view. It was proposed that colonies send representatives to the French constituent assembly when it convened after the war and that they be granted political representation in a future federal assembly. No express provisions were made for an African franchise, but it was recommended that each colony should have a consultative assembly composed of the Europeans and Africans. Decentralization was envisaged in the postwar administrative structure. The Conference recommended industrialization and liberalization of tariffs and customs.

Inspired by Governor Félix Éboué, the Conference made a number of social recommendations: that local customs be respected and safeguarded; that the Indigénat be abolished and a new penal code adopted; that health and education facilities be improved; and that labor conscription be ended. It also proposed that colonial administration be opened to Africans.

The Brazzaville Conference signaled the beginning of a new era in colonial policy, but it had little immediate effect, except for the passage of a law in August 1944 granting labor in the AOF the right to organize.

The Reforms: 1945-58

In September 1945 the French Provisional Government convoked the Constituent Assembly in Paris. Of the 600 delegates, 63 European and African delegates represented the colonies. The Africans, most of them members of the French-educated elite, played an active role in the Assembly. Out of the debates came a reevaluation of colonial policy and a draft plan for the union of France and the former

colonies. Other decisions abolished the *Indigénat* and forced labor and approved funds for economic and social development. A new penal code for the AOF was adopted in April 1946. In May the Lamine Guèye Law (named for an African socialist deputy from Senegal) extended French citizenship to all the inhabitants of the French colonies. It failed to define closely the new rights of citizenship, however, with the result that inhabitants of the colonies were not admitted to the full exercise of civil rights on the ground that they were not yet ready for it.

A draft constitution prepared by the First Constituent Assembly, however, was rejected in a popular referendum, and the Second Constituent Assembly met in Paris in June 1946. Differences of opinion, evident in the First Assembly, sharpened. The advocates of colonial autonomy included all the colonial deputies and the French political Left. They favored political autonomy for the colonies within the framework of Metropolitan France in a strong revival of assimilationist ideas. The extremists among them, including deputies from North Africa and Madagascar, demanded political independence while the deputies from Black Africa, including the socialist Diallo Yacine from Guinea, supported the idea of local self-government and the political equality of Frenchmen and the colonial people. On the other hand, white colonial interests and the French political Right and Center inclined toward a nominally federalist system, within which France would preserve its dominant position.

A compromise was finally reached, and the plan for the French Union was written into a new draft constitution which was adopted by the Assembly on September 28, 1946 by a vote of 440 to 106. All deputies from French Black Africa voted for it, and it was approved as the Constitution of the Fourth Republic in a referendum held throughout France and the overseas possessions on October 13, 1946. In Guinea the percentage of votes for the Constitution was high.

The preamble of the Constitution stated that the French Union was founded on equality of rights and duties without prejudice with respect to race or religion and that it was France's role to lead the peoples of the Union towards democratic self-government. Overseas possessions were divided into several juridical categories. The Overseas Departments were administratively organized on the pattern of departments of Metropolitan France and were legally a part of it. The former colonies of French West Africa were designated Overseas Territories (*Territoires d'Outre-Mer*) and were considered parts of the French Republic. As such, they were entitled to send deputies to the French National Assembly, but their administrative organization differed from that of the departments. Other units of the French Union were Associated Territories and Associated States; they were

juridically members of the French Union, but were not a part of the French Republic.

As parts of the French Republic, the Overseas Territories remained under direct French colonial administration, even though local inhabitants were granted the right to elect representatives (by limited suffrage and separate European and African electoral colleges) to: advisory assemblies in each territory and the AOF; the French National Assembly; and the Assembly of the French Union (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

The president of the French Republic was president *ex officio* of the French Union, the organs of which were the High Council and the Assembly. In practice, as before, Metropolitan France dominated. The French government exercised all legislative and executive powers, and the administration of the overseas possessions continued on a centralized pattern. Despite its federal trappings, it was a unitary and, in many respects, a strongly assimilationist system. Laws, administration, citizenship, and the educational system were all French, and the basic premise of economic planning was full integration of colonial economy with that of France. The first steps toward political autonomy were taken, however, by: giving some administrative and financial powers to the elective General Council (*Conseil Général*) in each territory (known as the Territorial Assembly [*Assemblée Territoriale*] after 1952); by granting limited suffrage; and by removing the ban on political association (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

The French Union provided the environment and impetus for the growth of political consciousness and political organization in the former colonies, while its failure to give real power to local representatives produced political frustration and discontent. After 1946 African nationalist sentiment grew rapidly and demands for concessions became ever more pressing. Before 1946 African leaders were asking only for more political representation, professing loyalty to France: in the late 1940's and early 1950's they were demanding autonomy; in the late 1950's they were calling for independence.

The French government gradually granted more political concessions. The second Lamine Guèye Law of 1950 admitted Africans to all high civil service positions on equal terms with Europeans. In 1952 a new Labor Code, patterned on the code in force in Metropolitan France, was adopted in the AOF.

The beginning of the end of the French rule in West Africa came with the passage of the so-called *Loi Cadre* in June 1956 and its enabling legislation in the spring of 1957. It granted universal suffrage and a single electoral roll and gave broad legislative powers to the Territorial Assemblies, while enumerating the powers reserved to the French government. The French governor remained the nom-

inal head of each territorial government, but he was assisted by an African Cabinet, known as the Government Council (Conseil de Gouvernement) chosen by the Territorial Assembly. Each Council had an African vice-president, and, for all practical purposes, he began to assume the prestige and functions of a prime minister. He was invariably the leader of the majority party in the Territorial Assembly. The Loi Cadre made no provision for an African executive body at the level of the AOF—which soon lost almost all real administrative significance (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

In June 1958 General de Gaulle came to power in France, and, in the draft constitution of the Fifth Republic, the French Union was replaced by a new type of association between France and its overseas possessions, the French Community (Communauté Française). The draft envisaged free association between France and its former colonies, with the former serving as senior partner.

The federal powers to the French Community—foreign affairs, defense, and basic policies on economy, finance, strategic raw materials and higher education—were clearly delineated. Its organs, under an elected president (who was also the president of the French Republic) were: an Executive Council (composed of the president, the prime ministers of member states and the French ministers concerned with Community affairs); a Senate (with membership elected indirectly by each member state in proportion to the population); and a Court of Arbitration. In a general referendum of September 28, 1958, the draft constitution was submitted to Metropolitan France and all overseas components of the French Union, which were given free choice to accept or to reject it. Rejection meant immediate and complete independence.

Guinea was the only territory of the French Union to vote "no" in the referendum. The "no" vote was made possible by the rapid growth of nationalist feeling in Guinea in the 1950's combined with the attainment of political ascendancy there by the Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti Démocratique de Guinée—PDG). It was the result of the decision made by the Party's leadership dominated by Sékou Touré. Touré himself was influenced by a number of considerations, not the least important of which were his personal ambition to be a leader of an independent federated West Africa and his personal rivalry with other African leaders who took a strong pro-Community attitude.

Among other factors influencing Party leadership were: a strong emotional conviction that France would never recognize an African state, especially a former colony, as an equal; a strong revulsion against a continued dependence on France; and a hope that foreign economic and political assistance would be forthcoming once a break with France had become a *fait accompli*. Their decision was also

prompted by a conviction that it would not be possible for an African state to be independent and yet remain in the French Community. Ironically, independence was granted to the African states within the Community on June 4, 1960, but this constitutional change could hardly have occurred had it not been for the impetus given to the independence movement in West Africa by Guinea's action in September 1958.

The Growth of Nationalism: 1945-58

Nationalist political organizations did not exist in French West Africa before World War II, but sprang up and developed rapidly under the impact of the changes brought about by the war. Initially ethnic and regional in character, they soon broadened. Three basic types of political parties emerged—the *patron* (boss) parties, the socialist parties and the nationalist parties. Only the nationalist parties were able to unite across territorial boundaries, and this they did in the powerful African Democratic Rally (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain—RDA), which dominated the political life of the French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa in the 1950's.

The *patron* parties were composed of local notables who cooperated with the French administrators. They were important in the individual territories in the late 1940's, but their lack of popular support and their record of subservience to the French sent them into a decisive decline upon the extension of suffrage in the area.

The socialist parties were dominated by members of the intellectual elite educated in the 1930's, a group which had close ties with French socialists and acted in unison with them. The African socialists commanded support among native intellectuals, the middle class and the better educated workers. Because of their French orientation, however, they were unable to win the support of the common people, who followed the more radical, African-oriented, nationalist leaders. It was this group, for a time closely associated with the French Communists, which was to dominate the African political scene. Most of its members received their political training in the Communist Study Groups and in the labor movement. They were, by and large, younger, less educated and less French in their outlook than the Socialist leaders.

Four major political groupings, formed on ethnic-regional lines, emerged in Guinea in 1945. Tribal differentiation provided the only familiar framework, even though tribal differences had lost much of their traditional significance under French rule. The four groups were: the Comité de la Basse Guinée of Lower Guinea; the Amicale Gilbert Vieillard of the Fouta Djallon; the Union de Mandé of Upper Guinea; and the Union Forestière of the Forest Region. There was,

in addition, a plethora of smaller organizations, such as the Union of the Senegalese, the Union of the Toucouleur and others (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

Postwar political conditions favored unified political action, not only at the territorial level, but in all of French Black Africa. Most of the new nationalist leaders met in Bamako in October 1946 to discuss a common program. The RDA was established and shortly had branches in all the constituent territories of the AOF and in parts of the AEF. The socialists, however, led by such well-known figures as Lamine Guèye of Senegal and Diallo Yacine of Guinea, refused to join the new movement. The rift with the socialists brought the RDA into close cooperation with the French Communist Party in the French National Assembly.

In internal matters the program of the RDA was egalitarian. It denounced the tribal distinctions and social ranking of the traditional society and also the inferior position of women. In Franco-African relations it rejected the policy of assimilation as utopian and hypocritical, stressing that the African cultures were different from, but in no way inferior to, French culture. The program demanded free and equal association between African territories and Metropolitan France. Holding an ideal of African unity, it favored unification of the territories into two federated entities identical with the AOF and the AEF.

The Guinean parties sent 11 delegates to Bamako. Each represented a different group, and they were unable for some time to establish a unified branch of the RDA. Formal unity was achieved with the establishment in May 1947 of the Guinean section of the RDA, called the Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti Démocratique de Guinée—PDG—RDA), but within this organization internal divisions on ethnic-regional lines were initially strong. Only a minority in the leadership clung to the Bamako platform, and they were subjected to persecution by the French administration.

In the beginning, PDG—RDA strength in Guinea was negligible. The organization faced government hostility and the competition of other parties, of which the most important were the Socialists and a *patron* party, the Bloc Africain de Guinée (Guinea African Bloc—BAG). In the first elections under the French Union, the PDG—RDA elected only 2 out of 50 deputies to the General Council. Undaunted, the PDG—RDA which increasingly came under the direction of young labor union leaders led by Sékou Touré, concentrated on building mass support. It aimed its appeals at the underprivileged and dissatisfied—peasants, workers, women and youth. The growth of the PDG—RDA coincided closely with that of the labor movement (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

The buildup of mass support and the extension of the franchise under the Loi Cadre favored the PDG-RDA. The best indication of the speed of its growth and the effectiveness of its organization and techniques is the number of deputies it elected to the Territorial Assembly after the passage of the Loi Cadre—58 out of 60. The PDG-RDA leaders obtained the two chief posts in the government of Guinea; Sékou Touré became the African vice-president of the Government Council (the Cabinet) and Saifoulaye Diallo, his second in command, the president of the Territorial Assembly.

The local strength of the PDG-RDA was based in its network of village party committees which undermined and gradually superseded the power of both the French-nominated chiefs and the few remaining traditional chiefs. The work of the committees was facilitated, after PDG-RDA electoral victory, when the new government curtailed the power of the chiefs. Village councils and *cercle* councils were elected for the first time in May 1958, giving the people their first taste of active participation in political life. In the overwhelming majority of cases the councils were dominated by the PDG-RDA (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

The PDG-RDA grew in prestige in the African scene outside of Guinea and in the councils of the RDA. PDG leaders were active in the African labor movement, and Sékou Touré was one of the founders of the General Union of Workers of Black Africa (Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire—UGTAN). The African labor movement began under the tutelage of the Communist-dominated French General Confederation of Labor (Confédération Générale de Travail—CGT), but its leaders broke with the Communists shortly after the RDA ended its parliamentary alliance with French Communist Party in 1950 and rejected Communist dictation in their drive towards realization of African goals. They retained, however, their Marxist concepts and organizational techniques (see ch. 13, Labor Relations and Organization; ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

French concessions and the speed of African evolution toward self-government precipitated a crisis in the RDA in 1957. The more conservative leaders, like Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, favored allegiance to France and a federal union between individual territories and France of the type which was eventually realized in the French Community. Younger leaders, and particularly those of the Guinea and the Sudan sections within the RDA, demanded autonomy and the unification of African states into large federal entities which would give them a more equal relationship with France. Bitter rivalry developed between Houphouët-Boigny and Touré. These differences were not resolved at the third RDA Congress in Bamako in September 1957, which took an ambiguous position on

what form the ties with France should take and, thus, left open the way for each territorial branch to decide for itself.

The PDG formulated its future policy at its fourth party congress in Conakry in June 1958, when General de Gaulle's access to power in France made it certain that changes would be made in the French Union system. The congress envisaged the AOF as a federated state with an elective legislative assembly and an executive organ which would take over the powers then exercised by the Ministry of Overseas France. It proposed a French-African Community to consist of Metropolitan France and three large African units—the AOF, the AEF, and Madagascar—all four to be united on the basis of complete equality and with full internal sovereignty. The powers of the Community were to be limited to finances, defense, foreign relations and higher education. The federal authorities of the Community were to consist of a parliament and a cabinet.

General de Gaulle's Community project came under the immediate criticism by the PDG. The major objections were that it failed to give African states full equality with France and that the proposed union of small, weak African units with a powerful France would contribute to the "Balkanization" of Africa. Other criticisms were directed at the absence of any federal legislative body and the combining of the offices of the presidency of France and the presidency of the Community.

The vigorous presentation of the Community project by General de Gaulle, together with the personal support of Houphouët-Boigny, persuaded most of the African political leaders that it would be to their advantage to accept the Community project, even though many were sympathetic to the position of Touré. In Guinea the debate and discussions preceding the September referendum were increasingly dominated by emotional factors which gradually came to outweigh all other considerations. The most important point in the minds of the PDG leaders and their followers, was that France was refusing to acknowledge the existence of the "African personality" and its equal worth with the "French personality."

The French, on the other hand, refused to make any changes to accommodate the Guinean point of view. At the time of General de Gaulle's visit in Conakry in August 1958, the respective French and Guinean positions were: "If you don't like the Community you can leave" and "Secession is being forced on us by refusal to recognize our just demands." In the campaign preceding the referendum, the PDG rallying cry was "We prefer to be poor in freedom than to be rich in slavery." The determination of the PDG leaders to drive toward immediate independence may also have been bolstered by their confidence that Guinea's rich bauxite and iron deposits would make an independ-

ent economy viable and by their hope of assistance from other African countries, the Communist bloc, and possibly the United States.

On September 28, 1958, when Guineans went to the polls, 95 percent of them voted for the PDG position and rejected the Community project. On October 2, 1958, independence was formally proclaimed by the Territorial Assembly, and the country was named the Republic of Guinea (République de Guinée). The Assembly transformed itself into a National Sovereign Constituent Assembly, the Government Council resigned, and Sékou Touré, as leader of the majority party, assumed the task of forming a new government.

CHAPTER 3

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

Guinea is situated on the southwestern edge of the great bulge of West Africa between 7 and 12 degrees north of the equator. With an area of approximately 94,900 square miles—almost the size of Wyoming—the country describes a thick arc east and southward from the coast. Within the curve of its southwestern boundary lies Sierra Leone and the northern part of Liberia, the oldest republic in Africa (see fig. 1).

Guinea's outer perimeter, beginning in the north, touches on Portuguese Guinea. Following to the east and south are Senegal, Mali and Ivory Coast, all three formerly important French West African colonies (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). The maximum distance from west to east across the country, from the Atlantic coast to Mali, is approximately 450 miles. The greatest north-south distance, from Mali to Liberia, is about 350 miles. At its narrowest, between Mali and Sierra Leone, the central arc is only 150 miles wide.

At only a few points do natural terrain features coincide with Guinea's 2,000 miles of land frontier. Over most of its length, the boundary was determined by administrative considerations within the territory of former French West Africa or by diplomatic agreement between France and other powers (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). These artificial boundaries have little meaning for the tribal and local groups through whose territories they were drawn, particularly in the many areas remote from the centers of administration (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

The coast, measured in a straight line, is 170 miles long, indented at many places by wide estuaries with low, muddy banks backed by dense mangrove swamps. Rocky spurs jut out at only two points—at Conakry, the capital city, which is built on an island extension of the spur, and at Cap Verga, about 50 miles to the north. Short stretches of fine-sand beaches flank Cap Verga, but they are unstable and may be washed away or covered with debris by the action of storm winds and waves.

Many swampy islands in the mouths of the estuaries and just off the coast give much of the shoreline the appearance of an extensive delta. Old inhabitants recall that this dense tropical vegetation once

provided concealment for freebooters preying on coastal shipping and for the security patrols operating against them. The tidal range is considerable—as much as 17 feet in some places during the equinoxes. Tides are noticeable in some coastal rivers for a distance of 25 miles inland. The heavy outflow of the rivers during the wet season is loaded with yellow sediment which colors the coastal waters and builds up the mud deposits supporting the mangroves on the shoreline.

The dominant feature of the country's terrain is a mountainous plateau, extending southeastward from Senegal and Mali on the north into Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ivory Coast on the south. The rugged northern portion of this plateau, with heights up to 5,000 feet above sea level, is known as the Fouta Djallon; its southern extension, unnamed in some texts, is designated as the Guinea Highlands in others. The Monts Nimba attain an elevation of 6,070 feet where Guinea, Liberia, and Ivory Coast meet (see fig. 5).


Other noteworthy land features are the narrow coastal strip with its steaming tropical swamps; the rolling savanna tablelands, which average about 1,200 feet in elevation and extend eastward from the Fouta Djallon and the adjacent Guinea Highlands; and the region of dense tropical forests in the southern Guinea Highlands.

The climate ranges from tropical to subtropical with alternating wet and dry seasons, high summer temperatures and year-around high daytime humidity. Heavy rainfall—in some years more than 200 inches in the Conakry area—and sustained heat are characteristic of the coastal lowlands and the forested area of the southern interior. The climate of the plateau resembles that on the eastern Gulf coast of the United States.

The heavy rainfall feeds the many rivers which flow down from the interior plateau through deep gorges and over numerous waterfalls. Rivers are a major factor in the country's economic life. Their flood plains produce a large proportion of the total crop yield.


Some are navigable, and in 1961, one was being exploited for hydroelectric power. Those which flow down the western side of the uplands to the Atlantic are short and, during the wet season, torrential. The most important rivers in this area are the Rio Nunez, the Kogon, the Fataha and the Koukouré. The more extensive eastern watershed drains into the upper reaches of West Africa's longest and most important river systems—the Niger, Senegal and Gambie (Gambia).

The population is estimated at approximately 2,800,000, with an annual rate of growth of about 2.5 percent. No complete census has ever been made. The number of non-African residents, mostly French, is reported to be 2,000 or less. More than 5,000 French nationals left the country soon after the country voted for independence.



Source: Adapted from Guid' A. O. F., *L'Afrique Occidentale Française et le Togo*, 1958-1959, pp. 28

Figure 5. Major Topographical Features and Wildlife



L'Afrique Occidentale Française et le Togo, 1958-1959, pp. 287-334; and R. J. Harrison Church, *West Africa*, pp. 281-289.

Figure 5. Major Topographical Features and Wild Animals of Guinea, 1960

The population comprises about 16 tribal groups. One of them, the Foulah, numbers over 1 million persons and makes up almost 40 percent of the total population. They were a cattle-raising people who first entered Guinea from the northeast in the fifteenth century as migratory pastoralists; other groups came in the seventeenth century as conquerors. Less negroid in appearance than the earlier inhabitants, they are thought to represent a mixture of Negro and North African physical types. Settling in the Fouta Djallon area, they quickly dominated the inhabitants. Freely intermarrying with the local people, they became agriculturists as well as cattle-raisers. Militant Moslems, by the eighteenth century they had spread Islam widely in the area (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Other tribal groups include some 525,000 Malinké, mainly farmers and traders who inhabit the upper Niger region; about 220,000 Soussou, who engage in agriculture and commerce along the coast; 160,000 Kissi and 145,000 Gnerzé, who are agriculturists and food-gatherers in the forest area of the Guinea Highlands. Other smaller groups are scattered throughout the country (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

At least 90 percent of the people live in rural areas or in towns of less than 5,000 inhabitants. The most densely settled areas are in the fertile sections of the Fouta Djallon plateau which have more than one-third of the country's population and approximately 25 percent of the total land area. The lowest population density is found in the relatively dry savanna region east of the Fouta Djallon and northeast of the Guinea Highlands, where one-fourth of the country's population lives on almost 40 percent of its area. Some densely settled districts, however, are found along the fertile banks of the Niger and its principal tributaries in this region.

MAJOR GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS

Guineans, when writing or speaking of the geography of the country, commonly distinguish four main regions: Lower Guinea or the coastal zone; Middle Guinea or the Fouta Djallon area; Upper Guinea or the savannas; and the Forest Region or Southern Guinea (see fig. 1). Some Guinean official publications list the districts within each region, and apparently some consideration has been given to the eventual organization of the national administration on regional lines.

Lower Guinea (Coastal Zone)

This generally flat and wooded coastal zone extends inland to the escarpments of the Fouta Djallon. About 60 miles wide in the north and 100 miles wide in the south, it contracts to a width of less than

30 miles in the center. It is crossed by numerous rivers which, after they plunge off the plateau, meander across the flat land into wide and deep estuaries on the Atlantic or lose themselves in brackish coastal swamps which, in the north, may extend inland for a distance of 20 miles. The coastal plain usually becomes flooded during the wet season (see fig. 1).

Middle Guinea (Fouta Djallon)

The Fouta Djallon rises abruptly from the coastal plain in a series of steep ascents, some of which are several hundred feet high. On the east, the ground slopes gradually toward the rolling tablelands of Mali and the upper Niger Valley. This funnel-shaped region, most of which is more than 1,500 feet above sea level, covers approximately 24,400 square miles or about one-fourth of Guinea's total area. The central portion of the Fouta Djallon is a rectangular plateau about 150 miles long from north to south and 60 miles wide. It averages more than 3,000 feet above sea level and rises to heights of nearly 5,000 feet in the north and the south. The northern boundary of the region is contiguous with the boundaries of Portuguese Guinea, Senegal and Mali for more than 320 miles; the southern boundary, where major ridges extend into Sierra Leone, is less than 40 miles in extent.

The Fouta Djallon is broken in many places by granite outcroppings called tors. Some of these detached, dome-topped hills are 2,000 feet high. The plateau is gashed in many places by narrow forested valleys, and the streams which run down its sides are picturesque with rapids, waterfalls and deep gorges.

West Africa's largest rivers rise in the Fouta Djallon. On the northern slopes are the headwaters of the Corubal River of Portuguese Guinea and those of the Gambie (Gambia) and Senegal Rivers. Rainfall draining off the eastern slopes feeds the Niger. In the south are the sources of the Kaba (Little Searcies) and the Kolenté (Great Searcies) which flow into Sierra Leone. The western slopes supply the Konkouré and other rivers flowing to the Atlantic coast.

The inhabitants of the Fouta Djallon are mostly Foulah, who combine cultivation with their traditional occupation of cattle raising. They pasture their cattle in the uplands during the rainy season and bring them down to the cultivated valleys in the dry season.

Soils are generally poor in the northwest, particularly toward the boundary with Portuguese Guinea. Many upland areas also suffer from excessive pasturing and from leaching caused by the common practice of brush burning during the dry season to permit the growth of pasturage during the wet season.

Upper Guinea (The Savannas)

Upper Guinea, with its extensive grassy plains or savannas, lies east of the Fouta Djallon. Rocky spurs from the plateau extend over 100 miles into the area along the Mali boundary in the north and at one point farther south. In the southwest, along the Sierra Leone boundary, the savanna is interrupted by the Guinea Highlands. The entire region covers approximately 37,300 square miles or almost 40 percent of the total area of the country.

Sometimes called the Niger Plain, the country east of the foothills of the Fouta Djallon is gently rolling, open terrain. Deciduous trees grow along the streams and in occasional clumps between them. Granite tors, smaller than those in the Fouta Djallon, here and there break the surface of the plain.

The Forest Region

South of the Niger Plain is the Forest Region, an area of approximately 19,000 square miles wedged between Ivory Coast on the east and Liberia and Sierra Leone on the south and west. It is traversed from the northwest to the southeast by the Guinea Highlands. Most of the region is 1,500 feet or more above sea level, and the Monts Nimba on the Liberian frontier rise to more than 6,000 feet. The Highlands consist of a series of dome-shaped hills, some with rather steep slopes. Most of the area below an altitude of 2,000 feet is covered with dense rain forest, which extends into Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The higher land is, for the most part, more lightly forested and some detached hills have crests of bare rock. Large portions of the rain forest are almost uninhabited.

RIVERS

Unlike neighboring countries, Guinea is not crossed throughout its length or breadth by a river system flowing in one direction. Few of its rivers flowing down either side of the interior highlands are navigable for more than short distances. Flooded during the rains and blocked by sandbars in the dry season, they are mainly useful as carriers of the water and sediment which support the lush vegetation and crops of the lowland and as potential sources of electric power (see ch. 24, Industrial Potential).

The most important river is the Niger. The fan-shaped drainage system of its upper reaches on the eastern watershed comprehends approximately two-thirds of the country's total area. The Niger's flood plains, in the savannas are assuming increasing agricultural importance. From July to November, river steamers ply between the rapids at Kouroussa at the base of the Fouta Djallon to Bamako

in Mali, a distance of approximately 225 miles. About 125 miles of this distance is within Guinea (see fig. 1).

From July to November, shallow-draft boats can operate for about 50 miles up the Milo, the largest southern tributary of the Niger, as far as the rail terminus at Kankan. During the dry season, traffic is limited to barges which are poled or sailed. Elsewhere in the Niger basin within Guinea, river traffic is made up of canoes and poled barges.

Small steamers and sailing craft can ascend the larger coastal rivers for varying distances during periods of high water. The most important coastal river for navigation is the Rio Nunez which flows into a wide estuary near the border with Portuguese Guinea. Ships drawing up to 19 feet can go to Victoria, some 20 miles from the coast at the head of the estuary. Except during the dry season, vessels with a draft of 7 feet are usually able to proceed 25 miles beyond to Boké, potentially a major bauxite-processing center (see ch. 24, Industrial Potential).

The Rio Pongo Estuary, about 50 miles to the southeast of the Rio Nunez Estuary, can accommodate, at high tide, vessels with a draft of 16 feet—but only as far as Boffa. A narrow, winding channel, sometimes obstructed by shifting sandbars, leads about 10 miles through mangrove swamps to this port which is on the edge of the firm ground. The sheltered port area is also a suitable anchorage for amphibious planes. The Mellacorée, near the boundary with Sierra Leone, is navigable for medium-tonnage vessels for about the same distance to Benty, the banana and pineapple port at the head of the estuary.

CLIMATE

A wet season from May through October is followed by a dry one from December through March in the monsoonal cycle characteristic of the West African coastal zone from Portuguese Guinea to Nigeria. April, May, and November are climatically transitional months which, in different years, may be wet or dry. Temperatures and humidity are relatively high throughout the year except in the plateau areas and in the savannas where humidity drops perceptibly during the dry season.

The rains are brought in from the ocean by the saturated southwesterly monsoons which, after breaking against the interior ridges, carry considerably less moisture for deposit on the leeward slopes. During the dry months of January, February, and March, the dusty Sahara desert winds, called the *harmattans*, blow toward the southwest across the Sudanese plains and the savannas of the Upper Guinea area to the coast. The sun is obscured throughout much of the year—in the wet season by clouds and in the dry season by dust or the haze

of smoke from brush fires. Dense morning fogs are common in all seasons during calm weather.

Each of the geographical regions has peculiarities of climate. Lower Guinea has the highest mean average rainfall and the least annual variation in temperature. The heaviest rainfall recorded in West Africa occurs rather consistently in Conakry in Lower Guinea where the mean average over a 10-year period is approximately 170 inches and in some years has exceeded 200 inches. About 70 percent of the total falls during July, August and September. Except for the Forest Region, Lower Guinea also has the highest mean relative humidity. Heat and humidity are especially high a few miles inland away from the sea breezes. The five months of the dry season, from December through April, have a monthly average of less than a half inch of rain, but are only a little less hot and humid (see fig. 6).

In Middle Guinea the rainfall—about 75 inches annually—is more evenly distributed throughout the year than in the coastal zone. Moreover, temperature readings are lower and the range of humidity percentages is wider. From November through March, daily temperatures may range between 54° and 94° F., with the mean relative humidity varying from 93 percent in the morning to 29 percent in the evening. In July and August daytime temperatures, lowered by the rains, do not often exceed 80° F. At night they may drop to 65° F. Humidity fluctuates between 95 percent in the morning and 84 percent in the evening.

Climate in Upper Guinea is strongly influenced, from November to March, by the dusty *harmattans*. Temperatures may vary from 104° F. at midday to 55° F. at night; the relative humidity, from 94 percent in the morning to 37 percent in the evening. Heavy rainstorms may occur in any month of the year, but most of the yearly average of 66 inches falls during the June through September period.

The Forest Region has a higher mean relative humidity than any other area. The contrast between wet and dry seasons is less than elsewhere and rainfall, exceeded only in the coastal zone, is more evenly distributed throughout the year. Only one month, January, averages less than one inch of rain.

SOILS, MINERALS AND ANIMAL LIFE

Soils

Soils vary considerably in fertility, depending mainly upon the amount of organic matter they contain in the form of humus or alluvial loam. Large areas in the country are covered with a subsoil of red or reddish-yellow laterite clay, the product of weathered rocks. Chemically, laterite is a residue of iron and aluminum hydroxides left after rains have washed the lime and magnesia, and most of the silica,




Figure 6. Mean Maximum Temperatures and Mean Rainfall of Conakry and Kouroussa in Guinea and of Miami, Florida.

out of the basic rocks. Laterite can be made suitable for crops only in its loose and unencrusted form which, when mixed with humus, provides assimilable nourishment and is easy to till. As much as two-thirds of the soils under cultivation in Guinea would be used for forest or pasture land in Europe or in the United States (see ch. 6, Family; ch. 23, Agricultural Potential).

In the coastal zone, soils are composed mostly of sandstone gravels washed down from the highlands over a granitic bedrock and covered with lateritic material. This land tends to become waterlogged during the wet season. In some reclamation projects along the coast, cleared swamps appeared to be free of salt water but were found to be too alkaline for rice growing.

In the Fouta Djallon, the sandstone bedrock in many areas on the level plateaus is covered with a compact lateritic crust, locally called *bowal* (no trees). The soil, however, produces pasturage of a sort during the wet season. Soil conservation is a particularly serious problem on the plateaus as the lateritic crust makes for rapid run-off of rain water, which cuts deep gullies and washes the soil down to lower levels. In places where the crust is loosened by cultivation, the soil, even if retained, tends to be leached of its plant nutrients.

In the Guinea Highlands the lateritic covering disappears and the ground consists of decomposed granites, gneisses, quartzites and schists which provide the basis for a fairly rich soil. The luxuriant vegetation there, however, is the result of high temperatures and abundant rainfall rather than soil fertility. Dead leaves, which might produce a layer of humus, are consumed by insects or fungus growths almost immediately after they fall to the ground.

The savannas of Upper Guinea have the same type of rocks as the Guinea Highlands, but the lateritic soil reappears. In most places humus is lacking and cultivation is hampered by the prolonged dry season, from October to May, when the ground becomes cracked and parched and grass fires are common. At the beginning of the wet season, tall grasses and rich tree foliage quickly appear. The soil in the Niger flood plain, with its high content of alluvial loam, has exceptionally high fertility.

Minerals

Mineral resources are limited in variety, but a few items are found in large quantities. Important deposits of bauxite and iron ores are being worked and constitute a major source of national income. Other known deposits await development (see ch. 24, Industrial Potential).

In addition to the sites being worked on the Iles de Los near Conakry and at the new town of Kimbo near the village of Fria on the Konkouré River, there are important bauxite deposits near Kindia, about 80 miles northeast of Conakry, and in the vicinity of Boké and Gaoutal

in northwestern Guinea. Other strata have been found on the eastern side of the Fouta Djallon—near Dabola and Tougué and at a point near the Mali frontier (see ch. 24, Industrial Potential).

Iron ore, like bauxite, is found in several places, but only the deposit on the Kaloum Peninsula in the vicinity of Conakry is being worked. Three other deposits are west of the Fouta Djallon—one in the south near Forécariah and two in the north near Boké and Gaoual. One deposit is in the Fouta Djallon southeast of Téli-mélé; several others are in the Forest Region, near Beyla and on the northern slopes of the Monts Nimba southeast of N'Zérékoré.

Diamonds were first mined near Macenta in 1935. The principal finds are near Kissidougou, but diamond-bearing gravels are found at various places within the rectangular area outlined by Kissidougou, Kéromané, Beyla and Macenta. Initially most of the stones obtained were of the industrial type but, since the late 1950's, excellent gem stones have been found in increasing numbers.

Gold is present in some of the quartz veins and in the gravels of stream beds in the Niger Valley, especially around Siguiri (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 24, Industrial Potential). Prospecting (up the Tinkisso River and in smaller Niger tributaries west of Siguiri) has met with some success at Dinguiraye and near Kouroussa. Small traces of gold have been found south of the Niger near Kankan and in the Forest Region near N'Zérékoré.

Animal Life

Human encroachment is diminishing the varied wild animal life. In many areas hunting is the principal source of meat, and older villagers say that, with the expansion of cultivated areas, some species have disappeared almost entirely from certain localities. The decrease in animal population is also ascribed to epidemics of pulmonary diseases, to which bovines are particularly susceptible. Major inroads have also been made by professional hunters using modern firearms to collect trophies or commercial products such as ivory, hides and furs.

Elephants, estimated to total about 1,000 head, herd near the rivers in various parts of the country. The principal groups are found along the Kogon River north and east of Boké, along the Konkouré west of Dalaba, along the Kolenté south of Kindia, along the upper Niger and its tributaries west of Kankan and in the Guinea Highlands between Kissidougou and Macenta (see fig. 5).

Hippopotamuses are numerous in the major rivers wherever there are long stretches of deep, quiet water throughout the year. The Niger is a particularly favored habitat. Dwarf hippopotamuses, weighing about 500 pounds, are found in the Forest Region near the Liberian frontier.

Buffaloes of various types are common, particularly in the northern tablelands along the Senegal frontier. Smaller types live in the forested areas around Kindia in Lower Guinea. Antelopes, including the bongos with white-striped reddish coats, roam in the same general areas as the buffaloes and in the savannas north of the Niger River. Lions are found in the Fouta Djallon and also in the savannas as far south as the Ivory Coast frontier. They prey mainly on antelope in unsettled areas, but they are also a menace to domestic cattle. They are a favorite target for hunters. Leopards, valuable for their fur and more common than lions, are especially numerous in the Fouta Djallon.

Chimpanzees and several types of monkeys abound in the forested areas. Certain varieties of monkeys are particularly valued for their fur. Some, which rove in large groups, make damaging forays on crops and on any exposed foodstuffs in towns and villages. Chimpanzees also can be destructive in settled areas.

Crocodiles infest the swamps and the waters near the mouths of the streams in the coastal zone. They also live in the area where the Tominé River flows through marshlands near the border with Portuguese Guinea. Snakes, venomous and nonvenomous, are found throughout the country, even in the towns. Guineans greatly fear the deadly green mamba and the viper, both of which are encountered. Pythons grow to be 20 to 25 feet in length. Reptile skins have commercial value, and about 50 tons are handled annually in the Kankan market.

Fresh-water fish are a supplemental item of the diet in some areas, particularly along the streams of Upper Guinea and the lower sections of the coastal rivers. Off shore and in the estuaries, tuna and various kinds of flat fish, including sole, are found in sufficient quantities to form the basis for a growing industry (see ch. 23, Agricultural Potential).

Bird life is plentiful. In diversity they range from birds of prey and vultures to egrets, parrots, pelicans and herons.

Vegetation

Vegetation varies with climate, topography and latitude (see fig. 7). Many types intermingle in the southern Fouta Djallon and in the northern part of the Guinea Highlands. Mangrove forests are confined to the brackish waters along the edges of the coastal lagoons and estuaries. Their stilt-like roots are visible above water and, instead of penetrating the soil, divide under water into a mesh of rootlets. The full-grown tree, sometimes 50 feet in height, appears to be floating upright on a kind of raft. Mangrove wood is extremely heavy and hard. When burned it generates intense heat, and it is sometimes used for making charcoal.

On the Fouta Djallon plateaus, forest trees are scarce or entirely absent except in wide stream valleys and in the Mamou area near the Sierra Leone boundary. The natural vegetation consists mostly of brush, shrubs and stunted trees able to grow in water during the wet season and in parched soil the remainder of the year. Rubber trees grow wild in the Pita and Labé areas and wild coffee shrubs near Mamou.


In the savannas of Upper Guinea the predominant vegetation is several species of grass which in the wet season grow to heights of 5 to 10 feet. Deciduous trees grow in scattered clumps. Grass fires are a seasonal occurrence, and the trees have developed a heat-resistant bark. They are useless as timber. Vegetation is densest along the streams where the large baobab trees are found. Their trunks sometimes reach 30 feet in diameter, but they are usually less than 50 feet in height. They bear an edible gourd-like fruit, commonly called "monkey bread," which contains a pleasant cool-tasting pulp. Their wood is light and soft. Their hollowed trunks are sometimes used as human habitations.

In the Forest Region south of the savannas the trees, which sometimes reach a height of 120 feet, provide a permanent overhead canopy of foliage. Bamboos, ferns and entanglements of clinging vines are common. Coffee shrubs also grow wild in the area. Teak and ebony are found in the Guékédou and N'Zérékoré districts in sufficient quantity for commercial exploitation.

Forested areas in various parts of the country contain several types of useful trees. One of these is the silk-cotton or kapok tree whose seeds are covered with a silky fiber used as a filling for mattresses and cushions. Oil from the seeds is used for making soap. The fruit of several species of palm provide oil used in candles and soap. The seeds of the shea tree provide a fat known as shea butter which is used for food and for illuminating purposes.

PEOPLE

In the absence of a comprehensive census, population statistics for Guinea generally are based on estimates of local administrators or represent conclusions drawn from the results of samplings made in 1954-55 by a demographic mission under French auspices. Recognizing the need for reliable vital statistics, the government in February 1961 established a Bureau of Statistics whose duties include making special studies of the population. Guinea census takers probably will not encounter the general suspicion and uncooperativeness experienced by the earlier French-controlled mission. Major problems affecting the accuracy of results remain to be overcome, however, including the lack of qualified and dependable enumerators and the fragmentary character of birth, death and marriage records.



Source: Adapted from Institut Géographique National (G. Lefèvre Cartographie) "Guinée Française Carte Economique".

Figure 7. Principal Natural Vegetation Features of Guinea.

Official Guinean estimates in 1958 placed the total population at approximately 2,751,500 (see table 1). Presumably this figure included some 8,000 non-African foreigners living in the country at the time. Assuming an annual rate of growth of 2.5 percent, as estimated by Guinean officials, the total population in 1961 would be about 2.8 million.

The average population density, based on the above figures, is 29 per square mile which is about average for West African coastal countries, the low being 20 per square mile in Liberia and the high, 93 per square mile in Nigeria.

The uneven distribution of the population throughout the country reflects variations of climate, terrain and vegetation, but there are no centers of great population density and no large uninhabited regions. The heaviest concentration, 620 per square mile, is in the District of Conakry, which includes the city proper on Tombo Island and its suburbs on the narrow Kaloun Peninsula (see fig. 8).

Elsewhere the highest population densities are found in the central portion of the Fouta Djallon and in the southern parts of the Forest Region. Labé and Pita in the Fouta Djallon have approximately 86 and 79 persons per square mile respectively. Both districts enjoy the most agreeable climate in Guinea. The most heavily populated districts in the Forest Region are Guékédou and N'Zérékoré which average approximately 74 and 54 persons per square mile respectively. This region is favored in its resources of wild fruits, nuts and game. Crops can be grown with little effort where the land has been cleared. Lowest densities are in Upper Guinea where they vary from 9 per square mile in Dabola district to 18 per square mile in the Dinguiraye district. The Gaoual district, adjacent to Portuguese Guinea in Middle Guinea, is also sparsely settled with 16 persons per square mile. These are plains areas which, like the areas along the Niger and its tributaries, are too dry and infertile to support the large cattle herds found in the Fouta Djallon.

Despite its low overall population density (15 per square mile), some of the highest concentrations of people in the entire country are found in certain areas of Upper Guinea, particularly along the Niger and Milo Rivers. Between Kankan and Signiri, where there are many villages with 3,000 or more inhabitants only a mile or two apart, population density is about 130 a square mile. Population increases may be expected in the Niger Valley if plans to improve methods of rice cultivation are realized, and around Gaoual if the iron and bauxite deposits there are developed.

Settlement Patterns

At least 90 percent of the people live in hamlets, villages or towns of less than 5,000 persons. Only 7 population centers, including

Table 1. Areas, Populations and Average Population Densities of Geographic Regions and Their Subdivisions in Guinea, 1959

Geographic Regions and Their Administrative Subdivisions	Area (square miles)	Population	Average Density (per square mile)
Lower Guinea Region:			
Conakry.....	119	78,388	659
Boffa.....	2,317	66,199	29
Boké.....	4,266	85,750	20
Dubréka.....	2,191	83,154	38
Fria (included in Dubréka).....			
Forécariah.....	1,785	64,800	36
Kindia.....	3,408	110,448	32
Total for Region.....	14,086	488,739	34
Middle Guinea Region:			
Dalaba.....	2,220	101,729	46
Gaoual.....	4,439	71,818	16
Labé.....	2,980	257,155	86
Mali.....	3,419	122,817	36
Mamou.....	2,377	81,700	34
Pita.....	1,583	125,300	79
Télimélé.....	3,109	110,211	35
Tougué.....	2,316	69,840	30
Youkoundoun.....	2,000	54,816	27
Total for Region.....	24,443	995,386	41
Upper Guinea Region:			
Dabola.....	3,474	32,448	9
Dinguiraye.....	2,817	50,079	18
Faranah.....	5,057	74,154	15
Kankan.....	10,610	157,662	15
Kouroussa.....	6,332	84,200	13
Sigüiri.....	9,623	154,771	17
Total for Region.....	37,313	553,314	15
Forest Region:			
Beyla.....	6,736	141,500	21
Kerouané (included in Beyla).....			
Guékédou.....	1,605	118,926	74
Kissidougou.....	3,424	127,975	37
Macenta.....	3,362	114,500	34
N'Zérékore.....	3,931	211,209	54
Total for Region.....	19,058	714,110	37
GRAND TOTAL.....	94,900	2,751,549	29

Source: Adapted from Mamadou Traore Ray Autra, *Connaissance de la République de Guinée*, pp. 20, 21.




Figure 8. General Distribution of Population by Administrative Region in Guinea, 1959

Conakry, have more than 10,000 inhabitants and only 10 have between 5,000 and 10,000 (see table 2). Many towns, including some of the district capitals with more than 10,000 people, are no more than an aggregation of villages with a central market place and few commercial or public buildings.

Table 2. *Guinean Towns with Populations of 5,000 or Over in 1959*

	Total Regional Population	Population of Towns Over 5,000	Regional Total for Towns Over 5,000	Percent of Regional Population in Towns Over 5,000
Lower Guinea.....	488, 739		119, 600	24. 4
Conakry.....		78, 400		
Kindia.....		25, 000		
Boké.....		6, 000		
Forécariah.....		5, 200		
Kimbo-Fria.....		5, 000		
Middle Guinea.....	955, 386		37, 100	3. 7
Labé.....		12, 500		
Mamou.....		9, 000		
Pita.....		6, 700		
Tougué.....		8, 900		
Upper Guinea.....	553, 314		53, 400	9. 6
Kankan.....		29, 000		
Siguiri.....		12, 700		
Dabola.....		5, 600		
Kouroussa.....		6, 100		
Forest Region.....	714, 110		33, 000	4. 6
Maeenta.....		10, 500		
N'Zérékoré.....		10, 500		
Beyla.....		6, 000		
Kissidougou.....		6, 000		
GRAND TOTAL.....	2, 751, 549		243, 100	8. 8

Source: Adapted from Mamadou Traore Rayautra, *Connaissance de la République de Guinée*, pp. 6-8 and 20-21; Guid' A. O. F. *L'Afrique Occidentale Française et le Togo, 1958-1959*, pp. 287-334.

Guineans of the same ethnic origin tend to group together, although no large region is occupied exclusively by the members of a single ethnic group. For example, Foulah villages are found in predominately Malinké areas as are Malinké villages in Foulah areas. Some large villages, particularly in Upper Guinea, may be divided into sections or quarters each occupied by a different ethnic group. In other instances, as among the Bassari and Coniagui of the northern Fouta Djallon, relatively new villages may be arranged around a so-called mother village (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages). A modification of this pattern is found in Upper Guinea along the

Niger and its principal tributaries where pairs of villages, both bearing the same name, are often found separated by a stream, one of the pair being the "mother village" and the other a newer offshoot. An example is Dialakoro (literally old Diala) on the south bank of the Niger and Dialakoura (new Diala) opposite on the north bank.

Villages typically consist of family groupings of mud-walled, thatch-roofed huts. Tin roofs are common in larger places, especially on the coast. The placement of the huts does not necessarily follow a rigid pattern even within the same ethnic group, and the physical plan of a village may be determined by its chief, by the terrain or simply by the whim of the householders. Family groups usually occupy adjacent dwellings, and a large family may occupy a group of 20 or more huts. Such a cluster ordinarily includes kitchen huts, grain storehouses and animal shelters (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The number of villages and towns of less than 5,000 inhabitants in 1959 was 4,383 according to official Guinean sources. The Forest Region had 2,043, Upper Guinea 1,084, Middle Guinea 648 and Lower Guinea 608. Lower Guinea, with the fewest villages, has the largest proportion of its population—about 24 percent—living in towns of 5,000 or more. Comparable percentages for other regions are: Upper Guinea, 10.7 percent; the Forest Region, 4.6 percent; and Middle Guinea, 3.7 percent (see tables 1 and 2).

Composition

Samplings made by the demographic mission in 1954-55 indicate some excess of females over males in the total population. The differential seems to be greatest in the Fouta Djallon where women are reported to outnumber men by about 25 percent. On the other hand, in the district capitals, and notably in Conakry, there are more males than females. Evidently young men in considerable numbers are leaving the villages for employment in the towns, many of them to remain permanently.

The estimated overall national ratio of 908 males for each 1,000 females contrasts with a ratio in the Fouta Djallon in Middle Guinea of 779 males to 1,000 females. However, in Upper Guinea—the most sparsely populated region in the country—the ratio of males to females is estimated to be approximately equal.

The apparent age distribution in Guinea is typical of economically undeveloped countries in general. Birth and death rates are high and life expectancy is short. The birth rate in 1954, the latest year for which information is available, was calculated to be approximately 62 live births for each 1,000 persons (the similar figure in the same year in the United States was 24.6 per 1,000). The 1954 death rate

was placed at 40 per 1,000 (as contrasted with 9.3 per 1,000 in the United States). Age group estimates, uncertain as they are in the area, leave no doubt that a relatively large proportion of the population is between the ages of 15 and 50 (see table 3; fig. 9).

Movement

Statistics on population movement are lacking, but one seasonal pattern is known. It involves mostly farmers of northwestern Guinea who spend part of each year in Senegal and Gambia (Gambia) raising and harvesting peanuts for local growers. The migrants are attracted by relatively good wages which may include transportation costs. For young men the sojourn away from home is attractive, not only as an opportunity to earn money, but also as a chance for adventure and as a source of prestige. Another seasonal movement involves Foulah cattle-raisers who take their herds to the highlands in the wet season and return to pasture them in the valleys in the dry season.

Table 3. Age Distribution of the Population of Guinea, 1954

Age Group	Total Population	Percent of Total Population
Under 5.....	469, 188	18. 2
5 to 14.....	613, 191	23. 9
15 to 49.....	1, 198, 089	46. 6
50 and over.....	289, 751	11. 3
Total.....	2, 570, 219	100. 0


Source: Adapted from United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook, 1959*, p. 109 and p. 150.

In Upper Guinea many young men from the villages seek jobs in the towns during the dry season. Some go as far as Sierra Leone, Ghana and Liberia, where they may find work as peddlers of cola nuts, rice or palm oil. The successful ones go home proudly before the wet season begins, but the less fortunate ones are apt to stay behind, ashamed to return empty-handed. Other villagers in Upper Guinea—in some years as many as 40,000—go to the Siguiri gold fields which, during the dry season, annually attract 80,000 to 100,000 persons, including single men and family groups. They leave behind villages which are temporarily deserted except for a few women and old men.

Malinkés from the savanna districts are attracted to the Forest Region where they engage in small-scale trade, especially in coffee. Those who prosper usually return to their home villages every two or three years to display their success, and they may continue to pay taxes there. Others, particularly in the Kankan district, actually

have two domiciles—one in their home village and another one in the Forest Region. Probably many in this group are included in the population counts of both districts. It appears, however, that the historical spread of Malinkés from Upper Guinea southward into the Forest Region is still taking place (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The movement of young men from the villages to the principal towns seems to be accelerating, but it has by no means assumed major proportions. The largest and most rapidly growing population centers are Conakry, the national capital and chief port, and Kankan, which has been commercially stimulated by road improvements and agricultural development projects in the Niger Valley. In the country as a whole, however, population movement continues to be impeded by limited transportation and communication facilities and by the absence of industrial activity except in a few centers (see ch. 27, Domestic Trade). Moreover, family ties and local attachments, if they are weakening in the younger generation, still remain strong (see ch. 6, Family; ch. 7, Social Values and Patterns of Living).



Source: Adapted from United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook*, 1959, pp. 109, 150; and *The World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1957*, p. 316.

Figure 9. Composition by Age Groups of the Populations of Guinea and the United States, 1955.

Major Towns

Conakry, with a population of 78,400, is the seat of the national government and by far the largest center in the country. Most of the few other towns of any size are capitals of administrative districts, and none of them yet plays a major role in national life. Only seven towns, including Conakry, have as many as 10,000 inhabitants: Kankan, 29,000; Kindia, 25,000; Siguiri, 12,700; Labé, 12,500; N'Zérékoré, 10,500; and Macenta, 10,500. Some other towns, though smaller, are noteworthy for particular activities. Among them are: Kimbo, more than 5,000; Boké, 6,000; and Kouroussa, 6,100 (see table 2). Both Kimbo and Boké are growing rapidly (see ch. 27, Domestic Trade).

Conakry

Conakry, second only to Dakar among West African ports in tonnage capacity, is situated on Tombo Island about 35 miles from the Sierra Leone boundary. The island, about two miles long with a maximum width of one mile, is an extension of the Kaloum Peninsula to which it is connected by a causeway about 200 yards long. The land approach to the city is by way of a railway and highway built on a narrow ridge of black rock rich in iron ore. This ridge extends some 25 miles southwestward from the Mount Kakoulima which rises more than 3,300 feet above the plain east of Dubréka. The ridge, at points 350 feet high, is bordered on either side by steaming mangrove swamps which are being filled in gradually by dumped refuse.

Farther off-shore, from two to eight miles to the southwest of Conakry, are the Iles de Los—three large and three small islands. The largest is approximately six miles long and one mile wide. They have rich bauxite deposits and are also valuable because they give Conakry some protection from wind and ocean currents. The Conakry port improvement program for 1961 included plans for the construction of additional modern facilities to increase capacity for handling iron and bauxite ores, alumina, and bananas and other perishable fruits (see ch. 24, Industrial Potential). The city is well laid out with broad tree-shaded streets forming rectangular blocks. The airfield is about nine miles northeast of the city at the edge of the swamp south of the railroad.

Most of the inhabitants of Conakry are engaged in activities connected with government, the port or related commercial enterprises. Industry is limited mainly to quarrying iron ore by scooping it into railway dump cars from the rich ore bed five miles east of the port.

Only about 35,000 of the inhabitants live in the city proper; the other 43,400 reside in the suburbs. These extend to the base of the Kaloum Peninsula, an area of approximately 120 square miles, and are within the city's administrative district.

Kankan

Situated on level ground on the western bank of the Milo River about 50 miles south of its confluence with the Niger, Kankan is the principal town in Upper Guinea and the second largest in the country. It is on the northern edge of the wooded grasslands, at an elevation of about 1,200 feet above sea level; the area marks the transition between the Forest Region in the south and the open savannas to the east and north.

Kankan has long been the leading market town in this region having been connected with Conakry by rail in 1914 and, still earlier, by road with the Fouta Djallon to the west, Mali to the north, Ivory Coast to the east, and the Forest Region, Liberia and Sierra Leone to the south. Its commercial importance is further enhanced by its location at the head of the boat service down the Milo and the Niger Rivers to Bamako in Mali. The movement of market products was also facilitated by the completion, in 1950, of a modern concrete bridge across the Milo to replace the small pole-operated ferry connected with routes to the east and south. An air landing field is located just west of the town.

Kankan is the capital of the country's largest administrative district, covering an area of more than 10,500 square miles—slightly larger than the state of Maryland. Almost 20 percent of the district's population lives in the capital city. Except for a central core of modern permanent structures—a hotel, commercial establishments, and district administrative buildings—the town has the appearance of a sprawling oversized village with tilled fields and thatched huts spreading out on all sides. While a sizable number of the inhabitants are government workers, most are engaged in marketing, transportation and trade.

Kindia

Kindia is situated in a fertile and picturesque depression at the point where the Mellacorée emerges from the southwestern edge of the Fouta Djallon plateau. The city has railway and road connections with the coast at Conakry, about 100 miles by road to the southwest, and with Kankan, about 345 miles to the east. Roads also lead northward to Télinélé and to Labé in the Fouta Djallon. After the railway reached Kindia in 1904, the place developed rapidly from a plateau village into a prosperous town, situated in the midst of increasingly numerous banana, pineapple and coffee plantations, and serving as a headquarters for firms trading in these commodities.

A branch of the Pasteur Institute, established in Kindia in 1925, has been conducting medical research on anthropoids with special emphasis on the study of smallpox, tuberculosis and poliomyelitis. A horticultural experiment station is also maintained near Kindia.

and the National Agricultural School was opened in the town in March 1961. Rich bauxite ores just southwest of the city have potential industrial importance.

Siguiri

Situated on the north bank of the Niger River about 35 miles from the Mali border, Siguiri has for centuries been a gold-producing center. In the past, reports of new finds have temporarily raised its population, together with that of the immediately surrounding area, to as many as 50,000 people.

The principal economic activity of the permanent inhabitants is providing the gold miners with food, tools and other supplies. Many tradesmen are engaged in exporting rice, and the city's commercial importance is increasing with the development of rice culture in the Niger Valley.

Truck and water transport facilities connect with Bamako, 130 miles northeast, with the railway at Kouroussa, 85 miles southwest, and with the rail terminus at Kankan, 85 miles south.

Labé

Labé is the largest, and one of the oldest, towns in Middle Guinea. It is situated in the midst of the mountainous Fouta Djallon plateau at an elevation of 3,445 feet and lies about midway between Senegal on the north and Sierra Leone on the south. The original inhabitants probably were attracted to the site because of its natural defensive potentialities, its good pasture land and its agreeable climate. Its soil is not well suited to farming, however, although later generations turned to cultivation wherever fertile land could be found along the streams.

Labé eventually became the capital of the country's most densely populated administrative district and now serves as the principal road center in the region. Routes lead east to Tougué (40 miles), north to Mali (50 miles), northwest to Gaoual (90 miles), southwest to Téliélé (80 miles), and south to the railway at Mamou (85 miles). Its strategic position in mountainous country was important in making Labé the base for sporadic Fula resistance to the French between 1900 and 1914 under Alfa Yaya, known as the "Chief of Labé" (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Economic activity centers on the marketing of cattle and citrus fruits, especially oranges and orange oil. Beef from Labé is consumed in places as distant as Siguiri and Conakry.

Others

Some of the smaller towns play a larger role in Guinean economic, political and cultural life than their size would indicate. For example, N'Zérékoré, 40 miles from the Liberian border by forest trail or 45 miles by road, is the main road center in the Forest Region.

The town has increased markedly in importance since the opening, in the late 1950's, of the N'Zérékoré-Monrovia road which runs 130 miles through Liberia to the coast. Most of the region's surplus products, such as rice, coffee, cola nuts, pepper, gum arabic and ebony wood are shipped over this route. The gold, iron ore and graphite found in the area have not been exploited and the town has potentialities for further growth.

Another important small town is Kouroussa which is about 55 miles by road northwest of Kankan and is on the railroad and at the head of navigation on the Niger. Its exports of rice, peanuts, beeswax, cow hides and draft cattle in 1961 were growing rapidly with increased use of farm machinery in the valleys of the Niger and its upper tributaries.

Another economically important small town is Kimbo, the industrial town built near Fria, the site of the world's fourth largest bauxite-processing plant. Also important is the port of Boké which promises to rival Conakry if the bauxite deposits in the area are exploited as planned (see ch. 23, Agricultural Potential; ch. 24, Industrial Potential).

CHAPTER 4

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES

There are about 16 ethnic groups, ranging in size from about 10,000 persons to more than a million. Three groups—the Foulah (called the Peul by the French), the Malinké and the Soussou—comprise about two-thirds of the total population and, on the national level, supply most of the country's political and intellectual leadership. Each has its own tradition of a centralized political authority and, in varying degrees, has tended to assimilate the smaller groups around it.

The major ethnic divisions correspond roughly to the four geographical regions. The Foulah (1,020,000) are concentrated in Middle Guinea; the Malinké (525,000) in Upper Guinea; and the Soussou (220,000) in Lower Guinea. The Kissi (160,000), the Guerzé (150,000) and the Toma (83,000) are concentrated in the Forest Region. About 10 other smaller groups are variously located on the coast and in pockets of the forest and upland areas (see fig. 10).




Figure 10. Ethnic Groups in Guinea.

The white population numbers only a few thousand. Most live in Conakry and a few other principal towns. Many are French nationals and Syrian and Lebanese tradesmen. In mid-1961, there were about 1,200 technicians, advisors and schoolteachers from Communist countries and a smaller number from Western Europe. There were only a handful of Americans.

The basic physical type in Guinea is negro. The people are typically long-headed with dark skin, dark eyes and black, kinky hair. Noses tend to be broad and flat, lips thick and the body build slender, but individual variations are as great as among the peoples of Western Europe. The people in the Forest Region seem to be somewhat shorter and darker than the others. The Malinké are among the tallest, the average height for adult males being about 5 feet 8 inches.

The Foulah seem to be a mixture of negro and North African physical types. Many of them are physically indistinguishable from members of the other ethnic groups in Guinea, but the group as a whole shows a marked incidence of straight hair, light skin and thin lips and noses.

Language is an obvious feature distinguishing one ethnic group from another in Guinea and the names of the principal ethnic groups are the same as the languages they speak. Retained notions of tribal identity and objective variations of culture pattern often accompany and reinforce difference in language. In some instances, however, groups with distinctive cultural patterns may speak the same language; in others, groups with similar cultural patterns speak different languages.

The official national language is French. It is taught in the schools and at least some members of even the most marginal groups are able to use it easily. It is the primary language of government, politics and the arts and sciences and has become so much a part of Guinean national life that probably few, if any, associate it with colonialism; on the contrary it is considered the language of the national culture of the independent nation.

Each local community in the country tends to use its own language, or the language of the dominant group in its particular area, for the ordinary affairs of day-to-day living. In addition to French, the government broadcasting stations have programs in Foulah, Malinké, Sonssou, Kissi, Toma and Guerzé. It is official government policy to make English a second national language in order to permit closer association with English-speaking African peoples of Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone. English is taught in the schools and by radio. Portuguese programs are broadcast for listeners in Portuguese Guinea.

Religious distinctions are frequently not clear-cut. Most of the Kissi, Guerzé, Toma and other groups in the Forest Region are

animists hostile to Islam. The majority in other groups—especially the Foulah, Malinkè and Soussou—are nominally Moslem, but many among them retain animist practices. Pockets of converts to Christianity are found on the coast, in the forests, and among the Coniagui in the northwest corner of Middle Guinea (see ch. 10, Religion). In the past distinctive dress, tattooing or scarification served as a badge of membership in one or the other of the various groups, but such distinctions are rapidly disappearing (see ch. 6, Family).

The differences in language, custom and religion, which have for centuries set the people off from—and often against—one another, appear to constitute a gradually diminishing potential for friction. More and more Guineans are learning to think of themselves as citizens of a national state rather than merely as members of the separate groups into which they were born.

To the Guinean national leadership the slogan "solidarity" is partly the assertion of an accomplished fact and partly a goal still to be realized. In domestic affairs neither the government nor the party can as yet ignore the stubborn core of local loyalties to subnational ethnic or regional groups. In increasing numbers, however, Guineans are seeing themselves as sharing a single Guinean and African heritage and a single national and pan-African purpose.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The varieties of people, languages and living patterns in Guinea, and in much of West Africa, appear to have grown out of a common racial, linguistic and cultural heritage. The essential similarities in physical type, with the exception of the Foulah whose distinctiveness can be accounted for by mixture with North Africans, suggest a common racial origin. Recent scholarship has uncovered underlying connections which testify to a common parentage for the West Atlantic and Mandé language stocks to which the native languages of Guinea belong. Similarly the myths and rituals of the various groups seem to be built up from the same basic assumptions concerning the nature of the world and its inhabitants.

A broad uniformity is apparent in the overall way of life. Most Guineans live in hamlets or villages and make a living by working the land. Food-gathering, fishing, hunting and raising livestock are important subsidiary activities. The family is the basic unit of production and consumption, but frequently acts as part of a lineage—a kin group comprising several families whose members are related through a single line of descent, usually through the men.

Polygyny is the preferred form of marriage, but most marriages are monogamous. Marriage arrangements typically involve bride-price—a payment in kind, usually cattle, to the bride's kin group on the part of the bridegroom or his kinsmen. Puberty is formally recognized

by elaborate ritual practices which center on circumcision for boys and excision of the clitoris for girls. Islam, at least nominally, is the prevailing religion, but religious sentiment remains closely associated with the founding ancestors of one's own kin group and the sacredness of the land.

The diversification of ethnic groups in West Africa seems to have first developed in response to the differing physical conditions of life in the forests and the savanna. Several distinct patterns have emerged.

The forest peoples became simple cultivators of root-crops and were heavily dependent on hunting, fishing and gathering for subsistence. Many kept livestock. Bark-cloth and raffia matting were the principal fabrics. Each community was a self-governing unit with a population ranging from about two hundred to a few thousand at most. Kinship provided the principal bonds within the local group. Each community consisted of several lineages in which descent was usually, but not always, reckoned exclusively through the men. Two or more lineages were sometimes linked by traditional or fictional kinship ties into clans. Political authority was vested in a headman and council of elders, commonly drawn from the senior males of the lineages.

In the smallest communities there was some division of labor between the sexes but little more. In larger settlements the population was divided into groups according to age, each age group having special status and special functions. Some communities had secret societies which carried out a variety of functions; others had both secret societies and age groups (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

Relations between communities ranged from hostility and open conflict to peaceful cooperation and mutual assimilation. Each formed, with its neighbors, a shifting patchwork of alliances and enmities with each trading, and perhaps intermarrying, with one neighboring community while warring against another.

The Guinean groups which have taken their characteristic features of social organization and basic patterns of living from this adaptation to the forests were among the earliest inhabitants of the region. Most of them were subsequently pushed out to the coastal areas of Lower Guinea or deeper into the forests. In Lower Guinea they are mainly represented by the Baga, the Landouma and the Nalon; in the Forest Region, by the Kissi, the Guerzé and the Toma.

In the rolling open land of the savannas to the northeast, exploitation of the fertile flood plains of the Niger River led to a different kind of development. By the first few centuries of the Christian era, the peoples in the western Sudan had developed an advanced technology based on the cultivation of grain and a complex social organization. Local kin-groups were organized into tribes, and tribal chiefdoms were federated into a series of extensive empires. Darryl Forde, the English anthropologist, lists the following distinctive

features of these savanna peoples: centralization of authority in a ruler with his councilors and subchiefs drawn from an aristocracy of birth; an elaborate etiquette expressive of ranking and subordination of classes in the social order; and the collection of tax and tribute to maintain the central organs of government and its agents.

For more than 1,000 years, a succession of these negro states fought one another, the Berbers, the Arabs and, lastly, the European powers for supremacy (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). The rise and fall of the successive kingdoms sent waves of displaced tribal groups from the population centers of the western Sudan into Guinea. Before the collapse of the Mali Empire in the fifteenth century, the Soussou-Dialonké, and later the Malinké, moved up the Niger into the Guinea plateau and savanna regions, subjugating or forcing out the Baga and other peoples already there.

At about the same time nomadic Foulah herders, moving south from the middle reaches of the Senegal River and the Fouta Toro area in Senegal and Gambia, appear to have first reached the Fouta Djallon in force. They were gradually joined by Islamic Foulah groups from Macina in what is now Mali (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

For almost two hundred years the Foulah seem to have lived amicably among the Soussou-Dialonké and others in the area. During this period the nomads and the settled agriculturalists achieved a system of interdependence which worked to the advantage of both. The Foulah supplied milk and milk products from their herds in exchange for agricultural products. In return for caring for the villagers' livestock they were permitted to bring their herds down to cultivated fields in the river valleys after the annual harvest, thus providing forage for the cattle and fertilizer for the fields. Gradually the Foulah began to settle down and to adopt agriculture insofar as retention of their flocks would permit.

In the eighteenth century, stimulated and perhaps led by the Islamic Foulah of Fouta Toro in Senegal, the Foulah of Fouta Djallon—most of whom had previously resisted Islam—were converted to it and turned on the other peoples in the area in the name of a holy war against the unbelievers. They organized the Fouta Djallon into nine territorial districts (*diwals*), each headed by an hereditary chief (*alja*). The chiefs of the various districts constituted a council of ancients which elected a paramount chief or *almamy* (Commander of the Faithful) from among themselves.

In the nineteenth century, after a long series of alliances and internal struggles, most of what is now Middle Guinea was brought under their direct control. Over the years, the conquered peoples were variously converted and assimilated, subjected or driven out. Most of Soussou-Dialonké followed the latter course and then split into two separate groups. Those who remained became serfs to Foulah masters. Some

were taken into Foulah households as individual servants, but it was more common for whole agricultural communities to move into a serf-master relationship with their conquerors.

Typically the serf-villages were situated in the river valleys. The Foulah groups, to which these villages were attached, established themselves in the mountains, pastured their flocks on the plateaus and, after harvest, on the fields of their dependent villages. All property belonged, in theory at least, to the pastoral nobility. Some villages retained effective control of the arable land, but surrendered a part of the crop and other tribute to their superiors. Others were permitted to keep the produce of their own fields, but had to put in a fixed amount of labor on their masters' fields.

Foulah preoccupation with class and caste, which led them to regard all other ethnic groups as inferior to themselves, led to enduring antagonisms. Although the Foulah attempted to transform their resistance to the French into a Moslem-Christian war, many of the Dialonké and other groups—some of them Moslems, themselves—sided with the French and fought against their Foulah overlords.

With the pacification of the region by the French, the various groups found it increasingly difficult to organize themselves for political, military or other action. Traditional tribal bonds were cross-cut by colonial administrative divisions at the local and regional levels. Chiefs were appointed by the colonial authorities or held office only with their approval. This subordination, together with the redefinition in French terms of the chiefly functions, tended to undermine the integrity of the traditional order.

AFRICAN LANGUAGES

All the African languages in Guinea derive from either the West Atlantic or Mandé language stocks (see table 1). West Atlantic languages are spoken in the coastal area of West Africa from Senegal to Liberia. Mandé languages are spoken in much of the savanna area and in the interior forests of West Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Black Volta River in Ghana and still farther east in parts of Nigeria.

Neither the West Atlantic nor the Mandé languages have been well studied, and until recently they were considered to be totally unrelated. In 1949, however, the American scholar, Joseph Greenberg, proposed a reclassification of African languages based on relationships which were previously unknown or only suspected. This hypothesis, which is gaining increasing acceptance, unites the West Atlantic and Mandé languages in a single Niger-Congo stock which also includes Gur, Kwa and other West African language groups and, among others, the Bantu languages of central and south Africa.

Table 1. Languages in Guinea

West Atlantic	Mandé
<i>Northern</i>	<i>Northern</i>
Foulah	Malinké-Dioula ¹
Nalou	Soussou-Dialonké ¹
Coniagui	Kono
Bassari	
Baga Feré	
<i>Southern</i>	<i>Southern</i>
Kissi	Guerzé
Baga	Toma
Landouma	Mano
Mmani	

¹ Malinké and Dioula are closely related dialects as are Soussou and Dialonké.

Mandé languages are normally divided into two groups according to whether they use the word *tan* or *fu* to designate the number 10. Most of the Mandé-tan languages are found in the north; most Mandé-fu languages in the south. Tone is important in the Mandé-fu languages where grammatical categories or even words are distinguished by their intonation. For example, the word *pu* means either "cave" or "put," depending on how it is spoken. The Mandé-tan languages no longer seem to use tone so extensively.

Malinké is a northern or Mandé-tan language; Dioula (Dyula, Dyoula) is closely related and both are probably only dialectical variations of the same language. Kono is a distinct Mandé-tan language. Guerzé, Toma and Mano are southern or Mandé-fu languages. Soussou and Dialonké use *fu* for 10, but they appear to be more closely related to Malinké and to the *fu* language groups.

The West Atlantic language family is also divided into northern and southern groups. Tone is important in all Western Atlantic languages, although it is apparently less so in Foulah than in the others. Foulah, Nalon, and the speech of the Tenda peoples (Coniagui, Bassari and Badyaranké) are the northern West Atlantic languages spoken in Guinea. Kissi, Mmani, Baga and Landouma are southern West Atlantic languages.

None of the languages has its own script, but many educated Guineans use Latin or Arabic characters to write them. Thus the Foulah have used Arabic script to create a vernacular literature. This literature is essentially religious—the Koran, for example, has been translated word for word into the Fouta Djallon dialect of Foulah—but there is also a body of secular poetry and prose. Similarly many of the gospels, written in Latin letters, have been produced for most of the different language groups. More recently, native songs and poems have been published in this form.

In addition to speaking French and their indigenous language, most of the educated Moslems—especially those descended from the Foulah, Malinké and Soussou ruling families—read and write classical Arabic and conduct their religious observances in that language.

MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS

The Foulah

The Foulah (Fula, Fulani; call themselves Fulbe [singular, Pulo]; called Peul by the French), with a population of more than a million, are the largest single ethnic group in Guinea. The name, Foulah, however, comprises communities with widely different customs and traditions, reflecting the historic mixing of peoples in the Fouta Djallon. At least one-third are descendants of the Dialonké, Malinké and other groups which were subjugated by the Foulah.

The principal Foulah concentrations in Guinea are in the Labé, Pita, Dalaba and Mamou administrative regions, but the Foulah are in the majority in most of the rest of the Fouta as well. There are about six million Foulah outside of Guinea. The major concentrations are in the Fouta Toro of Senegal, in the Macina region of Mali and in Adamawa in Nigeria. Smaller groups are variously located between Senegal and the Cameroons. Each speaks a distinctive dialect. The Foulah of Fouta Djallon no longer have any important contacts with outside groups.

Villages typically consist of several lineages grouped into one or more clans, each of which administers its own land holdings through its chief. "To each the land of his ancestors" is the general rule; both cultivated and uncultivated land areas are generally assigned to the individual families within the larger kin-groups.

Descent, succession and inheritance follow the male line. Polygamy is general, and the polygynous family is the preferred type of residential unit. Huts are grouped around a courtyard, each co-wife having her own hut. Each compound is surrounded by a hedge, and the compounds are grouped around a mosque which is the center of community life.

Cattle are the principal measure of wealth and are essential items in marriage settlements. Secret societies and elaborate puberty rites are generally absent but circumcision is universally practiced and excision of the clitoris is frequent.

More than 90 percent of the Foulah consider themselves Moslem, but many differ little from their non-Moslem neighbors in religious practice. According to legend, the Foulah are descended from four sons of Omar ibn Assi, reputedly the first to bring Islam to the Macina region. Each brother is considered to be the founder of one of the four great *yettoré* or tribes into which the Foulah are tradi-

tionally divided—Dialloubé, Ourebé, Ndayébé and Ferobé. Historically prominent tribal names (Diallo, Ba or Baldé, Bari, So) are still current, but they no longer signify organized kin groups.

The traditional Foulah social hierarchy—with a hereditary nobility at the top and hereditary slaves at the bottom—no longer exists, but the attitudes associated with it do. Apart from the descendants of the Foulah aristocracy and their agricultural dependents, there are other groups of varying status. Among them, and at the lowest levels, are the hereditary artisan castes and musicians or minstrels (*griots*). Women, perhaps because of the influence of Islam, have somewhat lower status than among most other groups.

Social, economic and psychological habits of dependency—built up over generations—have given way only slowly. As late as the 1930's free men, who left their home communities to work on the railroad, plantations or other French enterprises, were indemnifying their Foulah masters for work owed them. The going rate in 1937 was 20 francs a year.

The severance of traditional dependency relationships has left a patchwork of Foulah, Dialonké, Malinké and other settlements in the Fouta Djallon. Communities which once were integral parts of a feudal hierarchy dominated by the Foulah have become formally independent. The closeness of the feudal past, with all the class and caste consciousness it generated, however, is still an obstacle to the political and social integration of these communities on a basis of equality.

The Malinké

There are about 525,000 Malinké (Manding, Mandingo, Mandinka, Maninka) in Guinea and almost as many in surrounding countries. The Malinké, like the Foulah, are almost all Moslem, but their earlier religious practices, centering on ancestor cults and a supernatural relationship to the land, persist strongly within Islam.

Most of the Malinké live in Upper Guinea, but are gradually spreading into other areas as well—especially into the Forest Region to the south. The largest concentrations are in the Kankan, Signiri and Kouroussa areas where the old tribal names of Keita, Kondé, Camara, Traoré and Kourouma are still predominant. Differences in dialect, local traditions and occupational specialities are recognized by the Malinké—although not necessarily by others.

The Maninka-Mory, centered in the Kankan area, are perhaps the most Islamized of all Malinké groups and are known as tradesmen and religious functionaries. Their name for other Malinké—Sounounké—means pagan, perhaps dating back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the Maninka-Mory led a religious revival in the area (see ch. 10, Religion). Although their speech is not distinctive, the

names of some of their villages (Karfamoria, Tassiliman, Fodécariah, Foussé) and their principal tribal names (Cissé, Diakité, Diané, Kaba), support their claim to have been originally part of the Soninké (Sarakollé or Sissé), a Mandé-speaking people from the Sudan.

The Dioula (Dyula, Dyonla) are known as traders over a large part of West Africa. In Guinea they are scattered among the Malinké and are commercially active among the forest peoples of the south. In Upper Guinea their speech appears to be similar to Malinké and they probably speak dialectical variations of the same language.

The once formidable federation of Malinké tribes, headed by rulers believed to be divinely appointed, was broken up by internecine strife, war with the Foulah and, finally, subjugation by the French. Locally, however, the imprint of the former hierarchical order persists. Moslem religious leaders are still drawn from a hereditary aristocracy and various artisan groups, along with simple peasants, have low social standing. Although most of the Malinké have long been agriculturalists, manual labor is historically associated with the labor service imposed by the feudal rulers and is still looked down on.

Rice cultivation predominates but a variety of other crops are grown. Hunting, fishing and gathering are also important. Most households keep livestock, but they are only infrequently eaten, and, except where Foulah influence is strong, the animals are not ordinarily milked, being used primarily for prestige purposes and for bride-payment and religious sacrifices. All groups engage in trade and maintain regular markets. Most local market transactions are handled by women.

Dwellings are grouped into permanent villages, each of which is traditionally surrounded by protective palisade. Inside the village each lineage, consisting of a group of families related through the male line, has its own quarter. Polygyny is common. Typically the head of the family and his married sons, together with all of their wives and minor children, live in a fenced-in compound around a courtyard. The head of the lineage administers its common property, including, in theory, the land-holdings which are parceled out to the family heads. Along with the family heads in council, the head of the lineage administers local affairs. Descent, inheritance and succession are traced through the male line.

Age grades are common, and appear to be especially important in recruiting communal labor. Secret societies for men and women are also present, but these seem to be somewhat different and less important than the secret societies of the forest peoples. Puberty rites are elaborate and are widely accompanied by circumcision and clitoridectomy.

The Soussou-Dialonké

The economic and political pre-eminence of Lower Guinea in general and Conakry in particular gives the Soussou (Soso, Susu), who number about 220,000, a special importance among Guinean ethnic groups. They comprise almost half the total population of this region. The Soussou predominate in Conakry, and throughout the region, the other smaller groups have tended to assimilate to them.

The closely related Dialonké (Djallonké, Dyalonké), numbering about 73,000, are sometimes considered simply as an eastern branch of the Soussou. They are concentrated in the administrative regions of Mamou and Dabola in Middle and Upper Guinea, respectively. Smaller concentrations are also found in Labé, long dominated by the Foulah, and in Kouroussa where they are strongly influenced by the related Malinké. An additional 30,000 or so are located in Sierra Leone where they are known as Yalunké or Yalonké.

Like the Malinké, the Soussou and the Dialonké are primarily agriculturalists and traders. The coastal Soussou are fishermen and also rely heavily on coconut palms and oil palms for subsistence.

In the past the characteristic features of Soussou-Dialonké social and cultural patterns were probably closer to those of the Malinké than they are at present. In many respects—kinship organization, settlement patterns, descent, inheritance and succession through males, marriage practices and others—they still bear a strong resemblance to the Malinké. Neither the Soussou nor the Dialonké, however, have a hereditary aristocracy or age-groups organized for communal labor. They do have secret societies, but these are somewhat less important than the men's and women's societies of some of the smaller groups in Lower Guinea and the Forest Region. A majority of both groups is nominally Moslem, but a traditional animism frequently appears just below the Islamic surface.

SMALLER ETHNIC GROUPS

The relatively small ethnic groups scattered along the coast and concentrated in the Forest Region represent an ancient way of life which is only slowly breaking down. They are the least Islamized of all the Guineans and continue to resist Islam, in part because it was the religion of the slave-raiding Foulah and Malinké chiefs. Religion for them is closely bound up with the land and with their ancestors. Socially they are essentially egalitarian; women have high status, and there are no hereditary castes or aristocracies.

Polygyny is common in all groups, but is perhaps more prevalent among the forest peoples. In Lower Guinea the usual household unit is the extended family of related males and their wives and children living in several huts grouped around a clearing and sur-

rounded by a fence. In the Forest Region the household is typically the independent polygamous family, consisting of a man and his wives and unmarried children. In either case, the household has its own fenced-in compound. A group of such compounds comprises a hamlet. Several hamlets may be attached to a centrally located village, or the village itself may consist of a cluster of hamlets, all grouped around a central clearing and meeting house, with a protective wall surrounding the whole complex.

Typically land is administered by the headman who, theoretically holding it in trust for the group as a whole, allocates parcels to the heads of the member clans or lineages and, through them, to the individual families. Each household normally has a few cattle, goats, sheep and chickens. The livestock is not ordinarily milked, being used primarily for religious sacrifices and as a form of bride-price.

Age-groups and secret societies are widespread, and play important roles in almost all aspects of community life. Initiation ceremonies at puberty commonly involve circumcision for boys, excision of the clitoris for girls, and a fixed period of instruction—perhaps several years—in the life-ways of the community.

In general these smaller groups are looked down on by the Foulah, Malinké and Soussou. Those in the Forest Region are considered to be especially backward and primitive.

Lower Guinea

The Baga, numbering about 50,000, are scattered along the coast from Conakry and the Kaloum Peninsula to the Rio Compony, estuary of the Kogan River. The Temné of Sierra Leone may once have been part of them. Four separate groups are sometimes distinguished within the larger Baga unit: the Baga of Kaloum, Koba, Sobané and Sitemou. Most of them are cultivators, food gatherers and fishermen. They consider the Fouta Djallon, from which they were driven out by the Soussou-Dialonké, as their homeland. The Baga Kaloum of the Kaloum Peninsula have been largely assimilated to the Soussou, and only the old people still speak Baga. The Baga Koba of the Boffa region have been assimilated to a lesser extent than the Baga Kaloum, but more so than the other Baga groups.

The Nalou (Nalu), about 20,000 in number, live on the lower Rio Nunez and Kogan River and on the Tristao Islands. They speak a West Atlantic language, but claim to have come from the Mali region of the Fouta Djallon and appear to be strongly mixed with Mandé-speaking peoples. The Nalou groups on the islands and in Portuguese Guinea are reportedly more negroid in appearance and have a more primitive way of life than the others.

The Baga Foré (Sonssou for Black Baga or, perhaps here, Pagan Baga) number about 12,000 and are mostly rice cultivators concentrated in the coastal swamps around Monchon, northwest of Boffa. They seem to have been among the earliest Baga to reach the coast and have been strongly influenced by their more powerful Nalou neighbors. Their speech is more closely related to Nalou than to that of the other Baga. The Baga Foré claim that the Baga proper are also Baga Foré, but all Baga groups to whom the name is applied seem to resent the term as derisive.

The Landouma (Landoma), about 10,000 in number, live between the Rio Nunez and the estuary of the Fatala River, inland from the Nalou. The easternmost Landouma groups in the Boké and Gaoual areas are known as Tyapi or Tiapi. The Landouma are closely related to the Baga proper and speak a dialect of the same language. Matrilineal inheritance and succession, which was presumably widespread at an earlier period among the peoples speaking West Atlantic languages, is still retained by the Landouma.

The Mmani (singular, Mani; the Soussou call them Mandenyi) live between the Kolenté (Great Scarcies) and Morébaya Rivers in the Forécariah area. They are rice cultivators, but the gathering of nuts of oil palms and coconut palms, fishing and salt extraction are important subsidiary activities.

The Mmani are closely related to the West Atlantic language speaking Boulom (Bulom) and Sebouira (Sherbro) of Sierra Leone. The Mmani seem to have been late-comers to the coastal area where they attacked the Baga and separated them into two major groups: the Baga of Guinea and the Temné of Sierra Leone. Several Mmani place names are apparently of Baga or Temné origin.

The Forest Region

The Kissi, numbering about 160,000, are concentrated in the Guékédou and Kissidougou administrative regions. Some live on the other side of the Sierra Leone or Liberian borders. They speak a West Atlantic language and claim to have come from northern areas now occupied by Mandé-speaking peoples. Both racially and linguistically, they are closely related to the Mmani of the coast. Rice cultivation is the principal occupation and they are known as "people of the rice fields" to the Malinké.

The northern branch of the Kissi are in regular contact with the Malinké and are increasingly adopting Malinké language and customs. One of the principal Kissi families has taken the name Keita, traditionally associated with a ruling Malinké family.

The Guerzé (Kpelle, Kpèlè), numbering about 150,000, are mainly situated in the N'Zérékoré region, but there are many Guerzé groups in Liberia as well. Most of them are agriculturalists, but they rely

less on rice and more on root crops, food gathering and hunting than do the Kissi. In the same area as the Guerzé are two smaller groups of undetermined number: the Mano (Manon) and the Kono. Both speak Mandé languages. The majority of the Mano probably live in Liberia.

The Toma (Loma), about 83,000 in number, live in Macenta, between the Guerzé and the Kissi. An even greater number live in Liberia where they are known as Busi or Buzi. The Toma in Guinea are split into two sections by an intrusion of Malinké villages. The northwestern branch, like the northern branch of the Kissi, is being assimilated to the Malinké.

Other Small Groups

The Coniagui (Konyagi), Bassari (Basari), Badyaranké (Badiaranké), Tenda Boeni and Tenda Mayo are a related group of peoples living near the Senegal-Guinea border area around Youkounkoun. Collectively they are known as the Tenda, a name apparently given them by the Foulah. Their total number is estimated about 100,000. Of these about 10,500 Coniagui, 5,000 Bassari, and perhaps segments of the other Tenda groups as well, live in Guinea.

The Tenda peoples speak related dialects of the West Atlantic language family. Like the Landouma, both the Coniagui and Bassari trace succession through females. They are principally agriculturists, but are known as skilled hunters and fierce fighters who cling tenaciously to their traditional way of life.

Scattered clusters of Toucouleur (Tukulor), Wolof and Serer from Senegal and Bonlom and Mende from Sierra Leone have settled in Conakry and in other principal towns. Most of them are men who have taken Guinean wives.

TRENDS

Since the country became independent, the government has sought by all official means to minimize the political and other implications of ethnic differences, making it difficult to assess their importance. In 1961 the differences seemed to be less important than in the past, and perhaps less important in Guinea than in other parts of West Africa, but it was clear that they continue to intrude heavily into ordinary affairs. The persistence of group loyalties and ethnic identifications is demonstrated, on the one hand, by government concessions to traditional practices and, on the other, by the apparent failure of some government measures which do not, or cannot, take ethnic differences into account.

The national leadership exhorts the people to a "solidarity" which transcends "regional, religious, racial, or linguistic frontiers" at the same time that it extends official recognition to the separate systems

of local or tribal law. Within each administrative region, various local leaders are appointed assessors (lay judges) to administer the customary law of their respective tribesmen (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

Typical of the government concessions to traditional practice was the presidential decree of September 1959 which provided for the establishment of one or more administrative districts within each region "according to economic, geographic and ethnic circumstances." Typical of the difficulties the government encounters is the fact that the chief executive of a regional administration who does not belong to the dominant ethnic group in that region may encounter, in some instances, passive but popular resistance to his regional government.

Ethnic and local loyalties, however, are more a stumbling-block in the way of the development of national unity than a threat to it. Reports in the French press (in the period immediately before and after independence) describing inter-tribal wars and separatist movements appear to have little foundation and have been vigorously denied by Guineans. American observers report that the violence which accompanied the referendum was on a small scale, never getting beyond the local or village level and commonly reflecting personal and local antagonisms rather than broad regional or ethnic differences (see ch. 18, Public Order and Safety).

Indeed, the principal contest is not so much between one ethnic group and another as it is between the local communities within each ethnic group and the central government. In other words, it is between those who have vested political, economic or emotional interests in the traditional order as opposed to those who, represented by the party leadership, are committed to building a modern national state (see ch. 15, Attitudes and Reactions of the People).

The competition between the local groups and the government is an unequal one. The chief weakness of the separate communities is that they no longer have the tribal structure and machinery to keep alive the historic cultural and emotional ties among their members.

For a hundred years or more, ethnic groups organized along local or tribal lines have been steadily subjected to powerful pressures from the outside and to corrosive processes from within. In the nineteenth century their cohesiveness was weakened by broad, popular appeals—first in the name of Islamic fellowship and then by the call for a common resistance to the French (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

French rule displaced the traditional apparatus of authority and eroded the bonds which held large groups of people together in organized ethnic communities. Although the individual continued to identify himself with those who spoke the same language and observed the same customs, his loyalties began to shrink to his near kinsmen

and the people of his local community with whom he came into face-to-face contact. Increasingly, to be a Foulah, Malinké, Kissi or Baga, was something to be felt rather than an objective social reality.

Even before independence the native leadership was drawing up plans to further the breakdown of linguistic, religious and ethnic ties and group loyalties which stood in the way of developing a national consciousness. After independence the process was accelerated. Title X, Article 45 of the Constitution provides that "any act of racial discrimination as well as all propaganda of a racial or regional character shall be punishable by law."

French—rather than Malinké, Foulah or Soussou—was made the official language, and the hierarchy of chiefs between the regional administrator and the local group was formally replaced by a system which brought each village under the direct authority of the centrally appointed regional and district administrators. The threat posed by ethnic bloc voting in a system of universal suffrage has been effectively circumvented by restricting real executive power to appointive positions and by giving the central government, through the Minister of Interior and Regional and Local Administration, the power to dissolve local elective councils (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

Time is on the side of the new leadership which, by education and propaganda, is inculcating a new, national, super-ethnic ideal. Tribalism is finding it increasingly difficult to compete with the new nationalism. Traditional functions of the tribe have steadily been taken over by soldiers, policemen, judges, labor unions, cooperatives, women's and youth organizations and agencies of the government. The national leadership, which controls the schools, the press and the radio—and has the power to reward its friends and punish its enemies—has succeeded in involving almost everyone in one way or another with the new regime. People are encouraged—sometimes forced—to identify themselves as Guineans, rather than as Malinké or Soussou, and to call each other "comrade." Such pressures are especially successful among young people, many of whom are letting their tribal heritages slide in favor of the new citizenship.

CHAPTER 5

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The principal social distinction is between those who are in positions of public power and authority and those who are not. Increasingly, the person takes his place in society according to his ability, education and commitment to national goals rather than according to family status, seniority and other circumstances of birth. High social status, prestige and privilege are attainable only through participation in the government, the party, and the parapolitical mass organizations—trade unions, youth groups, women's organizations and various cooperatives.

Those who direct these structures at the national level are members of the social as well as of the political elite of the nation. Although their salaries are relatively low, and few—if any—are privately wealthy, they are better educated and enjoy a higher standard of living than the people whom they govern. They use French for normal discourse, wear Western clothes and adopt Western manners in their everyday life.

The members of the elite are an integral part of the society. With few exceptions, they are only one or two generations removed from families of village farmers. All have relatives and close personal ties among those who work the land; the wives of some of them would be more at ease in a thatched hut with outside cooking facilities than in the residence of a former French administrator.

Next in social prestige are the members of groups at regional and local levels which represent the national political structure to the local population. They are closely associated with the national elite and share the same orientation. Below them in status are those who are drawn from the local population and represent the local communities to the national structure.

The broad base of society, comprising more than 90 percent of the population, consists mostly of small farmers and their families who live in some 4,000 villages where they work the land with crude agricultural instruments. Most of them are full-time farmers or stock breeders; others are part-time artisans, petty tradesmen, fishermen and agricultural wage laborers. The great majority can neither read nor write.

A small section of this broad base consists of townspeople; a few thousand are skilled or semiskilled workers, and others are servants, artisans, shopkeepers, petty tradesmen, small-business entrepreneurs, domestics, porters and occasional day laborers (see ch. 13, *Labor Relations and Organization*).

There are no big business groups or large landowners and almost no professional groups among the African population. There is little private wealth, and almost none of it is in the form of investment capital (see ch. 22, *Character and Structure of the Economy*). Lebanese and European merchants, who played a vital role in the pre-independence economy, have been hit hard by the departure of their European customers and by official measures designed to replace them by Guineans in the economic structure. Many have left the country; others remain, but theirs is, at best, a holding operation and there seems to be little future for them in Guinea.

The various ethnic and territorial communities and hereditary classes which characterized the several separate societies of the pre-colonial and colonial periods, are steadily being incorporated into a single national structure and are losing their separate identities. Nevertheless ethnic affiliations and important remnants of hereditary classes and kin-organized village communities continue to be operative in many areas of daily life.

In smaller villages and remote rural settlements, for example, the structure of the traditional, kin-organized community exists within the formal structure imposed by the national government and the mass organizations. The old men of the lineage effectively control most of the property, make the major decisions which involve the welfare of the community and hold authority over women and young people. To the extent that age groups and secret societies still function, they do so under the direction of the community elders.

Hereditary class distinctions, weakened under the French, have been diluted further since independence. The formal privileges and disabilities of class and caste have been withdrawn, but the groups themselves are still discernible. Families belonging to the hereditary Foulah or Malinké aristocracies are apt to have greater capital accumulation in land, cattle and wives than other groups. They tend to be better educated in both the Western and Moslem traditions and to look down on occupations involving manual labor (see ch. 7, *Social Values and Patterns of Living*).

Regional, ethnic and hereditary class lines, although crossed with increasing frequency, continue to mark off the principal areas from which a man normally selects a wife. In general, men and women take their mates from their own ethnic groups and from their own natal communities; this applies even to those who have moved into the towns. Old aristocratic families—some of whom carefully pre-

served written genealogies—tend to marry among themselves. Similarly, a young man whose father was a potter or a craftsman in any of the traditionally despised occupations would probably find it difficult to marry the daughter of a respectable small merchant or farmer, regardless of his personal attributes and accomplishments.

According to President Touré, the new social order has no provision for the development of classes, each with its own identity and interests. Despite repeated references to a working class as distinguished from the agricultural workers, especially with respect to its role in the struggle for independence, Touré insists that class is irrelevant in the present organization of society. The political system of Guinea, he says, is a dictatorship of a mass party which draws its support from all of the people and is therefore democratic. The PDG does not represent the working class, as in the Communist countries, and is not, in fact, a class party at all; instead it is a mass organization serving the interests of the whole society.

President Touré boasts that Guinea, basing itself on traditional African values of cooperative labor and social solidarity, will be the first nation to achieve a radical advance through a political, economic and social revolution without a class struggle. The establishment of a popular dictatorship, he says, "permits the development of a social structure no longer pyramidal but cubic; that is to say a harmonious development in which the whole society is called upon to elevate itself at the same time."

HISTORICAL SETTING

The Precolonial Period

From earliest times the principal unit of social organization was the small, relatively isolated community of perhaps 10 to 100 families. Kinship was everywhere the basis of organization, with each community consisting of one or more lineages (groups of related families counting descent exclusively through the male or through the female line).

Occasionally a group of neighboring communities, speaking the same language and observing the same customs, was able to achieve an enduring unity based on real or fictive kin ties, but effective kin ties did not normally extend beyond the local group. Each community, although organized in much the same way as its neighbors, was itself a separate, self-sustaining society.

Within the kin group or community the distribution of authority and the division of labor followed fixed patterns based on age, generation and sex. Political authority rested mainly with a headman and a council of elders consisting of the heads of the member families. The headman and the elders in council directed the economic, social, political and religious activities of the group, reaching major decisions

through discussion and consensus. The heads of the families, in turn, directed the activities of their own family members.

Men's and women's secret societies were widespread and performed important functions, especially in the field of education and law enforcement. Such societies usually included all the adult men or women in the community, but membership was by initiation and kinship ties were irrelevant. The secret society supervised the extensive training period and conducted the elaborate initiation rites which marked the individual's passage from childhood or adolescence to adulthood. Once initiated, the individual enjoyed adult status in the community and membership in the secret society.

Those who were initiated at the same time were usually considered a distinct group with special duties and privileges, each age group subordinate to those which were initiated before it and superior to those which followed. The senior age groups held the important official positions in the society. Frequently the individuals who held these offices were also the heads of the lineages and members of the councils of elders.

Men and women frequently chose their closest friends from among those in their own age group, and age groups—along with kin groups—were commonly used as the basis for organizing mutual assistance groups and cooperative work parties.

Beginning perhaps in the fifteenth century, groups with experience in political and military centralization moved into the area. By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Foulah, Malinké and Soussou had established varying degrees of political hegemony over Middle, Upper and Lower Guinea respectively. These peoples, especially the Foulah and Malinké, had developed similar systems of stratified social organization in which there were hereditary chiefs, aristocrats, commoners and slaves. Their domination of the smaller and more simply organized peoples around them took on a quasi-feudal form. Some of the surrounding groups were assimilated and absorbed; others were enslaved. In the majority of cases, however, local communities were left relatively undisturbed in the management of their affairs, but were required to pay tribute in produce or labor to the ruling groups.

In Upper Guinea most villagers seem to have had the status of a kind of free peasantry which paid taxes in kind to the dominant Malinké families. In the Fouta Djallon area the Foulah pastoralist overlords evolved a more developed feudal pattern, frequently laying claim to both the land and the persons of the agriculturalists.

Under the Foulah and Malinké, at least, there developed castes of leather workers, carpenters, potters and certain other artisans who were looked down on and were forbidden to marry outside of their own occupational groups. The *griots* (minstrels) were also in this

category. The children of slaves remained slaves, but seem to have had somewhat higher status than those newly acquired by purchase or capture.

The ruling groups among the Foulah, Malinké and Soussou were militant Moslems. Subject villagers usually became nominal adherents of Islam while retaining most of their traditional animist practices (see ch. 10, Religion). Certain groups escaped immediate domination by moving to outlying coastal or forest areas, but their more powerful neighbors raided them periodically for slaves. Associating Islam with slavery, these outlying groups remained firmly animist. In most other respects, however, they came under the expanding economic and cultural domination of the Foulah, Malinké or Soussou.

The Colonial Period

The colonial period forced profound changes in the structure of society. The French forces put a stop to the aggressive warmaking of the Foulah, Malinké and Soussou clan confederacies and effectively dismantled their political and administrative hierarchies. Along with their former subjects, the members of the hereditary aristocracies became subjects of their French masters.

French suppression of serfdom and slavery—at first half-hearted, later somewhat more vigorous—struck deeply at the economic power of the African leisured aristocracy and gradually reduced many of them to poverty. However, many of the ex-slaves and serfs, although emancipated in theory, remained in fact dependent—especially in the Fouta Djallon. With no claims to the land—or only very tenuous ones—they generally remained economically and psychologically dependent on their former masters.

In the late 1930's plantation production of export crops was introduced, and new occupational groups began to emerge. After World War II, modern mining and industry were introduced. Although the economy remained based in large part on subsistence agriculture, the need for free or forced wage labor appeared in a variety of sectors, and Guineans found themselves working on plantations, laboring in the mines, building and maintaining roads and port installations.

Africans also responded to the need for a greater number of petty tradesmen to serve as middlemen between the individual native and the European or Levantine merchant. They bought the produce of many small individual producers for resale to the exporters, and they bought European light consumer goods from the importer or his agent for resale to the individual Africans (see ch. 27, Domestic Trade).

The French, in the field of culture even more than in that of the economy, brought about changes in Guinea—some of them deliberate, some of them indirect. In bringing to the country the French lan-

guage, culture, ideas, administrative system and practices, and, above all, a new and more developed educational system, the French created the *évolués*—the evolved Guineans who, in time, became as much European as they were African. The French also created an African elite—which was their own French-serving elite, parallel with a new Guinean elite of the *évolués*—which came into being through contact with the French system and with French education.

The French colonial administration developed and made extensive use of the members of the African elite, who derived their prestige and power from the French authority and usually gave loyalty to it. These Guineans served as French-appointed district chiefs and village headmen and also held such positions as clerks, interpreters, policemen, schoolteachers and lower-level civil servants. By the 1920's and 1930's, this African elite group was largely self-sustaining and self-perpetuating. Children of its members were sent to French-operated schools and emerged more French than Guinean in outlook (see ch. 9, Education). This served to set them apart and make them strangers to the great mass of Guineans who were not given similar opportunities.

The district chiefs and village headmen who carried out the policies of the colonial administrators at the regional and local level were important to the French colonial administration. Their principal duties centered around the collection of taxes and the fulfillment of conscription quotas for military service or various forms of labor service. Where traditional leaders demonstrated a willingness to carry out French policies, they were permitted to remain in office. Where such leaders were lacking, other more compliant ones were appointed. In the Fouta Djallon, the old Foulah elite continued to rule as agents of the French. Elsewhere, the French were forced to create new chiefs, recruited from outside the traditional dominant families. The *évolués* who assisted the French administrators in the towns and administrative centers were also selected as much for their willingness to conform as for their other abilities.

On the periphery of the two elites were those who were hired to serve the French administrators and upper African elite as cooks, chauffeurs, gardeners and houseboys. These people also learned to speak French and adopted European customs and values to varying degrees. Although not an integral part of the elite, they tended to imitate it in dress, speech, manners and values.

Until World War II, the pattern established under French domination changed only in detail. During the war, however, antagonisms developed between the majority of the Guineans and the French and their appointed African elite assistants. These were considerably sharpened by the rigorous policies of the Vichy-controlled adminis-

tration, and, in the ensuing struggle for political dominance, new groups emerged.

Unlike the members of the African elite, almost entirely creatures of the French administration, a new political elite emerged, mostly from among the *évolués*, which represented broad occupational groups, including some of the working class elements which, spurred by the rapidly growing economy, were developing in Conakry and other towns. Supported by the mining, railway and other workers in government-operated industries and by agricultural laborers—all of whom they had newly organized into trade unions—this new group quickly gained control of the PDG. Bypassing the French administrators and the French-appointed native chiefs and headmen, they pushed the organization of the party and trade unions down to the village level, appealing directly to the people and gaining their support.

Some of the French-appointed chiefs had tried to build political parties around traditional ethnic and regional groups. Intellectuals, schoolteachers and other ranking members of the African elite had founded a conservative Socialist party. By 1956, however, the chiefs and other functionaries, though still in formal positions of power, had lost political control to the various occupational groups whose union and party representatives completely dominated the territorial and regional assemblies (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics). In 1958, with the opposition effectively silenced by fear or through conversion, the militant nationalists of the trade union movement took over complete control of the country.

HIERARCHY AND STRATIFICATION

The National Elite

The men and women who have represented the central organs of the party and government since independence constitute a political and social elite whose authority, through the apparatus of these organs, reaches down to the smallest villages and whose prestige and status are recognized by everyone. As leaders of the PDG, they make national policies; as heads of the various ministries, agencies, trade unions, youth and women's groups, they carry them out (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

Few have any direct connection with the upper levels of the French-created African elite which they displaced. No French-appointed former chiefs or high officials are represented among them. A few are known to be descendants of precolonial aristocratic families, but this link has little if any connection with their national positions or prestige.

Typically, they are sons of small farmers or of lower level civil servants. Despite their youth—almost all are in their middle thirties

or early forties—they have a background of years of common experience and long personal knowledge of each other. Many first came together in upper-primary and secondary schools in the 1930's. Some, especially in Conakry, were thrown together in Communist study groups in the late 1930's and the early years of the war. After the war they were in almost continuous personal contact as leaders of the developing trade unions and political parties and as elected representatives to regional and territorial assemblies.

With few exceptions, they are either Malinké, Foulah or Soussou and, in name at least, Moslem. But always in public, these men and women take their basic identification from the party rather than from any ethnic, religious, regional, or other group.

All have had primary and secondary school training, but there are far fewer university-trained scholars and professionals among them than there were among the former African elite. All speak French in their official capacities and private lives; they wear European clothes, and have adopted European manners. Nevertheless they are among the most vigorous and articulate proponents of Africanism (see ch. 7, Social Values and Patterns of Living).

No member of this group is known to be independently wealthy. Although all appear to live modestly, they clearly constitute a privileged group. Their salaries are low—perhaps two or three hundred dollars a month—but they live in well-appointed, European-style apartments and private residences, sometimes those formerly occupied by their French counterparts. Like the high government officials of most countries, they have chauffeured limousines continuously at their disposal. These privileges, however, like the power and prestige with which they are associated, are accorded to the job rather than to the individual.

Regional and Local Elite

The upper social stratum at the regional level consists of party leaders and higher civil servants. These men are in direct, personal contact with the national leaders at Conakry and share their values and their commitment to national goals. At the apex stands the commandant of the region. Under him are the members of his staff and the other specialists who come under his direct command—the chief of police, the regional health officer, the treasurer, the principal of the secondary school (if there is one in the region), labor coordinators, directors of youth and sports activities, and agricultural or animal husbandry extension agents.

The top regional administrators and specialists are almost invariably members of the party. Ordinarily they do not come from the areas in which they serve. Professional administrators are moved regularly from one post to another.

Policemen, schoolteachers, technicians, clerks and other assorted functionaries also consider themselves—and are considered by others—as representatives of the central apparatus and take their basic orientation from their superiors rather than from the local population. This orientation is reinforced by the government's policy of transferring them periodically from one town or region to another. The great majority of these civil servants are probably members of the party, but education and experience are the principal prerequisites for their jobs.

The backgrounds of these regional officials and civil servants are varied. Some are the sons or daughters of men who filled similar jobs under the French. Others were themselves part of the old order and, as clerks, schoolteachers or policemen, simply changed their allegiance and stayed on their old jobs for the new masters. On the other hand, the gaps left by the withdrawal of the French have put such a premium on administrative, technical, teaching or clerical skills that young people who never dreamed of becoming part of a bureaucratic government or party structure now find themselves so engaged.

Whatever their origins, they are all salaried employees—town-dwellers who can read, write and converse in French and who have at least a primary school education. They wear Western-style clothing on all but ceremonial occasions.

Although salaries are low and durable consumer goods scarce, the typical civil servant enjoys a standard of living that is higher than average, but he has more of the same things rather than things which others do not have. It is only those at the very top—the commandant, the police chief, the secondary school principal—who have a standard of living that is conspicuously and qualitatively different. But even there, privilege and property go with the office rather than to the individual.

Many of the regional administrators live in stuccoed residences and work in buildings formerly occupied by the French. The commandant and the police chief have automobiles. The party section chief may use one which is owned by the section. The school principal uses the school's car and may also have a tape-recorder and refrigerator in his home, both of which belong to the school.

Their jobs entitle them to use-rights, not ownership rights. The policeman who is fired must surrender his bicycle; the transferred school principal must leave the tape-recorder and refrigerator for his successor. To the extent that a job confers property privileges and the *indemnité*, however, it also confers an added measure of status and prestige.

The social and political hierarchy which develops at the local level is less clear cut. Here, if at all, lineage, seniority and inherited class status persist as effective criteria in establishing rank, authority

and prestige. Apparently in certain areas of the Fouta Djallon, some members of the historically dominant families have been able to use their traditional authority and prestige to achieve positions of power within the new formal and legal framework of village councils and regional assemblies. This appears to have happened in Labé where section officials of the PDG were publicly berated by President Touré because so many of the representatives elected to the regional assembly were not members of the party.

In general, prestige, high status and even authority are passing at the local level to men and women who represent the local sections of mass organizations, such as the political party, trade unions, youth group cooperatives and women's organizations. They represent no single occupational or other social group. Their fathers may have been farmers, tradesmen, civil servants, laborers or religious functionaries. They may come from towns or hamlets and from the whole range of occupational, religious or ethnic groups.

They are the leaders and organizers of community life who have been selected for their roles according to criteria which, in large part, are set by the party. They are generally young people, perhaps better educated than most. They are rank and file members of the party—unpaid officials of youth, women's and larger groups and organizers and activists whose positions rest on dual membership in the party and in the local community.

The Broad Base

Among the great majority of people, gradations of wealth and education are relatively narrow but traditional criteria of social ranking divide them into fairly clear-cut strata. An important consideration is whether or not a man does manual—especially agricultural—labor. The historical status of his family, community or ethnic group—slave, serf, aristocrat or despised caste—also has some significance. Increasingly, however, social ranking, prestige and privilege are becoming associated with achieved rather than hereditary status. Status is beginning to depend on how much a man makes and on his closeness to the official apparatus rather than on the traditional position of his kin group or community.

In some communities the changeover is considerably slower than in others, and privilege is still distributed, at least in part, according to old standards. In the Fouta Djallon, for example, the aristocratic Foulah families preserve their pastoral heritage and look down on people who must work the land for a living. These families persist as a social elite in their local communities and continue to provide much of the religious and even political leadership, despite the government's attempt to break their hold on the area.

Descendants of former slave and serf families continue to be identified as such. No formal disability is attached to such status, nor to the despised caste-status of most artisans, but the social and psychological distinctions are sufficiently strong to discourage the children of former slave or serf families from intermarriage with the children of traditionally free families, or from establishing other relationships in which they confront each other as social equals.

Outside the Fouta Djallon, class and occupational distinctions are much weaker. In remote villages, prestige, status and economic power tend to persist as attributes of the senior members of the kin groups within the community. The oldest adult males continue to direct the labor of the family and lineage and to manage the property. Through their superior economic position, they may be able to acquire two or more wives—something that few young men can afford. This type of prestige persists, especially in remote areas not yet brought under the effective authority of the regional administration or local political party organs (see ch. 6, Family).

Townspeople generally have higher status than villagers unless they are people looking for jobs rather than those who have them. In Conakry, and to some extent in Kankan, a broad range of goods and services are offered by a variety of occupational specialists. Elsewhere, however, the towns are more like villages than cities; they are rural rather than urban centers, and occupational specialization tends to be concentrated in the area of government administration.

After the government workers, the members of the local business community rank next in prestige. This group may include a dozen or so merchants and shopkeepers, tradesmen who shuttle back and forth between the town and outlying areas and the owners of such service establishments as the hotel and restaurant, the coffee shop, the movie house, the taxi service to neighboring towns and the gas station.

Below the self-employed businessmen are the skilled workers—equipment operators, mechanics and machinists. There are only a few thousand of these in the country, and most of them are concentrated in three or four principal industrial sites. A few, however, are scattered throughout the country—primarily in various government enterprises, such as experimental farms, rural mechanization centers and road construction or building projects (see ch. 11, Labor Force; ch. 24, Industrial Potential). Their relatively high salaries (comparable to those of lower government functionaries), their steady employment and their association with modern machinery tend to stamp them as a kind of worker-elite.

In most towns, however, skilled industrial workers are almost totally absent, and chauffeurs and automobile mechanics—if there are any—comprise the elite of the non-civil-servant workers. After these come the regularly employed sales and other personnel of the busi-

ness establishments and the domestic servants of the business and administrative community.

In the past, chauffeurs, cooks, houseboys and others who performed personal services for the French enjoyed a special measure of prestige and power. Since they spoke French and were personally known by the administrators, they were frequently used as intermediaries between the administrators and the African community. After the withdrawal of the French, there were fewer opportunities for this type of work, but more recently some of these people have found employment with the foreign teachers and technicians stationed in the various towns. Others have used their knowledge of French and of administrative procedures to gain jobs in the civil service.

However menial their work, those with jobs which guarantee a year-round income are considered privileged. In this group are men who sweep up government offices, schools and other public buildings and laundresses who regularly wash and care for students' uniforms.

Near the bottom of town society are street peddlers and a variety of handicraft workers who turn out leather goods, household items and other small articles for local consumption. The unemployed who remain in town the year round and the underemployed agricultural workers and villagers who drift into towns after the major harvests command the least respect. Typically these individuals subsist by seeking odd jobs and by relying on help from employed kinsmen. This way of life is a cause of increasing concern to the authorities who view those who follow it as parasites responsible for many social problems, including drunkenness and theft.

CHAPTER 6

FAMILY

More than 90 percent of the people live in hamlets and villages where the individual's closest friends and neighbors are also his closest kinsmen. In the past a man lived out his life in the village into which he was born, knowing and caring little about the world beyond his own community and its close neighbors. His most immediate and most important social world was a large kin group with which he identified himself and was identified by others. Friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance closely followed the network of kinship ties.

Since the country became independent the government's efforts to bring about social modernization and change have been directed more toward removing ethnic and regional differences than toward altering traditional family patterns. Nevertheless, it has taken steps which have strongly influenced the family and, in particular, the role of women. Reinforcing earlier French colonial legislation against child marriage, it has decreed that girls must consent to marriage, must willingly accept the bridegrooms chosen for them and cannot marry before the age of 17. The change has been most effective in the urban communities and probably least effective in the remote areas of the interior. The government's attitude has had the effect of enlisting the support of young people for its larger social and political goals and has been a primary factor in mobilizing women for the government's purposes. On the other hand, the effect on the older and more traditionalist Guineans, especially the men, has been to provoke some resentment and even opposition.

In the past, before the changes brought about in the last phase of the colonial period and, even more, since independence, the large kin group—the basis of village organization and the individual's social world—tended to be a corporate body, collectively responsible for the actions of its members. Subsistence, defense, law and order, honor and revenge were its collective concerns. Tribute and taxes levied from the outside were its collective responsibility rather than that of the individual families which constituted it.

The local community, based on these large kin groups, was—or tried to be—sufficient unto itself. Each had its own customs and its own rules and, through a variety of mechanisms, coordinated and

directed the activities of its members, regulated marriage, prescribed inheritance and property laws, educated the young, resolved problems and cared for those who could not care for themselves.

For more than three generations the spread of a cash economy and the growth of towns around administrative and commercial centers have offered an increasingly stronger attraction to the village farmer. Many villagers were drafted into labor or military service and were taken from their communities; others, especially young people, went of their own volition, drawn by the opportunity for wage labor which would enable them to wear European clothes and enjoy the amenities and personal freedom of town life. The physical dispersion of its members made it increasingly difficult for the kin group to function as a corporate entity, however strong the effective bond between kinsmen remained.

In fact, the need for corporate action on the part of the kin community diminished. The French-imposed peace eliminated the need for defense; and the administrators, acting through appointed territorial chiefs, took over many of the legal, educational and police functions of the kin community.

Deprived of many of its functions, the cohesion of the kin community was weakened, and the range of individual loyalties and obligations began to shrink from remotely related kinsmen to one's own family. In Islamic communities this process was aided by Islamic marriage and inheritance rules which tended to emphasize the husband-wife and parent-child relationship at the expense of the larger kin group.

Despite these disintegrative pressures, the continuing need for cooperative labor in the fields, strongly bolstered by the carryover of traditional values and patterns of living, has kept the individual and his family dependent on the larger kin group.

Since 1957, when Guineans effectively began to govern themselves, the national leaders have directed a many-sided assault on the traditional organization of family and community life. Slowly, but with apparently increasing effectiveness, the government is changing the form of land tenure, regulating marriage, divorce and inheritance laws, and generally lifting the individual out of a world in which family and kin group define his place in society to one in which education, skills and national citizenship take precedence.

KINSHIP STRUCTURE

Lineage

Like most peoples of Africa, Guineans reckon descent either through males (patrilineal descent) or through females (matrilineal descent). This system of tracing descent exclusively through one

side separates blood relatives into exclusive kin groups called lineages. A patrilineage consists of those kinsmen, male and female, who are related through males and who trace descent from a known common male ancestor; similarly, a matrilineage is a group of kinsmen related through females who trace descent from a female ancestor.

The great majority of Guineans are patrilineal. Some peoples seem to have traced descent through females in the past, but only a few small groups—the Coniagui, Bassari, Landouma and probably the Nalou—continue to do so (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages). In general, the lineage is the primary regulator of political and religious life; it acts on behalf of its constituent members with respect to the outside world; it lays down marriage laws, rules for inheritance and succession and sometimes food prohibitions; it is the principal ceremonial unit; and, perhaps most important of all, it holds the ultimate property rights to land.

The lineage is an on-going, self-perpetuating kin group which keeps its identity so long as there are sons (or daughters in the case of matrilineal descent) born into it. The lineage founder—normally no more than five generations removed and frequently only four—is one of the principal objects of cult and reverence, for it was he who first cleared the land and established the rights of ownership and use. Indeed, it is only through membership in a lineage that the individual has rights to land, the right to assistance to work it and the right to a share of its products.

To an outsider, a lineage may appear to be, at different times, a large family, a landowning corporation, a religious sect, a cooperative work group or simply a local community. Typically, the senior male of the lineage, acting with the lineage elders, is alternately patriarch, trustee and administrator of lineage property, chief priest, labor coordinator and village headman or mayor.

Hamlets and small villages typically consist of a single lineage. Larger villages may have two or more lineages which usually consider themselves related to each other but cannot trace the connection. The composition of wards or quarters of towns generally corresponds to similarly organized kin groups.

Lineages normally take their names from their founding ancestors. Even when there is no real kin connection, members of lineages which carry the same name assume that they are descended from a common ancestor and are therefore kinsmen. Where related lineages are in the same community, they normally act as a single corporate group, with the senior male of the senior lineage acting as head of the whole kin community. Where the related lineages are settled in different communities, they have no common corporate existence, but their members are expected to be hospitable and friendly to each other.

Among the Soussou and Dionla, lineages with the same name share the same totem, an animal or plant which stands in a special relationship to the group, and the same food avoidances associated with the totem. Among the Dialonké, a man and woman with the same name may not marry. In general, however, the recognition of kinship and of mutual obligation is extended in practice only to those relatives in other lineages with whom the individual has established a personal relationship.

Family Structure

The concerns and activities of daily life are centered in the family, which is the basic residential unit and the principal unit of consumption and production. Under the leadership of its senior male, the family directs the day-to-day labor of its members. The family holds property rights to movables and to whatever property it accumulates by its own efforts. In addition, it contracts marriages for the children born into it and may also arrange for divorce.

The size and organization of the family vary widely. Polygyny is the ideal among all ethnic groups, but most men have only one wife because of the cost involved in acquiring additional wives and in supporting a large family.

Among the patrilineal peoples, the most general form of the family is the extended family. Ideally, this group consists of a senior male, his wife or wives, his sons and unmarried daughters, and his sons' wives and children. At the death of the grandparent generation, it would consist of a senior male and his younger brothers, their wives, unmarried daughters and children. Residence is patrilocal; at marriage, daughters leave the family and go to live with their husbands and their husbands' kinsmen.

Typically, the extended family is the basic residence unit. Each adult has his or her own separate hut. Children live with their mothers. The dwelling and service huts are clustered together, clearly separate from similar clusters of neighboring extended families. Frequently, each residential cluster or compound is marked off by a fence or a wall.

All the groups recognize the small family of husband, wife and children as a separate unit within the extended family. To varying degrees, the small family and its individual members are recognized as having rights and interests distinguished from those of the extended family. Husband and wife, jointly or separately, may have rights to their own piece of land and to other personal property for which they are accountable to no one, and individuals are usually free to reject a spouse proposed by or even contracted for by his extended family. Divorce especially is a personal, rather than an extended family or lineage affair, although by no means entirely so.

The Foulah appears to be the only one of the three major ethnic groups in which husband, wife or wives and children live as a separate residential unit. In a Foulah settlement, the senior male of the extended family lives in a central compound with his wife or wives and unmarried children. Arranged around this central compound are the compounds of his married sons, younger brothers, and their wives and children. Similarly, the husband, wife or wives and children also constitute a separate residence group among the Guerzé, Toma and Mano of the Forest Region. In general, however, even where the small family constitutes a separate residence unit, it is only as a member group of the extended family that it participates in lineage and community affairs.

The matrilineal groups, whose family organization seems to be more shifting and more varied than among the patrilineal groups, seem to be in process of changing to patrilineal descent. In the case of the Tyapi and the Landuma, it appears that the married couple live as part of the husband's matrilineage. Young men apparently move into the compound of the head of their matrilineal extended family—one of their mothers' brothers—bring their wives there when they marry, and raise their children there. As the children get older, the boy moves into his mother's brother's compound; the girl moves into her husband's mother's brother's compound. The typical residence unit, then, is the matrilineal extended family consisting of a senior male, his wife or wives and young children, and one or more of his sister's sons with their wives and children.

Among the Coniagui and Bassari, a woman also joins her husband and his maternal kinsmen at marriage, but extended families seem to be lacking. Husband, wife or wives and children participate directly in the life of the husband's matrilineage and community.

Succession and Inheritance

Succession to positions of authority is the primary concern of the lineage and extended family. In the small family group final authority is vested in the husband or father, but there is no problem of succession since the family dissolves upon his death and regroups itself anew.

Final authority in lineage or extended family ultimately rests with the senior male of the senior generation. Among patrilineal groups a man's heirs are his brothers and sons. Whether they have the same mother or not does not matter for purposes of succession. When the head of the lineage or the extended family dies, the headship normally passes to the eldest surviving brother. When there are no surviving brothers, succession drops down to the next generation. At this point it seems that there is no strict rule; the last surviving brother is most

commonly succeeded by the eldest son among his own and his brother's sons, but personal ability and other circumstantial considerations may influence the selection. The heir to the headship succeeds not only to the chief position of authority but also to the various roles and statuses—head of the lineage or family cult, for example—that normally go with headship.

Succession among matrilineal descent groups is complicated by the fact that they seem to be in the process of changing over to patrilineal descent. In the prevailing pattern, however, the head of the lineage or the extended family is succeeded by males of one matrilineage: his next eldest brother or, if none survives, his sister's son. Among the Conaigui and Bassari, the problem of succession is limited to the headship of the lineage, since there are no extended families, and is dealt with in similar fashion.

Individual, family and lineage rights to property frequently overlap. Traditional inheritance patterns are seldom clear-cut, and conflicting claims of inheritance are the most common cause of litigation in customary law.

Land is the most valuable form of property and is normally owned by the lineage, which holds it in trust from the founding ancestor. The lineage distributes the land among its extended families, who hold it in heritable usufruct. Extended families may separate dwellings collectively or parcel their holdings among the adult males. Inheritance of this collectively owned lineage and family property, like succession to positions of authority, closely follows the line of descent. The same man who succeeds to the headship of the lineage or extended family also becomes chief administrator and trustee of its property.

Personal property, on the other hand, is inherited in a variety of ways. In general, individuals want as much of their personal property as possible to go to their own children rather than to their brothers or, in the case of matrilineal groups, to their nephews.

Personal property generally consists of movables, sometimes including cattle, and fruit trees or plots newly brought under cultivation by the individual's own efforts. Among the patrilineal peoples, sons inherit all or the major share, but equal inheritance by all children of the same father is sometimes practiced. The specific form may vary from group to group. Thus, among the Soussou the largest share goes to the eldest son, equal shares to other sons, and daughters share half of the remainder. The Dialonké and Kissi give all personal property to sons, although daughters presumably inherit their mother's belongings. The Dioula assign half-shares to daughters. Among the Malinké, all of a man's property passes to the head of the extended family, but he is expected to distribute at least part of it among the sons and brothers.

Among matrilineal groups, men tend to distribute their personal property before their death, thereby forestalling the inheritance of personal property by younger brothers or sisters' sons.

Islamic inheritance law calls for equal inheritance among sons, with daughters receiving a half-share and widows one-eighth. Although the great majority of both patrilineal and matrilineal groups are Moslem, only a few of the more devout Foulah and Malinké families observe this rule. In some cases, its application to land held by the head of an extended family has resulted in the headship of larger landholdings.

Marriage

Marriage is taken for granted as the normal state of adult life. Traditionally, it is as much the concern of the lineage and family as it is the personal concern of the individuals involved. Marriage insures the perpetuation of the lineage and family and permits them to establish important economic and social relations with other groups. In the vast majority of marriages, the bride moves into her husband's household and becomes, eventually, an integral member of his family.

Polygyny is the preferred form of marriage, but because marriage normally entails considerable expense, most marriages are monogamous. Ordinarily, only the senior members of the community accumulate sufficient wealth with which to acquire other wives.

Typically, an individual marries outside his or her own lineage. Among patrilineal peoples, marriage to a member of one's mother's patrilineage is frequently the preferred form. Thus the Malinké, Sonsson and Kissi prefer marriage with a mother's brother's daughter but forbid it with father's brother's daughter who is, of course, of one's own patrilineage. An exception occurs among some strongly Islamized Foulah and Malinké families. Here, according to Moslem laws, marriage with a first or second degree blood relative from either side is prohibited, but marriage inside the patrilineage—especially with a father's brother's daughter—is preferred.

That marriage is a contractual relationship between lineages is clearly brought out in the patterns of secondary unions following the death of either the husband or wife. In the case of the death of the husband, the lineage's claim to the widow remains largely in force, and she generally marries her husband's brother, especially a younger one, but she may also marry his brother's son or even his own son by a different wife. Similarly, when a wife dies, the preferred secondary union is with a woman of the wife's patrilineage, especially her younger sister. Such secondary unions do not ordinarily involve an additional formal exchange of property, service or any special procedure. They seem to be considered continuations of a previous

contractual arrangement rather than newly constituted marriages involving a fresh set of rights, duties and property relations.

Marriage invariably involves bride-price, the transfer of movable property—especially cattle or other livestock, trinkets, clothing and, more recently, money—from the bridegroom's family to the bride's family. Frequently the bridegroom must also perform labor service for the bride's father or brothers, and occasionally, as among the Soussou, such service may take the place of a bride-price.

Ordinarily, the bride-price for a man's first wife is provided by his father and his older brothers, with other lineage members assisting if they can. Most often, the bride-price is distributed among the bride's parents and other members of her family. Increasingly, a part of it is turned over to her and becomes, in effect, her dowry. Among the Malinké, however, and perhaps others as well, the bride's family may keep the bride-price intact and use it to acquire a bride for her younger brother. Moslem marriage payments traditionally go to the bride as her personal property, but in Guinea the payments have taken on the collective character of the bride-price.

Where the bride-price is traditionally large, as among the Malinké, payments may be paid in installments and carry over after marriage. Where the bride-price is small, it is usually paid immediately before the marriage.

Infant or child betrothal is common, but it is more a matter of granting priority to a given family or individual than a firm commitment since boys and girls are usually free to reject arrangements made by their families. Boys and girls normally enjoy a wide range of sexual freedom before marriage. Only among some of the wealthier and more strictly Moslem Foulah and Malinké families is a girl's virginity an important consideration. Pregnancy ordinarily hastens marriage arrangements, but among the Coniagui, girls do not formally marry until after the birth of one child, and sometimes two.

The age for marriage varies widely. Ordinarily a person is not eligible to be married until after formal initiation rites which signal his or her entry into adult status in the community. Economics, however, may be a more important factor in the age of marriage than custom, especially for boys, in that inability to raise the bride-price can delay a young man's marriage many years beyond the customary age.

A boy or girl may initiate an engagement—he by offering a gift, she by accepting it—but once they express a liking for each other, the bargaining and arrangements fall principally on their parents or other kinsmen. When the bride-price has been agreed on and paid in part or full—always in front of witnesses, in case anything goes wrong and it has to be returned—the couple is considered formally engaged. During the engagement period the girl and her family receive many

gifts and services from the boy. The girl confers her favors on the young man, but is also free to distribute them elsewhere and does so or threatens to if he is remiss in giving her clothes, money or trinkets. The girl and her family try to prolong this engagement period; the boy and his family are anxious to conclude it. Finally, on an agreed-upon day after the girl's initiation, the marriage takes place in a ceremony consisting of the formal delivery of the bride—along with her utensils and other personal belongings—by her kinsmen or family and the formal acceptance by the bridegroom and his family. Except where Islam or perhaps Christian rites are strictly observed, the marriage ceremony is an entirely secular affair.

Divorce

Traditionally, there are no legal or religious restrictions against divorce. A woman simply leaves, or is put out by her husband. Divorce may be initiated by either party or by mutual consent. Public opinion, property considerations, custody and welfare of the children and, for men especially, the cost of remarrying are effective deterrents to the dissolution of properly constituted marriages. In general, whether the man regains the bride-price or whether the woman keeps it depends on the reason for divorce. Disputes regarding the return of the bride-price and child custody are among the chief subjects of divorce litigation.

Women are more likely to initiate divorce action than men, perhaps because men have greater economic interest in the marriage or perhaps because the traditional distribution of authority and rights is more likely to encourage the husband to abuse his wife than the other way around. Still another important factor is that in most cases the man at marriage remains among his family, his friends and in familiar surroundings; the woman—perhaps still in her teens or only just past puberty—is suddenly thrust into a strange and frequently hostile environment.

Maltreatment—such as repeated beatings—and nonsupport are among the chief reasons for women leaving their husbands. Inability to get along with in-laws or co-wives is also high on the list. Sterility of the husband is not always sufficient grounds for divorce action by the wife, but, at least among the Coniagni, the woman whose husband is sterile is not harshly blamed for having children by another man.

Sterility of the wife seems to be the most frequent cause for divorce initiated by men. Adultery on the part of the wife is more likely to lead to a beating than to a divorce, but it is sufficient reason for divorce if the husband wishes it. Women are also divorced for laziness. In addition, man and wife do not need specific reasons for divorce if they both agree to it, and it is sometimes sufficient if they find that they simply do not like each other. There is a limit, how-

ever, to the number of times a man or woman can dissolve a legitimate union. A twice-divorced Coniagui woman, for example, does not marry a third time, although it is not clear whether she is not permitted to or simply cannot find anyone willing to take the chance.

The Islamic Foulah and those Malinké, Dioula and others who follow the Islamic civil code make divorce easy for the husband, but difficult for the wife. The husband need only repeat a formula to effect a legitimate divorce, but the wife who wishes to divorce her husband must become a plaintiff in a formal judicial procedure. Men who wish to reclaim the bride-price, however, must also go before a religious court. Compared with non-Moslem peoples, divorce among the Foulah seems relatively rare.

Islam generally recognizes impotence, nonsupport and undue cruelty as grounds for divorce for women but, in Guinea, the wife who has the support of her kinsmen can also invoke other grounds.

Similarly, the Islamic code regarding children of divorced parents is modified in Guinea. Islam normally gives the custody of such children to the mother—boys until puberty, girls until marriage—with the father responsible for their support. Among the Foulah and other Guinean Moslems, the father takes custody immediately.

Elsewhere, among non-Moslems, there seems to be no definite rule regarding the children of divorced parents. Much probably depends on the particular situation, such as the age of the children involved. One pattern seems to call for children to remain with their mother until claimed by their father's lineage, perhaps beginning with their return to the father's community for the initiation rites. Similarly, a widow may keep and raise her children until young adulthood. She may remarry outside of her husband's lineage if she chooses to, but the children, of course, are still members of her first husband's lineage. When a widow does remarry outside her husband's lineage, the Kissi recognize the union only if the second husband remits a payment to the dead husband's lineage. If no payment is made, the woman still "belongs" to the first husband's lineage, and the lineage may even claim the children from the second union. A Foulah widow is theoretically free—according to Moslem law—to marry whom she chooses, but in practice the choice is made by her dead husband's family.

FAMILY RELATIONS

Husband and Wife

Seldom do husband and wife come together as strangers. They are generally from the same village or from neighboring villages, are frequently related, and have usually known each other as lovers over a period of time. Frequently, too, they are not particularly eager—especially the girl—to settle down and assume the responsi-

bilities of marriage and only reluctantly, under the pressure of public opinion, do they give up the pleasures, liberty and security of adolescence or young adulthood.

The change from the single to the married state is especially abrupt for the girl. She leaves her parents, family and friends and moves into her own hut in her husband's family compound. She is subordinate to the adult men, to her husband's mother and elder sisters, and to the other women who have already married into her husband's family. If she is not her husband's first wife, she is subordinate to the woman who is.

In general, the bride is looked on as someone who can relieve the other women of some of their work but who has yet to prove herself before she can be accepted fully into the family. Denis Paulme, the French anthropologist, reports that the chants sung at the Kissi marriage ceremony by the women of the bridegroom's family have a single theme: "I am happy today, the wife of my son has come. I will no more seek water, no more pound grain, no more prepare meals. . . ."

Despite the initially hostile environment of the bride and the general absence or weakness of legal, religious and even social sanctions in support of marriage, many married couples establish enduring unions based in large part on personal affection, mutual respect and a sense of duty to spouse and children. As the bride becomes accustomed to the ways of her husband's family and lineage, and when she gives them sons and daughters who are theirs as well as her own, affection and respect may characterize her relationships with the family members as well. She may call her mother-in-law "mother" and treat her as such; from among the other women who have married into the family, including her co-wives, she chooses her close friends and associates and spends most of her time in their company.

Such ties contribute importantly to the stability of the union but are not essential. Despite her theoretical subordination to her husband and to many others, in practice the wife enjoys a wide range of freedom and independence. Her freedom to leave and return to her home exercises a restraining influence on those who would abuse their formal advantages over her. Normally, she has her own hut, utensils, clothes and other personal belongings, a few cattle, sheep or goats and a private income from her garden (see ch. 23, Agricultural Potential).

Parents and Children

The birth of a first child establishes new social relationships and confirms old ones. Both husband and wife enjoy a higher status in the community. Their marriage gains a large measure of permanence, and the wife may be accepted as a full member of the family, lineage

and community. Depending on the pattern of descent, a son or daughter secures the continuity of the family or lineage. The child is a guarantee that the parents will receive a proper burial and that the grandparents will be honored after death (see ch. 10, Religion). He increases the labor force of the family and lineage, and he will be the principal economic and emotional support of his parents in their old age.

A child is usually born in his father's compound, but in some cases a wife returns to her family to give birth, especially for a first child. Special midwives are frequently, but not always, employed. The placenta and umbilical cord are commonly treated with special care and may be buried in or near the father's or mother's hut.

About a week after birth the family may hold a naming ceremony. The head of the lineage or his representative formally confers the lineage name on the child. Given names do not ordinarily follow any strict, general rule: within one group, a child's given name may designate his sex and rank of birth ("first son," "second daughter"); it may be the name carried by his father, grandfather or uncle; it may be an anecdotal name, such as "the one with the long nose"; or the child may carry two of these.

The first few years of life are spent almost entirely in the care or company of the mother. The infant is carried in a sash lashed to her back during the day and sleeps with her at night. All babies are **breast-fed**. Weaning, which is gradual and unhurried, may begin as early as 1 year, but it is not uncommon for children of 3 or 4 to continue breast feeding. During the period of nursing, husband and wife do not have intercourse.

Until age 3 or 4, when the child begins caring for itself, it enjoys the almost complete indulgence of everyone around it. After that the mother becomes less lavish in her affection. At 5 or 6, the child may be disciplined, but physical punishment seems to be relatively uncommon.

Children quickly learn to imitate adult behavior, and playtime is usually an imitation of adult activities. At 7 or 8, girls begin to care for younger brothers or sisters, and boys are sent to watch over the animals or to scare birds away from the crops. By the age of 10 or earlier, children are associating with others of the same age and sex rather than with their own brothers and sisters.

Children seem to learn to do particular jobs from their older comrades as well as from their parents. Although the process of learning to do the things that will be expected of them as adults is gradual and unforced, by 12 or 13 a girl is normally able to perform all the necessary household chores under distant supervision, and a boy uses his own agricultural tools in the fields.

The special bond of affection among children born of the same mother persists throughout their lives. Brothers of the same mother, for example, will normally continue to live in the same compound when their father dies and continue to work their fields in common. The son of a different mother, however, may claim his share of the patrimony and begin another compound nearby, alone or with his own full brothers.

Children of the same mother also establish close personal ties with the members of their mother's family and lineage. She takes them with her when she visits her household, where her parents, brothers and sisters give them gifts and indulge their whims. A young boy's first personal possession—perhaps a chicken or a goat—is normally a gift from his mother's brother.

Children also enjoy especially warm relationships with their grandparents. Frequently, a child is named after his grandfather or grandmother; and the grandparent may play an important role in raising the child, especially if the mother becomes too busy with later children. Grandparents frequently have an easy, teasing relationship with their grandchildren and almost never discipline them.

Initiation rites ordinarily indicate the end of childhood and the beginning of adulthood. They may occur at about the age of puberty or as late as 17 or 18. Initiation for girls is normally associated with excision of the clitoris. Boys are almost always circumcised, but this usually precedes initiation and is only occasionally a part of it. In contrast with the feasting, hazing and ritual of initiation, circumcision may be a family or private affair, with relatively little significance attached (see ch. 10, Religion; ch. 5, Social Structure).

TRENDS

The traditional pattern of family life and much of its substance stand in direct opposition to the kind of country that the postindependence leaders are trying to build. Their purposeful attempts to break down old patterns and establish new ones are directed at a system which had previously been weakened by the pacification of the country; the transfer of political power from African leaders to Western administrators; the introduction of money and of European education; the growth of towns; and many other influences which accompanied colonization.

Before independence, attempts to regularize marriage and family relationships by law—such as Article 2 of the 1939 Décret Mandel which specified that marriage must be by consent of the couple and fixed the minimum age at 14 for a girl and 16 for a boy—remained almost meaningless. Family patterns changed, but they changed in

their own way, at their own pace, largely preserving their basic outlines.

Even these are beginning to give way as the importance of the extended family or larger kin groups diminishes. Slowly the government is involving the rural community in the political and economic life of the whole nation. Members of a family or kin group are individually responsible for the payment of taxes, and the government, rather than the lineage, has ultimate ownership rights to the land. The requirement for the registration of landholdings and for building and construction permits makes it increasingly clear to the individual that his rights to land and property derive from his status as a citizen rather than from membership in his kin group.

Increasingly, the husband rather than his family pays the bride-price, and his marriage tends to become a personal rather than a family concern. The government has fixed the minimum age for marriage at 17 and insists on the previous consent of both boy and girl. A decree of April 1959 requires that marriages be performed in the presence of the chief administrative official of the district, subdistrict or village. No other marriage is legal, and violators are subject to imprisonment.

Enforcement of these measures is less effective away from the major administrative centers. But whether enforced or not, these measures serve as important rallying points in bringing women and young people to support government policies and to identify national goals with their own. Youth groups and women's organizations are publicly denouncing those who violate the proscription against child marriages or marriages arranged by families without the full and free consent of the couple.

Pressures against the polygynous family are also mounting. Dwelling patterns in the towns are increasingly ill-suited to the polygynous family unit, which requires a separate hut or room for each wife, and there is evidence that under government direction, housing patterns in rural areas also are changing. In addition, the public and legal insistence on equal rights for women—which give them greater freedom of choice in marriage and equal access to divorce—permits a growing number of women to refuse to have their husbands take second wives or to become second wives themselves. Although there is no formal proscription against polygyny, the monogamous marriage is beginning to appear as the result of free choice rather than only as an adjustment to economic circumstances.

The family is losing its authority over children as well as over young adults as the state, through youth organizations and compulsory education, asserts its authority over them. Many children in secondary school and even some in primary school must move from their communities to board at the school where they are under the sole authority of school and other local officials (see ch. 9, Education).

Through the growing mobility of the population, kin ties are stretched over greater distances. The wage earner in the town or the skilled worker at Fria continues to recognize the claim of his kinsmen to a share of his resources, but he recognizes this right with a growing reluctance. The extended family and the lineage continue to have reality for him, but he is beginning to think that his earnings are his own and that he, his wife and children have prior claim and perhaps the only claim to them.

CHAPTER 7

SOCIAL VALUES AND PATTERNS OF LIVING

The values explicitly set forth by the national leaders were, in late 1961, being vigorously projected throughout the country. They are promoted in the labor unions, women's organizations and youth groups and are taught to children in the schools. Through the careful mobilization of public opinion and an effective system of rewards and punishments, the values and habits of thinking carried over from the colonial experience are gradually being displaced by new ones designed to promote the construction and maintenance of a modern, African state organized along collectivist lines.

The transition is difficult, in large part because the nation's leaders are attempting to build a sense of individual and public responsibility at the same time. Young men and women have been given the legal right to select their mates, arrange their own marriages and manage their own property and income. In these and other ways they have been encouraged to assert their independence from the traditional authority of their elders. Women are also urged to reject the traditional authority of their fathers and husbands. However, at the same time that he is being thus urged to further his personal interests—which he is only just beginning to discover—the individual is also being asked to subordinate them to the public interest as defined by the state.

Values often associated with socialism in the Western world are seen by the leaders as an integral part of the African way of life. The emphasis on cooperative labor and collective action and responsibility, as well as the general subordination of the individual to the group, are not considered as elements of a political philosophy. To Guineans they have always been central features of the "African reality." The concept of private property is not considered ever to have been an important part of this reality. Similarly, human relations characterized by a profound sense of community are said to derive from the African's natural impulse to group solidarity.

The most serious antisocial actions, which are seen as stemming from individualism, are held to be a legacy of the colonial experience. In the official view—which to a large extent is also the popular one—Guinean society was once democratic. Traditional community leader-

ship was responsible to public opinion, and economic life was governed by cooperative production and consumption groups. As subjects of the French, it is said, Guineans lost sight of the inherent worth and dignity of the individual. Traditional respect for authority was replaced by fear, and trust and confidence in leaders gave way to suspicion and hostility. Individuals began to put their personal desires above the needs of family and community. Manual labor—once ungrudgingly accepted as a natural human activity essential to the well-being of society—was stamped with the mark of inferiority.

Since independence, the people have been repeatedly exhorted by their leaders to rediscover and reassert the values believed to be rooted in their own African cultural and moral traditions. The national motto of "Work, Justice, Solidarity" is represented as the distillation of those social values which are natural to the African way of life. Pictured as intrusive elements unnatural to the African setting are such attitudes as individualism, contempt for work and the workers, regional, ethnic or religious rivalries, the subordination of young to old, of women to men and all assaults on individual dignity. Manifestations of these attitudes are held to be serious social problems whose solution depends on public rejection of un-African values.

The emphasis is on the future. Awareness of the African reality and adoption of the social values which express it are seen, not as ends in themselves, but as the base on which Guineans may hope to build a modern African state. The developing social order, growing out of the African traditions of cooperation and mutual aid, is envisioned by President Touré as a communoeracy in which agricultural, industrial and commercial cooperatives provide the context for the social, political and economic life of the people. The President's view is that only in such an African social environment, supplemented by borrowings from other nations and traditions which correspond with or can be adapted to the African reality, can the individual "develop and be revealed in all his special aspects" and can Guinea be "integrated in the modern and universal life."

Although the leaders have the confidence of the great majority of people, the social values which they articulate are by no means shared, or even understood, by everyone. Old values persist, but those which are incompatible with the new order are being deprived of the colonial or indigenous institutional structures which once supported them. Other traditional values have been given new meaning and identified with national and pan-African aspirations. The old core values of group loyalty, cooperation and mutual aid are being placed in a different context, but their retention as primary values of society has been one of the most important factors in the growing popular acceptance of new national goals and policies.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVISM

The almost universal preference for collective rather than individual action is the cornerstone of both the old and new value systems. From the illiterate village cultivator to the French-speaking political party official, there is general agreement that the individual who strikes out for himself without regard for the group to which he belongs is a threat both to himself and to others. The leaders have redefined the group to which loyalty is due, but the principle remains essentially the same. Right behavior consists in loyalty to the group and a willingness to cooperate with other members and to subordinate individual needs and desires to the needs of the group.

In the precolonial past, there was no place for the individual except as a member of a group. The conditions of life in the area dictated a collective orientation, for only as a producing member of a cooperative group could a man provide himself with food, clothing, shelter and defense against enemies. However personal his relationships with other men, or with the natural or supernatural world, he usually confronted them as a representative of his family and community.

With the appearance of the French, a new way of life became possible, if only for a minority. The developing opportunities for town life attracted people from all areas, and many became either permanent or temporary residents. Opportunities for earning wages made it possible for some to gain the necessities of life outside the local corporate group, thereby reducing the individual's economic dependency on the group and seriously compromising the legitimacy of its claims on him.

Social and religious solidarity was also weakened by the physical dispersion of family members. In the towns men and women came face-to-face with people from different communities and ethnic groups, sometimes choosing friends and mates from among them. Similarly the collective character of religious life in the villages, which centered on common membership in a kin group and on joint occupation of ancestral lands, tended to lose its relevance in towns where both Islam and Christianity invited the individual to join, by means of a personal act of faith, a diffuse community of believers.

In the towns, and to a lesser extent in the villages, people began to see themselves as individuals responsible for their own well-being rather than as members of a community held together by a system of mutual obligations. Increasingly individuals placed a higher priority on their personal desires and needs (for such things as European clothes and other consumer goods or a dowry) than on meeting the needs of their kin groups and home communities. Labor for wages was rewarded on an individual basis and tended to become a means for satisfying these desires.

The majority, perhaps, retained traditional notions concerning the priority of the group over the individual. By the time of independence, however, important segments of the urban population and some elements in rural areas had largely discarded them. Indeed, some of those who had learned French, and especially those who acquired a European education, adopted Western European values on a wholesale basis. For them the communal life of the villager had become unfamiliar.

To the new leaders, including some of the preindependence intellectuals and professionals who, until 1958, had been more French than Guinean, individualism is a threat to national security and a barrier to national development. They see it as expressing an alien egoism introduced by the French, which contaminated most of those who came into contact with it. They declare that individualism and egoism persist at various levels of Guinean society, but especially among educated townspeople. According to President Touré it reveals itself in an each-man-for-himself attitude, but also, more subtly, it is manifested in such ways as the admiration of some young people for Western tangos and waltzes in preference to native folk dances and group singing, or in their adulation of individual Western artists to the disadvantage of the anonymous producers of Africa's own social and utilitarian art.

The true African, Guineans are told, cannot conceive of life except as part of a collectivity. It is only by submerging his identity in the group and subordinating his interests to it that the individual can realize his human potential and achieve a meaningful individual dignity.

LOYALTY AND THE GROUP

The boundaries of individual loyalty have greatly changed in recent years. A father who has never left his natal community and whose loyalties are limited to kinfolk and close neighbors may have a son who wept spontaneously on learning of the death of Patrice Lumumba more than 2,000 miles away—a man whom he had never seen or known.

In the past the individual identified himself with the family into which he was born and the community in which he lived. Kinship and community ties fixed the place of the individual in society and defined his areas of loyalty and obligation. Ultimate loyalty was owed to one's own kin-community. Obligations diminished rapidly as one moved beyond this narrow circle, giving way to fear and hostility as kinship ties became more tenuous and finally disappeared.

The family unit remains the focus of loyalty and obligation, but family no longer includes a wide range of relatives, both living and dead. The effective range of kinship ties is gradually shifting to the basic family unit of husband, wife and children. Economic, social

and psychological security is no longer dependent on residence and on membership in the larger kin-community. In many instances a man finds that he cannot make a living unless he breaks away from the local group and establishes himself elsewhere. Increasingly he sees himself as earning a living by his personal labor rather than as a member of a cooperating kin group. Even when he remains in his natal community, he tends to look to the government and its agents to educate his children, to keep law and order and to provide emergency aid and for all the other services that were previously provided by the kin-community.

Physical separation from the local group weakens the individual's sense of loyalty, but obligations of mutual aid disappear only gradually. The wage earner in the town, mine or plantation continues to recognize the claims of his kinsmen—either by accepting them as dependents in his own household or by sending money or gifts back home—but with increasing reluctance. Where mutual aid was formerly requested and proffered as a matter of course between kinsmen, narrowing family loyalties have made it more difficult to give and ask for.

The government and the party are vigorously attempting to transfer individual loyalties from the kin-community to the state. Those with vested economic, political or emotional interests in the old order, and who remain committed to it, are denounced as feudalists and reactionaries. Able-bodied villagers who rely on traditional loyalties and obligations and move in with working relatives in towns are denounced as parasites on the body politic. Similarly, townsmen who have divested themselves of traditional loyalties, but have acquired no new ones beyond a loyalty to spouse and children, are denounced as self-centered, antisocial individualists who have been victimized by the colonialist mentality.

A growing number of people appear to be finding that the larger loyalty to nation offers greater material and emotional rewards to the individual than any other orientation. The prerequisites to any of these rewards, however, are explicit loyalty to the nation, identification with the national purpose and participation in the organs of national life.

On the material side, the government and the party are almost the sole distributors of salaried employment, higher education, political power and social prestige. Emotional rewards are also great. Women and young people, most of whom have experienced civil and social disadvantages in some degree in the traditional kin-community, enjoy a new sense of personal freedom as full participants in various voluntary organizations established by the state. Similarly the ethnic or regional minorities, which were historically subordinated to their more powerful neighbors and frequently held in contempt by them,

can now also assert their equality and enjoy equal opportunities by identifying themselves as Guineans and Africans rather than as residents of one or another village, region or ethnic group.

Moreover, loyalty to the nation affords the individual a new sense of personal dignity derived from the changed relationship between his country and the outside world. His government is sovereign over its own lands and people; the individual who identifies himself with the nation and its purposes can share in a new national and racial pride.

Thus, by giving his loyalty to trade unions, youth groups, women's organizations and the party itself, the individual becomes part of various social groups in which kin ties are irrelevant and regional or ethnic affiliations are accidental. Every unit of each of these organizations is linked with the national government and party structure. Through participation in these organizations, the individual learns that he is intimately involved in a society many times larger than the one his father lived in. He may still be Moslem Soussou from the coast or a Guerzé animist from N'Zérékoré, but more importantly he is a Guinean and ultimately an African.

AUTHORITY

Persons in positions of authority do not automatically enjoy the respect of their subordinates. In general, respect is accorded to the man rather than to the position he holds. Even in the army, where respect for authority is normally built into the system, soldiers do not bother to conceal their contempt for an incompetent officer. Armed with a newly acquired sense of personal dignity, the typical Guinean speaks easily and freely with those far beyond his own station in life and may go out of his way to address an official as "comrade." The official may reply in kind.

Despite enthusiasm for independence and self-rule and the broad support accorded the government, the sense of public responsibility among the citizenry is generally weak. The carryover of the attitudes toward officialdom and government property which prevailed during the colonial period is an important factor. Before independence, for example, theft of property belonging to a colonial administrator or the French Government was popularly condoned and, perhaps, encouraged. Since independence and the change from French to Guinean ownership which accompanied it, the theft of public property and public funds has continued to be a serious problem even though the courts deal harshly with offenders and the practice is denounced as a crime against the nation and a betrayal of its interests (see ch. 18, Public Order and Safety).

In general, the effort to promote good citizenship tends to focus on developing a sense of public responsibility rather than on requiring strict obedience to authority. The government relies more on exhorta-

tion, propaganda and leadership than on enforcement of arbitrary decisions. Guineans have usually responded well to their leaders on broad social and political matters, but resistance to measures which adversely affect their immediate personal interest has been strong. For example, villages continue to ignore restrictive regulations concerning the destruction of land cover by brush firing for cultivation, hunting and pasturage. Similarly, government attempts at price control are met by withholding produce from the markets and by widespread blackmarketing (see ch. 23, Agricultural Potential; ch. 27, Domestic Trade). Although the government has preferred persuasion to physical coercion and fear in exercising its authority, it seems increasingly willing to resort to punitive measures in dealing with those whom it regards as deficient in a sense of public responsibility.

WORK

Popular attitudes toward work have been strongly conditioned by the basic pattern of subsistence cultivation, by traditional divisions of labor according to sex and age and by long experience with slavery and other forms of forced labor.

Typically, the village cultivator aims at little more than producing the necessities of life. Both the means and the incentive to produce for sale as well as for use are generally absent. The cultivator lacks the tools and techniques for the production of large surpluses as well as the storage, transportation and marketing facilities to convert them to his private profit (see ch. 23, Agricultural Potential). Furthermore, the concept of producing beyond one's immediate personal needs is unpopular because it is associated with colonial exploitation. Work in general, and especially manual labor, has for generations been associated with inferiority, weakness, and with slave, client or colonial status. Among some groups—for example, the Foulah, who assign most subsistence tasks to women—manual labor is considered unmanly as well. A man works because he must. Work confers no beneficial side effects. It gives him neither prestige nor respect, nor is it considered a means of building character or soundness of body or of contributing to the well-being of the community.

~~Government attempts to change popular attitudes toward work~~ and to associate manual labor with individual dignity and the public good have not yet taken hold at the personal level. Indeed, many of those who are most contemptuous of manual labor are probably to be found at the lower echelons of the government itself and among the students who are being trained for future administrative positions.

Where the government has attempted to utilize the traditional attitudes and practices rather than to oppose them, positive results on a modest scale have been achieved. The human investment program, for example, which requires all able-bodied men and women to volun-

teer their labor on public works projects for 20 days each year, is in line with the deep-rooted African tradition of communal labor. The response to it has generally been favorable and frequently enthusiastic. Its effectiveness has been diminished, however, by the fact that what starts out as a work party soon tends to become a festive social gathering or political rally. Frequently it is enough for a man or woman to carry three or four bricks or mix a single batch of mortar to discharge his public obligations. But however little he works, the individual is encouraged to feel that, by working, he is participating directly in national development. The public stigma associated with manual labor tends to be lost in the nation-wide cooperative effort, and public condemnation is increasingly aimed at those who disdain to participate.

EDUCATION

A European secular education is almost universally highly regarded—by those who do not have it as well as by those who do. Education is generally thought of as something which can be obtained only from books or through officially designated specialists in a formal teacher-student setting. Its acquisition automatically confers a measure of prestige and opens up important avenues for advancement in the government or in the party. Education is considered to be less a matter of knowledge than of certificates and degrees, and those without such certificates are largely cut off from positions of public influence and power.

The value attached to secular, modern schooling is growing rapidly, while public interest in traditional educational techniques and goals is diminishing. This trend—away from bush-schools and from Moslem or Christian religious instruction and toward secular education—was under way long before independence, but the process has been accelerating under the new leadership. Many bush-schools have become inoperative through loss of interest; others remain, but more as symbols of the past than as on-going institutions. The period during which children receive formal instruction in the bush has dropped from several years to a matter of months or even weeks.

Similarly, the nationalization of private schools—well underway in 1961—will probably not offend the public at large (see ch. 9, Education). Many who sent their children to the local *imam* or mission school were more concerned with having them learn to read, write and count than with furthering their religious education. Indeed, many Moslems send their children to Catholic mission schools at great personal sacrifice in order to have them learn the French language and gain proficiency in Western skills (see ch. 10, Religion).

In the past, education was one of the principal distinctive features of the ruling elite. The Foulah and Malinké aristocrats were charac-

teristically Moslem scholars as well as warriors and administrators. Under the French, traditional positions of leadership frequently passed to those who had gone to French schools. For generations, education marked off the conquerors from the conquered, the master from the servant, and those who did the work from those who directed their labor.

For the present generation of parents and children, the compelling attraction of formal education lies in the fact that education is equated with high status, power and prestige while illiteracy or little education is equated with dependency status and manual labor. The government presents its educational programs and goals in terms of the nation's needs for administrative, scientific and various technical skills. The individual tends to view education in terms of personal advancement as measured by the social distance he can put between himself and those who must work with their hands for a living.

This attitude stands directly in the way of the government's attempts to meet national requirements for skilled craftsmen and technicians. Steadily, however, young people are showing an increasing willingness to forego the higher prestige traditionally ascribed to the liberal arts and to move into trade and technical schools after completing their primary education. The official insistence on the dignity of labor has probably not been an important factor. Repeated assertions that the social usefulness of the mechanic and the technician is on a par with that of the white-collar clerk or administrator have met with only limited acceptance, and then only among those who are fully committed to party policies and philosophy. Apparently a much more important factor in gaining acceptance for trade and technical jobs has been the establishment of a national system of job grading and pay scales which does, in fact, ignore the traditional inferiority of those who work with their hands (see ch. 11, Labor Force).

Students in nontechnical secondary schools of the liberal arts type still have an air of self-conscious superiority. Despite their regional and ethnic differences, the students in any such school share an attitude of self-importance which permits them to establish a united front in their dealings with the townspeople. These students—clearly set apart from the other young people in the town by their freshly laundered shirts and their ball-point pens—are apt to think in terms of traditional status symbols rather than in terms of service to the state or to the community. Ideally, they see themselves as competing for the opportunity for advanced study abroad and subsequent appointment to high positions in Conakry. Only a few look forward to serving as teachers or other specialists in a village or small town.

CHAPTER 8

ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL EXPRESSION

The ancient African arts of dance and music remain the characteristic and principal forms of artistic expression. Pervading every aspect of day-to-day living, they play an important part in almost every form of group activity and, through the Ballets Africains, have become important media in the projection of Guinea's image to the rest of the world. This company, originally formed and directed in Paris by Fodéba Kéita—in 1961 Minister of National Defense and Security—was first made up of students drawn from all of French West Africa but later consisted entirely of Guinean male and female dancers with accompanying singers and musicians—all recruited from among village amateurs. It performs frequently in Guinea and has appeared in many of the capitals of the Western world.

Native music, primarily singing and playing on percussion instruments continues to play its traditional role as an accompaniment to dancing and communal work. The *griots*, originally the musicians, annalists and even chancellors of the Malinké rulers, have survived as the singers of songs of praise, poets, musicians and entertainers, as well as guardians of a prolific oral tradition. The coming of Islam transformed many of the techniques of music, bringing several new types of instruments and a body of songs and melodies which, in Upper Guinea at least, completely replaced those that had existed before. Western influences are also evident, although no native compound—like the neo-folk music which has developed elsewhere in Africa—has emerged. Western jazz music has been enthusiastically accepted and imitated.

The dramatic arts are not well developed, but there are indications of interest in them. The Ballets Africains present some performances that are essentially theatrical, and other singing and dancing troupes often put on a playlet or series of tableaux as part of their performances. Although several Guineans are known as theatrical producers, there are as yet no facilities for legitimate theater or opera in Conakry or elsewhere in the country. A few documentary films had been produced domestically by mid-1961, but they were not of high quality. Foreign films are shown to some extent, musicals and westerns being especially popular.

The craft arts, unable to compete with manufactured consumer goods are almost extinct. A few craftsmen survive and produce a small quantity of leatherwork items, masks, statuettes, art objects and jewelry for the tourist trade. But their products are mainly imitative and often of inferior quality.

In literature there are indications that a fusion of African and French traditions is producing prose and poetry with a distinctively Guinean flavor. This fusion is perhaps best illustrated in the writings of Camara Laye, a Malinké. Best known is his "L'Enfant Noir" which, although written in French, is unmistakably African in quality. It has been enthusiastically acclaimed in both the original French and the English translation. Other Guinean writers, such as Emile Cissé, Djibril Tamsir Niane, Antoine Lawrence, Mamadou Traore Rayantra and Sadan Moussa-Touré are also contributing to a growing body of authentic Guinean literature.

In the area of formal and scientific thought, Guineans have far to go. Before the coming of Islam, they had little interest in formal thought and learning. But from the Moslems, and later the French, they acquired a great respect for intellectual capacity and education, and they are now devoting great efforts and a large proportion of their national income to the education of their people. Interest in pure learning is necessarily subordinated to the need for acquiring specific skills and abilities of immediate practical value, but the small staff of the government-supported National Institute of Research and Documentation (Institut National de Recherches et Documentation—INRD) is already directing its attention toward pure research in a few areas, as well as toward applied research with immediate practical objectives.

The government has several forms of explicit support for the arts. The JRDA has a department for art and culture whose purpose is to "inventory and encourage African art, folklore, music and literature;" it apparently directs entertainment troupes and orchestras, arranges exhibits and holds classes in printing, photography and film work. The country's compulsory educational system provides for instruction in art and music. There is official support for the Ballets Africains and national and local sponsorship of artistic competitions of various sorts, typically those between the combined song, dance and drama groups which are such important features of community, school and youth-group life. In its publications and in the two government newspapers, *Agence Guinéenne de Presse* and *Horoya*, prominence is given to artistic and cultural news (see ch. 21, Public Information and Propaganda).

At the same time government patronage of the arts is subject to overriding political considerations which, for reasons of national unification, entail stamping out much of the animist fetish worship

and initiation ceremonial. This means that, while folklore manifestations are emphasized as a tourist attraction, the original sources of these manifestations are being destroyed. For example, Kissi fetish statuettes have been forcibly removed to prevent their traditional use by the Kissi, while at the same time such statuettes are being collected for the ethnographic collection at the National Museum at Conakry.

DANCE, MUSIC AND DRAMA

The Dance

Dancing is the principal means of self-expression and recreation. It is engaged in by both men and women, young and old alike, and from earliest times it has been the center of all artistic activity. Guineans danced on all occasions—on a holiday, to welcome an important visitor, at full moon or often from sheer joy of living. Elaborate ritual dances evolved for recurrent formal occasions. There were such dances for the great events in the lives of individuals—birth, initiation, marriage, sickness, death and burial. Others were developed for communal occasions—the seasonal dances of the agricultural cycle, which were performed before sowing or harvest or to ensure the coming of the rains and the dances performed before hunting or battle and after a successful hunt. These rituals were often in the hands of sorcerers, secret societies or age groups which also had their own rituals, usually centered around a propitiatory incantation and sacrifice.

Dancing was also connected wherever possible with everyday work, especially the characteristic communal work of the villages. Harvesters, for example, danced on their way to the harvest field. Although dancing was in this way a social and communal activity, in later times there were various professional dancers and entertainers—*griots*, clowns, fire-eaters, acrobats who threw and caught young girls in rhythm and dancers who were also snake-charmers.

The style of dancing was expressive rather than formal; its effect came more from the rhythmic activity of the body as a whole and its interpretation of a character or mood than from disciplined precision of footwork or line. The accent was on collective rather than individual performance. While there were often short solos in which individuals could show their special skill and versatility, the overall character of the dance was normally the pattern of a group moving in unison.

The solo might be performed by the leader in a secret society dance, the mourners in a funeral dance or, on simpler occasions, by each dancer in turn. Sometimes such a solo created a character and enacted a simple mime. Dancing in the group was rhythmic and simple—the dancers might move around in a circle or in single file with

hands on each other's shoulders; they might advance and retire in a circle or in line abreast; or they might leap on the spot.

Dancers wore ceremonial clothes which were made in many colors, patterned with paints, dyes or embroidery and covered with ornaments, tassels and plumes. There were special ritual costumes—bark, fiber and raffia skirts, wild-animal skins or elaborate and convincing representations of strange animals or spirits. Headdresses were fantastic—tall and pointed, built up on a headband out of brilliant white plumes or imitative of a bird or animal. Masks also assisted the process of representation, being worn especially by the leaders or initiates in secret societies such as the Komo cult of the Malinké. The same performers often wore tall stilts, on which they were adept and fast-moving, and there were special stilt dances such as the Guerzé dance of Nyomou, the Hunter.

Such traditional dancing, which had long served the purpose of animist ritual, was later adapted to serve Moslem ritual and has also survived the arrival of European culture. Guinean dancing is in fact successfully exported, notably by the Ballets Africains founded and formerly directed by Fodéba Kéita, in 1961 Minister of National Defense and Security. This company, first formed in Paris of students drawn from all of French West Africa, has become wholly Guinean since independence. At home it entertains the President, his visitors and the public; abroad it has visited 20 countries and appeared in most of the capitals of the Western World. In the United States it appeared most recently in January 1961, after a first visit 2 years earlier.

The Ballets Africains are a troupe of male and female dancers with accompanying singers and musicians, all recruited from among village amateurs throughout Guinea. The dances it presents are essentially state translations of genuine African village dances. Smaller amateur troupes perform and compete locally in Guinea and tour abroad; one such troupe (from Conakry) appeared in 1960 at an international youth summer camp in East Germany.

Music

Singing and the playing of instruments were developed primarily as an accompaniment to dancing and so became communal rather than individual activities and played a significant social and religious role. Special songs, melodies and types of music had special purposes, and there were often strict rules governing when and by whom each musical instrument might be played. Musical education was sometimes a part of the initiation retreat.

Music and singing also accompanied much of the everyday work of the village, especially communal work. Working songs, accompanied by a single drummer or a small orchestra, helped to ward off

fatigue, raised morale and gave rhythm and stimulus to those working at such tasks as hoeing, sowing, harvesting, carrying burdens, paddling canoes or house-building. Such music was usually provided by amateurs, but there were also professional musicians; the best known were the Malinké *griots* who entertained their own village or wandered from one village to another.

Instrumental music was provided chiefly by percussion instruments, most of all by drums. The wooden drum or tom-tom, probably native to Guinea, was a simple large wooden cylinder which was usually played lying on its side. Special slots cut in the body made some wooden drums capable of varieties of pitch or timber; these were employed in the drum language used to give secret commands to dancers.

Skin drums were a Malinké importation which in some places superseded the wooden drums. Some had one skin and varied in size from funeral drums 4 feet high to small ones played for dancing. Some of the latter were mounted in batteries of three to five drums to produce a particular rhythmic pattern. Other types with skins might be as large as the wooden drums and were played hanging on the chest. The small hourglass drum, so called from its shape, was played tucked under the dancer's arm, so that by varying his pressure on the series of tension cords which surrounded his waist he could vary the note produced. In recent years imitations of the conventional bass drum of Western military bands have been used.

Other percussion instruments were a wooden xylophone, another Malinké instrument, and a related instrument called the bala or bala-phone. A variety of rattles, gongs and bells were also used, and almost anything else which could be beaten with a stick to make a loud noise might be called into use on occasion.

Stringed instruments—harps and guitars—were rarer and, when found, were usually played by individual performers—sorcerers or *griots*. The commonest form of harp had seven fiber strings stretched between opposite ends of a forked or bowed stick mounted in a sounding box. The commonest stringed instrument of all—much used by *griots*—was a Sudanese lute-harp or guitar, often known as the West African harp, which consisted of half a large calabash used as the soundbox with a long wooden pole protruding from its rim to form the neck. Most often it had three or six metal or fiber strings, but sometimes many more.

The chief wind instrument was a straight or slightly curved horn made of a variety of materials and usually giving only one note. A small orchestra could be formed using horns with different notes which, by alternation, produced a simple melody. There were also wood or bamboo flutes, often played as individual instruments, and various sorts of whistles.

The music was characterized by its subtle and complex rhythms. Drum beats were always syncopated, and a large number of different types of drums could be used together for contrast, producing an intricate series of overlapping rhythms. A dance might be accompanied by combinations of drums, xylophones and rattles, and further assisted by hand clapping, stamping feet, and the rhythm of bells worn by dancers and musicians.

The melodies played by harps, horns or flutes were generally simple, rhythmic and repetitive. They ranged from the haunting minor melodies of the flute, often heard in Kissidougou, through the cheerful, strong melodies played (usually in major keys) by lute-harp and balaphone combinations popular in Kankan and Lower Guinea, to the martial, bell-like rhythms of a four-horn orchestra, common among the Malinké around Kankan, as well as among the Kissi, Guerzé and other groups living in the Forest Region. As in Western jazz music, a framework of rhythm and melody provided wide scope for the enterprise and virtuosity of the individual musician.

The songs accompanying dances were sung by the dancers, the musicians or the audience. There were set chants for many ritual dances whose unvarying detail was essential to their validity. These were learned at the time of initiation to adult life or to secret societies and were carefully guarded secrets. There were also special songs, as there were special dances, for the rice harvest, for other field work, for funerals and for many special occasions.

These chants were often antiphonal. The leader's part, which was largely extempore and often consisted of topical comments, would alternate with that of the chorus, which could be a chanted set of complets, a repetition of the leader's narrative, or a characteristic humming. Sometimes the chorus hummed in imitation of stringed instruments played pizzicato or imitated bird and animal cries. The individual recital reached its highest form with the *griots* who sang traditional epics as well as songs of praise or mockery of their own composition.

Europeans coming to Guinea found native music strange, tuneless and noisy. Since it was also difficult to transcribe for European notation or instruments, Guineans were soon introduced through schools and missions to European rhythms, the tonic scale, and four-part harmony. Later they took enthusiastically to the importation of Western jazz.

As a result, native music has borrowed something from Western sources, but it can hardly be said that any genuine compound, like the neo-folk music of other parts of Africa, has been formed. Of the current nationalist songs, some are simply European while others are more traditional in style. "Liberté," the national anthem written

jointly by Fodéba Kéita and J. Cellier (a Frenchman who taught music in Guinea and led the band of the Republican Guard), seems to have a lingering African flavour. Another song, "M'Bore" ("Forward Boys"), is a rhythmic chant, while "Fany-fan" ("Long live the friendship of the peoples") is more modern in form. Another present-day song, "C'est nous les Guineans" ("We are the Guineans"), was composed by Théodore Frederic, a young composer from Kindia, and is used as a rallying song by the JRDA. Still another is "Koginefa" ("Our friend [literally, the foreigner] is here").

The government appears to encourage traditional music in all its forms. It constitutes an integral part of the repertoire of the Ballets Africains and of the many local singing and dancing groups. Much African music and song, including that of Guinean origin, is played over Radio Conakry. Recordings of Guinean music have been made by Fodéba Kéita, and in early 1961 others were being made in all parts of Guinea by an American whose collection was eventually to be available through the Library of Congress. Few opportunities for hearing European music exist; apart from a few military bands, there are no concert facilities in Conakry or elsewhere in the country.

Drama, Theater and Motion Picture

Guinean drama can be said to have existed for as long as the traditional dances, since these included, at least in their ritual forms, all the elements of dramatic presentation. Such dances were often supposed to represent, possibly with some degree of genuine belief, the presence of spirits or heroes of the tribe. In some cases they constituted a rudimentary play with developed characters and a skeleton plot which was transmitted to the audience by mime or by the accompanying song.

The dance of the cock, a Coniagui male initiation dance, is an example of this type of dance. In it the young men wore enormous headdresses portraying a cock's red crest and wattles, and white plumes. In other similar dances "bird men" wore elaborate costumes built up of layer upon layer of colored feathers. Groups of warriors or hunters in full dress also did mimed dances. In the Bako dance of the Bassari, a group of women danced an elaborate mime of the life of their menfolk. Appropriately dressed and faithfully mimicking their originals, the Koukon age-group society of the Guerzé used to act out a caricature of figures of the European administration—the governor, the regional commandant, his adjutant, the army captain and the European doctor.

A common dramatic aid was the use of masks to make the wearer resemble, or even be, the person or spirit he represented. Masks were considered to be profaned by speech, and their wearers had to remain silent. In some places, especially where the wearing of masks

had been tolerated in a Moslem society, they gradually lost their special significance and thereafter degenerated into adjuncts to clowning or comic representation of public institutions.

These forms of nascent drama did not evolve along European lines and, after the coming of the French, the theater was limited to officially sponsored West African tours by French companies. The French administration, however, subsidized a few native theatrical troupes in West Africa which performed indigenous plays at home and in France.

In late 1961 there were no facilities for legitimate theater or opera in Conakry. Dramatic entertainment was provided for the public only by the Ballets Africains and by occasional traveling entertainment groups, such as a touring troupe from the People's Republic of China (Communist China). Nevertheless there seems to be indigenous theater of some sort; the Ballets Africains give performances that are largely, if not wholly, theatrical, and several Guineans are known as theatrical producers. The typical singing and dancing troupes often present a playlet or a series of tableaux as part of their performances.

European cinema appeared during the colonial period and found favor with the Africans. Many French films, some American ones with French subtitles, as well as Russian and other foreign films with dubbed-in French, are shown in the larger towns. In 1960 a few 16-millimeter films of mediocre quality were being produced under the direction of the Ministry of Information and Tourism. In early 1961 a Czechoslovakian team arrived in Conakry to discuss with the government the possibility of producing a Guinean historical film (see ch. 21, Public Information and Propaganda).

ARTS AND HANDICRAFTS

Pre-Islamic Guinea had few specialist craftsmen; each family made what it needed for itself. Greater craft development came with Islamic influences from the Sudan, particularly with the Malinké who introduced the growing, dyeing and weaving of cotton, as well as leatherwork, embroidery, filigree work in jewelry and improved techniques in basketry. Smiths, weavers, leatherworkers and woodworkers were always men; potters were always women and dyers usually were. It was customary everywhere for both husband and wife to be craftsmen; the wives of smiths were potters and those of leatherworkers were dyers. There was some local specialization—villages of potters or weavers—and in this and other ways particular crafts gained a local fame in certain areas. A few craftsmen, especially weavers, were itinerant.

Smiths also made jewelry; the best was made by a specialist caste among the Malinké. They used gold and obtained silver and alu-

minum either commercially or by melting down coinage. Jewelry made of precious metals was usually cast or forged, but the Malinké craftsmen centered on Kankan and Conakry did filigree work in gold, often of great delicacy. Ornaments and jewelry played an important part in the costume of the people; the ideas of ornamentation and religious protection were inextricably mixed. The most prized ornaments were rings and bracelets of precious metals, sometimes engraved with geometric figures. Bracelets were made of several thin rings or, among the Malinké, of a single heavier ring, usually with an opening in it, the two ends being tapered and finished with little balls or cones. Earrings and gold jewelry worn in the hair were also common.

The smith also worked in both hard and soft woods. Many wood-work products, from large chests and other furniture to small objects like door locks and snuff boxes, were elaborately ornamented, predominantly in geometric patterns, with carving or pokerwork. The roof pillars of huts were sometimes polished and ornamented with carved geometric designs or, in non-Moslem areas, with representations of familiar animals or everyday objects.

Leatherwork was the speciality of the pastoral peoples which brought the Sudanese tradition to Guinea, but their work was never of the best Sudanese standard. They made mainly luxury and ornamental articles—sandals, slippers, amulets, bracelets, belts, straps, cushions, bags and pouches, sheaths and scabbards, saddles and harness, bindings and cases for the Koran and some household articles. For ornament, leather was often dyed in lively colors, punched and carved in geometric patterns, plaited, embroidered or decorated with jewelry. Leather strips were used in appliqué work, and sheaths and cases were ornamented with thick tassels or fringes.

Weaving was done on small looms which produced cotton lengths over a yard long and four to six inches wide. The best weavers could at one time produce color patterns, usually in stripes, with a single length of cloth. Gala or ceremonial clothes were made in a single bright color or in patterns formed by using either parti-colored lengths or else separate contrasting lengths placed side by side. Indigo was the commonest dye; other plant and bark dyes produced various shades of blue, green, brown, ocre and black. Patterns could be made by covering or pressing on parts of the cloth during dyeing. Plain white or yellow clothes could be ornamented with black circles or geometric figures which were stenciled on the cotton with a special clay.

The embroidery of clothes was an art of Sudanese origin. It was highly regarded in Islam because the Prophet himself had advocated it, and it spread from the Fouta Djallon and Upper Guinea into other

areas. It was usually done in one color, primarily using characteristic geometric motifs originally of Arabic inspiration.

Basketry had many uses; baskets were made in various shapes and were frequently ornamented by weaving black or other colored strands into a lighter ground. Raffia and straw were woven to make bags, matting, satchels, boxes and scabbards, and plaited to make necklaces, bracelets and other ornaments, ropes and string. Foulah women made the *mbedo*, a traditional decorative spiral disc used to cover milk bowls, in yellow, red and black straw.

Pots were carefully made and finished, but tended to be fragile and usually suffered from inadequate baking. Though not glazed, they were hand-polished with stones inside and out and ornamented in various ways—by variations in color, by shells stuck in the clay, by geometric designs either superimposed in kaolin on the outside or scratched or printed into the clay while soft. Designs could also be painted on in color, but these soon disappeared with use.

Paintings, other than that used in decorating pottery, seems to have been done only for ornamenting the inside or outside walls of huts. Kissi homes were decorated on the outside by women who used a mixture of ash and cow dung diluted in water to produce traditional and sometimes very stylized representations of village and household scenes or plants in monochrome on the white kaolin plaster. More recent paintings by traveled young men have featured such popular motifs as trucks and planes. Other huts and ceremonial tombs often had simpler designs in red and white. Moslems traditionally covered the inside of their huts, floor and walls alike, with dense geometric patterns carved on the plaster and painted.

The fetishist forms of animism, which originally existed in all parts of Guinea, produced a variety of religious objects. Although Islam was strongly opposed to all representations of people and animals, it accommodated itself to animism to a certain extent, and characteristic fetish objects survived in modified form in some Moslem areas as well as in the Forest Region and Lower Guinea.

Many fetish objects embodied the craftsman's best work. The best known of these are the carved statuettes, mainly in stone, found among animist tribes and also among the Malinké, though not apparently among the Foulah. They served various religious ends, but were generally the embodiments of the powerful spirits of cult heroes or ancestors. Similarities in style over large areas suggest some sort of common origin, and tentative datings extend back to the sixteenth century. While they were still found in the 1950's, their users had largely lost the art of stone sculpture.

These statuettes were carved in soft stone, generally steatite (soapstone), and included animal figures, human heads, full-length human figures and small groups such as a funeral group of two men carrying

a bier. In style, they varied from elegant, stylized, abstract figures showing the influence of Sudanese art to the animated, realistic and grotesque figures commoner in the Forest Region. Female figures were often represented with symbolically enlarged breasts. The statuettes were carefully shaped, and their surfaces might be covered with geometric ornamentation.

In addition to stone, other materials, such as ivory, wood and clay, may have been used for sculpture. There were some ivory-workers in Conakry, Kankan and other centers, but they did not form part of a large-scale indigenous craft group. Wood-carving, most often found in the savanna and forest regions, seems even there to have been confined mainly to house-pillars, furniture and ritual masks.

Masks were typical of animist societies and also survived among the Malinké. Like other ritual apparatus—musical instruments and costumes—they gained magic power from their use and were elaborately made and decorated. The Coniagui and Bassari made tall, pointed hood-masks of bark, but masks were usually made of soft wood, carved into the shape of a face and coated with a black vegetable-resin which was polished to give a brilliant, lacquer-like finish. Large masks were made for dancers, smaller copies for sorcerers. Some peoples had a range of individual patterns to represent particular spirits, genies and divinities, male and female; men's masks had beards and moustaches made of coarse hair. Masks were carved in more or less naturalistic shapes with long faces, prominent aquiline noses, large mouths and distinctive slit eyeholes and ranged in appearance from the stylized and expressionless to the realistic and terrifying.

Musical instruments used in ritual were richly decorated. The bodies of drums and the sound boxes of stringed instruments were carved and painted with geometric or representational designs, or covered with pokerwork ornamentation. A few instruments—drums and flutes—showed attempts at anthropomorphic sculpture; one wooden drum used by the Kundo agrarian cult of the Kissi was made in the shape of a small female figure. Horns and flutes were often cased in leather or wild animal skins.

For some time after the French conquest the inaccessibility of much of the country and the conservative tastes and poverty of Guineans combined to preserve native handicrafts, but once imported goods and materials began to reach consumers they brought craftwork—particularly in iron and textiles—to an end. Native handicrafts were not generally modified or improved by coming into contact with industrial processes; they either remained intact, or, more often, died out completely. French attempts to foster and improve craftwork, through schools, technical courses and adult classes, met with little success—partly because those who were reached by those means were the would-be officials rather than the traditional craftsmen.

Some craftsmen continue to do traditional craftwork for the tourist market, but their output is commercialized, mainly imitative and variable in quality. It includes leatherwork, masks, statuettes, heads and jewelry. One or two shops in Conakry specialize in selling local handicrafts and art objects to tourists, and such objects are also sold in the large open-air markets.

LITERATURE

Storytellers and Griots

The literary tradition began in the nonliterate period of storytellers, singers and *griots*, with its rich and extensive body of legends, myths, fables and proverbs. Each area had its characteristic traditions—plain tales in the savanna and uplands, weird and primitive fantasies in the forest. But there was also some interchange between different traditions, even between Islamic teachings and animist myths, and stories were continually being modified and invented.

Legends and epics about tribal ancestors and great warriors were numerous, as were the myths of the supposed origins of families and tribes. Other legends offered explanations of social customs or natural phenomena such as fire, thunder and lightning, the sun, the moon and the stars. Moral and cautionary fables, with a grotesque or comic twist or any unexpected ending, pointed out the virtues of goodwill, humor, piety, hospitality and justice. In many of these, insects and such animals as the hare, the antelope, the elephant, the tortoise and the crocodile—played characteristic roles. A group of Kono stories about the orphan and the spider were related to a widespread African tradition. Proverbs, problems, riddles and puzzles were part of village lore, especially of children's games.

All these stories centered on universal themes. They were vivid, realistic and kept to essentials. Fables, even about fantastic events, held closely to real life: spirits, genies and specters behaved in simple human ways. The most moral stories had a ribald, realistic undercurrent.

The telling of a story was an art in itself; part narrative, part song, and often accompanied by music, it involved all the teller's dramatic abilities in mimicry, voice and gesture. Good storytellers had a wide reputation; the most renowned were the *griots*, the traditional minstrels of the Malinké people. While the *griots* drew on the general tradition of songs and stories, their specialties were the historical Malinké epic, often of war and battle, and the formal eulogy—both of which were chanted in eloquent, ornate language. They also sang songs of mockery and satire, love songs and dirges. In Malinké country, each village had its own *griot* who had served a long apprenticeship in order to learn the requisite sagas, historical traditions and the

techniques of singing and oratory. Other *griots* traveled far beyond the Malinké area; some lived a wandering life, earning a meagre living with their lute-liarps as praise singers and go-betweens or as the companions of great hunters.

Early Literature

The nearest approach to writing in pre-Islamic Guinea was the Toma alphabet, a collection of ideographs thought to have been used in Upper Guinea. Islam brought the Arabic language and, with it, the Koran as well as other sacred writings, law books and literature. Arabic never became an everyday language in Guinea, but although ill-suited for the purpose owing to its incapacity to denote the vowels, the Arabic alphabet—with the help of a special system of accent marks—was later used to transcribe the Foulah, and possibly also the Mandé, language. The Foulah used their written language to translate the Koran word-for-word and to record the elements of Moslem instruction in simple verse. Later they turned to original composition, mostly in verse, which was based on Arabic models. Their poetry was pre-eminently religious but also touched on social or philosophical subjects or life. A characteristic form was the lyric satire on manners. The language often recalls that of the psalms; there is the same sense of religious longing and some of the poetry has a simple lyric beauty. It has been stigmatized as derivative, but at least some of it seems to have a value of its own. Much was translated into French by Gilbert Vieillard, a French administrator.

Modern Literature

No Guineans were among the few native West Africans who, starting in 1926, began to publish books in the French language. But by the 1960's, after a slow start, a new interest in writing, given impetus by the coming of independence, had led to some interesting literary developments.

The Guinean writer with the widest popular reputation abroad is Camara Laye, a Malinké from Kouroussa, who went to France to complete his education. Later, while working in an automobile factory in Paris, he wrote the story of his life from early childhood to his departure for France—a simple description of the atmosphere, events, highlights and mysteries of African town and country life as interpreted by a sensitive and intelligent child. In doing so he seems to have created in French an unmistakably African work. First published in France in 1954, as *L'Enfant Noir* (The Dark Child), it caused a sensation: an English translation was issued both in the United States and in England. Camara Laye has since published *Le Regard du Roi* (The King's Regard) and written, on a

number of occasions, for the literary review, *Présence Africaine*. This bimonthly cultural review of the Black African world was founded in Paris by Alioune Diop of Senegal with French literary support and now publishes (from Brussels) articles by African authors of many countries, including a number of Guineans, as well as others by white authors with an interest in Africa. There is an English-language as well as a French edition.

Assiatou de Septembre (Assiatou in September), published in 1959 by Emile Cissé, is more typical of the present regime. It is a short novel describing a love affair between Assiatou, daughter of a former customary chief from the Fouta Djallon, and a young Guinean political progressive; it concludes with a tragic ending which takes place during the period of the 1958 referendum. Interspersed throughout the vivid narrative are sections of political discussion and commentary, and there is a long preface by President Touré.

Soundjata, ou l'Epopée Mandingue (Soundjata, or the Malinké Epoch), by Djibril Tamsir Niane, a Guinean educator, was published in 1960. It concerns the life of Marion Mari Djata, one of the founders of the Mali Empire in the Middle Ages, who has been called an African Alexander the Great. As a rediscovery of past African greatness, the book has overtly nationalist aims, but it also has literary interest in that it purports to be a personal transcription of the Mandé epics sung by Djeli Mamadou Kouyaté, a modern Malinké *griot* from Siguiri. The author's notes place the *griot* saga, with its epic grandeur and mythical atmosphere, in a full historical context.

The same author collaborated with Jean Suret-Canale, the French director of the INRD, to produce a Guinean textbook, *Histoire de l'Afrique Occidentale* (History of West Africa), published in 1960 (see ch. 9, Education). Previously (in 1958) Suret-Canale had published *Afrique Noire* (Black Africa), an African history written from a Marxist viewpoint, which is to be followed by a sequel covering recent years.

Not least among Guinean writers is Fodéba Kéita, who has published notably *Poèmes Africains* (African Poems), *Le Theatre Africain* (The African Theater), *Le Maître d'Ecole* (The Schoolmaster) and *Les Hommes de la Danse* (The Dancers). His anticolonial poems were banned in French Africa in 1951. Other Guinean writers include: Antoine Lawrence a Catholic and a philosophical writer; David Mendessi Diop, a university graduate and schoolteacher; Mamadou Traore Rayautra, deputy director of the INRD.

Sadan Moussa-Touré is a Guinean poet who brought out *Les Premières Guinéades* (The First Guineads) in 1960 to celebrate the Three-Year Plan; this is to be followed by further volumes for each year of the Plan. The First Guineads consists of two long, patriotic and nationalist poems and several shorter poetic fables—traditional dia-

logues between humans or animals on moralistic themes. Apart from the subject matter, little marks the poems as specifically Guinean.

A collection of a few contemporary Guinean songs and poems in French and native languages from various sources was published by Djibril Niane in *Présence Africaine*. Two of the more interesting are attributed to a young *griot*, Diely Mamadou Kandé; one is a long, diffuse hymn in praise of independence; the other—an exhortation in Mandé to Guineans to vote against continued union with France in the 1958 referendum—is a mixture of moralizing, proverbial wit, topical reference and eulogy and is apparently modeled on the *griot* song of praise.

Apart from *Liberté*, a magazine at one time issued by Ismael Touré and edited by Maurice Camara (but which has apparently gone out of existence), the reviews open to Guinean writers are *Recherches Africaines*, the journal of the INRD, and *Présence Africaine*. A special issue of *Présence Africaine* (No. 29 of December 1959 and January 1960) celebrated Guinean independence. *Présence Africaine* has also published many books, including Niane's "Soundjata" and several volumes of President Touré's speeches, and has also sponsored two international congresses of negro writers and artists—one in Paris in 1956 and one in Rome in 1959. From the first congress emerged the African Cultural Society (*Société Africaine de Culture*). The second congress was addressed by President Touré on "The African Intellectual in the Political Struggle."

FORMAL AND SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT

The traditional way of life of the Guinean was almost specifically nonintellectual; his preoccupation was with the actual and concrete, and he had no interest in abstraction. While the supernatural invaded every part of his day-to-day life, he dealt with it in realistic terms. His artistic symbolism was employed, not to depict an abstract unknown, but rather to make the unknown and the supernatural seem more concrete. Any detached intellectual inquiry was precluded by the viewpoint from which he saw the physical world.

The specific innovations introduced by Islam included: the Arabic language and alphabet; various technical improvements such as the lunar calendar of weeks, months and years; more efficient and standardized Arabic systems of measurement; written numbers; and possibly decimal system of counting. But, above all, Islam introduced for the first time a respect for learning and for the intellect. The Koranic school, which functioned in almost every Moslem village, taught reading, writing, spelling and grammar to a sizable portion of the population and gave a very few students instruction in legal and literary studies. But this important intellectual tradition was not one of original thought; it aimed, not at genuine intellectual inquiry,

but rather at inculcating by rote a predetermined body of known facts, mainly religious (see ch. 9, Education).

The French in their turn brought a new language and a new and highly developed intellectual discipline and culture and attempted to transmit it to some Guineans through French schools. However, French education, in accordance with the official assimilation policy, was provided on a very inadequate scale and strictly along European lines. The resulting instruction in the "three R's"—with a little history, geography and science—seemed irrelevant and meaningless to most Guineans. The few who achieved a higher degree of education and became the *évolués*, or intellectual elite, tended to lose their links with their own African background. In striving to become Guinean copies of educated Frenchmen, some of them achieved a high degree of superficial French culture, but failed to integrate it with their own way of life.

Hence European intellectual traditions achieved little prestige during most of the colonial period. Not until World War II did the small but growing intellectual elite become a recognizable entity with a character of its own. At about this time, the French administration began to encourage native intellectual initiative by offering prizes for original scientific or literary work and making grants to lecture troops and societies.

In 1938 the French Institute of Black Africa (Institut Français d'Afrique Noire—IFAN) was created in Dakar out of an existing semiofficial organization. Its purpose was to sponsor original West African research in physical science, ethnology and economics and to preserve African culture and native crafts. The Guinean territorial center of IFAN (known as Centrifan) was founded in Conakry in 1945 by Georges Balandier, who also founded and edited the IFAN territorial review *Études Guinéennes*, which appeared between 1947 and 1956. The center consisted of a museum of African arts, a library, archives and an experimental garden; it also served as a base for French anthropologists working in Guinea.

European intellectual culture has perhaps come more into its own since independence than before it. Guineans have a great respect for intellectual capacity and education and are devoting more thought, labor and money to their development than ever before. The results are still entirely French in form and language and are largely so in content; nothing in this field yet belongs uniquely to Guinea. The President and the government recognize the need for people with intellectual background, and particularly for those with scientific and technical training, but at this stage in the country's development, the scholar or educated man is valuable only insofar as he can be made immediately useful to the state. There is little time for academic speculation, especially in the humanities. The intellectual sphere is

pervaded at all times—in public speaking, in writing and in thought—by the modified Marxist outlook of the PDG leaders (see ch. 9, Education; ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

The only institution of pure or applied research is still the former Centirfan, transformed in November 1958 into the National Institute of Research and Documentation. (Institut National de Recherches et de Documentation—INRD.) It is directed by Suret-Canale, whose deputy is the writer, Mamadou Traore Rayautra. It includes within its scope both Africanist disciplines and all forms of national scientific research, including that required under the Three-Year Plan.

In mid-1960 the INRD comprised the National Museum, various collections, a library and a laboratory in Conakry, and the National Scientific Station and Nature Reserve at Mount Nimba (N'Zérékoré). Its small staff was engaged in making sociological studies for administrative purposes, in collecting ethnographic material, and in maintaining a documentation and information service for the public; programs in scientific research and archaeology were also in prospect. Its quarterly review, *Recherches Africaines*, successor to *Études Guinéennes*, first appeared in 1959. It has already published articles in a wide variety of fields, many of which appear to achieve a high academic standard.

CHAPTER 9

EDUCATION

Education has become a vital activity since independence. At a time when the average African budget allotted 3 percent to education, in Guinea it commanded over 20 percent of the 1961 budget, 10 percent of the Three-Year Plan and substantial contributions from regional budgets and the human investment program. Official figures showed that, with this investment and assistance from foreign countries, including the United States, the school enrollment in two years doubled what it had been after 60 years under the French. Secondary education had trebled in capacity, technical education had increased many times, and, while Guinea's first institution of higher education was being erected at home, about 1,000 students were following their studies in some 15 countries overseas. Education had achieved a central position in national life and had become the acknowledged instrument of national aims.

This situation contrasted sharply with that in 1958 just before independence when, even after considerable postwar development, French primary education still reached only one child in ten and secondary education, first introduced less than ten years before, reached only two or three primary pupils in a hundred. For most of the colonial period the rigid French primary system, which consisted of French language education balanced by manual and vocational training, had had little effect on Guineans. The small elite, which was trained to a higher standard in order to fill gaps in the French administration, had become men of two worlds who could not live at ease in either and were resentful of their second-rate qualifications and limited opportunities.

Guineans emerged from this era with contempt for what they saw as "cut-price" education—inappropriate in content, insufficient in provision and inadequate in range. They had acquired, however, a deep respect for the concept of formal education as the source of white supremacy.

Immediately after independence they set out not merely to maintain French standards but to improve them. In the educational reform, they proposed to provide instruction of European caliber, adapted to African needs, which would meet the national demand for a trained

elite and, within ten years, achieve the universal primary education promised by the Constitution.

Two years after the initiation of the reform, the plans for numerical increases were in general being fulfilled. In mid-1961 there were some 420 primary schools teaching 84,000 pupils; 14 secondary schools teaching 5,500; 4 technical schools holding 1,660; and a number of vocational schools. The Guinean teaching staff was about 2,000 strong, supplemented for secondary teaching by 100 or 200 qualified teachers from foreign countries. The total school population of 91,000 then formed about 15 percent of the school-age population.

The scale of this increase, however, in view of the lack of academic tradition in Guinea and the extreme shortage of trained teachers, suggests that quantity has so far been won at the expense of quality. There is evidence that standards have fallen, particularly in secondary schools. The present teacher-training system, besides being inadequate to meet the demand, makes no immediate provision for training secondary teachers and thus dispensing with the foreign teaching staff. The practical effort of the new Africanized syllabus is uncertain. As of mid-1961 school authorities continued to express the need for fundamental textbooks on geography, geology, botany and zoology, based on conditions applicable to Guinea and West Africa, to replace those based on non-African countries. Guineans are still bound, probably more than they realize, by French traditions, and culture is seen largely in terms of French culture. The desire to retain the cultural bond was demonstrated in the French-Guinean cultural accord signed shortly after independence and renewed in July 1961.

Besides its main purposes of providing universal instruction and forming an elite, especially in the technical field, education is an important vehicle for national and political ends. Political courses are to be provided in secondary schools; the content of certain other courses, and the choice of languages taught, serve broadly political purposes. English and Arabic language instruction take on special importance as a means of facilitating communications with many other African countries. The system serves the aim of national unity by providing the common factor of the official French language and by mingling the various Guinean regional and ethnic groups in the secondary boarding schools.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Native Upbringing

Before the coming of either Islamic or European culture, Guinean children had little or no formal education. They began to learn everyday tasks and skills at five or six years by copying the activities of adults. They pretended to grind corn, light fires and carry bundles.

They were left much to their own devices, and punishments were few. At seven or eight the play turned almost imperceptibly into genuine tasks—boys were sent to scare birds away from the crops, collect the chickens or fetch water; girls swept the floor or looked after younger children.

Later the children would learn the specific occupations of their sex: boys from their fathers, girls from an older friend or perhaps a future mother-in-law. At 12 or 13 they had their individual duties: a boy had his agricultural tools and kept a few chickens, a girl had jobs to do in the hut. A few children in places where handicrafts flourished were apprenticed to a smith, carpenter or potter.

The climax of the boy's or girl's upbringing came most often in an initiation ceremony, normally involving a period of retreat away from the village, which ended with pubertal rites—circumcision or excision. Sometimes the retreat was the time for formal instruction in adult behavior. Initiation marked the assumption of adult duties and established the now mature man's or woman's status in society.

Islamic Schooling

Entering Guinea with incoming peoples, Islam, with its emphasis on learning and literacy, brought with it the traditional Koranic school. In the Moslem areas of the Fouta Djallon even the remotest villages had such a school where a single teacher taught 10 students or less. His only qualification was the ability to recite the Koran and write Arabic characters. Although he could not teach the Koran for money, he was entitled to gifts and services from his pupils.

The Koranic school had no formal buildings—it was held in the teacher's house or in the open. The school day consisted of two or three sessions in the early morning, early afternoon and evening. The school year was broken by frequent festivals as well as by the weekly break from Wednesday mid-day to Friday evening. Whenever agricultural work was heavy, school would recess or close down entirely. Education was informal by Western standards, and discipline in schools was mild.

The pupils, who included an unusually high proportion of girls, attended the school from about the age of six. In the first stage of education, which took two to four years, they learned reading and writing of Arabic and memorized as much as possible of the sacred writings; the Koran was the sole subject matter. After this stage, students might go on to *firugol* which involved *ka'be*, study of the divine unity, and *tafsir*, Koranic exegesis. In the latter, the Foulah language was used (up to this point all study was in Arabic). Both Foulah and Mandé languages could be written in Arabic script, and contrary to African Moslem tradition, vernacular manuscripts of the

Koran were not unusual. The successful student of *firugol* could go on to *fennu*, the study of Moslem law, Arabic and Foulah literature and other Islamic subjects.

The Koranic school gave the Fouta Djallon a reputation as "a state of lettered citizens," in which only serfs and caste classes were illiterate. It thus brought a system of formal education to Guinea many years before the arrival of Europeans.

French Colonial Period

French formal education came to Guinea by way of Senegal, where state and missionary schools operated from 1817. After failure with a vernacular language, the state imposed French as the official medium of instruction, and missionary teachers set a practical nonacademic pattern for native education, teaching handicrafts to boys and home skills to girls. Governor Louis Faidherbe initiated the formation of an African elite with his School of Hostages (later the School for the Sons of Chiefs and Interpreters) which he founded at St. Louis, Senegal, in 1856. He also worked for a general introduction of secular state schools to combat Moslem resentment against the government-backed mission schools.

However, when French colonization moved southward along the coast, the initiative in providing education was left to the emerging colonial administration, which did little except to subsidize mission schools. The first French school in Guinea was opened by the Holy Ghost Fathers at Boffa in 1878; it was moved to Conakry in 1890. Three years later the first girls' school was opened in Conakry by the Sisters of St. Joseph of Cluny. The Holy Ghost Fathers opened five more schools during this period. By 1900 the missionary schools at Conakry and Boffa held a total of about 360 children.

The first state schools in Guinea were opened in 1903 when a standard system of French education was introduced throughout newly formed French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française—AOF). The contemporary separation of church and state in France made these schools necessarily secular and also caused the withdrawal, in 1906, of the state subsidies to mission schools, largely halting their progress and leaving the field to the state schools.

The chief task of the state schools was to teach the French language, which was the sole medium of instruction. It was accompanied by reading, writing, arithmetic and, in the upper grades, history, geography, geometry and elementary science. The academic content was of French origin and largely irrelevant to African life: pupils remembered little of it, or of the French language, after leaving school. It was supplemented by manual work, either on a school farm or garden or in a local handicraft.

For reasons of expense and of policy, the state system grew slowly. By 1938 it still had only 55 schools, with 42 European and 191 African teachers, teaching almost 8,000 pupils or 2 percent of the school-age population (see table 1). Only the town schools and the regional schools—which took on the best pupils from the village schools in their region—taught even as far as the primary certificate, a poor relation of its French counterpart, which pupils took at about 16 after about six years of school. —

Table 1. School Enrollment in Guinea, 1938

	Schools	Boys	Girls	Total Students
<i>Government Schools:</i>				
Elementary primary:				
Village schools.....	43	3, 263	495	3, 758
Regional schools.....	10	2, 845	354	3, 199
Urban schools.....	2	641	178	819
Total.....	55	6, 749	1, 027	7, 776
Higher primary:				
Higher primary.....	1	62	-----	62
Professional.....	1	130	-----	130
Total.....	2	192	-----	192
Total Government Schools....	57	6, 941	1, 027	7, 968
<i>Private Schools:</i>				
Mission schools.....	3	606	346	952
Total All Schools.....	60	7, 547	1, 373	8, 920

Source: Adapted from *Annuaire Statistique de l'Afrique Occidentale*, Vol. II, Paris, 1951.

The full scope even of the primary system did not reach Guinea until the early 1930's when the Ecole Camille Guy, a higher primary school, and the Ecole Georges Poiret, a professional school, were opened in Conakry to offer a 2 to 4 year course to those who had earned a primary certificate. The former turned out junior administrators, the latter foremen or artisans. Both schools accepted only as many pupils as would be required to fill the administration's needs, since they existed solely for this purpose, and the French characteristically avoided giving instruction to those who would not be able to use it. In 1933 a small agricultural school was opened at Tolo, near Mamou, and offered adult classes in agriculture, crafts and hygiene, given in the vernacular and held mainly in the towns. This completed the French educational system in Guinea.

For further education the Guinean elite went to Senegal, most often to the Ecole Normale William Ponty near Dakar, for many years the only teacher-training college in AOF. It turned out a small number of qualified teachers who had to be supplemented by unqualified staff recruited from primary school and trained in teachers' classes—several of which were eventually opened in Guinea. It also trained administrative and medical students, the latter completing their studies at the School of Medicine in Dakar.

Guinean girls attended a similar school at Rufisque, near Dakar, which opened in 1939. Several Guineans attended the Higher Technical School at Bamako which trained for the public works service. There were special schools for the sons of chiefs in Senegal and Soudan, and the European high schools in Dakar, run primarily for French children, were also open to Africans. A very few Guineans went on from one or another of these schools to higher studies in France.

The elite of educated Africans (*évolués*) who emerged from this system formed a new social class. Usually they were unable either to return to their African background or to integrate it with their considerable degree of at least superficial French culture. Most of them joined the French regime, in which they gained definite privileges, assuming European views and giving loyal and able service within their appointed fields. Even here they realized that their progress was bound within the essentially static administrative structure, and they resented the fact that their African qualifications were always inferior to the corresponding French ones.

This situation improved in the course of time. By the end of World War II, French attitudes were more enlightened, and the *évolués* had emerged from notoriety as the servants of the regime to recognition as a group of leading spokesmen of African aspirations. The final period of French education in Guinea—after the Brazzaville Conference in 1944 and the creation of the French Union in 1946—brought widening scope and rising standards (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

New primary schools were opened, and many village schools were elevated to the standard of regional schools. Seven complementary courses, nearly equivalent to the former higher primary school, were created. School attendance, which was 9,000 in 1938, grew to 14,000 in 1948 and nearly doubled in each succeeding five-year period. In 1957–58 more than 44,000 students were attending school, most of them at the primary level. Government and private schools, which numbered 219 in 1953–54, had multiplied to 328 in 1957–58 (see table 2).

Guinea's first three secondary schools were opened soon after World War II, all in Conakry. The *collège classique* offered a full academic secondary program; by the time of independence it had 800 students, had been promoted to high school (*lycée*) status and was granting the high school diploma. The parallel *collège moderne* offered a shorter.

Table 2. School Enrollment in Guinea, 1953-54 and 1957-58

	1953-54		1957-58	
	Schools	Students	Schools	Students
<i>Government Schools:</i>				
Primary-----	151	19, 189	224	31, 904
Secondary-----	7	825	20	1, 745
Technical-----	18	684	¹ 18	¹ 700
Total Government-----	176	20, 698	262	34, 349
<i>Private Schools:</i>				
Mission schools-----	43	4, 549	66	10, 165
TOTAL ALL SCHOOLS-----	219	25, 247	328	44, 514

¹ Figure for 1957-58 technical education estimated.

Source: Adapted from Guid'A.O.F. *L'Afrique Occidentale Française et le Togo*, 1958-1959, p. 289.

more scientific course. The *collège de jeunes filles* was a separate girls' secondary school. Most secondary students were given maintenance scholarships. In 1958 only 1 in 20 out of the relatively small school population was a secondary student.

The Conakry professional school became a technical college, which awarded an industrial diploma after four years of training. Vocational centers were opened at Conakry, Kindia and Kankan, and the agricultural school at Tolo was given a similar status. A School of General Administration, capable of training about 40 future officials, and a Women's Training School were opened in Conakry about 1957. A School of Nursing was also opened to train both male and female staff. The prewar adult classes were overhauled, and useful experiments were held in Labé, Conakry and elsewhere, but for various reasons these classes remained unpopular.

The flow of advanced students to France greatly increased immediately after the war, but to avoid the pitfalls of this trend, as many as possible were later diverted into the new Institute of Higher Studies at Dakar which, in 1957, became the University of Dakar. Guinean students continued to go to France in some numbers (300 in 1955) as well as to Dakar.

By the mid-1950's there were five teacher-training classes in Guinea—at Boké, Kindia, Kankan, Popodara (near Labé) and Conakry; the latter was for girls. Before independence another was opened at Macenta, and a full teacher-training school was founded at Kindia. In 1953 the teaching strength of 389 in state schools comprised 254 fully- and partly-qualified teachers (including a number from France) and 135 unqualified teaching staff.

The administration of the state schools was in the hands of a chief inspector who was responsible to the governments in both Conakry and Dakar. The territorial government of Guinea had a minister for education and one for technical education, and, at the time of independence, the territory was divided into four education regions under primary inspectors.

Private schools continued to operate alongside the state system. Attendance at the Moslem Koranic schools was about 18,900 in 1938—more than twice that at French schools. Many Guineans, including President Touré, were sent to a Koranic school for several years before going on to French primary school; some attended both schools simultaneously.

The Christian mission schools, all Catholic and mainly primary, were hampered both by the loss of their subsidies in 1906 and by official regulations aligning them with the state schools. From 1949 on, however, they were needed to assist in the expansion of education and so were given subsidies both from the Fund for Economic and Social Development (Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Économique et Social—FIDES) and from the territorial administration. They held a steady proportion of the school population, including children of both Moslems and animists, and for many years in Lower Guinea offered the only formal education.

Their instruction was marked by its emphasis on practical work and on female education—over 30 percent of the students were girls, compared with less than 15 percent in state schools even in the 1950's. They also tried to give a genuinely African background and have been praised for preparing Catholic, French-speaking Africans, rather than detribalized civil servants.

Independence and the Reform

At the time of independence in October 1958, education became the focus of great attention. The postwar expansion of the educational system begun by the French was continued, but at a much faster rate.

The crisis caused by the immediate withdrawal of nearly all French teachers and administrators, including virtually the whole secondary and technical teaching staff, a few days before the opening of the school year in 1958 was met in several ways. Teachers came to help from other African states, particularly from Senegal, and others returned from France. Laymen and secondary-school students were also pressed into service. Deficiencies in school accommodation are claimed to have been overcome within a few weeks under the human investment program which makes use of voluntary unpaid part-time labor on national projects (see ch. 24, Industrial Potential).

Once the immediate crisis was met, plans were laid for the future. The Constitution proclaimed the secularity of schools and the equal

right of all citizens of the republic to education (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government). The Franco-Guinean cultural accord of January 7, 1959, which assured the maintenance of French as the official language of the country and the primary vehicle of instruction, paved the way for the return of French teachers to Guinea. The administration was placed under a single Minister of National Education and reorganized internally.

One year after independence the reform of education program was introduced. This was the product of a Commission on Educational Reform, established some months earlier, whose recommendations were submitted to the Minister of National Education. The reform was made effective at the opening of the 1959-60 school year and was to be placed in operation over a three-year transitional period. The most important points were: that education was to be compulsory from ages 7 to 15 years; that it was to be provided free with maintenance scholarships being given to students in need; that the language of instruction was to be French; and that the second language, where taught, was to be English. At about this time it was ordered that all private schools should be transferred to state control over the next three years.

On July 1, 1960, the Three-Year Plan was launched (see ch. 22, Character and Structure of the Economy). It contained provision for an educational expenditure of 3,680 million Guinean francs (247 Guinean francs equal U.S. \$1)—just less than 10 percent of the whole expenditure of the Plan (see table 3).

Its aim was to make primary education universal by 1970, by which time secondary and technical education were to be provided for 7 to 8 percent of primary-school graduates, or about 32,000 students. The provisions of the Plan were expected to be supplemented by the human investment program, by assistance from various foreign countries and by state and regional annual budgets.

The budget provision for education rose in each year after independence both in amount and in proportion of the total budget. It went from 11.8 percent in 1959 to 17.5 percent in 1960 and 20.9 percent in 1961—at which time it amounted to 1,830 million Guinean francs. This is divided among secondary education (41 percent), elementary education (36 percent), technical education (19 percent) and administration (4 percent). Separate scholarship provisions were made of 184,000 Guinean francs for study outside the country and 5,000 Guinean francs for scholarships within Guinea (see ch. 25, Public Finance).

In the two-and-a-half years of independence, 939 primary classes were opened in new and existing schools, many in remote parts of the country. Primary school attendance rose from about 50,000 at independence to 84,000 in 1960-61. The latter is officially estimated as 14 percent of the primary-school age population of 600,000. This figure

Table 3. *Projected Expenditures for Guinean Education Under the Three-Year Plan*
(In millions of Guinean francs)

Item	Amount
Primary education.....	900
Construction and equipment of 900 classes and 900 accommodations.	
Secondary education.....	900
Construction and equipment of classes and accommodations.	
Technical education.....	200
Extension and equipment of 3 vocational centers (at Conakry, Kindia and Kankan) and extension of the National Secretarial School).	
Agricultural education.....	200
Agricultural school at Kindia (2 classes of 20 students); the School of Practical Agriculture and Cooperatives at Tolo (3 classes of 25 students); 2 centers for practical training in machinery and agricultural mechanization (100 trainees at Koba and Kankan); 1 center for cooperative practice at Tolo (100 trainees).	
Polytechnic Institute.....	1, 100
Construction and equipment of school to admit 350 students a year for 4 years of study.	
University at Dalaba.....	150
Facilities for about 100 students mainly in field of secondary school teaching.	
Campaign against illiteracy.....	150
School of Public Health.....	80
Training of 300 nurses, 60 midwives and 60 welfare workers.	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE FOR EDUCATION.....	¹ 3, 680

¹ Total proposed budget of the Three-Year Plan was 38,912 millions of Guinean francs.

Source: Adapted from *L'Action Politique de Parti Démocratique de Guinée: La Plantification Economique*, Vol. V, pp. 418, 419.

probably includes about 6,000 pupils in surviving private schools. Secondary school attendance increased steadily from about 2,000 at the time of independence to 5,500 in 1960. The increase was accommodated in extensions to existing schools and in four new secondary establishments. The number of secondary school maintenance scholarships was also increased.

Technical and professional schools accommodating about 300 students before independence, enrolled 1,660 students in 1960-61—all absorbed in existing establishments. The number of teacher-training schools also remained constant. The number of Guinean teachers, estimated in mid-1961 at approximately 2,000, was said to be double that at independence, but included a majority of untrained teachers.

The total provision of primary, secondary and technical education within Guinea is therefore officially estimated to have risen from

52,000 in 1958-59 to 91,000 in 1960-61, or by 75 percent in two years. The number of Guinean students studying outside Guinea, about 500 in 1958-59, increased to about 800 in 1959-60; the figure for 1960-61 is thought to be still larger.

Future plans in mid-1961 foresaw still greater expansion. Universal primary school attendance was still foreseen by 1970, involving school accommodations for 800,000 and a teaching staff of 10,000. The construction cost of the required 20,000 classes and teacher accommodation was estimated at 50,000 million Guinean francs. The Guinean delegate to the 1961 Conference on African Education in Addis Ababa, sponsored by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, proposed that these costs be shared equally between the Republic of Guinea and international organizations. There were more long-range proposals for new technical teacher-training establishments.

THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Administration

Responsibility for the operation and administration of the educational system, public and private, belongs to the Minister of National Education who, since early 1961, has been Damantang Camara. The Minister works through a staff (called a *cabinet*), in which his immediate deputy is the *directeur de cabinet*. The other members are the deputy director, two directors of education, a technical adviser and the secretary of the *cabinet*. Apart from Camara himself, most of the mid-1961 staff members came from teaching posts.

The two directors deal with elementary and secondary education respectively; direction of technical education falls to the deputy director of the cabinet. These three directors have at their disposal a common ministry staff, under control of a chief of central services, which consists essentially of six departments: schools and statistics; personnel; finance, salaries; finance, equipment; examinations; and scholarships.

The responsibility of each director is for "all administrative and professional questions concerning personnel and establishments" within his sphere of operations. The director of elementary education functions locally through inspectors. Guinea was redivided at the time of the reform from four to six elementary education regions and, in October 1959, these were redistributed to form a total of 10: Conakry, Dubréka (headquarters in Conakry), Boké, Kindia, Mamou, Labé, Dabola, Kankan, Beyla and Guékédou. (See fig. 11.) Each region is in the charge of an inspector of elementary education who controls all its primary schools and staff.



Figure 11. *Regional Organization of the State System of Higher Education in Guinea, 1961.*

Inspection of secondary and technical schools is theoretically carried out as an additional duty by a specially appointed teaching staff, but in practice it seems to be covered by the inspectors of elementary education, as was the custom in colonial days.

Elementary and Secondary Schools

Elementary education, officially a six-year course for children aged 7 through 12, was being provided in some 420 schools in early 1961. These ranged from one-class schools in the bush to establishments providing the full six grades and holding the examination for the primary certificate (*certificat d'études primaires*--CEP). Holders of this certificate who pass a further competitive examination may be admitted to the secondary level.

Secondary education covers a further six-year period from ages 13 through 18, subdivided into two 3-year cycles. The first cycle ends in the examination for the first cycle diploma (*brevet d'études du premier cycle*--BEPC). This and its equivalent, the so-called elementary diploma (*brevet élémentaire*--BE), may be likened to the graduation diploma of an American junior high school. Those who go beyond this stage are directed into the general or technical courses of the second cycle leading to the high school diploma (*baccalauréat*). This examination has been reconstituted since the reform and is now taken at one session instead of in two parts as before.

The annual conference of the PDG, August 14 to 18, 1961, at Conakry, resolved to change the 12-year cycle of public education from the two 6-year elementary and secondary periods to 3 periods, beginning with 4 years of primary (*de masse*) instruction, followed by 3 years of intermediate and by 5 years of secondary instruction. As of the end of 1961, no information was available regarding what steps had been taken to put the resolution into effect.

Secondary education in mid-1961 was being provided in 14 schools, only 4 of which extended to the second cycle. The high school in the Donka area of Conakry (Lycée de Donka or Lycée de Conakry) is the largest and had 1,300 students in 1960. The girl's high school (Lycée de Jeunes Filles) at Conakry held 360 students in 1960. The high school at Labé, with 450 students in 1960, and its annex at Dalaba both achieved their high school (*lycée*) status after independence. The secondary course (*cours secondaire*) at Dixinn in the Conakry suburbs, with upwards of 300 pupils, offered the *baccalauréat* for the first time in 1960. In all, about half the secondary school capacity was concentrated in Conakry.

The other 10 secondary schools can be called junior high schools (*college courts*) since they provide only the first cycle of secondary education, which, during the transitional period of the reform, is being spread over four years instead of three. Seven of these schools—

replacements for the French complementary courses—reopened in time for the 1959–60 school year at Conakry, Kindia, Kankan, Labé, Mamou, Macenta and N'Zérékoré. Three new schools of the same type opened a year later at Boké, Dabola and Kissidougou.

The syllabus of elementary education consists mainly of French, English and arithmetic. French language, reading and writing occupies roughly half the curriculum; English is taught in the last three years. There is an allowance for vernacular language in which children are expected to learn a vernacular other than their own. History, geography and elementary science are also taught. It is the practice for elementary school pupils to be taught by a single teacher in all subjects.

In the first cycle of secondary education the amount of French language instruction is reduced. English language, history, geography, mathematics, and especially science, are all increased, and an allowance for a third language is added. This language is Arabic in some predominantly Moslem areas; elsewhere (as in Conakry) Spanish, German, Italian and even Russian are studied or have been proposed for study. In the secondary curriculum, as in the elementary one, there is a provision for art, music, civics and physical training. The second cycle provides options of literature or science in the general course and of physics, chemistry or social sciences in the technical course.

In the reformed secondary syllabus, balanced and realistic courses are provided in history, geography and scientific subjects. History and geography are approached through a study of Guinea in particular and Black Africa in general and lead afterwards to a view of the world as a whole. The detailed content suggests a strong political bias; history is an obvious vehicle for political teaching and is clearly treated as a very important subject. Science courses are simple and straight forward.

The French language syllabus is overambitious and still includes a large element of purely French literature. For English language nothing is provided beyond a short reading list consisting mainly of American authors, negro and white. The mathematics syllabus, which is large and impractical, is said to be based on a Soviet one.

Textbooks and equipment for teaching in the French language can only be obtained from France, and the texts used are standard French and French-African series. There are plans to produce Guinean texts once the printing press in Conakry, scheduled for completion by the end of 1961, is in production. Meanwhile the first Guinean textbook, printed in Czechoslovakia, was published in June 1960 and issued to schools in quantity in time for the following term. This is the *Histoire de l'Afrique Occidentale*, written jointly by a Guinean, Djibril Tamsir Niane—former director of secondary education—and a Frenchman, J.

Suret-Canale—director of the Guinean National Institute of Research and Documentation (Institut National de Recherches et de Documentation). It is well produced and, in large part, factually accurate, but it has a propaganda bias. The government is reportedly eager to see it used elsewhere in Africa. General school supplies are good and usually plentiful; many come from Czechoslovakia.

Methods of teaching are still simple and conservative; much material is instilled by rote learning, copying and dictation. At the lower levels, rote material in particular is chanted aloud in unison. There is little in the way of teaching aids, though tape recorders and film projectors are sometimes available. Scientific equipment and laboratory accommodation are largely nonexistent. School conditions seem primitive: there is often overcrowding—three or four sitting at a desk built for two—and lighting is very poor. School buildings vary from the simple plaster and thatch bush school to modern, four-storied concrete buildings in Conakry. In general they seem adequate.

The school year for elementary and secondary pupils lasts about nine months and is divided into three terms (*trimestres*) with a three-month summer vacation and short Christmas and Easter holidays. The school week has 32 hours: one-hour classes are held from 8 a.m. to 12 noon and from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday, and from 8 a.m. to 12 noon on Saturday. Thursday morning may be used if necessary. The heavy schedule leaves little opportunity for homework, which is officially limited to two hours weekly in any one subject. School examinations (*compositions*) are held each term in addition to the major examinations which are organized by the Minister of National Education in central towns, the results being published in the *Journal Officiel*.

In organization there is considerable separation between the academic and the administrative sides of the school, which leaves the teaching staff more free for teaching. The principal alone is responsible for both sides—for teachers and students in and out of school hours, for salaries, material and equipment. The principal of a high school (*proviseur*) delegates his administrative duties to his assistant (*censeur*). There are several school committees dealing with students' grades, coordination of teaching programs, discipline and so forth.

Day-to-day administration is the job of a general superintendent (*surveillant-général*) and his assistants and of the class leaders (*responsables*) whom they appoint. They look after student welfare: boarding facilities (*internat*); school supplies, clothes and laundry; discipline and punishments; grades and attendance records. A treasurer (*économe*) supervises the estate, materials and equipment, salaries and purchasing.

Boarding is the exception in primary schools and the rule in secondary schools where 70 to 80 percent of the students may be boarders.

Of these some will come from the same region or even the same town, but the majority are from other regions. Since independence, students have more and more been sent from home in one part of the country to school in another even when it is not strictly necessary in order to encourage the mixing of groups and the breakdown of regional ties. The government provides competitive scholarships for free maintenance, and there are also places for the 10 to 20 percent of the students whose parents can pay their way. Boarders receive board, linen, school uniforms and transportation. At some schools there are dormitories; elsewhere the students rent rooms in town for themselves. The level of discipline seems to vary considerably. In some places the strictness of the French has remained with little diminution; in others standards have relaxed. The forms of punishment to be used are scrupulously listed in the reform and range from censure and reprimand, through additional work, to detention and, in the last resort, expulsion. Corporal punishment, notorious in French days, is not mentioned but is not unknown in practice. Expulsion is a real threat, since it removes at one blow the student's hope of any future above that of menial occupation.

Sports and out-of-school activities are not widely developed. The most popular sports are soccer and basketball which are played with great spirit by organized teams out of school hours. These teams play in interschool and sometimes in national leagues.

Students stage entertainments including songs, ballets, playlets, and so forth, often quite effective and usually strongly political, which deal with national and African history and events. Some of the larger schools have their own newspapers.

Higher Education—Foreign Scholarships

In the absence of any facilities within the country, Guineans have continued since independence to receive their higher academic and technical education through foreign scholarships. Most of the potential candidates are prepared in the high schools at Conakry which specialize in this work. In theory scholarships for higher education are only granted to holders of the *baccalauréat*. Dossiers on candidates are prepared by the Minister of National Education who submits them each year to a national Committee on Scholarships (Commission d'Orientation).

This committee takes final decisions on selection and placement, even when scholarships are being provided by other countries, and makes binding recommendations to the Minister. It is guided by its knowledge of future manpower requirements, especially those of the Three-Year Plan, obtained from reports submitted by government agencies. The determining factor is, therefore, not the wishes nor

aptitudes of the candidates, but specific national needs for skilled personnel. Scholarships are canceled annually and reconsidered "in the light of the results obtained by the student and the needs of the nation."

Since independence Guinea has provided scholarships for study within West Africa—to Dakar and Bamako—and to France, Belgium and Switzerland. The monthly rate of overseas awards has been raised to a minimum of 50,000 Guinean francs. The number of these scholarships has also increased, and more than 10 foreign countries have offered additional awards.

During the first year of independence about 500 Guinean students were studying abroad. Of these, 439 (or 59 percent more than in 1955-56) were in France, where there was an Association of Guinean Students in France (*Association des Etudiants Guinéens en France*). Scholarships for 273 of them were provided by the French Government. They were enrolled in about equal numbers at universities, technical colleges and secondary schools. The sending of secondary school students abroad is regarded as an evil which will be necessary only until Guinean facilities are adequate.

In the following year (1959-60) the number of students abroad increased, there was more diversification in their places of study and the amount of individual awards was increased. There were 794 students studying abroad in that year, distributed as follows: 97 in Senegal or Mali; 356 in France; 24 in other Western European countries (Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, United Kingdom and West Germany); 11 in the United States (including 3 who held United Nations' scholarships and were studying in New York); 186 in the Soviet Union; and 120 in the Soviet bloc countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland).

The majority (560), which included almost all those in Eastern bloc countries, were following technical courses. There were 162 university students who were studying medicine, law, literature and science in roughly equal numbers. The remainder were at secondary schools in France and Senegal.

A generally similar pattern was followed in 1960-61. While France was being suspected of exerting a counterrevolutionary influence on Guinean students, it remained host to the largest number—about 480. Innovations in this year included the presence of Guinean students in Yugoslavia and the departure of significant groups for the People's Republic of China (Communist China) and for the United States, the latter under the United States-Guinean cultural agreement of October 1959.

This agreement established 150 university and technical school scholarships, to be awarded over a three-year period from September 1960. It was founded through the International Cooperation Ad-

ministration and administered under contract by the African-American Institute in New York, which made arrangements with the government from a temporary field office in Conakry. After much delay, the first 40 students left for the United States in November 1960. Selected entirely by the Guinean Government, they consisted of 27 university and 13 vocational students (the latter in place of technical specialists who could not be spared). The former were given intensive English courses at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., before taking up their studies in early 1961. The latter, having little or no English, were assigned to the American Institute of Engineering and Technology in Chicago which gives vocational courses in French. The remainder of the students were scheduled to arrive later; 60 in 1961 and 50 in 1962.

Technical, Vocational and Adult Education

Since the reform of the education program was begun, technical education has been provided at two levels. Each consists of a course lasting from two to three years.

The first level is given in one of the three existing vocational schools (*centres d'apprentissage*) which had been established during the colonial period at Conakry, Kindia and Kankan (see fig. 11). Each offers a two- to three-year course parallel to the second cycle of secondary education and consisting of both general education and vocational training. They are now renamed technical colleges (*collège technique*), although their closest American parallel would be trade schools. Each offers a variety of courses, generally embracing electrical, automobile and general mechanical work, carpentry and joinery. The Kankan school also specializes in building construction. Students graduate by taking the certificate of professional aptitude (*certificat d'aptitude professionnelle*—CAP) in their particular trade. All these schools were scheduled for expansion under the Three-Year Plan, and in 1960-61 their enrollments totaled 700 students, by far the largest number being in Conakry.

The second level of technical education is entered either from the first level or after graduation from a high school. It provides a further 2 to 3 year course leading to the technical baccalaureate (*baccalauréat professionnelle*—BP). This is provided in the former Conakry technical college, now the Lycée Technique, which in 1960 had 960 students. It offers the same variety of technical courses as are available in the technical colleges and also provides more academic subjects. About a third of the students in all four schools receive government scholarships. Technical training is also given at schools run by the Fria combine for its Guinean industrial personnel

and for certain trainees designated by the government, but these are not a part of the state educational system (see ch. 11, Labor Force).

Higher technical education is at present available only overseas, but is to be provided within Guinea when the Polytechnic Institute (Institut Polytechnique), another Three-Year Plan project, opens in Conakry. This was to be planned and built by Soviet technicians under the 1959 agreements for economic and technical cooperation, but construction apparently did not start until early 1961. It was designed to accept graduates of the Lycée Technique and students from other African states and to give four-year courses in civil, mechanical, electrical and chemical engineering, geology and mineral prospecting. Its capacity was to be 1,600 and the first 350 students were to be accepted in 1963.

Vocational training in agriculture is given in two schools. The existing school at Tolo was renamed the School for Practical Agriculture and Cooperatives (l'Ecole Pratique d'Agriculture et de Coopération) and was expanded in order to give a 4-year course to 75 students. The National School of Agriculture (Ecole Nationale d'Agriculture) at Kindia, planned to hold 40 students in two classes, was opened under the Three-Year Plan in March 1961 with a first entry of 25 students. The course was to extend over three years (see ch. 23, Agricultural Potential).

Vocational schools in other fields are all in Conakry. The National Secretarial School (formerly the Women's Training School), which trains secretaries and social workers, and the National School of Nursing are both pre-independence establishments. The School for Midwives (l'Ecole des Sages Femmes) opened in 1959. The School of National Administration, opened in 1960, is the successor to one that opened in 1957 only to be dissolved at the time of independence when all its students were taken straight into administrative service. It has been enlarged and now offers future officials four courses: general administration; justice and police; economy and finance; and foreign affairs.

Adult education has increased in popularity since independence and receives strong government support; school buildings and, to some extent, school teaching staff are used in the evenings for this purpose. School students are also used. The first aim is to increase literacy to which end the Three-Year Plan allocated 150 million Guinean francs—and after that to teach the people, especially outside the towns, simple means to improve their material way of life.

Among the population as a whole the highest estimate given for literacy is 20 percent, though the true proportion may be nearer 10 percent. Most literates are concentrated in the larger towns. Literacy in Arabic script—mainly in the vernacular languages—may form an appreciable addition to this figure.



Teachers and Teacher Training

In mid-1961 there were nearly 2,000 Guinean teachers, or one to every 45 students. Of these, 130 were said to be qualified teachers (*instituteurs*) while the rest are partly trained or untrained teachers (*moniteurs*). The negligible number of qualified Guinean secondary school teachers (*professeurs*) were employed in key positions, mainly as school principals; the rest of the secondary and technical teaching staff was supplied from overseas.

In the present training system there are only two full teacher-training schools (*écoles normales*); one for boys at Kindia and another for girls at Conakry (see fig. 11). They provide the second cycle of secondary education and turn out about 100 *instituteurs* in all each year to teach in elementary schools. The other establishments have only training classes (*cours normaux*) providing first cycle education and turning out assistant *instituteurs*. The largest seems to be at Kankan and probably has about 300 students. There are smaller ones in Kindia, Macenta and Dabadougou (near Kankan). Their combined output may be about 200 yearly. In 1961 there were no firm plans for any secondary school teacher training, the Three-Year Plan proposals in this direction having been abandoned.

The inadequate supply of elementary teachers was reluctantly supplemented by the employment of untrained *moniteurs*. Two-month training courses are held each summer both to train existing *moniteurs* and to recruit probationers (*stagiaires*); in 1960 over 100 teachers were so recruited. In 1961 the courses were made compulsory for all *moniteurs* and included political instruction. Secondary school students have also been withdrawn to teach elementary classes, and many teachers work supplementary hours. Even so schools are understaffed, classes are oversized and pupils go untaught in some subjects.

In mid-1961 President Touré launched plans to introduce Guinean teachers into secondary schools at once by transferring up to 100 of the best qualified elementary teachers, half of whom were to replace all foreign teachers in the politically important fields of history, geography and civics. These proposals provoked union dissent. Teachers, who are part of the civil service, are organized in the National Union of Guinean Teachers (Syndicat National des Enseignants de Guinée), formed during the last years of French control. The Union held its Seventh Congress, the first since independence, in Conakry in March 1961.

To meet the teachers' general discontent with President Touré's proposal and other innovations—as well as with their poor pay and low status—the government took steps to restore professional *esprit de corps*. These included the drawing up of a new professional statute (*statut particulier*) to cover conditions of teachers' work. The exist-

ing conditions were based on those of the French Community. Standard weekly hours ranged from 30 in elementary school to 15 to 18 in secondary school. Basic salaries depended primarily on qualifications, but were largely influenced by gradations (*échelons*) for seniority and various allowances.

The party's resolution in August to modify the instruction courses within the 12-year cycle of public education and the government's continued stress on the elimination of illiteracy portended an increased workload for teachers. This was the subject of a memorandum distributed early in November by the executive officers of the National Union of Guinean Teachers. The memorandum criticized the educational program and complained about low wages and long working hours. The party leaders regarded it as a subversive document, and 12 union executive officers were ordered to stand trial before the High Court of Justice. Five of the accused were found guilty. When their sentences to imprisonment were announced, many secondary school students in Conakry—and reportedly, in Labé, Kankan and other centers—openly manifested their sympathy for the Union's efforts in behalf of the teachers. In Conakry the students went on strike and demonstrated in the streets. The authorities closed the secondary schools temporarily, and the students involved in the disturbances were sent to their homes by train or by truck (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics; ch. 20, Subversive Potentialities).

The need for foreign secondary school and technical teachers was first met after independence by the French, who soon returned in strength under the Franco-Guinean cultural accord of January 1959. There were about 140 teachers from France in Guinea in 1959, but their number had dropped to about 100 by 1961. Those who remained were largely left-wing sympathizers with the regime; some of them held responsible positions. The renewal, on Guinean initiative, of the cultural accord in July 1961 again pledged France to cooperate in recruiting teachers for Guinea.

Teachers from other countries first arrived in strength in 1960, and by the end of 1961 more than 300 had arrived—many of them from the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany and other Western countries. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the United Arab Republic each provided about 30 or 40, and a few came from the Soviet Union. The foreign teachers were recruited mainly to teach English, mathematics and science, and also to provide a non-French source of French language teachers. It was not known what effect the transfer of all history, geography and civics teaching to Guinean teachers, scheduled for late 1961, would have on the number of foreign teachers.

The American contingent was recruited under the United States-Guinea cultural agreement of October 1959. The African-American

Institute arranged recruitment and, after many difficulties and delays, was able to dispatch 18 teachers (in response to a request for 25) in September and October of 1960. Five of these taught in Conakry; the others were scattered about the country. They included several Haitians who were particularly warmly welcomed in Guinea. Since the start of this program the original contracts of most have been renewed and the Institute has been asked to provide an additional 25 teachers, but it is improbable that the original quota had yet been completely filled by mid-1961.

Further English language teaching is provided by four members of the staff of the British Council who teach mainly in schools, by a few Africans from English-speaking areas, and by two American sources, the English Language Service (Washington, D.C.), and the United States Information Agency. The former works under an International Cooperation Administration contract and provides a small, well-equipped staff which does some school teaching but concentrates on intensive training courses for teachers of English, held in Conakry and Labé in the summer vacations. There are plans to extend the scope of these courses with a mobile laboratory. The leader of the staff is official adviser to the Guinean Government on English language training.

The United States Information Agency office in Conakry provides English lessons through a small team which used the fully equipped language laboratories of the agency's library until it was closed in March 1961. These lessons are given mainly to adults, including schoolteachers and administrators. The leader of the team assists with the English language lessons broadcast by Radio Conakry (see ch. 21, Public Information and Propaganda).

Private Schools

Private education in Guinea is provided by a number of Christian mission schools and by the Moslem Koranic Schools. Information is lacking about the number of Koranic schools. At the most, they are simple, noninstitutional affairs which operate alongside, rather than in competition with, the public system. No action appears to have been taken against them despite the ban on religious instruction anywhere except at home and in places of worship. The government attitude seems to be one of neutrality rather than hostility (see ch. 10, Religion).

The same is true of the attitude toward the Christian mission schools, but otherwise their case is very different. In September 1959 it was announced that private schools could henceforward accept no new students and would be expected to close down over a three-year period with their ex-students and their facilities being transferred to the state system. By July 1961 a total of 44 Catholic schools had been

taken over, and the private school system, which at independence operated 60 to 70 schools with 10,000 pupils (25 percent of the school population), had shrunk to 24 schools with 6,000 pupils. In the following month the Catholic Bishop Gerard de Milleville was expelled from Guinea for publicly opposing this policy (see ch. 10, Religion).

Surviving Catholic schools are still popular. In spite of relatively high fees (about 500 Guinean francs or approximately \$2 a month), they are crowded with Catholic and non Catholic children, including children of practicing Moslems. They are patronized by rich and poor Guineans alike, and there is some element of support for them in preference to the public schools.

The closing of private schools did not affect the one Protestant school, which has been operated by the Christian Missionary Alliance of New York at Mamou since the 1920's for children of missionaries and which never accepted Guinean children. In 1961 it had 5 teachers and about 60 children in ten grades. This school, and those run for the children of Guinean and foreign employees at the Fria combine, appeared to be viewed as outside the jurisdiction of the Minister of National Education.

EDUCATION IN THE STATE

Seen in the context of national aims, Guinean education has importance of several kinds. It is primarily important in its own right as the means to the material prosperity and welfare of the people, through the development of the knowledge and skills the country needs, especially in science and technology. Here the government must fight a widespread prejudice against manual labor and industrial work in general. This prejudice is often attributed to the influence of French education, but is in fact a traditional African one.

Education is also important for its propaganda value. It has long commanded respect and even reverence as the source of power and prestige, and its outward appearances—numbers of classes, teachers or diplomas—are potent symbols. Hence official educational programs are calculated to arouse enthusiasm among the people and their fulfillment is as important from the point of view of national morale as from that of education; here it may well happen that quality is sacrificed to quantity to meet published targets.

Education is important, thirdly, as an explicit political instrument, and no secret is made of this fact. It is difficult to tell whether political influence affects the selection of students and teachers, but it does not do so in theory. Many teachers clearly have political duties, and secondary school principals may have high standing in the party and in local administration, but in a country with so small an educated elite this kind of importance could be expected to follow on their professional status if it did not precede it (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

For the first three years of independence there was no explicit political instruction in schools; this was left to the local student branches (*sous-comités scolaires*) of the African Democratic Youth Rally (La Jeunesse du Rassemblement Démocratique Africain—JRDA), which has a special department (Elèves et Étudiants) dealing with school and university students. Weekly meetings were attended as a matter of course by most students, although membership did not appear to be compulsory or universal.

However, the President's official visit to Conakry schools in March 1961 revealed widespread ignorance and misinformation on political and social matters among the students, and it was later ordained that from the beginning of the school year in October 1961 courses of political and civic instruction would be given in all secondary schools. Advance courses held in the summer vacation covered party and government structure, the constitution, foreign policy, the youth and labor movements, financial organization and the Three-Year Plan.

The choice of foreign languages to be taught in schools also has importance. Emancipation from French culture is clearly hindered by the necessity of using the French language, but, wherever possible, it has been assisted by using non-French sources of French teaching and by teaching other languages. English is taught as the official second language, partly to provide an alternative access route to Western culture and affairs and partly to enable Guineans to talk directly to English-speaking Africans in West Africa and elsewhere. Vernacular languages are being taught for the first time, apparently to introduce all Guineans to a vernacular other than their own. While a knowledge of all the three main indigenous languages should promote Guinean unity, the choice of one of them as the national language—a proposal which has also been discussed—would certainly have the opposite effect of arousing officially nonexistent ethnic rivalries.

The most original use of education to further national unity has been the intentional movement of secondary students from one region of the country to another. This was probably intended to break narrow regional and ethnic loyalties and to replace them among students with a feeling of Guinean nationhood and pride in their membership in a relatively small future elite.

This policy seems successful in that, with the help of the all-important French language, students lose their regional limitations by forming ties with students from other regions. And, while there can yet be no concept of a national "student body" with a separate voice, school children in general form a distinct and coherent group. Nevertheless, in June 1961, the Minister of Education reprimanded Conakry secondary students for "ethnic groupings, the consequences of an old regionalist spirit," though the causes of this censure are not known.

CHAPTER 10

RELIGION

The Constitution affirms that the Republic is "based on the principles of democracy, freedom of religion, and social justice." Freedom of religion is "assured to all citizens by the secular character of schools and the state."

Almost 2,000,000 of the country's 2,800,000 people would probably identify themselves as Moslems and some 25,000 to 30,000 as Christians. The rest are animists, sometimes referred to as fetishists or simply pagans.

Islam was first carried into West Africa by North African Moslem traders in the eleventh century. It quickly became the principal religion of traders and ruling groups, but it was not until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that it acquired a broad and popular base though the impetus provided by the establishment of Moslem theocratic states. In the twentieth century, its growth was encouraged by French colonial administrators during a period of antagonism to the Catholic hierarchy in French government circles (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 9, Education).

Christian contacts with West Africa go back to the European settlements established in coastal areas in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Guinea, however, was not an important focus of European attention. The first permanent missions were not established until the late nineteenth century; others gradually followed as various parts of the country were brought under French control.

The Moslem community embraces almost all members of the three major ethnic groups—the Foulah of the Fouta Djallon, the Malinké of Upper Guinea, and the Soussou of Lower Guinea—and also includes important segments of other groups in Lower Guinea and the Forest Region. Animism prevails among the majority of forest peoples and many of the coastal Baga.

The Christian community, overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, is concentrated mainly in the Boké, Boffa, Conakry and other areas of Lower Guinea with perhaps a third of the total scattered throughout Upper Guinea; smaller concentrations are found in the Forest Region (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Protestants—numbering 2,000 at most and perhaps no more than 1,000—include an Anglican com-

munity on the Iles de Los and scattered converts of the few American missionary establishments.

Whatever their formal religious affiliation, Guineans see themselves as living in intimate association with the supernatural world. Despite important changes affecting the individual and society, the relationship of the individual and the family to the supernatural continues to play a vital role in the daily life of the community. Birth and naming ceremonies, rites marking adult status, and the rituals which accompany marriage and death almost always require the mediation of a priest, a moslem functionary or an animist specialist.

Adherents of the Islam and Christian religions, in urban as well as rural areas, have not entirely renounced their commitments to the ancestral and nature cults, but have attempted instead to fit them into the framework of their adoptive religion. Only a few have managed to dissociate themselves fully from the beliefs and practices of the indigenous animism. These include some of the aristocratic long-Islamized Foulah families in the Fouta Djallon and their Malinké counterparts in the Kankan area and a few of the long-established Catholic families in Boffa, Boké and Conakry.

In Guinea, Islam has been more receptive to animist admixtures than has Christianity, and this has probably been a contributing factor in its ability to attract a great number of adherents. Indigenous social and religious practices, which are frequently compatible with or adaptable to Islam, may lie beyond the area of compromise for Christianity—particularly polygamy and other practices which center around marriage.

These and other considerations have tended to create an image of Islam as a native religion and Christianity as an alien import. Most important in this respect is the fact that the agents of Islam have been exclusively African and specifically Guinean. They are frequently men who have been born and raised in the same communities in which they marry, raise families and provide religious models for their fellows.

Christianity, on the other hand, is encumbered by its association with white, Western Europeans in general and French colonialism in particular. Of the 85 to 90 Catholic priests in the country, for example, only 4 or 5 are Guineans, whereas the rest are French. These, like the few Protestant missionaries, continue to be regarded as aliens however closely they may try to involve themselves in community life.

The non-African character of Catholic clergy became a major issue in the relationship between the Church and the state in 1961. This was highlighted by the expulsion in August of Monsignor de Milleville, and Archbishop of Conakry, after he had engaged in a public exchange

with the government in connection with the nationalization of the schools and the policy of Africanizing the Church. During the course of this controversy, important party and government leaders—at least one of them a Catholic—repeatedly denounced the Guinean Church hierarchy. The cross, they said, came to Guinea as companion of the sword. The clergy were condemned as long-time agents of French colonialism and as practitioners of racial discrimination who supported the opposition in the country's struggle for independence.

The relationship of the state to Islam and animism is considerably simplified by the fact that neither Islam nor animism is any longer supported by an effective, formal organization. Government and party spokesmen periodically denounce some of the Moslem officials who are active in village councils as "fakes." There is also a campaign under way to discourage the sale of *gris-gris* (amulets and magic charms). Except for such actions, however, the government has not taken a public position against the traditional practices of these religions.

In areas of religious activity which pose no threat to its exercise of full power, or which provide an opportunity to extend its power, the government is willing, and even eager, to identify itself with the Moslem majority. The construction of mosques, for example, is explicitly provided for in the Three-Year Plan. In 1961, when some 850 Guineans made a summer pilgrimage to Mecca, the first contingent to return was formally greeted with great fanfare at the airport by several government dignitaries of ministerial rank. Newscasts and accompanying press reports on the front page of the official newspaper, *Horoya*, gave detailed accounts of the reception and carefully noted that nine of the pilgrims were top-ranking members of the government. These included: Sinkoun Kaba, Minister of Interior and Regional and Local Administration; Ambassador Telli Diallo, Guinea's Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and Habib Tall, Vice President of the National Assembly.

Animist institutions, such as the secret societies or mystery cults, no longer play an important role in community life. Their educational, police, mutual-aid and other functions have largely been taken over by the government and the agencies of Islam and Christianity. Whatever prestige they retain can only diminish with time as the local communities are increasingly brought into the orbit of the national state.

ISLAM

Islam is a universal, monotheistic, revealed religion founded in the seventh century A.D. by the Prophet Mohammed. The sacred book, the Koran, comprises the inspired teachings of the Prophet. The Hadith (Arabic, tradition) records his noninspired sayings and actions

and those of the original community of believers. Together they make up the core of Moslem belief. Associated with them are a large body of interpretive commentaries and an elaborate system of Islamic canon law (Sharia), of which there are four schools. In Guinea, as in West Africa generally, Moslems belong to the Sunnite sect, the largest branch of Islam, and recognize only the Malikite version of the Sharia.

Islam was first introduced into West Africa in the eleventh century and became the principal religion of the ruling tribal groups and of the traders and other townsmen in the negro kingdoms. The great mass of rural agriculturalists, however, remained largely untouched. It was not until the establishment of the Islamic theocratic state in West Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that Islam began to take on the character of a popular religion (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

At first through conquest, then by its own momentum, Islam was adopted by the great majority of Guineans. Its development has been favored by the fact that it has no organized church and requires no formal adherence to an elaborate system of dogma or belief. The typical villager can join the community of believers without seriously compromising the external aspects of his traditional way of life.

Prayer, fasting, alms, pilgrimage and the profession of faith constitute the Five Pillars of Islam—the basic duties of Moslems everywhere. The fundamental tenet is the public profession of faith (Arabic, *shahada*): “There is no God but God (Allah) and Mohammed is His prophet.” This is normally abbreviated in West Africa to “There is no God but God,” and, for some Moslems, the declaration is their only formal observance.

Moslems are enjoined to pray five times a day: at dawn, twice in the afternoon, at dusk, and later in the evening. Prayer consists of recitations from the Koran accompanied by a series of prescribed body movements oriented toward Mecca. Ritual washing preceding prayers is usually perfunctory in Guinea, but remains an important part of the ritual. Only the very pious and various religious officials normally perform the daily prayers. These include the leader (Arabic, *imam*), teachers or generally learned men (*karamokos*) and several other variously titled officials, such as those qualified to interpret canon law or to adjudicate trouble cases. Mid-day prayers on Friday are considered more important than others and are everywhere well attended, especially by the older men of the community. Among the Foulah, the Friday service typically concludes with a sermon (Arabic, *khutba*) which is then translated into Foulah.

Communal prayer is held at the mosque under the leadership of the *imam*. Among the Foulah, the mosque is normally a round hut which looks like an ordinary dwelling. It is traditionally the center of

secular as well as religious activities of the parish (Foulah, *misidi*). The distinctive and imposing mosques familiar in the Middle East are absent, and in villages and small towns, the mosque may consist of no more than a special area marked off by stones or a low wall.

Women are excluded from the mosque, with the occasional exception of the aged. In the Fouta Djallon area, however, they are sometimes permitted to listen in on Friday prayer from a separate hut or enclosure near the mosque.

The requirement for fasting is commonly observed. It is abstention from all food, drink, and worldly pleasures between dawn and dusk of each day of the month of Ramadan, the ninth month in the Moslem lunar calendar; in Malinké this month is called the moon of deprivation (*sunkalo*). During Ramadan religious practices are more strictly observed than at any other time, and the mosques are generally crowded with men who neglect weekday prayer at most other times of the year. Daily prayer is also observed regularly on two other occasions—the festival which marks the end of Ramadan (Arabic, *id al-fitr*; Malinké *sunkaro sali*; Foulah *julde sumaye*) and the Great Festival (Arabic, *id al-adha*; Malinké, *id'har*; Foulah, *julde donkiki*) which falls on the tenth day of the twelfth month. The Great Festival is popularly known as *tabaski*.

Each festival lasts two or three days and is marked by feasting, visiting and gift-giving, especially to children. Strict Moslems generally frown on the parades and night-long drumming and dancing which are conspicuous elements of the celebrations at the end of Ramadan. During the Great Festival more time is given over to rest and quiet visiting.

Other festivals, such as Mohammed's birthday (twelfth day of the third month) and the commemoration of the Prophet's visit to the seven heavens and the seven hells (twenty-sixth day of the third month), are less widely celebrated. In the Fouta Djallon, however, men who are especially pious and learned may fast, pray and recite poetry in Foulah in observance of these occasions.

Formal almsgiving has not been institutionalized in Guinea as in the Middle East and plays only a minor role in Moslem religious life. In the theocratic state established by the Foulah, the obligation to give alms was identified with one's duty to pay taxes. More recently, almsgiving has been associated with periodic contributions to support the local school teacher or prayer leader or for maintenance of the mosque (see ch. 9, Education).

The pilgrimage to Mecca (Arabic, *hajj*) is more an ideal goal than a practical possibility for most people. The arduous trek across the continent or the long and expensive sea route has been almost entirely displaced by air travel, but only a relatively few have the means to make the trip. Those who do are mainly elderly people who come from

families long Islamized. The title *al-haji*, borne by the returned pilgrim, is respected but confers no special privileges.

In the process of being adopted by the great majority of Guineans, Islam has undergone important changes. Each individual or each community has, wherever possible, shaped it to fit special needs. Even among the Foulah and Malinké—more deeply Islamized than other ethnic groups—local animist practices and beliefs have not entirely disappeared, and Islam takes on a West African and specifically local quality.

In large part the success of Islam in gaining converts has been in its ability to accommodate a wide range of beliefs and practices. In the process of accommodation, however, the pre-Islamic animist base is also changed. The result is, in varying proportions, a Moslem-animist synthesis which is increasingly becoming the characteristic feature of religious belief and practice in Guinea.

In several important instances, as in the acceptance of polygamy and bride-price, Islamic law clearly fits animist traditions and requires no important change in attitude or practice of either system (see ch. 6, Family). In the majority of cases, however, the two systems are sufficiently far apart to require a shift in one or both.

Circumcision, for example, is sanctioned both by animist cults and by Islam. In animism, it is an integral part of ritual; in Islam it is a strong, unvarying custom but lacks any supernatural sanction. Among those with a Moslem orientation, circumcision tends to be done in accordance with the will of God and takes on the added quality of a purification rite. Furthermore, although Islam encourages early circumcision—on the seventh day, fortieth day, or seventh year—most Guinean groups delay it until puberty or later, and it retains much of its former significance as an initiatory rite.

Other animist practices are preserved and given Islamic respectability. A pre-Islamic Malinké taboo against cutting down a certain variety of tamarind (*sa-nan*) persists, but it is now explained by a reworked legend which holds that this tree provided shade for the Prophet when he prayed. Similarly, an old taboo against eating monkeys—observed by certain coastal groups—is now justified on the grounds that monkeys were once people who had to be punished for violating Friday prayers.

Islamic belief and practices are also reshaped to fit the animist context. Most Moslems observe the injunction against eating pork, but the animist-oriented do so in the belief that a pig once befriended Mohammed; the pig is therefore sacred rather than, as to the more traditionalist Moslem, unclean.

In general, traditional animist practices have been retained but reinterpreted and fitted, however loosely, into an Islamic framework, particularly in regard to specific religious and magic practices. Islam

condemns the worship of spirits or spirit-forces, for example, but does not condemn belief in them. Indeed, Islamic tradition in Guinea gives explicit recognition to a host of angels and *jinn* (Arabic, terrestrial spirits) which frequently become counterparts of, or are identified with, specific animist deities. In the same manner, Allah is frequently identified with the creator-gods of the different animist communities.

At both ends of the Moslem-animist spectrum, man continues to recognize the spirit world through ritual prayer and sacrifice. But the more Moslem he is, the more he sees himself as worshipping Allah while seeking only to control or bargain with the lesser spirits.

ANIMISM

Animism is not an organized body of religious beliefs but a highly varied set of assumptions about supernatural powers and ancestral spirits. Each local animist group has its own pantheon of spirits or deities, its own body of ritual for dealing with them and its own explanatory mythology.

In the animist view, everything in the world—animate or inanimate, living or dead—has its own soul or spirit (Malinké, *nyama*) whose existence is independent of its material form. *Nyama* is not a diffuse and impersonal spirit; it is distinct and personal, a property of concrete objects and specific phenomena. There is a *nyama* for each tree, but not for trees generally; one for each man, but not for mankind. Each distinct plot of ground has its *nyama*, as does every rock or rain cloud, and every growing thing. Each object or phenomenon is informed with a will, a personality and a distinctiveness all its own.

To the animist, the natural and the supernatural are integral parts of the world he lives in. There is daily, continuous evidence of the spirit world. The gods are not distant, strange and inaccessible; they are everywhere part of one's immediate surroundings, familiar and even commonplace beings whose continuous interaction with man contributes importantly to the texture of daily life.

The Cult

Religion centers on ritual through which the community attempts to bring about or maintain a desirable relationship with the supernatural. The most important spirit forces are those of founding ancestors and of natural phenomena associated with ancestral land. The principal responsibility for dealing with them rests with the family or lineage. They are not only objects of the family cult, but they are themselves considered members of the family, whether they are the *nyama* of men or of things.

The ancestral cult of the local kin group is generally the most important religious unit of a community. The head of the family or

lineage is also its chief priest. He alone has the right to communicate with the *nyama* of the ancestors, and he does so on behalf of all the members of the group (see ch. 6, Family). To be successful, every undertaking of the group—clearing the land, sowing, reaping, hunting, house-building—requires the previous consent and good will of the deities concerned, each of which must be approached through invocation, sacrifice, prayer or other appropriate ritual.

Family rites are usually carried out at sites where the deities are thought to reside. The sacrifice to an ancestor may be conducted in the center of the family compound or in the house in which he died or was buried. A sacrifice to the *nyama* of ancestral land is conducted in the field itself or at a distinctive rock or tree close by. A particular spot on a river bank or a place struck by lightning are likely residences of nature deities. The *nyama* of land, water and other major phenomena are sometimes represented, indirectly and by extension, by objects which normally appear in close association with them. Thus, an animal may share the power and sacred character of the forest or river in which it lives, or a rock may come to symbolize the *nyama* of the field which surrounds it.

The particular form of the ritual depends on the deity involved and on what is wanted from him. The invocation may follow one of several formulas: the sacrificial victim may be a cow, sheep, goat, dog, chicken or even an egg; and the offering itself may be a piece of flesh, or some blood, hair, skin or other part of the animal. Palm wine, millet beer or other fermented drinks are common libations. The altar may be a small clay table, a flat stone, a conical clay mound, a tree or tree stump or simply a designated area of ground. A bowl is always placed on the altar to receive the offering or libation.

Only rarely is there a need or desire to make a statuette or other direct representation of mountains, rivers or other natural forms. Ancestral spirits, on the other hand, are represented in tangible form by a wide variety of objects: small statues, generally made of wood or clay but occasionally of stone or metal; personal possessions, such as a drum or some other item owned by the ancestor during his lifetime; and bones or other relics of the deceased. The relationship of such objects (Malinké, *boli*) to the spirit forces with which they are associated may vary from group to group or from person to person. In theory, the distinction between *boli* and *nyama* is clear: in practice, the symbol tends to become confused with what it symbolizes.

In addition to general participation in ancestral cults, the men of a community—and sometimes the women—may belong to mystery cults, the so-called secret societies. The best known are the Poro society for men and the Sande society for women which are most active in the southern and coastal areas of the country. Membership

is by initiation rather than birth, and the same cult may have members in several different communities.

Typically, the cult object is an animal or nature spirit. Each cult has its own sanctuary (generally a grove or a clearing in the bush), altars and other ritual paraphernalia. Members of particular cults may be identified by characteristic tattoos, dress, dance steps, songs, secret passwords, emblems or other special feature. Initiation into a mystery cult or secret society ordinarily takes place at puberty and normally involves some form of bodily mutilation—especially circumcision or, for women, excision—and a period of instruction in the lore and ways of the cult and the community (see ch. 9, Education). Men and women's societies are usually separate, and each is secret with respect to members of the opposite sex and uninitiated children. The identity of the officials of the society is known only to the initiates and sometimes not to all of them. When appearing in their official capacities the officers wear masks which represent the cult object. Such masks are among the most sacred and carefully tended ritual objects in the community.

The chief executives of the societies usually are senior persons in the community, and frequently they are also members of the council of elders. Some secret societies, especially in the Forest Region and along the Sierra Leone and Liberian borders, have been sufficiently powerful to exercise an important voice—and occasionally a controlling one—in local affairs (see ch. 5, Social Structure).

The Individual

Ancestral and mystery cults aim principally at the collective security and general well-being of the group. In a wide range of personal matters, an individual must look out for himself and the members of his immediate family by establishing a favorable personal relationship with the spirit world. Nothing happens of itself: there is no such thing as an accident. Personal fortune or misfortune, the failure or success of an enterprise, the contraction and course of a disease, all come about through the action of the spirit forces of the universe.

In large part these forces are amenable to manipulation by humans who may use them for good or ill. The man who wants to get along must deal with them, either directly or with the help of a variety of persons who have special knowledge or special power in such matters. Perhaps the greatest threat to the individual comes from witches or sorcerers—men and women endowed with the power, perhaps unconscious and involuntary, of directing sickness, death or other misfortunes toward others. Trial by ordeal is one of the principal techniques for identifying sorcerers, but even rumor or suspicion is frequently sufficient to indict a person of sorcery and expose him to the wrath of the community. The detection and punishment of sor-

cerers is frequently left to one of the local mystery cults. More often, however, individuals who feel threatened defend themselves by enlisting the aid of private practitioners of the occult.

Almost everyone has regular recourse to diviners, healers, spell-casters, makers of protective amulets and charms or other specialists in the supernatural. Each practitioner normally has his own way of dealing with the supernatural and is apt to have more-or-less regular clients who hire his services whenever the need arises. Treated on a private, individual basis, each case must be separately analyzed and prescribed for. Thus, in addition to observing the taboos, cult objects, sacrifices and other rituals of his ancestral or other local cult (which are fixed by custom and are uniform for all members), the individual lives with a whole complex of personal taboos, sacred objects, and sacrificial and ritual observances which he has either discovered for himself or which—more often—have been prescribed for him.

CHRISTIANITY

The great majority of the 25,000 or 30,000 Christians are Roman Catholics. The estimated 1,000 or 2,000 Protestants are divided among several groups which, with one exception, are affiliated with parent churches in the United States. Unlike many of the British West African countries, in Guinea native African Protestant denominations without foreign affiliations are negligible or nonexistent.

At any given time there were probably never more than two hundred foreign clergy and other church personnel in Guinea, but they had an important impact on Guinean society which goes far beyond the relatively modest number of individuals they converted. In their schools and by example, the priests, sisters and brothers of the Catholic orders, principally the Holy Ghost Fathers (*Congrégation du Saint-Esprit*) and the White Fathers (*Société des Missionnaires d'Afrique*), along with Protestant missionaries and their families, have been among the first to introduce the values, techniques and material culture of Western civilization to Guineans.

Schools operated by the Catholic orders provided a principal starting point for the spread of the French language, and through the efforts of Protestant groups, the Bible has been written down in a number of local languages, providing many of the language groups with a Western alphabet for recording their own speech (see ch. 4, *Ethnic Groups and Languages*). Many pre-independence native leaders as well as many of the present leaders received their initial formal training in mission schools (see ch. 9, *Education*).

More important, perhaps, than this formal influence specifically directed at students and converts have been the more diffuse and less tangible effects on community attitudes brought about through the

simple presence of the missionaries. They were also carriers of Western culture and dispensers of medical care and general welfare assistance. Changes in dress from near-nudity or traditional styles to Western clothing are, in part at least, the result of missionary activities, as are the gradually spreading Western ideas of personal and community hygiene. Although relatively few African Christian families have adopted monogamy as an ideal, this and other Western standards have at least become known and may contribute to the development of the value system of the modern nation which the government is trying to create.

Catholicism

Catholic evangelization began in 1877 with the establishment of the first permanent mission at Boffa by the Holy Ghost Fathers. Originally Church authority over the territory was given to the Ecclesiastical Superior of Sierra Leone. In 1897 parts of the Sierra Leone and Senegambian missions were joined to form a separate Apostolic Prefecture. In 1920 the Prefecture was elevated to a Vicariate, but the N'Zérékoré region remained an administrative dependency of Bamako (Mali) until 1937.

In 1955 the Catholic administrative system in Guinea was divided into three territorially distinct and administratively independent areas—the Archdiocese of Conakry, the Apostolic Prefecture of Kankan and the Apostolic Prefecture of N'Zérékoré. Both the Archdiocese of Conakry and the Apostolic Prefecture of Kankan have been historically, and continue to be, in the care of the Holy Ghost Fathers. N'Zérékoré is administered by the White Fathers.

The Archdiocese of Conakry, which includes all of Lower Guinea and much of the Fouta Djallon, and the Apostolic Prefecture of Kankan, which includes all of Upper Guinea, parts of the Fouta Djallon and the northern half of the Forest Region, are roughly equal in area. The N'Zérékoré Apostolic Prefecture, which covers the southern Forest Region, is about one-third as large as either of the other two.

At the end of 1960 the Archdiocese of Conakry had 15,474 baptized and practicing communicants, 33 priests (3 of whom were Guineans), 22 sisters of St. Joseph of Cluny (14 of whom were Guineans) and 2 Guinean novices in training. Twenty-two Guinean students were studying as junior seminarians, and one senior seminarian was studying outside the country. (Guinea does not have the facilities for providing the advanced training prerequisite to ordination.) The Archdiocese maintained 16 churches and chapels open to the public, 25 schools for some 5,000 students and 6 charitable institutions which housed over 200 inmates.

The Archdiocese maintains 12 mission residences: Boffa (established in 1877); Boké (1897); Coleah (1954); Conakry (1890); Conakry

(1952); Dixinn (1924); Fria (1959); Katako (1951); Kindia (1908); Labé (1954); Mamou (1948); and Ourousa (1912). In some cases, substations or annexes may have been set up in these areas before the formal establishment of permanent mission residences.

In 1960 the Apostolic Prefecture of Kankan, under Monsignor Jean-Baptiste Coudray, had some 7,000 baptized and practicing communicants, 21 priests (including 1 Guinean), 6 nonordained brothers (including 1 Guinean), 14 sisters (of whom 3 were members of the [Guinean] Sisters of our Lady of Guinea), and 4 junior seminarians studying at schools in Conakry. The Prefecture also included 14 churches, 19 schools for 2,132 male students and 2 schools for 97 girls. It maintained 9 mission residences: Broadou (established 1902); Dabadougou (1940); Faranah (1948); Guékédou (1951); Kankan (1923); Kéniéran (1939); Kissidougou (1958); Mango (1910); and Siguiri (1924).

The N'Zérékoré Apostolic Prefecture, under the White Fathers, had about 3,500 communicants and 34 priests, 1 of whom was apparently a Guinean. It maintained 3 charitable institutions, 17 schools for 2,833 boys, and 7 schools for 640 girls. There were 8 mission residences throughout the prefecture.

In the winter of 1960-61 the government began to carry out its previously announced intention to nationalize all private schools, beginning with schools operated by the White Fathers in the N'Zérékoré region (see ch. 9, Education). By June 1961 some 40 Catholic schools had been taken over by the government.

In July, at a series of meetings of party officials, President Touré formally raised the question of Africanizing the Church hierarchy. Archbishop de Milleville responded with a pastoral letter read in all the churches, which precipitated a series of personal exchanges between himself and government spokesmen and ended with his expulsion from the country.

In his pastoral letter, Archbishop de Milleville said, "The Church . . . has always sought to become African in Africa . . . [but] it cannot force any of the faithful to become priests." After noting that there are African bishops in other countries as well as an African cardinal, the Archbishop continued, "But let there be no mistake about it--the Church has never acted under external pressure; it will continue to remain independent of all temporal authority. . . ."

The government denounced the letter as subversive and President Touré in a public address on August 23, demanded a retraction. He repeated his statement on the necessity for the Africanization of the Catholic cadres and declared that no non-African archbishop would be acceptable to the government.

The next day the Archbishop restated his position in a personal letter to the President and requested a personal meeting. He repeated

that he was against suppression of the mission schools, but added that the Church does not refuse to submit to nationalization. With respect to Africanization, he said that the Church respects the authority of the state but that "a state can not impose a national character upon a religious institution, whether the institution be Islam or Christianity. . . ." On August 26, Archbishop de Milleville was expelled, and at least one other priest was similarly forced out a few days later.

The government's position throughout the controversy was restated by President Touré the day after the expulsion. He said that religion is a private matter, strictly based on freedom of choice, and that the PDG respects all religions but takes care not to confuse them with other organizations, such as those of the school system or of agriculture. He further stated that while a party, trade union or cooperative is a social entity, religion is not; it is an individual matter.

"In Church during Mass," said the President, "the priest must speak of God and not of the PDG. If he wishes to concern himself with the PDG, the PDG will concern itself with him." Asking rhetorically whether the Church in Guinea had, in effect, become the equivalent of a political party, he went on to say that in the past:

. . . we have indicated that it would be necessary to envisage in the future the Africanization of all social institutions in the Republic of Guinea. We were talking about the future. But now that certain people have chosen to precipitate matters, we state explicitly that no member of the Church hierarchy will be accredited to our country if he is not an African. This is a plain fact. Whether he comes from Dakar, Mauritania, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic or the Congo does not matter. This is not a racial issue. . . .

From now on, may each person pray according to his faith. But if this does not satisfy certain missionaries who propose to break down the political unity of the PDG, let the Guinean people be permitted to tell them that [the people] are able to oppose their evil and anti-Guinean actions. . . .

In early October, French and African archbishops of West Africa met in a general assembly at Dakar. They then issued a communique which deplored the situation in Guinea and expressed the wish that "God [would] permit the Church in Guinea, in an atmosphere of calm, to pursue its work of peace and evangelization without constraint."

In late 1961 the nationalization of schools was well under way, but the mechanics of the procedure and the arrangements between the parties were unknown (see ch. 9, Education). President Touré's suggestion that one of the Guinean priests be made acting archbishop was not acknowledged, nor were other changes in personnel carried out.

Protestantism

The World Christian Handbook (1957 edition) lists two principal Protestant missionary groups operating in Guinea: the Society for

the Propagation of the Gospel (Church of England) and the Open Bible Standard Churches (American). In the mid-1950's the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel had about 800 adherents. It maintained four places of worship staffed by six ordained ministers and six women, all of whom were British. Ten Guineans worked as officials, but none of these were ordained ministers. The Open Bible Standard Churches had 20 members. Its staff consisted of three ordained ministers (none Guinean) and three Guinean women.

Other missions in Guinea, operating with even smaller staffs, are all affiliated with Protestant organizations in the United States: Christian and Missionary Alliance; Southern Baptists; Missionary Church Association; American Ministerial Association, Inc.; United World Mission (small, unaffiliated denominations); and World Wide Evangelization Crusade. The Christian and Missionary Alliance operates a school for the children of missionaries at Mamou (see ch. 9, Education).

CHAPTER 11

LABOR FORCE

In late 1961 the labor force included about 1.4 million persons between the ages of 15 and 50—approximately half the total population. At least 90 percent of them earned a livelihood from agriculture, including horticulture, animal husbandry and fishing. Statistics were almost totally lacking, and it was impossible to estimate the number of persons engaged in any type of work. Government officials estimated, however, that the number of wage earners totaled approximately 122,000, of which about 36,000 were employed on fruit plantations and in other agricultural activities and 86,000 were engaged in nonagricultural work. Hence the number who worked for money wages constituted only about 8.7 percent of the population of working age. Moreover, most of the workers lived in rural areas where many worked only part-time or were completely idle during several months of the year (see ch. 23, *Agricultural Potential*).

At least 16 ethnic groups were represented in the labor force which was, however, homogeneous in the sense that virtually all its members were born in Guinea. In 1961 the occupational capabilities of the workers were limited by illiteracy (90 to 95 percent) and the lack of professional and technical skills, but steps were being taken to remedy these deficiencies. Many workers were being supervised and instructed by foreign specialists—mostly from Communist-bloc countries—who had arrived under economic and technical aid agreements.

Supply and demand for unskilled labor appeared to be about in balance in the country as a whole. Labor shortages were reported in only two administrative districts—in Kindia, a fruit-growing and cattle-raising district, and in Siguiri, the gold-mining area. Surpluses were reported in four districts—Boké in Lower Guinea, Pita in the Fouta Djallon and Kissidougou and N'Zérékoré in the Forest Region.

Like other undeveloped countries, Guinea had a relative abundance of unskilled workers but an acute scarcity of capital. To compensate for this handicap, the government treated the labor force as a capital resource for constructing the foundations of a modern economy. A prominent feature of the Three-Year Plan, inaugurated in July 1960, was the so-called human investment program, which envisaged the use

of volunteer labor, recruited locally, to furnish most of the manpower for public works and agricultural projects throughout the country under the direction of district officials. All able-bodied men were expected to work voluntarily without pay for 20 days each year, or a total of 60 days for the three-year period. This policy took advantage of a tradition of cooperative work among groups of people in carrying out community undertakings (see ch. 22, Character and Structure of the Economy).

The country's most pressing labor problems in 1961 derived from the difficulties created by the transition from French control to national independence. These problems were made more difficult by the fact that the people generally placed little value on work in excess of that necessary for basic personal needs; they were only beginning to be stimulated by recognition of the rewards to be gained from increased industrial productivity.

For most, the incentive to work has lacked the spur of hope since an individual had little possibility of accumulating personal wealth in a subsistence economy in which he worked as much for his kinsmen as for himself. The disposal of surplus products has long been hampered by primitive transportation and, for the most part, the consequent limitation to local markets. The value of material wealth has also been depreciated by the scarcity of available prestige items or of opportunities for personal pleasures that cost money. The rewards associated in more modern economies with concentrated and sustained occupational effort and initiative have meant little to the average Guinean. A new attitude toward work, however, may be expected to develop with progress in the industrialization and monetization of the economy (see ch. 6, Family; ch. 7, Social Values and Patterns of Living).

Independence brought to power a leadership committed to modernizing and developing the economy. The Three Year Plan, a first step in this direction, created an immediate and growing need for persons with special skills, such as mechanics, operators of construction equipment, teachers, public health experts, statisticians, engineers, agronomists, managers and others. The Government and the Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti Démocratique de Guinée—PDG) have made strenuous efforts to encourage people, particularly the young, to qualify in such skills and to provide facilities for them to do so.

The government, conscious of the importance to its plans of enlisting the active support of the labor force and of creating a positive enthusiasm for work, has stressed, in its vigorous propaganda, the necessity for an extraordinary effort in building a new independent nation. The workers have been reminded that their contribution was the key element in developing their country's strength and prosperity and in preserving their own dignity and freedom. They have been con-

stantly told that, under the leadership of the PDG, they are working for themselves and for an African purpose. In contrast, the period of French control has been portrayed as a time when they labored for Frenchmen for the benefit of French colonialism. The government, supported by the PDG-dominated labor unions and aided by the human investment concept, has had firm control over the wage-earners throughout the country (see ch. 13, Labor Relations and Organization; ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

GENERAL CHARACTER

In attempting to achieve rapid modernization and development, the new Guinean Government faced many serious problems. The bulk of its labor force lived by subsistence farming in rural areas. Except on the commercial fruit plantations, agricultural methods, including those for cattle-raising, were primitive. On the plantations, most of the laborers also were unskilled and worked under the supervision of overseers. In the farming villages, women and children worked in the fields with the men, particularly during planting and harvesting. In some coastal communities, many families earned a livelihood from fishing, while in the forested areas some of the men specialized in timber-cutting. In small towns and villages throughout the country, a few persons were engaged, at least part-time, in making baskets, clothing, leather items, crude tools, household utensils, furniture or jewelry, but mainly for local use. In the larger centers, an unknown number of artisans were employed full-time in these and other handicraft pursuits, and some had acquired a high degree of skill.

In mid-1961, the number of skilled and semiskilled industrial workers was small but increasing. At the Fria bauxite-processing plant at Kimbo, one of the largest and most modern in the world, 840 African employees and an increasing number of students at Fria's training center were benefiting from a systematic training program. Other workers were engaged in industrial activity at the bauxite and iron mines and at the port of Conakry. Still others were employed in road construction, the building trades, the operation of the railway, the operations and maintenance of motor vehicles and the miscellaneous crafts and small industries in the larger towns. Government-operated apprentice schools were beginning to help meet the need for trained men in these fields.

Meanwhile, in the framework of the government's ambitions for economic development, the shortage of skills was general and acute. School training was essential and could do much to meet the need in a relatively short period. Only time and experience, however, will produce the competent managers and supervisors of whom there were, in 1961, too few. Moreover, among the workers themselves, prolonged

experience under capable leadership will be required to develop the initiative, resourcefulness, discipline and the industrious habits essential in a modern economy.

Employment Pattern

Statistics were lacking in 1961 for such categories as employers, employees and the self-employed. In the countryside, most of the farm work was done by families, groups of families, or state-sponsored agricultural cooperatives. Family groups also worked together in mining gold in the Siguiri area; during the dry season, when work at home was slack, as many as 80,000 to 100,000 persons might be so employed. Most of the fruit, coffee and kola plantations, of which there were over 3,000, were operated by individuals, cooperatives or companies. They constituted the largest group of private agricultural employers (see ch. 23, Agricultural Potential; ch. 24 Industrial Potential).

The largest employer in the country was the government. In addition to the usual administrative agencies in Conakry and the district capitals, it operated agricultural experiment stations, rural modernization centers, a medical research station, schools of various types, the Guinea National Railway (Chemin de Fer Guinée), the Guinea National Airways Company (Compagnie Nationale Air-Guinée), public utilities and public works construction projects (see ch. 23, Agricultural Potential; ch. 24, Industrial Potential).

Most of the self-employed in 1961 were cattle-raisers, farmers, traders, persons engaged in private business or artisans. A few entrepreneurs engaged in small-scale manufacturing and food processing.

Before independence, the professions, such as law, medicine, dentistry, pharmacy and journalism, were practiced almost exclusively by foreigners—mostly French—many of whom have since left the country. After independence, the government encouraged Guineans to enter the professions, but they had to study abroad to do so and the number of qualified professionals remained small.

Age and Sex Distribution

Since independence, all types of work have, in theory, been open to women in accordance with Article 44 of the Constitution which provides that "all citizens of the Republic of Guinea shall enjoy the same and equal rights to work, rest, social assistance and education." Nevertheless, certain types of work continued to be popularly regarded as suitable only for men or for women, although women began to press for equal employment opportunities and equal treatment with respect to salaries and fringe benefits.

In the villages, women and young girls traditionally have done the housework, looked after the children, tended the gardens, and done much work in the fields, especially in the cultivation of such crops as peanuts and vegetables. Women also customarily carried the surplus vegetables and other produce to the local markets to sell or trade them there. Men and boys drove and guarded the livestock and did the work connected with raising rice, millet and tobacco. Men also worked in the forest, cutting timber, gathering wild fruit and nuts, and hunting. On hunting trips, they might be out for several days in the forests with their dogs, trapping and shooting small and large game. In gold mining the men customarily did the digging, while the women did the carrying and, aided by their children, the washing of the gold-bearing gravels. During the planting season, in many villages, almost everybody worked in the fields from morning to night leaving a few boys to guard the huts. Men, women and children all participated in harvesting the crops, both fruit and grain. Men and women also worked together in constructing village huts and in certain special tasks, such as making baskets and pottery. Little change in these traditional patterns seemed to have been made by late 1961.

Aptitudes and Skills

Various ethnic groups are associated with particular occupations and skills. The Soussou, who live along the coast, are known as fishermen, traders and specialists in handling palm-tree products. The Foulah (called the Peul by the French), who live mainly in the Fouta Djallon, combine farming with their traditional pursuit of cattle-raising. The Malinké, who live mainly in the alluvial flood plains of the upper Niger and in the adjacent savanna area, have for centuries been in contact with trading groups from the regions to the east and north and they engage in trade as well as in farming and hunting. The Kissi, Guerzé and Toma in the Forest Region are coffee growers, palm-oil extractors and hunters (see ch. 3, Geography and Population; ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Members of all groups have shown good aptitude for learning industrial skills. In one instance (in 1959-60), a composite group of some 600 literate, unmarried men between the ages of 16 and 20 was given intelligence and aptitude tests to qualify for training in the operation and maintenance of electrical equipment, internal combustion engines and other machinery. About 10 percent passed the screening tests and all of these made good progress. Trainees from the Forest Region were reported to be outstanding in their ability to master industrial skills; they were followed in order of aptitude by the Malinké, Foulah and Soussou.

Unemployment

Unemployment in Guinea was difficult to define in terms which apply in industrialized countries. Moreover, statistics on both the supply of labor and the demand for it were lacking. In its commonly accepted meaning, unemployment in 1961 existed only in a few local areas and in specific labor categories for temporary periods. A large segment of the rural labor force, however, was underemployed. This group, except on the commercialized fruit plantations, farmed on a subsistence basis which required only a part-time effort by the available workers.

As measured by the number of jobless persons registering with the National Labor Office (l'Office Nationale de la Main-d'Oeuvre), some unemployment existed in Conakry in 1960, particularly among the estimated 16,000 construction workers—the largest single wage-earning group in the country. Construction work had fallen off immediately after independence, but rose again with the receipt of Communist-bloc loans. Between January 1957 and October 1958, the number of registrants for work varied from 210 in March 1958 to 792 in July 1958. In 1959 (the last year on which figures are available), the number of registrants rose to 1,925 in April, but by May it had fallen to 215. The peak of 1,925 jobless registrants represented only 1.6 percent of the estimated total of 122,000 wage earners in the country. Hence, unemployment, even in the populated centers where most of the registrants lived, was not the source of serious political or social problems.

NONAGRICULTURAL GROUPS: WAGES AND BENEFITS

Minimum Wage and Salary Scales

Minimum hourly wage and monthly salary scales for various labor categories were established in June and July of 1959 by a series of commissions composed of representatives of employer and labor groups (see ch. 13, Labor Relations and Organization). Commission membership varied with the type of work being considered. Each labor representative belonged to a union affiliated with the National Confederation of Guinean Workers (Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs de Guinée—CNTG). One scale was established for Conakry and the main population centers in the administrative districts, together designated as "Zone 1." Another scale, reduced by 20 percent, was established for the remainder of the country, designated as "Zone 2" (see table 1).

Hours of Work

A work week of 45 hours was established by law for government employees and, presumably, for most other categories. The prescribed

Table 1. Selected Minimum Wage and Salary Scales in Guinea, 1960¹

[In U.S. dollars and cents²]

Type of Employment	Number of General Categories	Pay Scale Range			
		For Lowest Category		For Highest Category	
		Hourly (cents)	Monthly (dollars)	Hourly (cents)	Monthly (dollars)
General mechanics	7	14.5		64.8	
Chauffeurs	4	21.8		43.7	
Construction workers	6	12.5		43.7	
Construction worker supervisors	5		109.30		182.18
Domestic help	5		26.10		48.58
Clerical and sales personnel for commercial houses	11		21.76		303.64
Transportation employees:					
Manual workers	7	12.5		63.1	
Office workers	7		21.76		122.95
Supervisors	5		109.30		213.76
Managers	3		231.58		391.90
General Mechanics:					
Functionaries	7		23.86		109.30
Supervisors	5		109.30		213.76
Employees of commercial and industrial firms, banking and insurance houses:					
Manual workers	6	18.2		64.8	
Functionaries	6		29.55		133.58
Crews of commercial and fishing vessels:					
Large coastal ships:					
Boatswain			49.15		
Seaman sailor			44.22		
Inshore coastal ships:					
Boatswain			65.42		
Seaman sailor			31.56		

¹ Applicable for Zone 1 (Conakry and the main population centers). In Zone 2 (areas outside Conakry and the main population centers) the scale for each category was 20 percent less than for the corresponding category in Zone 1.

² Computed at the rate of 247 Guinean francs to U.S. \$1.

Source: Adapted from République de Guinée, *Journal Officiel*, 1^{re} année, No. 17, August 20, 1959, p. 519; 1^{re} année, No. 19, September 15, 1959, p. 57; 2^e année, No. 7, April 1, 1960, p. 139.

daytime hours were: Monday through Friday, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:00 m. and from 2:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.; Saturday, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.

Special regulations applied to certain kinds of workers, such as domestic servants. Their regular work hours were established as between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. Regulations entitled them to one day

off each week and to a two-hour rest period in the afternoon. They were also entitled to an hour for each meal or to 1½ hours if they lived off the premises. For overtime work an additional 10 percent of the hourly salary was required to be paid for each hour in excess of 51 hours a week up to 59 hours a week. For work in excess of 59 hours employed on day work during the regular week, this was increased to 25 percent. For work between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. on regular work days, the increase was 50 percent. For day work on Sundays and holidays, the increase was 100 percent.

Medical and Social Security Benefits

Employees were entitled to compensation for accidents or sickness occurring in connection with their work. To cover such contingencies, employers were required to take out insurance made payable to the National Social Security Fund (*La Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale*), administered by the Minister of Labor and Social Legislation. The Fund was maintained by the employers who were required to pay quarterly assessment amounting to a minimum of 1 percent of the wage or salary of each employee before deductions.

A similar procedure was followed in connection with the family allowances to which wage earners were entitled. Employers were required to submit quarterly reports to the Director of the National Social Security Fund listing each authorized recipient and his work-attendance record.

The Director of the National Social Security Fund is advised by a consultative commission composed of approximately 25 members, appointed for two-year terms by the Minister of Labor and Social Legislation. In May 1960 commission membership included three deputies representing the National Assembly, eight employees' representatives, eight labor union representatives, and five persons representing the Ministry of Labor and Social Legislation (one doctor from the Ministry of Health and Population, one official each from the Ministries of National Economy and of Finance, one lawyer and one midwife).

Fria

The Fria bauxite processing plant in 1961 employed about 340 Europeans and 840 Guineans—with dependents, about 7,000 persons—for whom the company provided housing, recreational, medical and hospital facilities. Fria had special arrangements with the government for recruiting labor, both African and European. The wage scales and the standards for fringe benefits of all types were higher than for other enterprises. Europeans and some Guineans lived in three newly built and furnished nine-story apartment houses. Large families lived in detached units. Most of the Guinean em-

ployees, however, were accommodated in a large housing development. The entire complex included schools for European and Guinean children, a modern 40-bed hospital, recreational playgrounds and a swimming pool. When government employees were transferred temporarily to Fria, the company assumed responsibility for payment of their wages, pension deductions, sickness and accident compensations and other allowances recognized by the Labor Code.

GOVERNMENT POLICY

The basic labor policy of the government asserted the equal right of all citizens to work, rest, social assistance and education. The right to form trade unions and to strike was recognized. Many government leaders, including President Sékou Touré, had had experience in the left-wing French labor movement which was active in the West African Territories. These leaders continued to exert a dominant influence in labor matters and union affairs.

Special regulations pertaining to healthful and safe working conditions, graduated wage scales, promotions, longevity pay, accident and sickness compensation, family allowances and pensions were promulgated and enforced. The worker was told that he was protected by comprehensive codes from exploitation by private employers, but he also was reminded of his duty to contribute freely to the fulfillment of the Three-Year Plan. The government made every effort to induce all able-bodied persons to work voluntarily for limited periods on some planned project. The party organization was the primary instrument used in creating and sustaining enthusiasm for this concept.

Labor Force as a Political Instrument

The government assigned a key role to the labor force in the achievement of the economic and political goals. Workers were exhorted to make themselves the nation's strong "invincible arm," supporting the struggle by other African countries for independence. Efforts to win the cooperation and support of labor groups were successful. The Three-Year Plan apparently compensated for the cessation of French construction activities and the political hazards of unemployment were averted. The unions and the agricultural cooperatives, which exerted powerful influence over the nonagricultural and the agricultural labor force respectively, were, in effect, adjuncts of the ruling political party, the PDG. Deliberations at the meetings of the unions or the cooperatives touched as frequently on political and social matters as on economic concerns (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics; ch. 23, Agricultural Potential).

The labor unions were among the first groups to endorse the Three-Year Plan, including the volunteer labor feature of the human in-

vestment program. Popular support was virtually assured when the railway workers in Conakry volunteered to work each Saturday for three months without pay. The party and the unions soon supported the program and called upon all workers to do likewise. Volunteer labor was obtained without difficulty for the numerous projects which were promptly begun in the rural areas.

Party leaders appealed to local pride and sought to arouse a competitive spirit among communities in order to stimulate people to strive to complete assigned projects on schedule. Widely publicized recognition was given to groups which exceeded a quota or completed a project ahead of schedule. Outstanding communities were honored with inspections by high government officials, sometimes accompanied by visiting foreign dignitaries. Such visits were the occasion for speeches designed to strengthen support for the PDG and its policies. The lowliest worker was made to feel that his efforts, large or small, were being observed and reported to higher authority. The human investment program thus at once provided a means for maintaining close touch with the rural population, for maintaining discipline by active supervision of work groups and for keeping down unemployment (see ch. 13, Labor Relations and Organization).

Labor Codes

Toward the end of World War II, Guinean workers began to press for equality with French workers. In 1944 the French government proposed the Overseas Labor Code (Code du Travail Outre-Mer) which prescribed an 8-hour day, a 40-hour week, a minimum wage scale, paid vacations, equal pay for equal work (without regard for race, sex, age or legal status), family allowances, pensions and the right to form unions, strike and bargain collectively. It also provided for labor inspectorates and for labor dispute committees with equal representation from workers and employers. But labor legislation for the Overseas Territories had low priority with the successive French governments of the post-war period. In 1952, however, the French West African deputies, with the support of the French labor unions, finally succeeded in getting the Code passed in the French National Assembly and in the Territorial Assemblies.

The 1952 Code, with its impressive list of 241 articles, fulfilled most of labor's demands, although it omitted provisions for agricultural workers and for accident and sickness compensation. But the French territorial governors were slow to put the Code into effect, particularly the provisions pertaining to family allowances, working hours and wage scales. It had some acceptance, however, and even after independence, the Guinean government continued to apply it until a new Labor Code, passed by the National Assembly on June 30, 1960,

was published as a presidential decree a month later. Besides providing additional safeguards against the exploitation of workers by their employers, the new Code specifies the organization and functions of labor courts and prescribes the minimum and maximum penalties which they are authorized to impose for violations of the various sections of the Code.

Labor Courts

The labor courts are empowered to decide disputes between workers and employers relative to individual or collective agreements and to the application of regulations already in effect. The courts also judge disputes between workers involving labor issues.

The jurisdiction of a labor court is limited to the area of the dispute under consideration. In litigations arising from cancellation of a labor contract, a worker whose habitual residence is in an area other than that of his work may choose to have his case heard either by a court in his residential area or by one in his place of work.

Labor courts are appointed by presidential decrees on the recommendation of the Minister of Labor and Social Legislation and on that of the Minister of Justice who is responsible for administration of these courts. The courts are composed of a magistrate (*magistrat*), appointed by the Minister of Justice, and four assessors (lay judges). Two of the assessors represent the employers and the other two represent the workers. They are selected by the Minister of Labor and Social Legislation from lists submitted by the major labor union organizations. A new list of assessors is prepared each year, but the same person may be carried on the list from year to year. A clerk, appointed by the Minister of Justice, is attached to each court as secretary. A president of the court is appointed for each case and the assessors are selected for their familiarity with the regulations pertinent to the dispute. Assessors serve without pay, and court proceedings are without cost to the litigants. Moreover, workers involved in court cases may have free legal assistance.

Court hearings are public except during conciliatory discussions between the contesting parties. After completion of the arguments by both sides, the courts deliberate in secret. Judgments in cases involving less than 150,000 francs (approximately \$650 at the rate of 247 francs for U.S.\$1) are final and cannot be appealed except on the issue of jurisdiction. Judgments in cases involving more than 150,000 francs may be appealed to a justice of the peace court with extended jurisdiction or to the Court of First Instance in the area where the case is tried (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government). If an appeal is made, it must be initiated within 15 days after the court's decision is announced and then submitted with the case records within 8 days to the appropriate court.

The usual penalties for infractions of the labor code are fines which range from 2,000 to 60,000 francs. Certain violations are also punishable by imprisonment from 6 days to 1 year. For repeated offenses, the penalties are much heavier and usually include a mandatory prison sentence.

The following are examples of infractions and the penalties which may be imposed for them: failure to furnish medical or first-aid services and violations of regulations pertaining to the employment of minors or women—2,000 to 4,000 francs; imposition of fines on workers by employers—4,000 to 8,000 francs; irregularities in labor contracts, including failure to observe wage payment regulations—10,000 to 15,000 francs; opposing labor inspectors in the exercise of their duties—30,000 to 60,000 francs and imprisonment for 15 days to 3 months; knowingly making a false declaration in claiming accident or sickness benefits—12,000 to 40,000 francs. If an infraction is found to have injured several workers simultaneously, the employer is fined for each worker, but the total fine may not exceed 50 times the maximum that could have been imposed for a single worker.

Regional Labor Inspectorates

A presidential decree, dated June 3, 1960, abolished the National Inspectorate of Labor and Social Laws which had operated since the early 1950's. On July 1, 1960, four regional labor inspectorates were established and given the mission of "maintaining social peace and protecting the workers" under the direction of the Minister of Labor and Social Legislation (see table 2). Each inspectorate had virtual autonomy in dealing with labor matters within its area. In charge of each was a regional inspector of labor and social laws, appointed by the President of the Republic upon recommendation of the Minister of Labor and Social Legislation.

Table 2. Regional Labor Inspectorates of Guinea, 1960

Region	Location of Headquarters	Administrative Districts Within Region
1	Conakry	Conakry, Forécariah, Kindia, Dubréka, Boffa, Téli-mélé, Gaoual.
2	Mamou	Mamou, Dalaba, Pita, Labé, Youkounkoun, Mali, Tougué.
3	Kankan	Kankan, Kouroussa, Dabola, Dinguiraye, Siguiri, Beyla, Kérouané, N'Zérékoré, Macenta, Guékédou, Kissidougou, Faranah.
4	Fria	Fria, Boké.

Source: Adapted from République de Guinée, *Journal Officiel*, 2^e année, No. 14, July 1, 1960, p. 223.

The inspectorates were charged with protecting the workers' interests in the application of laws and regulations pertaining to labor and social security matters. They were expected to clarify them by giving advice and making recommendations both to the workers and the employers. They were expected to receive counsel and opinions from district administrators and to draw up charges against labor-law violators. Monthly, quarterly and annual reports were required to be made to the Minister of Labor and Social Legislation concerning their inspections and other activities.

National Labor Office

The National Labor Office was established by the Guinean Government to take over the responsibilities of the Territorial Employment Exchange which the French Government had set up in each of its West African colonies in 1953. Beginning in November 1958, the Labor Office operated under the Minister of Labor and Social Legislation. It was responsible for dealing with all matters pertaining to the supply and distribution of labor. It collected and maintained current information on the national supply and demand for labor, registered the unemployed, filled employers' requests for workers, issued employment cards and work-record certificates to new employees and inspected and approved labor contracts.

It also issued labor permits to foreign workers, cooperated with the security services in checking on foreign workers' arrivals and departures and transferred, upon request, the savings of foreign workers to their homelands. It was the only labor placement agency in the country. Hiring through private arrangements, although legal, frequently proved to be unsatisfactory, particularly when a sizeable number of workers and various categories of skills were involved.

A consultative commission, with equal representation from the government, employers and workers, was provided to advise the Minister of Labor and Social Legislation about the operations of the Labor Office. Commission members served without pay. The government officials designated by law to be available for service as commissioners included the Ministers of Finance, National Economy, Public Works and Transport, Posts and Telecommunications, National Education, and Public Health and Population. The Inspector of Labor and Social Laws also attended the commission's meetings. The representatives of the employers and of labor were appointed for two years by the Minister of Labor and Social Legislation from a list submitted by employer and labor organizations. When registering for work at the local employment office, the applicant was required to submit his identity card and his work-record book in which previous employers had certified to the wages paid and the period of employment.

Provisions for Training

Until recently there were few opportunities in Guinea to acquire specialized training. Until the end of World War II, there were only two apprentice schools in the country—one, at Conakry, to train workers and specialists for the Public Works Service and the country's few private enterprises and the other, at Kindia, to train artisans. Relatively high academic requirements limited the number of admissions and graduates tended to move into white-collar jobs rather than to accept the work for which they had been trained.

During the period of French control, employers generally imported technicians and skilled workers and saw no reason to establish apprentice schools or training programs. Apprentices received only nominal pay and worked virtually as servants for the skilled workers. Finding little real opportunity to learn a trade, many broke off their apprenticeship. Since independence, the government has attempted to improve the situation, by imposing a small tax on the employers to be used to establish several new apprentice schools and to improve the old ones.

By mid-1960, the human investment program included projects for expanding and modernizing apprentice-training facilities. School capacities were substantially increased, in some cases by as much as 100 percent. The School of Practical Agriculture and Cooperatives (l'Ecole Pratique d'Agriculture et de Coopération) at Tolo near Mamou, had been enlarged to accommodate three classes of 25 students each. It offered a four-year course. Kankan and Kindia each had a building-trade school (*centre d'apprentissage*) which, together, could accommodate about 140 students. The Conakry Trade School for Boys (Centre d'Apprentissage de Garçons), teaching manual-training subjects, could take about 150 students. The National Secretarial School (l'Ecole Nationale de Secrétariat) at Conakry had been modernized, but information regarding its capacity was not available in mid-1961. The National School of Agriculture (l'Ecole Nationale d'Agriculture) was opened in March 1961 at Kindia. It started with two classes of about 20 students each; students were to pursue a two-year course. The Polytechnic Institute at Conakry was scheduled to open late in 1961 with Soviet assistance; plans called for the admission of 350 students a year for a four-year course (see ch. 9, Education).

The government has encouraged small enterprises to develop the skills they themselves need by giving on-the-job training to selected employees. Products made by trainees in Conakry workshops were proudly displayed to foreign dignitaries who visited the country in 1960 and 1961.

The Fria Company, in 1961, was conducting its own school for training technicians and specialists and applications for admissions were being received from all administrative districts. To qualify for enrollment, applicants were required to be unmarried, to be between 16 and 20 years of age and to possess a primary studies certificate showing competence in reading, writing and arithmetic. They were also required to pass intelligence and aptitude tests given by the company. Successful candidates were given a two-months' general course before being separated into four groups for specialized instruction in welding, auto and industrial mechanics, electricity and the making of precision tools.

The student spent 48 hours in the classroom each week, devoting half his time to theoretical instruction and half to practical exercises. Instruction continued until proficiency was attained. Thursday afternoons were spent on recreational activities which included swimming and organized sports. Each student had his own sleeping room in a concrete barracks-type structure. The remarkable results obtained in making precision tools after only five months of training indicated a high quality of instruction, effective screening methods and excellent capacity and serious application on the part of the students.

Foreign Assistance in Training

Numerous foreign specialists were in Guinea in 1961 as instructors and advisers in a wide variety of technical subjects. By far the largest group of specialists, estimated in May to total about 1,200, was from Communist-bloc countries. Meanwhile, approximately 560 Guinean students were being sent abroad for technical instruction and training (see ch. 9, Education). By early 1961 about 200 Soviet and Czechoslovakian technicians were modernizing and expanding the Conakry airport; another group, consisting of Soviet technicians, was engaged in modernizing the railway system, and still another was building an engineering school. Czechoslovakian specialists were reorganizing and improving the Conakry radio station and managing the Conakry airport; Czechoslovakian doctors were replacing French doctors in the Conakry hospital.

Specialist groups from East Germany were building a powerful radio transmitting station, constructing a modern printing plant and teaching Guineans how to operate new diesel railway engines made in East Germany. Polish shipping experts were constructing a fishing port in Conakry and the crews of the two Polish fishing vessels were training Guinean fishermen. Bulgarian and Hungarian medical doctors were in evidence. Hungarian motor transport specialists were in Conakry supervising the operation and maintenance of new

buses made in Hungary. President Touré indicated, in January 1961, that he had been promised other technical help from Hungary.

An estimated 100 to 125 Chinese Communists were at various places in the country instructing and aiding in improving rice-growing methods. Yugoslavia, under an agreement signed in October 1960, sent technical experts, some of whom were working as staff members and advisers in the Conakry hospital; others were instructing in schools.

Technicians from West Germany were engaged in establishing a model modern slaughterhouse and in building a refrigeration plant. A few were helping to improve fishing methods and to set up three fish-smoking plants. Others were operating a mobile veterinary clinic, establishing a laboratory to produce vaccine for cattle and instructing in cattle-raising methods. Still others were teaching nurses, supervising public health and sanitation training methods and working in an agricultural research center that produces quinine.

About 15 Guineans were in West Germany taking a 16-month proficiency course in office administration; two doctors were also there studying eye diseases that are spread by insects. West Germany also had made scholarships available for veterinary science courses. Yugoslavia, in accordance with the 1960 agreement, had arranged for Guineans to attend "proficiency courses" in specialist subjects. Czechoslovakian hospitals and public sanitation establishments were visited early in April 1961 by Guinean public health officials, including the Minister of Health and Population.

CHAPTER 12

FORCED LABOR

Forced labor is defined by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations as a "system of forced or 'corrective' labor, which is: (a) employed as a means of political coercion or punishment for holding or expressing political views; and (b) is on such a scale as to constitute an important element in the economy of a given country." As so defined, it did not exist in Guinea in mid-1961. France abolished the *corvée* and other forms of compulsory labor in its Overseas Territories by an act of April 11, 1946, and tightened the prohibitions in the Overseas Labor Code of December 15, 1952. Forced labor was not explicitly forbidden in the 1958 Constitution of the Republic of Guinea, but was prohibited in Article 3 of the Labor Code of June 30, 1960.

An important feature of the Three-Year Plan, initiated in 1960, is the human investment program under which all able-bodied persons are expected to contribute 20 days of unpaid labor a year on public works or agricultural projects (see ch. 11, Labor Force; ch. 22, Character and Structure of the Economy; ch. 25, Public Finance). Guineans apparently do not regard this program as a system of forced labor, nor can it be described as such in terms of the United Nations definition of forced labor.

Human investment operates, in theory, if not entirely in practice, on a voluntary basis, and it evokes a tradition old in the area of collective effort by kin groups and local communities. In promoting the program, leaders emphasize that the people are being called upon to help themselves in contrast with the days when they were forced to work for the benefit of a colonial power.

In the first year of the program, 1,441 public buildings were constructed, 6,456 kilometers of roads were built or repaired, 2,333 hectares of unused land were brought under cultivation, and nearly half a million trees were planted. It is anticipated that by the time the Three-Year Plan has been completed, one-fifth of the total expenditure will have come from labor contributed by the people and that 70 percent of the labor force will have been involved at one time or another in work on Plan projects (see ch. 11, Labor Force; ch. 22, Character and Structure of the Economy.) The use of either penal labor or military conscript labor in the mining of gold was also envisaged in the Three-Year Plan.

FORCED LABOR IN THE PAST

Pre-European

Slavery was widespread in the Sudanese kingdoms and empires in the earliest periods of recorded history of Africa south of the Sahara. Under the Mali Empire (eleventh to sixteenth centuries) and the Songhai Empire (fourteenth to sixteenth centuries), nobles and local chiefs held serfs and slaves, whom they inherited or acquired through raiding and conquest. They were used as household servants, workers of all kinds, or soldiers (see ch. 2, *Historical Setting*). Later, native states, such as that of the Foulah, were built upon the exploitation of conquered peoples as slaves and on traffic in slaves.

From the eighth century onward, the chiefs of the Sudan supplied slaves to Arab traders, who transported them over the Sahara for resale on the North African coast. Slave-trading received new impetus with the discovery and settlement of America. From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, there was constant tribal warfare; local chiefs raided and sacked village after village for captives to sell to Arab middlemen in the markets of the interior or to European traders who put in by ship along the southern coast of West Africa.

The overland caravan trade to the Mediterranean gradually gave way in this period to seaborne traffic, which moved in a triangular pattern between Europe and America, by way of the African coast. Vessels laden with bright cloth, trinkets and firearms sailed from Liverpool, Bordeaux, Amsterdam and other European ports. They put in at fortified outposts on the African coast between Cap Vert and the Niger River and later as far south as Angola, where they exchanged their cargoes for slaves, which they carried to the West Indies and other parts of America. There the slaves were sold, and cargoes of rum, sugar and tobacco were picked up to be taken back to Europe. The "Triangular Trade" inflicted heavy population losses on Guinea and other parts of West Africa during the three centuries of its existence. The slave trade was formally outlawed by Great Britain in 1807 and by France in 1818, but trade across the Atlantic was not completely halted until after the abolition of slavery in the United States in 1865.

French Rule

The French employed various forms of forced labor in their colonial territories in West Africa. The device provided the government with a readily available and needed source of manpower for public purposes. The system and the abuses to which it lent itself gave rise to bitter resentment among the people. Ultimately, forced labor and the still earlier European slave trade became particulars in the general indictment of European exploitation and colonial rule. The memory

is kept alive in independent Guinea in the school books and in frequent references by political leaders.

One of its basic forms was the *prestation tax*, which required all adult males between the ages of 18 and 50 to donate up to 12 days labor each year for public purposes. Only the few persons in official positions or with wealth or ranking family connections were allowed to redeem their obligation by paying a nominal cash fee.

Prestation labor was employed, not only for upkeep of roads, bridges and the like, but also, contrary to law, for construction projects. The resentment created by this abuse was intensified by the practice of using *prestation* labor on tasks in and around government posts or residences or on projects which were of little benefit except to the Europeans. Moreover, people were frequently kept at work longer than the period specified or were called out at harvest time and sometimes received no food.

Apart from unpaid labor for a short, fixed period, French officials could also require members of the local population to work for the government for unspecified intervals in return for wages. Men were frequently required to act as porters or bearers for public officials or military officers. Others were put to work on the construction of ports and highways, generally at low wages and often under harsh treatment or unhealthy conditions.

Military conscripts and penal labor were an additional source of manpower. Conscripts who failed to qualify for the First Contingent of colonial troops because of physical or other reasons were assigned to the Second Contingent, an auxiliary force employed on developmental projects. The number of persons involved in this type of forced labor appears to have been relatively small as compared with other types.

A further source of unpaid labor derived from the *Indigénat*, a disciplinary system under which French administrators could impose summary punishment on native subjects for minor transgressions (see ch. 16, *Constitution and Government*). Offenders were liable to fines and brief imprisonment and could be made to work out their sentences.

After World War II the French colonial authorities used less forced labor. The recommendations of the Brazzaville Conference of January-February 1944 paved the way for the enactment of legislation by the Constituent Assembly in Paris in 1945-46 eliminating the *Indigénat* and abolishing forced labor (see ch. 2, *Historical Setting*; ch. 16, *Constitution and Government*). The use of military conscripts on development projects was forbidden in 1950, and the Overseas Labor Code of December 1952 included a prohibition of forced labor (see ch. 11, *Labor Force*).

Although slavery was outlawed, large numbers of persons in the Foutah Djallon and possibly in other parts of Guinea continued throughout the period of French rule to live under conditions of virtual servitude within the framework of a fental master-serf relationship (see ch. 6, Social Structure). They were legally free, but as landless farmers they remained in their ancestral villages and continued to work the holdings of their Foulah overlords. Evidence was uncovered as late as 1955 that a few French West African Moslems while in Mecca, ostensibly as religious pilgrims, were selling their personal servants as slaves.

CHAPTER 13

LABOR RELATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS

Labor organization is essentially political in character, reaches down to the smallest village, and includes workers in public administration, commerce, industry, agriculture and the arts. All regional unions and federations of unions are represented in the National Confederation of Guinean Workers (Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs de Guinée—CNTG), whose president is an influential member of the National Political Bureau (Bureau Politique National—BPN), the supreme executive body of the Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti Démocratique de Guinée—PDG). The CNTG is affiliated with the General Union of Workers of Black Africa (UGTAN) which was created in 1959 by President Touré to promote African national independence and eventual continental unity.

Guinea, Ghana, Senegal and Niger were represented in the original roster of UGTAN officers which was made up of a president, six vice-presidents, four general secretaries and a treasurer. Sékou Touré was named president and, in the absence of a secretary general, the organization's officers were to act as a collective executive with a general secretary for orientation.

The control of this organization by President Touré is an important factor in Guinean efforts to play a leading role in Black Africa. A basic precept of UGTAN at the time of its founding was complete independence and nonaffiliation with any international organizations. That policy, strongly advocated by Guinea and Ghana, has been challenged or only reluctantly accepted by various other West African countries.

President Touré, who made his political reputation in union organization activities, has been a most vigorous advocate of the unions. In explaining his conception of labor union responsibilities in the dependent African countries, he has stated that such unions are forced to enter the political field and take part in the anticolonialist struggle since betterment of the workers' lives can only come by political action and victories. Another reason why this combination of unionism and politics must be accepted as a matter of course, he contends, is that the union-trained official can make a valuable contribution when he is later called upon to assume political or governmental responsi-

bilities. Unionism is not an end in itself, but a means for promoting political evolution and economic and social transformation. A union cannot separate its industrial activities from its educational function in political development; in dependent or semidependent territories, it must mobilize workers against the colonial system. In a newly independent country such as Guinea, unions must work for the abolition of inherited colonial structures. He rejects the basic concept of unionism as a class struggle as not applicable to Guinea on the theory that such conflicts do not exist among its various social levels (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

DEVELOPMENT OF UNIONS

No effective labor union organizations developed in French West Africa before World War II, although a few poorly organized unions were formed in Bamako and Dakar in 1937 after the issuance of a decree by the Popular Front government in France permitting African civil servants and white-collar workers to organize. They barely survived the wartime restrictions of the Vichy regime conforming with German-inspired policies of exploitation and racism. In the earliest stages of organization, labor unions were little more than ineffective conspiratorial underground committees. They served as a means of expressing anticolonial sentiments, but there was little or no sense of unity among them. Their weakness and inexperience made it relatively easy for employers to keep their enterprises operating as usual by exploiting differences and rivalries among various groups.

The Brazzaville Conference of colonial administrators from French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa in 1944 went on record as favoring more freedom for African labor organizations. Acting upon the recommendations of the Conference, the French Government committed itself to a policy of encouraging trade unions. One decree eliminated an earlier provision of 1937 which required that all union members be literate in French. Although a relatively high degree of education for union officials was required, the restriction was never fully enforced. The French also established a labor inspectorate for its African territories, lent civil servants to act as union officers and gave free space in public buildings for union meetings. Under these arrangements labor disputes were settled, collective agreements made and local union leaders gained experience under French tutelage and began to influence labor policy. By the end of 1946 the labor inspectorate for the territories in French West Africa had registered 175 new unions.

Most of the new organizations were affiliated with French labor federations and modeled on the French unions. There were a few

autonomous unions—of which those of the railway workers and the commercial employees were the largest—and many of these were backed by the Communist Party. A railway strike in 1947 split the railway workers' organization and seriously weakened it. Thereafter this group, as well as that of the commercial employees' organizations, came increasingly under the influence of the French unions.

First proposed in 1944, a Labor Code for the Overseas Territories was finally passed in 1952 as a result of strong pressure from African labor groups and liberal elements in France. France had previously signed the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention of July 11, 1947, concerning minimum wages, and it now guaranteed French and Black African wage earners equal pay for equal work, a minimum wage scale, a 40-hour week, an 8-hour day, paid leave, pensions, arbitration committees, and safeguards for women and child workers. Agricultural workers were left outside the provisions of the Code because of opposition by both African and European employers and the practical difficulty of enforcing complex regulations which reflected standards so new to the area.

Implementation of the complex Overseas Labor Code of 1952 was obstructed by territorial governors and few of the benefits were realized in full by African workers. Strong measures were frequently taken against militant unions on the grounds that their activity was of a political nature and incited disorder. Discrepancies in application of the code in favor of European workers served to focus the attention of the unions on the issue of African equality. As the labor movement gained in strength, more and more pressure was exerted on the French Government for enforcement of the Labor Code.

In the early postwar years, strikes often failed because of regional or tribal differences, the inexperience of the leaders and the large proportion of unskilled workers among the unions' membership. But some significant gains were made. In 1953 a series of strikes developed from the demand for equitable application of the Labor Code to African workers and spread throughout French West Africa. In Guinea, Sékou Touré played an outstanding role in the strike and emerged as an idol of the workers when the government granted a 20 percent wage increase. With this success, unions began to press for further benefits, including family allowances for wage workers and agricultural laborers.

Influence of French Labor Federations

After World War II, the African labor movement was fostered by French federations anxious to increase their own political power. The developing African unions, lacking experience and preparation, found needed support and guidance in affiliation with French labor

federations and most of the young African labor leaders gained experience in their branches.

Until 1956 unions were chiefly organized into one or another of the three French confederations which contended for the allegiance of African labor. They were: the General Confederation of Labor (Confédération Générale du Travail—CGT), affiliated with the Communist-oriented World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU); the French Confederation of Christian Workers (Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens—CFTC); and the General Confederation of Labor-Workers Force (Confédération Générale du Travail-Force Ouvrière—CGT-FO).

The CTG was the most powerful of the French Federations, and it proved to be the most successful in French West Africa. Its Marxist orientation was transferred to the movement, and African organizers were increasingly exposed to Communist doctrines and techniques. By 1955 it was estimated that almost all organized Guinean workers were members of the CTG. The rest, a small minority, were distributed between the CFTC and CGT-FO. The CFTC, strongest in the coastal regions where the Roman Catholic Church was well established, admitted Moslems and theists of all types. The CGT-FO represented more conservative elements and resisted all moves directed toward autonomous control for African trade unions. It was never numerically strong.

From the beginning the African labor movement was more political than economic in its concerns. While retaining the organizational techniques and many of the political concepts of the French Marxists, the emerging African leaders rejected their doctrine of class conflict as inapplicable because of the small number of industrial workers and the preponderance of village cultivators. The initial ties that bound the African organization to their French prototypes were that such association brought advantages through subsidies, advice, training and world contacts. By 1956, however, union officials had come to regard these ties as incompatible with union needs and ultimate African interests.

Struggle for Independence

The rising tide of nationalism, a manifestation of which was the demand of African workers and their leaders for equality with French workers under the Labor Code of 1952, encouraged increasing cooperation and unity among African labor organizations. In April 1956 African CGT leaders—among them Sékou Touré as CGT head in Guinea—took the first step toward an autonomous and united labor movement in the French African territories. They formed the General Confederation of African Workers (Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Africains—CGTA). This was not affiliated with the

French CGT or the WFTU, but proclaimed a desire to preserve friendly relations with both.

Leaders of the CGTA openly resented the French CGT's hostility to formal expression of African nationalism, and they rejected basic Communist doctrines, reasserting that the CGT's stress on class struggle was not applicable in Africa. They insisted that African farmers and agricultural laborers be admitted to the new organization on the same basis as industrial workers. While pledging themselves to work for general French Black African unity and to encourage foreign capital investment in the territories, they demanded that the legislative and executive branches of government in French West Africa be controlled by Africans and that the development of the area be oriented to African welfare. Echoing current objectives of the African Democratic Rally (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain—RDA), the newly formed CGTA readily obtained that party's blessing (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

For six months after the formation of the CGTA, a bitter struggle for leadership was fought. Opposition to Sékou Touré came from Communists and their adherents who, led by Adboulaye Diallo, vice president of the WFTU and head of the unions in Bamako in Mali, remained in the CTG. But, with the backing of the powerful RDA, the CGTA under Sékou Touré's leadership proved better able to express the spirit of changing times. The old CGT organization in French West Africa began to disintegrate: members failed to pay dues and, by the end of 1956, the CGT announced acceptance of the principle of autonomy and disaffiliation with the WFTU and accepted a call for a preparatory conference on unity at Cotonou in Dahomey to be held in January 1957.

The goals of the Cotonou Conference, as described by Sékou Touré were:

. . . to unite and organize the workers of Black Africa, to coordinate their trade union activities in the struggle against the colonial regime and all other forms of exploitation, to defend their moral and material interests, and to affirm the personality of African trade unionism.

A committee was elected by the Conference to work out the organization of a new African confederation as proposed by Sékou Touré, the General Union of Workers of Black Africa (Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire—UGTAN), replacing the CTGA.

The framework for UGTAN was laid down at Cotonou and it was agreed that its first constituent congress would be held at Conakry in January 1959. Representatives of the anti-Communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICTFU) attended the Conference, but did not accept the UGTAN on the ground that it was too much influenced by Communist ideology and also because of its

announced policy of complete disaffiliation with all international organizations.

When General de Gaulle in 1958 called upon both the African peoples and the French to vote a referendum for or against a draft constitution which provided for a new relationship between France and the African territories, the unions—along with the Guinean section of the RDA, the PDG-RDA—played a dominant role in determining the outcome in Guinea. A conference of UGTAN leaders met at Bamako to examine the proposed constitution. They unanimously approved a report of the committee director which recommended that the territories vote against the proposed constitution on the grounds that it was not acceptable because it was founded on inequality and merely perpetuated colonial domination. In Guinea 95 percent of the voters followed the committee report and rejected the proposed constitution. Independence was then proclaimed (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

LABOR ORGANIZATION SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Unions and the Party

Immediately after independence the unions assumed a unique position in relation to the PDG-directed government. With the sudden withdrawal of most of the French civil servants, many recruits were drawn from the labor movement to take over civil functions. Moreover, the unions continued to serve as a training ground for future government workers.

President Touré at once made it clear that one of the primary functions of the union was to present and support the policies of the party. Great importance has been attached to this implementing role of the unions in respect to policy, but whenever union members have attempted to determine party policy, energetic corrective measures have been taken. The union organization, reaching down to the smallest village, remains an arm of the party in the task of mass education to remove all vestiges of colonialism.

General Organization

The basic pattern of labor organization remained unchanged after independence. Under party direction the unions continued to expand, and the legislation governing labor which was enacted before October 2, 1958, has remained in effect with certain modifications (see ch. 11, Labor Force).

The unions are organized into a hierarchy of small sections, local unions, regional unions, national federations and confederations. Information is lacking as to the details of organization. All regional unions and national federations are represented in a national

organization, the National Confederation of Guinean Workers (Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs de Guinée—CNTG) which is affiliated with the UGTAN. Elected union officers in both the regional and national organizations are: a secretary general; an assistant secretary; an administrative secretary; a secretary of economy and education; a secretary for press; a secretary for organization; a treasurer general; an assistant treasurer; three counsellors; and two comptrollers.

It is estimated that the trade unions affiliated with the CNGT have between 80,000 and 90,000 industrial members. Most of these live in the four major industrial centers, but an undetermined number are in small enterprises located elsewhere in the country. The estimated figure on the number of union members in industry is high because it also includes dependents. Nonindustrial members include all government and administrative personnel and agricultural workers.

The unions are supported by membership dues of 1 percent of the monthly or annual salary of workers. This uniform rate, applicable to all union members, was established by the 1961 Congress of CNTG meeting at Conakry. Formerly there was no uniformity in union membership dues as each base trade union established its own rate for dues and even those varied from one section of the country to another.

An ordinance of October 8, 1959, confirmed the rights of civil servants to form unions, their rights to strike and to protest against regulations and decisions contrary to individual or collective interests. A new union may be officially recognized two months after the deposition of its statutes and lists of officers with the commandant of the region or the mayor who sends the documents to the Minister of Labor and Social Legislation and other ministries concerned. For unions of civil servants already existing before this date, official recognition became effective two months after the publication of the above statute.

One of the largest workers' organizations is the national organization of civil servants—the Amalgamated Unions of General Administration and Service Workers (Syndicat Unique des Travailleurs d'Administration Général et Offices—SUTAGO). Various branches of this union were established before 1957 under provisions of the Loi Cadre of 1956, but departmental interests within the colonial bureaucracy prevented any concerted action toward unification. The first national congress of SUTAGO was held at Conakry on July 6, 1961.

Government control of labor, and indirectly of the unions, is centered in the National Labor Office, under the direction of the Minister of Labor and Social Legislation. This office has established liaison with services and organizations concerned with the recruitment of professional personnel. The Minister is assisted by a consultative

commission of equal representation from the government, employers and workers. Government representatives are designated by law; representatives of employers and workers are appointed for two years by decree of the Minister of Labor and Social Legislation. All members serve without compensation (see ch. 11, Labor Force).

The relations between foreign companies and labor remained basically good after independence. Such difficulties as had occurred up to mid-1961 were usually minor misunderstandings stemming from national or ethnic sensitivities or ignorance on the part of Guinean employees of the regulations under which the companies operate. Disputes are always settled by representatives of government, labor unions and employer. Foreign employers do not have authority to hold labor conferences.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

The Cotonou conference reinforced Sékou Touré's stand against any extension of European control or influence in African affairs. He has repeatedly stated that the injection into Africa of the European concept of class conflict does not serve African needs and tends to divert union leaders from their true mission of unifying Africa. This policy received wide, but not universal, support from the other countries of French West Africa by the time the first UGTAN Congress met at Conakry in January 1959. Opposition sharpened in disputes over leadership and disagreement with the type of political unionism advocated by President Touré and his followers.

A decision of the 1959 Congress to establish a trade union school resulted in the creation of an African Workers University at Conakry where short-term sessions of three to four weeks are held for union workers from neighboring countries. These sessions are designed to develop union leaders outside of Guinea who will support UGTAN policies. Mali, Ghana, Niger, Togo, Portuguese Guinea and Angola have been among the countries represented at the school. Instruction is in French.

At present the strongest adherents to UGTAN are Guinea, Ghana and Mali. Senegal, which had initially supported Guinea in its efforts to achieve an all-African union movement, withdrew to affiliate with the ICFTU-sponsored African Regional Organization (AFRO) which was established in November 1960 by African leaders who desired a stronger voice in international trade union affairs.

A meeting of African unions held at Casablanca in May 1961, at which 35 African nations were represented, pointed up the wide range of views held by the new African states. A charter, adopted after hot debate, brought into being the All African Trade Union Federation (AATUF), represented a victory for UGTAN, which is recog-

nized as one of the main forces behind the Pan-African union movement. Implementation of the critical clause in the charter—which stipulates that member unions may not be affiliated with international trade-union organizations—was postponed for 10 months. Although no mention is made of ICFTU, which has an estimated affiliated membership of 1.5 million in the African countries, the measure is considered to be directed toward removing the ICFTU from the African scene. This policy, strongly pushed by Guinea, Ghana and Mali, is a potential source of discord. The WFTU has very few, if any, affiliations in Africa and strongly supports the nonaffiliation stand taken by Guinea.

In accepting aid from other countries, union policy has been to specify that the mobilization of human and financial resources must be made without obligation and with full recognition of the independence and sovereignty of African nations. President Touré has recommended the UGTAN should make requests for such assistance through the United Nations. To this end Guinea became a member of the ILO (International Labor Organization) in 1959 and ratified the conventions concerning accident compensation, minimum wages, forced labor, freedom of association, the rights to organize and related conventions.

CHAPTER 14

HEALTH AND PUBLIC WELFARE

Health conditions in late 1961 were better than they had been before World War II. Modern medical care had been extended to many rural areas and training facilities for doctors, pharmacists, hospital assistants and midwives had been improved. Yellow fever had been virtually eliminated and smallpox reduced to sporadic localized outbreaks. These relative gains, however, left the country with health conditions and a level of medical care and public sanitation that were average only by the standards of an undeveloped tropical area.

Health problems ranged from malnutrition, bad housing and a host of communicable diseases to the attitudes and beliefs of a population only beginning to learn the rudiments of personal and public hygiene. Local food shortages recurred in the final months of the grain harvest each year, and families in villages and towns were forced to reduce their caloric intake drastically. Even during the months when food was plentiful, few persons obtained a balanced diet. The predominant form of housing was a small, ill-ventilated hut or shack, without indoor cooking facilities, toilet or running water. The infant mortality rate was high. Official estimates for the 1950's indicated that some 20 percent of the children died at birth or in infancy. Sleeping sickness had declined, but other endemic diseases, such as malaria, tuberculosis and syphilis, were widespread. Alcoholism was increasing in the urban areas. City water supplies were generally pure, but many village sources were not, and the incidence of dysentery in the rural population was high. Ignorance of the principles of hygiene kept sanitation standards low, and popular reluctance to submit to modern medical treatment was only slowly being overcome.

To the extent that technical and financial resources permitted, the government was making a serious effort to deal with some of the more pressing of these problems. Immediate health and welfare goals, as set forth in the Three-Year Plan for the development of the country, included an overall increase in personal income and improvements in medical care, housing and social services. The program provided for the establishment of infant homes and youth centers and for the development of new and improved maternity centers, dispensaries, hospitals and housing.

Although more had been planned, the accomplishment by mid-1961 was significant. Four dispensaries had been built in the Guékédou administrative region, three in the Kindia region and two in the Boké region. One maternity center, five branch centers and a surgical block had also been established in Boké. In addition, construction was well advanced on a modern three-story hospital and a dispensary and maternity center in the Kankan administrative region. The new School for Midwives (*Ecole des sages Femmes*) opened in Conakry in 1959, and a school for hospital assistants was founded in 1960. The government reported that in early 1961 there were more physicians practicing in the country than at any previous time. The number included many foreigners working on short-term contracts, most of whom came from Communist countries.

Substantial technical and financial help was coming from abroad. The Sino-Soviet bloc, Ghana and West Germany were covering the entire cost of the Three-Year Plan health projects. Some of these countries had also sent physicians and technicians to assist in these projects.

STANDARD OF LIVING

Unlike some other former colonial areas, the country had no extreme poverty on a mass scale. The quantity and quality of available goods were low by European standards, but such wealth as the country had was divided fairly evenly among the population, and differences in the standard of living between one group and another were not great enough to cause any significant dissatisfaction.

The standard of living of most of the small percentage of the population which was dependent upon wages or other money income—rather than on subsistence farming—probably had not risen since 1959 and may have declined. The purchasing power of the Guinean franc had dropped perhaps 20 percent below the 1959 level of the CFA franc, while the scarcity of foreign exchange had led to serious shortages of various consumer goods.

Food and Nutrition

Rice is the mainstay of the ordinary diet and the preferred staple throughout the country. Fonio (rudimentary millet), corn, manioc, sweet potatoes and other tuberous root plants are substituted when rice is unobtainable. The preference for rice is so strong, however, that many feel that a meal without rice is not a meal and that they are starving after a long period without it. Milk and milk products are basic foods (along with rice) for pastoral peoples like the Foulah, but they are consumed in smaller quantities—or not at all—by other groups. Dietary habits vary locally and everywhere are conditioned

by religious attitudes and—still more important—by the seasonal availability of different foods.

In the Fouta Djallon, and to a lesser extent in other parts of the country (excepting possibly parts of the coastal area and the Forest Region), the seasonal cycle of heavy rains and drought drastically affects the food supply. During the dry harvest season, food is plentiful and people generally eat heavily of the foods they prefer. In the ensuing months, grain stocks dwindle and caloric intake declines. During this two- to three-month period of pre-harvest shortage (called the *soudure*), people rarely starve, however, for hunger can be relieved by eating nuts, wild roots, snails, insects and rodents.

The ordinary diet is based on starchy staples and lacks essential vitamins, animal protein, calcium and other protective elements. Even the Foulah do not produce and consume enough milk and milk products to make up for this deficiency. Different ethnic groups eat varying amounts of meat, fish and dairy products, but none of them consume a sufficient amount of these foods. Somewhat more fish is eaten by people on the coast and in the villages along rivers in the interior than is consumed in other areas where it is less readily available. Consumption of meat is limited to special occasions, even among livestock breeders. Religious taboos may also limit the use of various foods among Moslems and in some animist groups.

The basis of the ordinary meal is a paste or porridge made from rice or a substitute pounded into meal or flour and mixed with water. The paste or porridge, which provides bulk, is given flavor with an accompanying hot sauce. These sauces are made of palm or peanut oil, tomatoes, wild spinach, other chopped vegetables, hot peppers and other condiments. Virtually any edible protein may also be added when available, including beef, mutton and goat meat and fat, fresh and dried fish, game, caterpillars and insects. The housewife's reputation as a cook depends to a large extent upon her ingenuity in varying these ingredients.

Food preparation takes up a great deal of the woman's time. Grains have to be crushed between stones or pounded with a mortar before they can be boiled into paste or porridge. Few dishes or utensils are used at meals, each person helping himself from the common dish by dipping in small lumps of paste with his right hand.

Imported foods have become scarce or unobtainable even in Conakry since 1958, both because foreign exchange has been reserved for essential imports and because of difficulties with domestic distribution (see ch. 27, Domestic Trade). The shortage has created considerable dissatisfaction among the townspeople, many of whom had become accustomed to varying their diets with foreign foods. Some staples are imported from the Communist bloc, but they are inferior to simi-

lar foods from the West. Price controls, imposed in early 1961, now apply to imported foods.

Clothing

The traditional mode of dress appears to be much the same throughout the country, although styles and color combinations vary from place to place. The basic men's garment is a simple flowing robe, generally referred to as a *boubou*, although other names are used. Most *boubous* are made at home from imported cloth. Where native fabrics are still used, the cotton is usually grown, carded and spun by women at home, but it is woven by professional weavers. Western clothing, which many men wear, is never made at home; fabrics are taken to a tailor.

The color and quality of the *boubou* provides an indication of the owner's wealth and position. The poorest kind of *boubou* is plain white muslin. More costly ones are of solid color or striped—often blue or indigo and white.

Men, especially in Lower Guinea, commonly wear a skull cap. A bonnet made of a length of material folded into a peak is popular in Middle Guinea and may be embroidered. Yellow sandals are standard traditional footgear. A few former soldiers have kept their combat boots which are prestige items to be saved for festive occasions.

The basic garment of women's dress is a skirt, which is simply a piece of cloth tied around the waist. Printed designs—especially Indonesian motifs—are generally preferred to solid colors. Other articles of women's clothing are camisoles, sandals and handkerchiefs to cover the hair. Nylon is becoming increasingly popular.

Western clothing is rapidly replacing traditional dress, especially in the urban centers. Government officials nowadays rarely wear the *boubou* except on ceremonial occasions. Trousers and open shirts ordinarily white or khaki, are becoming standard. Many women wear ready-made Western dresses. Watches, pencils and pens, and other items of Western clothing and personal paraphernalia give their owners the prestige of the modern.

Clothing is often poor in quality and sometimes unsuitable for the climate. In the uplands of the Fouta Djallon, for example, shorts and thin shirts are insufficient to offset the cool dampness of early morning. People stay indoors by the fire until the sun is strong or, if forced to go out, may have to wrap themselves in a blanket.

Housing

Standards and types of housing are diverse, ranging from the simple mudbrick or wattle-and-daub thatched huts (in which the great majority of people live) to plantation villas and well-constructed town houses. In village enclaves, huts are clustered together

in family groups. Around them, there is ordinarily a public area which serves everyone in the village as additional living space in good weather. It is used for cooking, eating and leisure-time activities. Frequently, an entire settlement is surrounded by a mudbrick wall or wooden stockade.

Huts are small, dark and poorly ventilated. The most common type is a circular structure with a conical, thatched roof and walls of mudbrick. The interior is typically a single room with one or two windows which is entered by a low door. The interior framework, which may be decorated with carvings, is often smoke-smudged and dingy. The overhanging eaves of the thatched roof provide a narrow rim of shade around the outside of the house. Variants on this type of structure include the traditional Kissi hut made of branches and strong weeds which have been interwoven into a latticework frame and plastered with mud.

Since most huts are small and badly ventilated, people tend to stay outdoors except during the rainy season and at night. Mud walls and thatched roofs deteriorate in the rainy season and have to be repaired frequently.

The main piece of furniture in the hut is the bed which is sometimes made of beaten earth. The hard platform is covered with a straw mat and pillows are tossed on top of it. Depending on whether the hut is a man's or a woman's, other common items are cooking utensils, working tools and hunting equipment of various sorts which are usually hung on the walls. Prayer rugs, seed boxes and small jars of potions for dispelling evil spirits are also found.

Huts are to be found in the towns as well as in the villages, but more typical of urban dwellings is the small, one-story frame or mudbrick house, 30 or 40 feet long, with an entrance and small veranda at front and rear. Electricity and indoor plumbing are limited to a few relatively luxurious apartment buildings and houses occupied by officials and their families.

Conakry has a serious housing problem. Few families can afford to rent, much less buy, adequate living accommodations. Many houses are run down, and overcrowding has been made acute by the influx of villagers in recent years.

The government set aside 600 million Guinean francs in the budget of the Three-Year Plan for housing improvement (247 Guinean francs equal U.S. \$1). Information on how this money will be spent is not available.

HEALTH

Birth and Death Rates

Vital statistics are almost totally lacking. Although registration of births and deaths is in theory compulsory, in practice the records

are incomplete even in Conakry. Many urban women go back to their villages for the birth of children, and both men and women go back when they become seriously ill and expect to die. Many of these births and deaths are not recorded by the authorities in either place.

The only available estimates for birth, death and life expectancy rates are based on a sample survey of the population made in 1954. Projections from this study indicate a birth rate of 62 per thousand and a death rate of 40 per thousand. The report indicates an extremely high infant mortality rate: 190 per thousand live births in the cities, 220 per thousand in rural areas.

A study made in Conakry in 1952 indicates that the excessively high infant mortality rate is related to the prevalence of hereditary syphilis and to poor sanitary conditions and a lack of modern medical care during confinement. Newborn infants must survive two critical stages before attaining the relatively safe age of five years. These are: the weeks immediately after birth when many infants die of gastrointestinal troubles or malaria; and the age of one year when breast feeding stops and the children are put on adult food and exposed to the strong sun. It is anticipated that infant mortality rates will drop as new maternity care centers are established enabling increasing numbers of expectant mothers to avail themselves of modern medical care.

Disease

Data on disease rates are also incomplete. Such figures as do exist are certainly not representative of actual conditions, since they are based on fragmentary hospital records, scattered sample surveys and specialized reports of research institutions.

The country is relatively free of certain epidemic diseases. Immunization has effectively checked the incidence of smallpox and yellow fever, and cases of plague are reported only occasionally. Outbreaks of meningitis and pneumonia recur from time to time.

Among the chief endemic diseases are malaria, venereal diseases and tuberculosis. Malaria is endemic throughout French West Africa, and the incidence in Guinea is high. Prevalence varies from place to place: it was estimated that in one suburb of Conakry during the early 1950's, 50 to 80 percent of the population was afflicted with the disease. Venereal diseases are widespread, particularly in the 20- to 30-year age group, and—together with tuberculosis—are said to account for more than a third of hospital admissions. Tuberculosis is most prevalent in coastal areas where housing congestion and a wet and unhealthy climate contribute to a high rate of incidence. Dysentery and other diseases associated with contaminated food and polluted water are common. Trachoma, cholera and sleeping sickness are also present. There are enough cases of leprosy for the United

Nations to have undertaken a special study on the disease in 1958. There is a leprosy hospital at Mamou. Hookworm and yaws are prevalent in the forested areas.

Popular Beliefs and Practice

Since 1958 modern medicine has achieved limited popular acceptance. In the cities many afflicted persons consult dispensary physicians or, if seriously ill, enter hospitals. Even in rural areas some persons go voluntarily to dispensaries and maternity centers where they are available, although rarely before having consulted a local healer first.

Traditional notions about the cause and treatment of disease are still widely held, however. As late as the mid-1940's, for example, many of the Kissi believed that all misfortune, illness or death was caused either by evil sorcerers or by the angry spirits of deceased persons who had been neglected by descendants. The only recourse of the afflicted persons was to consult a diviner (*wanawaya*) who could ascertain the patient's chances of recovering. If they appeared good, the *wanawaya* might take various courses of action. Depending on the nature of the case, he might undertake to seek out and neutralize the talisman of the sorcerer responsible for the illness, recommend that the afflicted person make a suitable sacrifice to his neglected ancestor, or prescribe treatment. The latter might call for prescription of a potion of bark or herbs, abstinence from certain foods for a stated interval or massage.

Many of the herbal remedies in this mixture of folk medicine and magic were efficacious. Practices varied in different groups and included preventive as well as curative measures. Among the Malinké, for example, it was customary to smear oneself before retiring with an array of ointments and liquids to keep evil spirits away.

Facilities and Services

Medical Personnel

In early 1961 there were 87 physicians in the country. Twenty-five practiced in Conakry, of whom 15 were assigned to Donka Hospital, 5 to Ballay Hospital and 5 to city dispensaries. The rest were distributed throughout the country, including 35 attached to government dispensaries in major towns.

Thirty of the 87 physicians were Guineans, the rest were Europeans. Among the European physicians were 7 Poles, a substantial number of Czechs and Bulgarians, and 2 French nationals. Both French physicians planned to leave the area in early 1961, but it was anticipated that their departure would be offset by the arrival of 15 to 20 more physicians from Europe at about the same time. Efforts were also being made to build a corps of trained Guinean physicians, and

some 40 students from various parts of the country were studying medicine abroad.

Other medical personnel included 750 nurses—many of whom were only partially trained—and 60 African nurses. Donka Hospital had 150 nurses; Ballay Hospital had 50; and Fria Hospital, in Kimbo, had 13. There were also a small number of dentists, laboratory assistants, technicians and pharmacists. No sanitation engineers were available.

Lack of funds and scarcity of teaching personnel hamper the government in its effort to meet the pressing need for more physicians and trained technical personnel. Guinea has no medical school where doctors can be trained, but the School for Midwives (founded in 1959) offers a three-year course, and a school for hospital assistants (founded in 1960) offers a two-year course. Twelve students were enrolled in the School for Midwives the first year.

Hospitals and Dispensaries

As of 1961 medical care facilities were few and nearly all of the existing institutions were understaffed and badly equipped. Altogether there were 3 hospitals, 35 major dispensaries, 100 rural infirmaries, and 7 mother and child care centers. Seven additional hospitals were planned or were in various stages of construction.

The largest and newest of the two public hospitals was Donka Hospital in Conakry which was started by the French and completed by the Guineans under the direction of a Polish architect. The building is a windowless five-story structure with wards in the center and balconies around the sides. It appeared in mid-1961 to be neither clean nor well maintained, and signs of deterioration were evident soon after its completion.

The hospital had departments of medicine, surgery, radiology, dermatology, dentistry, psychiatry and pediatrics. An obstetrical unit was housed in a separate building. There were over 400 beds and four operating rooms. Equipment, most of it from East Germany, was fairly modern but badly maintained. According to observers, the quality of patient care was also poor.

Ballay Hospital, also in Conakry, had fewer departments than Donka Hospital and only 150 beds. Except for a small tuberculosis wing, it was equipped only for general medical care and surgery. Fria Hospital in Kimbo was operated for employees of the Fria Company, but it accepted a few patients referred from outside. It had 40 beds and was well staffed. The seven hospitals planned or under construction were to be located in Kankan, Guékédou, Kissidougou, Labé, Mamou, Kindia and Faranah. Four sections of the hospital in Kankan, which was to have 200 beds, had been completed by early 1961.

The Soviet Union announced in 1961 that it would equip a 500-bed hospital in Conakry. This institution, to be the largest in Guinea, was to be financed under the Fund for Economic and Social Development (**Fonds d'Investissement pour de Développement Economique et Social—FIDES**). The Soviet Union said it also would furnish a director and six physicians for the hospital for a one-year period.

Thirty-five major dispensaries, in towns and large villages, supplemented hospital services. Dispensaries of this type, staffed by physicians and nurses, were equipped for general medical treatment and minor surgery. Five of them were in Conakry. In 1957, 28 such major dispensaries had a combined capacity of 1,009 beds. There were also 100 rural infirmaries—actually first-aid stations stocked with some medicines. Mother and child care centers were maintained in seven cities: Conakry, Kankan, Macenta, N'Zérékoré, Labé, Mamou and Boké.

Laboratories and Research Institutes

The major research laboratory in the country in 1961 was the Pasteur Institute in Kindia, founded by the French. Until 1958 it was affiliated with the Pasteur Institute in Paris through the Pasteur Institute at Dakar, the leading diagnostic laboratory in West Africa. After 1958 it was taken over by the Guinean Government and maintained under the auspices of the Ministry of Public Health and Population.

The Institute conducted research in veterinary microbiology and had facilities for research on human diseases. It produced smallpox and other vaccines and exported snake venom to laboratories abroad for use in the preparation of snakebite antitoxins. It also raised baboons and chimpanzees for experimental use. The facilities of the Institute included various laboratories, a monkey house, animal stables, workshops and staff housing.

Steps were being taken in early 1961 to establish a bacteriological laboratory at the National Hygiene Institute (Institut National d'Hygiene), a part of the Ministry of Public Health and Population. The establishment of a laboratory had been recommended by a United Nations sanitation engineer who had visited the country earlier that year.

Drugs and Supplies

Reserves of medicines, antiseptics and dental supplies were, in 1961, inadequate and diminishing. Some Czech, East German and Polish drugs were available in Conakry pharmacies, but customers—familiar only with West European and United States brands—were reluctant to buy them and stock remained on the shelves. Outside of the larger towns, physicians and dentists worked with few drugs or none at all.

Quinine was locally produced at a plant in Sérédou in the Forest

Region where a United Nations technician was scheduled to do a survey in late 1960 with a view to improving and expanding productive capacity. West Germany was to cooperate with the Ministry of Public Health and Population and the United Nations in this project.

The distribution of medicines and drugs was government controlled through the Pharmacy Supply Agency (Pharmacie d'Approvisionnement) in Conakry. Private pharmacists were being licensed to open and operate shops in major towns in late 1960, but only pending the establishment of a government-operated pharmacy in the same neighborhood.

Sanitation

Public health programs under the French focused on two areas—preventive medicine and sanitation. By the late 1950's, Conakry and several of the major inland towns had sewage facilities and water supply systems. The water was pure, although in Conakry the 17,200 cubic meters of water supplied daily met no more than 45 percent of the city's needs. Many streets in the main towns were paved.

But the level of sanitation, even in Conakry, was low. Only the western section of the city was served by the sewage system, and only 160 of the 3,000 buildings in that area were connected to it; most of the others employed cesspools. Conakry had a city-wide garbage collection, but not all the trucks used for this purpose were closed against flies and other insects. The garbage was being used as a fill for the swampy lowland section of the city and, since it was insufficiently covered with layers of earth, this area had become a breeding ground for rats.

Even in Conakry few, if any, precautions were taken to insure that food sold in markets or served in restaurants was uncontaminated. Vegetable vendors displayed their produce neatly on boards outside shops or on the ground but no effort was made to protect it from flies and insects. Neighborhood eating places in the poorer sections of the city seldom had either running water or sanitary facilities.

Polluted water supplies were a major health problem. Water in all but the major towns was unsafe for drinking unless boiled, and few persons other than Europeans took this precaution. Villagers drew their water from shallow wells, rivers or streams.

In early 1961 the government took a major step toward the nationalization of the water supply when it seized control of African Public Services Company (Compagnie Africaine de Services Publiques). In so doing the government charged that the company had performed poorly and neglected to maintain its equipment and make new plant investments since independence. The company was reconstituted as the Water Distribution of Guinea (Distribution d'Eau de Guinée—DEG), under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Works and

Transport, and given responsibility for well digging and the purification, transportation and distribution of water.

PUBLIC WELFARE

Before 1900 the basic units of the traditional society, the family and lineage, cared for their own as best they could, and it was primarily to his kinsmen that the individual looked for support, protection and help in time of need. The educational, medical and emergency relief activities of the Christian missions provided a new resource, but the percentage of the total population within reach of these services was small. With the advent of French rule, the government entered the field and steadily enlarged its role, but the welfare burden continued to fall mainly on the family and lineage. After World War II, foreign business enterprises, international relief agencies, and Western and Soviet bloc technical assistance programs began to figure importantly in welfare and development programs.

In the traditional order, any person in need of food, clothing, shelter or help in illness appealed for assistance to the closest kinsman with whom he was associated under an unwritten code of mutual obligation. Often the person who gave help was little better off than the one who received it. Yet resources were shared; during food-shortage periods, for example, everyone's consumption of food was simply reduced until stocks were replenished by the new harvest. The principle of cooperation and mutual aid went beyond the kin group in certain matters: neighbors might assist each other with certain heavy tasks; two or more villages might combine to halt the destruction of their crops by wild animals; or, when a dangerous animal was thought to be lurking outside the stockade wall, drums might sound to summon hunters from all the surrounding villages to track down the marauder.

The Government

In French West Africa the administration of government health activities was centralized under the control of the General Public Health Department (*Direction Générale de la Santé Publique*) with headquarters in Dakar. Regional headquarters in each territory were responsible for the establishment and maintenance of hospitals, dispensaries, maternity centers and research institutes. They also organized the rural mobile medical service (*Assistance Médicale Indigène*) and enforced quarantine and sanitation regulations.

Since 1958 government health and welfare responsibilities have been divided between the Ministry of Public Health and Population and the Ministry of Labor and Social Legislation. One of the most important public health departments, the National Service of Mobile Hygiene and Prophylaxis (*Service National d'Hygiène Mobile et Pro-*

phylaxie—SNIIMP), supervises mobile health and epidemic preventative units in rural areas. In early 1960 it was reorganized and six regional offices for endemic diseases were established, with centers in Dubréka, Mamou, Labé, Kankan, N'Zérékoré and Kissidougou. Other departments or individuals in the public health ministry were concerned with the maintenance of hospitals and dispensaries in the towns, medical inspection of schools and the health of mothers and children. In 1961 the Minister was Roger Najib Accar, a physician with surgical training.

The Ministry of Labor and Social Legislation was organized into three general services: the Labor Inspection Bureau, the National Labor Office and the National Social Security Fund. Also attached to the Ministry was the office of Secretary of State for Social Affairs. Mrs. Loffo Camara, who held this position in 1961, was by virtue of this office a member of the President's Cabinet (see ch. 11, Labor Force). Fodé Cisse, the Minister, was directly responsible to the President for the supervision and operation of his Ministry, as are all other Cabinet ministers (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

Expenditures for the Ministry of Public Health and Population in the 1961 budget amounted to 1,356.2 million Guinean francs, or about 16 percent of the 8,745.2 million franc total budget. Of this amount, 761.2 million francs were allocated for wages and salaries, the rest for administrative and operational expenses. The total allocation represented an increase of about 4 percent over the 1959 figures. The Ministry of Labor and Social Legislation was allocated 44 million francs (about .005 percent of the total)—35.8 million francs for wages and salaries and 8.2 for current expenses. This share was roughly the same proportion that was allocated in 1959.

Other Agencies

In 1961 Guinea was a member of the United Nations and several of its specialized agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the International Labor Organization (ILO); the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and the World Health Organization (WHO).

Programs and Services

The Three-Year Plan

The Three-Year Plan provided for a total expenditure of 38,912 million Guinean francs, of which 771 million (about 2 percent) was to be spent for housing and youth; 1,760 million (about 5 percent) was to be spent for public health; 3,680 million (about 9 percent) was allocated for education (see tables 1 and 2; and ch. 9, Education). The expenditure budgeted for housing, youth, education and health combined to equal 6,211 million Guinean francs, or 16 percent of the total.

As of mid-1961 the cost of the Plan was being covered entirely by loans from Soviet-bloc nations, Ghana and West Germany (see ch. 25, Public Finance). Some of these countries were also supplying technical assistance.

Social Security Benefits

The government has established a comprehensive social security program for workers, with a full range of family allowances. A revised social security law was enacted in December 1960.

Table 1. Proposed Expenditures for Housing and Youth Under Guinea's Three-Year Plan

[In millions of Guinean francs]

Item	Amount
Housing improvement.....	600
Infants' home.....	25
Establishment of a pioneer center (JRDA).....	25
Sports equipment.....	100
Regional work inspection.....	15
Labor exchange.....	6
Total.....	771

Source: Adapted from République de Guinée, *La Planification Économique*, pp. 417-422.

The direction of the social security program was entrusted to the National Social Security Fund (Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Legislation. Its main functions were the collection of contributions and administration of benefits, including family allowances, retirement payments, survivor's annuities, and compensation for work accidents and occupational diseases. A director and an assistant director were responsible for the operation of the Fund. They were advised by a consultative commission, composed of 23 persons and presided over by the Minister of Labor and Social Legislation. Its members included: the head of the Undersecretariat of Social Affairs; three persons representing the National Assembly; three delegates appointed by the Minister of Labor and Social Legislation (including one each from the Ministries of Public Health and Population, Finance and what, at the time the commission was set up, was the Ministry of National Economy); eight employer representatives; and eight trade union representatives.

Family allowances were extended to all working persons, rather than to civil servants alone as had been the case under the French. The Fund handled both collection and disbursements, but information is lacking about the methods by which these functions are accom-

Table 2. *Proposed Expenditures for Public Health Under Guinea's Three-Year Plan*

[In millions of Guinean francs]

Item	Amount
Completion of Donka Hospital (Conakry).....	100
Repair of Ballay Hospital (Conakry).....	60
Construction of a pavilion annex to Ballay Hospital (Conakry).....	15
Dispensary and surgical block (Boké).....	15
Maternity hospital and surgical block (Gaoual).....	10
Hospital (Koundara in Youkounkoun district).....	30
Surgical block and hospital pavilion (Siguiri).....	10
Complete hospital (Kankan).....	250
Hospital with pavilion (Beyla).....	10
Surgical block (N'Zérékoré).....	10
Completion of hospital (Macenta).....	10
Completion of hospital (Guékédou).....	10
Completion of hospital (Kissidougou).....	10
Completion of hospital (Labé).....	15
Psychiatric hospital and general hospital (Mamou) (20 mil. each).....	40
Complete hospital and pavilion (Fria).....	40
Improvement on maternity hospital (Kindia).....	13
Hospital and maternity equipment (Dalaba-Kindia) (3 mil. each).....	6
Completion of hospital (Faranah).....	15
Establishment of sanitation corps.....	30
Maternity center and dispensary at the State Farm.....	15
11 frontier maternity hospitals and dispensaries.....	66
Maternity and child care centers.....	75
Campaign against intestinal parasites.....	50
Campaign against tuberculosis.....	30
Construction of two sanitariums.....	125
Campaign against major endemic diseases.....	170
Creation of a research laboratory for major endemic diseases.....	70
Medical inspection of schools.....	50
Pharmaceutical reform.....	150
Water purification.....	n.a.
Creation of a laboratory for pharmacy, medicine and experimental chemistry.....	50
Lodging for personnel—Donka Hospital.....	50
Equipment for sanitation corps.....	160
Total.....	1,760

Source: Adapted from République de Guinée, *La Planification Économique*, pp. 417-422.

plished. A decree on family allowances of October 19, 1959, specified that payments were to be made to mothers rather than fathers—a provision which met with strong protest.

A work accident and occupational disease benefit program had existed under the French, but its benefits were limited; African

workers were not entitled to claim damages until they had lost 28 days of work and then had to submit proof that the accident had been caused directly by the machine which they had been operating. The accident and occupational disease program in 1961 was supported by contributions from the employer, whose rate of payment was fixed by legislative decree in March 1960 at no less than 1 percent of the wage and salaries paid before deductions (see ch. 12, Labor Force).

Workers were also entitled to retirement benefits, and their widows were entitled to annuities. Employers were required to contribute quarterly assessments ranging from 2.7 to 3 percent of total wages and salaries paid. Employee contributions, which during the colonial period had varied between 2 to 6 percent, were discontinued. Sums paid to widows were computed on the basis of the average monthly earnings of the deceased in his last year of work, multiplied by his number of years of service, multiplied by 15 and divided by 200. The amount in some cases exceeded the husband's actual earnings.

Youth, Women and Human Investment

More than 90 percent of the people live in rural areas where women are kept busy with agricultural duties, child care and household activities and have little time for organized activity. Women in the towns also have little leisure time for interests outside their homes. A few are becoming active in women's and political affairs, including those who are associated with the Women's Section of the PDG. This group, which in 1960 was headed by Mrs. Mafory Bangoura, emphasized welfare work (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

Young people are organized on a national scale in the JRDA, an integral part of the PDG. President Touré described the organization as the militant wing of the party and its members as the working arm in the construction of the young republic. The organization—which includes scholars, students, athletes and artists—is responsible for the development of everything related to youth in the entire country (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics). It is divided into two main sections—a sports section and a general section. The sports section has a local club for every sport pyramided under a national team at the top. The general section is subdivided into the Pioneers and girls division. The Pioneers are boys and girls, aged 7 to 18, who focus on paramilitary training, civics, the development of national consciousness, sports and economic development. The girls are concerned primarily with literacy, family life, child care and housekeeping.

Many members of the JRDA have participated in construction projects of the human investment program. Under this government plan workers donate 20 days of work yearly to public works without pay (see ch. 11, Labor Force; ch. 22, Character and Structure of the Economy).

Aid from Abroad

Economic and technical assistance from foreign governments for health and welfare programs took several forms. In early 1961 doctors, teachers and technicians from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, West Germany and the United States were working in the country and others were expected to arrive in the near future. Hungary was scheduled to conduct a survey for pure water sources in the interior. West Germans were building a slaughterhouse and had started a veterinary service. The United States had made \$1 million worth of surplus agricultural commodities available.

Specialized agencies of the United Nations were carrying out several health projects in the country in 1961. WHO, for example, had sent a physician and an assistant to work with the government on its mother and child care program. The same agency had also financed a study of sanitation facilities carried out by a French engineer.

The future of such projects was jeopardized in February 1961 when, as a gesture of formal protest over the death of Patrice Lumumba, President Touré ordered all United Nations personnel to leave the country.

Various Christian missions were active. Some were closing down. Two Catholic orders were represented—the Congregation of the Holy Ghost and the White Fathers. The Holy Ghost Fathers, with three bishoprics, maintained their headquarters in Conakry and Kankan: they had dozens of missions in the interior, in connection with which they operated schools and dispensaries. The White Fathers were centered in N'Zérékoré, in the Forest Region, where they too operated schools and dispensaries and conducted apprentice training. There was also an American Protestant group, the Christian Mission Alliance, with a school in Mamou. In August 1961 the PDG decided to nationalize all private schools. President Touré proposed that all churchmen should be African. In the conflict between the government and the Catholic Church on this issue, Archbishop Milleville was expelled from the country (see ch. 10, Religion).

The Fria combine had also undertaken various projects. In addition to providing health and housing facilities for African workers employed at the plant, its American shareholder, Olin Mathieson, sent a supply of antibiotics and vitamins to the Ministry of Public Health and Population and also arranged and financed an eight-week tour in the United States for two officials of the Ministry.

CHAPTER 15

ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

The people welcomed independence with enthusiasm and fervor, and, in late 1961, the views of national leaders and officials—as associated in the minds of politically aware Guineans with liberation from the French—played a predominant role in influencing and molding popular attitudes toward the nation and the government. So far as observers could tell, there was little active dissent from the general acceptance of such views.

Attitudes in the countryside, except in the remote bush and forest areas, were not noticeably different from those in the towns, but it was plain that, despite the efforts of the government and party, many Guineans outside the towns had little idea, or unclear ideas, of the real meaning of the political changes which had taken place since 1958. President Touré and his colleagues, who spoke constantly to the people in the remote areas as well as in the towns, could be considered to be speaking also for the people, but to what extent and how reliably were beyond accurate appraisal (see ch. 20, *Subversive Potentialities*).

The concept of nationhood is a recent development in most of West Africa; in Guinea it preceded separation from France and complete independence by less than a decade. Before independence Guinea was a territorial unit of French colonial administration within which the people knew themselves by such ethnic and tribal designations as Malinké, Soussou, Foulah, Baga or Kissi. By 1940 the territory ranked third among the French West African colonies in its contribution, through customs revenues, to the wealth of Metropolitan France, but in comparison to adjacent Senegal, the oldest of the West African colonies, it was a political and economic backwater in terms of benefits received. General dissatisfaction with colonial domination sharpened into resentment under the economic exactions and oppressive policies of the Nazi-influenced Vichy regime during World War II (see ch. 2, *Historical Setting*).

The ideals articulated by the victorious Allies during and after the war raised new hopes in the area for political and economic equality. The rights of French citizenship were extended, at least nominally, to all inhabitants of the West African territories without regard to race, and there was formal recognition by the French authorities that equality of political rights for Africans should be ac-

accompanied by measures to abolish economic inequalities. These actions represented an improvement over the wartime situation, especially in increased African participation in local administration, but there was little actual alteration of the basic colonial relationship. The wide gap between African and European living standards and the ever-present division of white employer-manager and black worker persisted (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

Political and trade union organizations, which developed rapidly after World War II, provided an outlet for those who were dissatisfied with the status quo and were searching for means of ending colonial exploitation and achieving equality with Europeans. In this atmosphere local leaders, many of whom gained their political education in left-wing trade union organizations, began to talk about the "African personality," a concept which idealized African culture and asserted its unique worth. To the sense of injury at European hands, which was so large an element in rising nationalist feeling, there was added a positive affirmation of the intrinsic value of African civilization and its claim to full equality with all others.

Under the direction of the Guinean section of the RDA, the PDG-RDA, the desire for equality and self-government was finally transformed into a demand for complete independence which came on a wave of popular enthusiasm in the referendum vote against membership in the French community. After independence a popular distinction was made between colonialism, as direct political control, and neocolonialism, as indirect economic domination. President Touré, in a report to the First National Conference of the PDG in August 1961, stated that Guinean security and the conditions for its development were dependent on the elimination of all forms of colonialism and imperialism. Pointing out that the state had endowed itself with institutions permitting it to control its national economy, he warned against indirect economic domination. He said that the colonial powers, in abandoning their former methods of domination, resort to more subtle economic actions which tend to create conditions under which their privileges can be indirectly maintained.

In late 1961 the people were intensely jealous of their independence, and their pride in it was strengthened by an emotional reaction to the removal of colonial restraints. Much of the credit for winning independence was given to President Touré himself. He enjoyed widespread popularity, and many even regarded him as being endowed with almost supernatural powers.

THE NATIONAL CONCEPT AND TRADITIONAL VALUES

Loyalty to the nation, transcending ethnic and family loyalties, is a political fact even though popular comprehension of the idea, par-

ticularly outside the towns, remains rudimentary. Aside from pleasure over the removal of the real or fancied hardships of colonial domination, most of the people tend to think of independence in terms of material benefits, such as more school buildings and public works of all kinds. They have little understanding of the need for individual responsibility to achieve national goals.

A primary objective of the leaders is to bring about a general realization that the people must demand as much or more of themselves as was once demanded by the colonial authorities. Inspired by the PDG, the unions and the other mass organizations, those with at least a rudimentary education take personal pride in their citizenship, which they feel places them on an equal, if not superior, footing with their former European masters. They are assured by their leaders that their backwardness in the present-day world stems only from a lack of material and technical knowledge which can soon be remedied.

Participation in the political life of the country as a whole is a relatively new experience to most of the people. Traditional attitudes toward authority are utilized and adapted wherever possible, but regional differences, which might take divisive political expression, are suppressed, and the Constitution prohibits discrimination and all propaganda of an ethnic or regional character. The operation of the national government and general acceptance of party authority tend to extend the loyalties of the people beyond their original kinship groups to Guinea as a nation (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The party has been most successful in winning the loyalty of the youth organizations and the women's associations which have responded most readily to the appeal of a new citizenship. A Foulah or Malinké youth, for example, may feel superior to a representative from one of the smaller ethnic groups of the Forest Region, but all are indoctrinated with the concept of a common Guinean nationality. Around Labé, a Moselm Foulah center, and in the remote areas of the Forest Region, party and government organization have been less successful. The ethnic and local ties there have been resistant to the changes which have been taking place; there have been reports of disturbances and of disciplinary action by the government and the party to enforce government regulations (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Religious, linguistic and ethnic ties and group loyalties have not proved to be obstacles to the development of a national consciousness, but they are, in varying degrees, stumbling blocks to the individual's identification with the nation and its objectives. Although the country is predominantly Moslem, religion has little or no influence on the government, which is determinedly secular. It is unlikely, however, that a non-Moslem could achieve a large political following. Indi-

vidual freedom of religious belief and practice is guaranteed by the Constitution but President Touré has made it clear that religious organizations must stay out of politics and confine their activities to religious observances. In the sphere of religion, the preoccupation with equality and independence found expression in the summer of 1961 in the determination of the President to Africanize the Roman Catholic clergy (see ch. 10, Religion).

Decisions of the party and the government in the political realm have, on the whole, been successful, but, in practical terms, decisions in the economic sphere have not met with universal success. President Touré has observed that some of the more progressive and revolutionary laws and regulations cannot succeed when the habits and way of life of the people are contrary to the content of law.

THE AFRICAN PERSONALITY

After World War II, young West African leaders began to reject explicitly the simple premise that everything European was civilized and that all that was African was primitive. At the same time they accepted European culture on the basis that, though different, it was not necessarily superior to African culture. They sought in their past for a record of greatness and became convinced that they had a cultural heritage which had produced a distinctive African personality.

Just as the European historian of the colonial era tended to justify the colonial regime as a civilizing influence on Africa, so an emotional idealization of African history by contemporary African writers has been a tool employed by the Guinean leaders to destroy an earlier passive acceptance by Africans of the European assumption of inherent superiority. The past is offered as reassurance for the present because this makes it easier for Africans to accept ideas, values and processes derived from the former colonial power.

The people are repeatedly told, in speeches, articles and the new history textbooks, about the political, social and cultural accomplishments of ancient African empires and native states. Unflattering comparisons are made with contemporary Europe. It is said, for example, that when the kings of the Ghana Empire were patronizing arts and letters, the Capetian kings of France were dabbling in alchemy and that when the Mali and Gao Empires were fostering Islamic scholarship, Europe was in the Dark Ages. European colonization of Africa is held up as a long record of military conquest, political oppression and economic exploitation. The European claim to having had a civilizing mission in Africa and to having made important contributions to its welfare and prosperity is ridiculed as hypocritical.

The concept of an African personality appears as a reinterpretation in nationalist terms of traditions and customs, many of which persist.

Changes are rationalized as minor when seen in relation to the long continuity of African culture; new political, economic and social forms are reconciled with older patterns. In its individual expression, the African personality is idealized as exemplifying the virtues of emotional warmth, intuitive insight, dignity and self-respect. Socially it is held to manifest itself in a profoundly democratic principal of community decision through public discussion and consensus, by a tendency toward collective action which works against division into economic classes and by a social disposition to organize life for its fullest enjoyment. Such notions, less formulated than felt, help to provide an African identity which does not suffer by comparison with erstwhile Western assumptions of superiority and which gives sanction and form to ambitions for the future.

PAN-AFRICANISM

The quest for historic roots led to the identification of modern African political entities with ancient states and empires—whether or not their geographic areas coincided with the boundaries of modern Guinea—and of modern leaders with old heroes and kings. The assertion of connections between Guinea and the three ancient empires of the region reinforces the pan-African philosophy of the national leaders and their ambition to play a leading role in the creation of a united Africa (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Pan-Africanism is primarily a political concept. Political leaders in West Africa agree in principle on the need for African unity, but differ vigorously on how it should be achieved and on what form it should take. Although agreed as to the objective of replacing colonial habits and concepts with African formulas, they are intensely jealous of their sovereignty. Competition for leadership among the former British and French West African territories is a limiting factor in their efforts to achieve effective unity.

An important aspect of the Guinean expression of pan-Africanism has been the rejection of colonial control and a suspicion of Western motives, which are assailed as indirectly aiming at some form of economic domination. President Touré, as the leader of the only former French West African territory to separate itself completely from France, has a strong popular appeal in neighboring countries as well as an undisputed mandate from his own people. His stature as a spokesman for pan-Africanism is enhanced by this circumstance as well as by his initiative in the arena of African politics.

Pan-Africanism has taken formal expression in the Union of African States (Union des Etats Africains—UEA), organized by Guinea, Ghana and Mali in 1961, and in the African Charter of Casablanca, signed in January of that year by these three nations and by Morocco,

the United Arab Republic and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne—GPRA). President Touré, as one of the leaders in this movement, has set forth its guiding principle in declaring that the direction of African affairs must return to the peoples of Africa without restraints and without the delegation of authority in any area—political, economic, social or cultural.

ATTITUDES TOWARD OTHER COUNTRIES

Psychologically the country's orientation is toward France, which introduced it into the modern world. French is the official language, and French thought and ways of doing things have had a lasting influence. At the same time France is condemned for its colonial policies, and the Western powers with which it is allied share in this criticism. Although the need for foreign financial help in developing the industrial agricultural potential of the country is recognized, the national leaders are suspicious of Western motives and are hypersensitive to the possibility that the country's sovereignty may be compromised.

In admitting foreign private enterprise, the government accepts the principal of profit on capital investment, but is determined that the primary consideration shall be the benefit of Guinea. Past practices are denounced on the grounds that they were based on the notion that the African economy was a mere appendage to that of Europe, that Africans were inherently incapable of managing their own affairs, and that they were entitled to no more than their colonial masters chose to give them.

Guinea's leaders assert that in the international sphere they desire economic relations with other countries on terms of complete equality and that they accepted extensive aid from the Communist bloc because it was offered in this spirit when the country was abandoned by France and other Western powers. They declare that they welcome help from any quarter, provided that it is given without conditions touching the nation's sovereignty.

France

Bitterness against France, which was manifested in the vigorous anticolonialist campaign which preceded independence, was sharpened by the precipitous French withdrawal from the country. Blunt rejection by France of the former colony's bid for cooperation and assistance was interpreted as an attempt to bring about the early collapse of the new regime. Moreover, the action was taken by President Touré as a personal insult and an affront to Guinean pride. In reaction, it was said that whatever good the French had done in the

country was accomplished because Guineans forced them to do it. From the beginning, however, President Touré made it clear that independence did not necessarily mean an end to cooperation with France.

Despite continued strictures against French colonialism, resentment had softened by mid-1961, and relations with France had improved. Indications of this were the cultural accord with France, signed in Conakry in July 1961 and, shortly thereafter, the visit to Guinea, at President Touré's invitation, of former French Premier Pierre Mendès France, former Minister François Mitterand and Jean Mauternat, last Governor-General of Guinea.

It is impossible to assess popular feeling toward France with certainty, but the prestige of French culture is high. The French were respected by the people, and many individual friendships existed. When the French technicians and foremen were expelled from the public utilities in Conakry, Guinean workers are reported to have pleaded with them not to leave. The Frenchman, "*le grand blanc*" or "*le patron*," worked with Guineans for 60 years, and the abler and more sensitive of them set an example of responsibility and competence. The skilled Guinean workmen and plantation operators were trained by the French, and the decline in their efficiency reflects the loss of a supervisory apparatus which they respected and which has not yet been successfully replaced. French culture and language continue to be vehicles through which the new state attempts to cope with the modern world and participate in it.

Aside from the resentments which developed during the colonial period and the frictions which persist in the realm of formal politics, Guineans are on familiar ground in dealing with Frenchmen because they have come to share in important respects many of the French ideas, attitudes and values. The experience of foreign teachers indicates that the French teacher enjoys a close relationship with Guinean students which doubtless stems from having a common language but seems equally to reflect certain shared intellectual values and a notion of prestige attached to things French.

The United States

Relatively few Guineans have had contact with Americans or know anything about the United States other than what they hear from official sources. The country's leaders were disappointed and resentful that the United States did not give immediate recognition to Guinea after the referendum and that it failed to respond to a request for arms and instructors for the police, security forces and armed services. It is alleged in Guinea that President Touré sent a request for such assistance through President Tubman of Liberia and that

the United States did not respond out of fear of offending its French ally. During the first year of independence, President Touré taxed the United States with unjustly interpreting Guinea's political orientation as Communist and failing to recognize that Guinea was actually anticolonial, independent and, above all, African.

In the spring of 1961, there were indications that a more favorable attitude was developing. In June the director of the United States Peace Corps was warmly welcomed by President Touré when he visited Conakry, and a request was made for a Peace Corps project. During the summer criticism in the official press moderated, and there were fewer articles charging the United States with imperialism in connection with the Cuban situation.

Other Western Powers

Attitudes toward other countries of Western Europe are much less clearly defined and, in some respects, seem to reflect those held in France itself. There is apparent admiration for German scientific ability and industrial efficiency. Israel, although geographically in the Middle East, is identified as culturally Western, and it has won Guinean admiration both for the abilities of its representatives and for its achievements as a new, small state struggling successfully against difficult odds.

Belgium and Portugal are harshly attacked for their actions in the Congo and Angola. England is also criticized as a colonial power. Interest in learning English, which is now taught as the second foreign language in schools, has grown since it is regarded as a necessary means of communication with the English-speaking African countries and the United States.

The Communist Countries

The Communist countries enjoy a number of advantages in their relations with Guineans. None of them is associated in the popular mind with colonial rule, and their propaganda against the West tends to win credit for them as enemies of colonialism. The political outlook of some of Guinea's leaders has been conditioned by exposure to Marxist ideas, but Communist visitors find no simple acceptance of their own political orthodoxy. In greeting Leonid I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, President Touré said that Guinea had chosen socialism but was not Communist and would join no bloc.

Communist visitors are received as representatives of countries to which Guinea owes a debt of gratitude as the first to extend diplomatic recognition and aid. Although Guinean leaders have not hesitated to borrow and adapt Communist concepts and organizational techniques,

they insist that their sole concern is with political and economic measures designed to serve Guinean and African needs. They see the parallels with their own system, which they are convinced is the only suitable one for the particular needs of their country, in the one-party rule, the highly centralized government, and the state ownership of the Communist powers, but they explicitly deny any disposition to accept doctrinaire solutions and are preoccupied with African goals.

The foreign aid received by Guinea up to mid-1961 came mainly from the Communist bloc. This material and technical assistance has had greater popular impact in Guinea than has help received from the West, not only because of its quantity but because of its nature. Communist China, for example, is represented by more than 100 agricultural specialists working on the improvement of rice production techniques. Their work is reported to be effective and well received by the local rice growers who can understand and use the simple but modern equipment and methods brought by the Chinese.

Some irritation over Chinese attempts at political indoctrination has been voiced. President Touré himself, in commenting on Chinese claims about the effectiveness of the rural communes, noted that, while in China they represent an audacious revolutionary reform, every Guinean village has already been transformed into a democratically functioning rural commune.

NATIONAL SYMBOLS AND HOLIDAYS

The red, yellow and green of the flag—the same colors adopted by a number of other new African states—are arranged in three vertical stripes. Red symbolizes the readiness to shed blood for independence and African unity; yellow represents the sun; green, the color of vegetation, stands for prosperity and hope. The pictured elephant, “Sily,” has been the emblem of the PDG since 1954. An ancient symbol of high authority, it came to be associated with the struggles of the party under colonial rule and the ultimate victory of Guinea’s leaders.

Patriotic songs, composed and sung by native writers or minstrels (*griots*), are popular, particularly with the JRDA youth groups. Many of the songs are in praise of President Touré. The three ancient empires, Ghana, Mali and Gao, are celebrated in songs and stories as forerunners of modern African statehood. The national roster of heroes is headed by Samory Touré, a Malinké, who fought against French colonial expansion in Africa and to whom President Touré claims to be related. It includes such leaders of the resistance to French rule as El Hadj Omar of the Toucouleur, Alfa Yaya of the Foulah, Kaba Keita of the Kissi, Koko Tolino of the Toma and

Yallon Tené of the Coniagui and Bassari. Official ceremonies welcoming officials and foreign dignitaries to district capitals include the laying of a wreath at a "Monument to the Martyrs of Colonialism."

The most important national holiday is Republic Day celebrated on October 2 with speeches, parades, athletic contests and dances. September 28, the anniversary of the referendum in which Guinea voted against membership in the French Community, is also a legal holiday, as are January 1 and May 1. Religious festivals observed by the government as legal holidays are Easter Monday, Ascension Day, Christmas, the end of Ramadan, Tabaski (the "Great Festival" which is on the twelfth day of the last month of the Moslem lunar calendar), and Mohammed's birthday (on the twelfth day of the third month).

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SECTION II. POLITICAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 16

CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT

On November 12, 1958, Guinea, through the action of its National Assembly, adopted a Constitution establishing a republican form of government and assigning sovereignty to the people. The Constitution provides for a presidential system based on the separation of powers between the executive and the legislative branches of government and for an independent judiciary. The system is unitary and strongly centralized under the presidency.

The most important single factor in the political life of the country is the hegemony of the sole political party, the Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti Démocratique de Guinée—PDG), led by a handful of men under the strong personal leadership of President Touré who is also executive secretary of the party. The party prepared the way for independence, wrote the Constitution, created and in fact controls all three branches of the government; it is in effect the government. Nearly half of the members of the Cabinet in 1961 were also members of the National Political Bureau (Bureau Politique National—BPN) of the PDG, the directing body of the party.

To quote the president:

. . . the party assumes the directing role in the life of the nation [and so] . . . disposes of all the powers of the nation: political, judicial, administrative, economic and technical powers are in the hands of the Democratic Party of Guinea. It is the party which designates the Chief of State through universal, direct suffrage. Deputies to the National Assembly . . . are elected directly by the people under the same conditions as the Chief of State. . . . Ministers, who are appointed (by the Chief of State and can be removed by him at any time), remain in office subject to serving in accordance with the party line, that is to say within the framework of national interest . . .

The PDG is not named in the Constitution, but its ascendancy is favored by the enormous powers granted to the President who is also the leader of the party. Election laws assure that only party candidates will be elected to the National Assembly. No safeguards are provided for judicial independence. The unity of action imposed on

the three branches of the government by the PDG eliminates any real separation of powers and limits the exercise of popular sovereignty to what the party regards as desirable.

The role of President Touré, who heads both the party and the government, is primary. His personal authority, however, is qualified not so much by the Constitution and the laws—which he played a leading part in shaping and could alter if he chose—as by the influence of a handful of other party leaders with whom he has ties of personal friendship, mutual dependence, and shared experience in building up the party organization and leading the country to independence. President Touré appears as the dominant feature in a ruling committee duplicated on a descending scale throughout the nation down to the local party committees and village councils. The system has resemblances to the collective leadership of the Communists, with whom the President and his followers share certain doctrinal premises, but it also has direct antecedents in the consensus principle of the African tradition of chief-in-council and in the bureaucratic methods of the French colonial apparatus.

The Constitution is the fundamental law of the nation, but it is regarded as neither a sacred writ nor a rigid framework within which government action must be confined. It is viewed rather as a flexible instrument of policy. In President Touré's words:

The Constitution of the Republic of Guinea . . . is a law in the service of the Guinean revolution. . . . It is conceived as a practical and simple working tool. It permits the more dynamic expression of the action of the Guinean nation. It is meant to be a continuous creation, not a brake nor an end in itself.

Constitutional amendments may be adopted by a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly.

The operation of government has three outstanding features: one-party rule; a pragmatic approach; and the intensely personal direction of a group of leaders who, from the President on down, make all the major decisions and do not hesitate to inquire, intervene or conciliate in national or local affairs (see ch. 17, *Political Dynamics*).

African tradition, French influence and Marxist doctrine have conditioned the structure and methods of the government and the attitudes of both the governors and the governed. The African tradition is expressed primarily in the authoritarian and personal character of leadership and in the operation of group discussion on all levels as a check on the power of the leader. French influence predominates in the structure of political institutions, in formal laws and in bureaucratic practices; French education has powerfully molded the thinking of the country's leaders and French is the national language. Marxist doctrine is reflected in basic premises about the nature of society and the ends of government. It is apparent in such practical

matters as party organization, party and government controls, the mobilization of public opinion in support of policy and techniques for dealing with opposition. It has also contributed to the all-pervading emphasis on politics.

Strong as the impact of Marxism has been, Guinea's leaders have avoided doctrinaire rigidity. Preoccupied with the task of building a new African society, they have adopted what they considered useful and ignored what might hamper their freedom of action (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics). Institutionally, the government was constructed on French lines with few changes to accommodate local conditions. The Communist model, however, is apparent in the structure of the ruling party.

The makers of the new order have been fortunate in that basic aspects of the indigenous political heritage have proved compatible enough to blend into a workable system. The operation of authority is different in the African tradition, in the French bureaucratic structure and in the Marxist pattern, but executive authority is strong in all three. In the Constitution this emphasis found expression in the extensive powers of the presidency, and it is manifested in governmental practice at all levels. The expectation in the traditional order was that the chief acted with the approval of the community—manifested through the council of elders—and this has coincided with the Western European democratic principle that the governed have the right to express their will through elected representatives.

Two themes permeate the Constitution—nationalism and African unity. The centralized structure of the government is in part the result of a determination to forge and maintain national unity and a fear of the divisive force of regional and local loyalties. Strong legal sanctions have been erected against centrifugal tendencies. The emphasis on African unity reflects the ambition of Guinea's leaders to play a leading role in a united Africa which they believe must come into being if the peoples of the continent are to achieve their rightful place in the world.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Formative Influences

Historically, the political pattern in the area of Guinea and the western Sudan has shown a remarkable uniformity notwithstanding ethnic complexity and the existence of political entities varying in size from simple village communities to large empires (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). A common feature of most of these was that the exercise of political power by the local chiefs—or, in the case of the empires, by kings—was authoritarian. It was normally a qualified authoritarianism, however, in that the chief required the support of the

community to remain in power. He might speak the first and last words in decision-making, and he administered communal property, but he was seldom an absolute master. His powers were limited by custom and religious belief, and a chief who did not conform to the established ways or who did not satisfy the central expectations of the community was apt to be removed.

An advisory council of elders assisted the chief in the exercise of his duties. In large, stratified societies the council was composed of lesser chiefs or heads of clans; in small ones the elders were heads of lineages, families or households. Their advice, which was freely given, was not binding, but no chief could hold his position long if he consistently ignored the council's advice.

The deliberations of the chief and the elders were institutionalized in the group discussions which have come to be known by Europeans as "palavers" (from the word *palavra* of the early Portuguese explorers and traders). A village palaver might include not only elders but all adult males. Every participant could express his opinion and, in the course of discussion, a preferred course of action gradually emerged. The final decision was made by the chief, and reinforced by his authority, community consensus and supernatural sanctions, it was generally accepted as binding.

Traditions of descent united people into lineages, clans and tribes. Kin group and political community were often identical. A whole village, or group of villages, might comprise a single large kin group tracing its origin to a common ancestor. In an important sense the chiefs and elders presided as senior figures in a family hierarchy rather than as occupants of impersonal political office. Only in the great ancient empires did bureaucracy, chosen by and responsible to the ruler, come to rival the political importance of kin groups.

The village chief was in direct contact with the people. His powers were specified by custom. Frequently the advisory role of the council of elders was shared by other groups in the community, such as organized age groups and secret societies. Some of the ritual functions and special prerogatives of these groups could not be revoked by the chief. Elements of this pattern of village government have survived into modern times, especially in the Forest Region and on the coast. In the more highly organized societies of Middle and Upper Guinea, the chiefs had less direct contact with the people, but they still depended on the support of lower chiefs and other notables.

All powers of government were centered in the person of the chief. At the village level judicial functions were the most important, the council of elders assisting the chief in the adjudication of disputes. The larger and more complex the community, the more important became the chief's other functions. There was an important warrior tradition among the Malinké and the Foulah.

New chiefs were usually, but not always, chosen from families which had acquired a hereditary right to fill this office. There was no consistent rule of primogeniture, and the chief was most often selected from among several eligible candidates. Religious duties constituted an essential part of the chief's responsibilities in all pagan and Moslem communities, with the chief acting as an intermediary between the people and the supernatural. In the animist groups he also maintained contact with the spirits of departed ancestors (see ch. 10, Religion).

In the period of French penetration, French residents were appointed to advise the African chiefs under various treaties of protection, and gradually the residents curtailed the power of the chiefs. With the advent of French rule, indigenous political institutions declined rapidly. French administrators treated the chiefs as their subordinates, appointing and dismissing them at will. The administrative authority of the chiefs was reduced to the execution of French orders, and their judicial powers were curtailed and brought under French supervision. With the decline of their temporal authority, their religious role also diminished, and their prestige among the people waned. Many of the smaller or more remote villages were relatively undisturbed and continued to manage their own affairs in the traditional way, but elsewhere the French ruled directly or through chiefs who functioned essentially as their agents.

The French introduced a centralized colonial bureaucracy into Guinea, but they did not, as in Senegal and some colonies, make an effort to promote representative institutions. At each level of the hierarchy there were: an executive officer endowed with extensive authority within his own area of responsibility—the Governor General of French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française—AOF); the lieutenant governors (governors after 1937) of the constituent colonies; and the administrative officers of the smaller units. These officials took their orders from France, were appointed from above and owed no responsibility to the people they governed.

Early in the colonial era the chiefs who opposed the French were eliminated, and others who were willing to accept subordinate status were appointed. Their sons and grandsons and a few others made up the small group who, in the next two generations, went to French primary and secondary schools and served at the lower levels of the colonial administration. The French colonial system both introduced them to French cultural and political ideals and frustrated their desires and expectations which were aroused by those ideals. In the years after World War I, some of them found in Marxism a programmatic explanation for their discontent, and the shocks of World War II and the rise of African nationalism stimulated organized political expression. First in the field were labor unions organized under the

tutelage of the French General Confederation of Labor (*Confédération Générale de Travail*—CGT), politically controlled by Communists. The early influence of the CGT in the African political movement was an important factor in the strong impact of Marxist thought on the new generation of African leaders since most of them, especially in Guinea, served their political apprenticeship in the labor movement (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 13, Labor Relations and Organization; ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

French Administration Until 1946

The AOF was established by decree of the President of the French Republic in 1895 and, except as modified by another decree in 1904, its organization remained essentially unchanged until World War II. Guinea was among the first of the eight colonies ultimately incorporated in the AOF. The others were Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, Sudan, Senegal, Upper Volta and Mauritania. Togo, adjacent to Dahomey, was brought under French rule as a mandated territory after World War I.

Inhabitants of the colonies were divided into two categories—a small group of French citizens and the mass of African subjects. The Africans were subject to special laws and had no representation in the government. In 1912 a naturalization decree provided for the granting of French citizenship to certain African subjects. The most important requirements for citizenship were knowledge of French, loyal service to France (demonstrated, for example, by receipt of military honors), good character and evidence of a means of livelihood. Few were naturalized under this complicated procedure; even in the relatively favored colony of Senegal—where special provisions applied—the proportion of citizens to subjects was minute.

The AOF was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Colonies of the French Republic. The highest official in the AOF was the Governor General at Dakar. Governors were the chief executives in each colony. Both the Governor General and the lieutenant governors were appointed by the French President on the recommendation of the Minister for the colonies to whom they were subordinated. Legislation for the colonies was by decree, prepared by the Ministry on the advice of the Governor General and promulgated by the President.

Consultative bodies were established on various levels of the colonial administration. The Supreme Council for the Colonies—known after 1937 as the Supreme Council for Overseas France (*Conseil Supérieur de la France d'Oltre-Mer*)—included members elected by French citizens in the colonies every four years; its function was to advise the Ministry of the Colonies. The Governor General of the AOF was advised by the Council of Government (*Conseil de Gouvernement*).

Its membership included all the governors of the AOF, special representatives from Senegal (the oldest of the colonies) and two members from each colony—a citizen and a subject—elected by the Council of Administration (Conseil d'Administration) of each constituent colony.

The members of the Council of Administration in each colony, at first appointed, were elected after 1925. In Guinea, the Council consisted of two French citizens elected by the local chambers of agriculture and commerce and two subjects elected by an electoral college drawn from seven categories of Africans, such as civil servants, persons with prescribed property or educational qualifications and those who had been officially cited for loyalty to France. Under the centralized French system, however, the colonies were subordinated parts of the larger entity of the AOF despite sporadic efforts in Paris to give them broader powers. The Governor General of the AOF closely supervised the governors and exercised all the more important financial powers (see ch. 25, Public Finance).

The district (*cercle*) was the basic unit of territorial administration. It was administered by a district commandant (*commandant de cercle*), a civil official with extensive powers. Representatives of the various central services of the colony in his area reported through him to higher authority; the commandant was directly responsible to the governor. Some districts were divided into administrative units known as subdivisions. These were headed by assistant administrators. In 1938 Guinea had 18 districts. The urban centers of Conakry, Kankan and Kindia were given separate administrative status as communes in 1920. They were headed by appointed French mayors assisted by appointed councils, half of whose members were French citizens and half subjects.

French administrative officials belonged to a career colonial service made up of colonial administrators and a lower category of civil servants. The first were graduates of a special school in Paris and served in all the French colonies; most colonial governors and district commandants came from this group. Below them were civil servants who were recruited, trained and employed locally to serve as assistants and clerks. They could not rise higher than the post of chief of a subdivision. Educated Africans were admitted to this category.

The district and subdivision were the smallest units directly administered by European officials. The province was part of a district or a subdivision and was in turn divided into cantons and villages—each under an African chief, all of whom had been reduced to adjuncts of the colonial administration. The provincial chief—the office was not everywhere present—nominally had authority over the chiefs of the cantons in his province and, through them, over the village chiefs

in the area. Some villages, however, were outside this pyramidal scheme, their chiefs being directly under the French authorities. The French apparently were not altogether satisfied with the office of provincial chief—reminiscent in rank of the once powerful regional chieftainships—and sought to dispense with it whenever possible.

Chiefs were chosen from among those Africans believed to be loyal to the French and able and willing to assist the colonial administration. A traditional chief who demonstrated these qualities would be confirmed in office, but appointment frequently went to commoners who had been clerks or interpreters in the French service or to graduates of the School for the Sons of Chiefs and Interpreters (founded at St. Louis, Senegal, in 1856 by General Louis Faidherbe, then Governor of the colony).

The main responsibilities of the chiefs were to collect taxes, to supply the French authorities with the labor required for public works and other activities and to provide men for military service. Provincial and canton chiefs were paid a salary. Village chiefs were remunerated with a share of the taxes they collected. Their share was progressively reduced with delay in the collection of taxes, and the chief received nothing if taxes were not in by a certain date.

As agents of an alien authority, the chiefs were distrusted by the community and had no power beyond that derived from their French superiors. They had a reputation, which many of them deserved, for maladministration and corruption.

Some of the French governors advocated the restoration of the traditional chieftainship, but nothing came of it. In 1919 Councils of Local Notables (Conseils des Notables Indigènes) were established in the districts to advise the commandants on such matters as taxation and labor conscription. The councils were intended to help create native understanding of government policies and support for them, but with only limited advisory power and dominated by the French (district commandants were council presidents), the councils had little value as channels of African opinion.

Justice was administered separately for French citizens and African subjects. For French citizens, primary civil jurisdiction was exercised by a court of the First Instance in Conakry and criminal jurisdiction by the Court of Assizes, also located in Conakry. Their decisions could be appealed to the West African Court of Appeal in Dakar and, further, to the Court of Cassation in Paris. For subjects, the administration of justice, at first in the hands of the chiefs, was gradually brought under French supervision. In 1912 the judicial powers of village chiefs were completely abolished, and customary courts (*Tribunaux indigène*) were created in district and subdivision headquarters. District courts sat under Europeans, but African judges

could preside in the subdivisions. In 1925 almost all judicial functions were brought under French supervision.

As finally reorganized in 1931, the system of justice for African subjects consisted of customary courts of the first and second degree in district and subdivision headquarters and in the three full communes of Senegal. Customary courts of the first degree were composed of two African assessors (lay judges) customarily under the presidency of the district administrative officer. The vote of the assessors was deliberative in that at least one assessor had to vote with the president for a decision to be made. These courts had primary jurisdiction in civil actions involving limited sums and in criminal cases in which penalties did not exceed a fine of 2,000 francs or 10 years' imprisonment or both. Customary courts of the second degree ordinarily sat in district headquarters and had original and appellate civil jurisdiction but no criminal jurisdiction. They were composed of a French district official, who presided, and two native assessors with a deliberative vote.

Unlimited original criminal jurisdiction in serious offenses, with the right to impose the capital penalty, was exercised by a criminal court in each district. Presided over by a district administrator, the criminal court usually had four assessors—two Africans and two Europeans—half of whom had to agree for a judgment to be rendered. A colonial Court of Appeal in Conakry, presided over by the president of the Court of First Instance (which administered French law in civil and minor criminal cases involving French citizens or foreigners of comparable background) was composed of two senior French officials and two African notables. It had appellate jurisdiction in civil and criminal native law cases coming from the courts of the first and second degree. The Supreme Customary Court of Appeal in Dakar (*Chambre d'Annulation*) had final appellate jurisdiction in all native civil and criminal cases.

The basic drawbacks in the system of justice for African subjects were the absence of a unified penal code, the ignorance of many of the French officials of African concepts and customs, and the cumbersome appellate procedure which made appeal practically impossible in criminal cases (where appeals had to be initiated by the procurators) and extremely difficult in civil ones. There was a shortage of courts and of judicial officials. Many offenses were not brought to court, whereas others might be punished too severely or too lightly by African standards. In civil cases, local customary law was frequently misunderstood and misapplied. No attorneys were allowed to practice in the customary courts.

A further source of dissatisfaction was a system of summary disciplinary measures—the *Indigénat*—under which French adminis-

trators had discretionary power to punish their African subjects for minor infractions. Penalties could not exceed a fine of 15 francs or 5 days' imprisonment (before 1925 the limits had been 100 francs and 2 weeks). Besides being arbitrary, the system could be—and often was—abused as a means of discouraging “insolence” or as a device for securing free labor.

The French Union

The French Union, established under the Constitution of the Fourth Republic in 1946, was composed of Metropolitan France and its former overseas empire reorganized into Overseas Departments, Overseas Territories, Associated Territories and Associated States. The President of the French Republic was President *ex officio* of the Union. Its principal organs were a High Council and an Assembly with only advisory powers (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). The AOF continued to exist as a regional entity, but its erstwhile colonies—Guinea among them—were designated Overseas Territories. As such, they formed a part of the French Republic and were subordinated to the newly created Ministry of Overseas France.

Some months before the establishment of the Union, the Lamine Guèye Law extended French citizenship to all subjects in the former African colonies, nominally on equal terms with citizens of Metropolitan France. The vague wording of the law, however, did not specify their rights and duties. The grant of citizenship was upheld in the Union, but the 1946 Constitution provided that the exercise of the rights of citizenship would be determined by special laws. The former African subjects were thus made citizens and were given a measure of political representation, but they did not have full political rights. Article 82 of the Constitution provided that citizens under local customary law could remain so without jeopardy to their newly acquired rights of citizenship, but suffrage was given to only certain categories in this group. The number was successively enlarged in 1947, 1951 and 1952.

Within the Union, the AOF continued to be headed by a governor general and each territory by a governor. Assisting these officials were newly created elective bodies—a Grand Council (*Grand Conseil*) in the AOF and a General Council (*Conseil Général*) in each territory. The councils had only a regulatory and advisory function, the French government retaining its exclusive right to legislate for Overseas Territories. It was provided, however, that a law, in order to apply in a territory, had to be so designated and that presidential decrees had to be approved by the Assembly of the French Union. Legislative practice remained much as it had been before.

Despite their limited powers, the Councils played an important role. They had broad authority to make inquiries, and they exercised

considerable disposal of land and property, economic development, education, health and social welfare. They proved to be an excellent training ground for Africans, who were by then permitted to form political organizations (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

Elections to legislative and consultative bodies at various levels were governed by a complicated system of direct and indirect representation. The General Council in Guinea consisted of 40 members who were elected directly by two separate colleges; 16 members by citizens under French law, 24 members by citizens under customary law. Representation was weighted heavily in favor of the first who, numerically, constituted only about 0.3 percent of the enfranchised members of the second group.

As a member of the French Union, Guinea sent deputies to the French National Assembly. These, of whom there were three by 1954, were elected directly in one college by all enfranchised citizens. Guinea's two members of the French Council of the Republic were chosen indirectly by the territory's General Council whose members voted in two colleges, each electing one senator. The five deputies to the Grand Council of the AOF and the four representatives to the Assembly of the French Union were elected indirectly by the General Council voting in one college.

No basic changes were made in the organization of local administration in the territory. The three communes, Conakry, Kankan and Kindia, were advanced a step toward self-government in being granted elective councils although their mayors continued to be appointed. In 1953 three other towns, Labé, Mamou and Siguiri, were raised in status to communes with appointive councils.

Reorganization of the procedures for the administration of justice was carried out under the reform of April 1946. The French penal code was extended to all inhabitants of the AOF, and the customary courts were deprived of their competence in criminal matters. Jurisdiction in minor transgressions was transferred from the customary courts of the first degree to justices of peace, 15 of whom were appointed. The French Court of the First Instance in Conakry was given jurisdiction in all major crimes committed by citizens under both French and customary law. Customary courts were retained for civil litigation involving citizens under customary law.

In 1950 the Second Lamine Gnèye Law admitted Africans to certain higher posts in the civil service, hitherto reserved for Europeans. In February 1952 the General Councils in the Overseas Territories were renamed Territorial Assemblies. The powers of the Guinean Assembly were enlarged, and the number of its deputies was increased to 50 (18 elected by the French law college and 32 by the customary law college).

Loi Cadre

Important progress toward self-government was made in the Loi Cadre (enabling act) of June 23, 1956, and its implementing decrees. Universal and unqualified suffrage was granted to all citizens in the AOF, and the system of separate electoral colleges for Europeans and Africans was abolished.

Major emphasis was placed on decentralizing the administration of the Overseas Territories, and substantial autonomy was granted to the individual territories. The AOF continued to coordinate their financial, economic and social affairs, but the powers of the Grand Council were greatly reduced, and no provision was made for an executive at the AOF level. The Governor General was redesignated High Commissioner.

The powers of the Territorial Assemblies were greatly increased, and the administration of local affairs was entrusted to newly created executive bodies—Councils of Government. The assemblies were given the right to legislate for their respective territories on such matters as agriculture, public health, education, welfare and public administration. It was the responsibility of the AOF to coordinate the legislation of the several territories. Bills of Territorial Assemblies became law unless set aside within 90 days by the Minister of Overseas France—action which could be taken only on the grounds that the Assembly had exceeded its competence. Elections to the Territorial Assemblies throughout the AOF were held in March 1957. In Guinea the PDG won 58 seats out of a total of 60.

The Councils of Government in each territory administered the laws passed by the Assembly. Council members were chosen by the Assembly from among its members—in practice from among the leading members of the dominant political party—and in effect they functioned as Cabinet ministers. Each was in charge of a sphere of local administration. Council members were not responsible, however, to the Assembly. They could be dismissed only by a decree of the French Council of Ministers with the Assembly's concurrence. Regulations issued by the Council could be set aside by the Governor, now known as the Chief of the Territory, but only if they exceeded the Council's legal competence.

The Council of Government in Guinea was formed in May 1957. Its 12 members, commonly referred to as ministers, were in the leadership of the PDG. Sékou Touré, Secretary General of the PDG and the Council member receiving the most votes, automatically became Vice-President of the Council, the highest territorial post reserved for an African. The Chief of the Territory was the Council's president ex officio, but he functioned largely as a figurehead. By

French decree in July 1958, all the African Vice-Presidents became Presidents of their Councils.

The policy of the newly formed Council and of the PDG was to take over as much of the territory's administration as possible and to Africanize the civil service. One of the first actions of the Council was to abolish the system of government-appointed chiefs and to establish elective councils in the villages, communes and districts. (The latter, which had been called *cercles*, were redesignated as circumscriptions [*circonscriptions*].) Elections to local councils were held in November 1957. Some 40,000 councilors were elected to 4,123 village councils, and 526 councilors were elected to 25 circumscription councils. Most of the deputies were PDG members. The councils, elected by universal suffrage for five years, replaced the village chiefs.

The PDG, through the Council of Government and the Territorial Assembly, continued to press for measures calculated to limit the powers of the French administrators and increase Guinean initiative. Several towns were elevated to the status of communes, and a plan was approved for establishing more than 100 administrative posts to be staffed by Guineans in parts of the country long neglected by the authorities. The new administrators were taken from the first students of the School of National Administration (Ecole Nationale d'Administration), established in early 1957.

By mid-1958 the government of the territory was thoroughly re-organized and largely in African hands. The Council of Government was the central executive authority and the powers of the French Chief of the Territory was mostly negative. Locally the PDG, which had about 4,300 village committees, maintained effective control through its members in the elective councils and among the steadily increasing number of Africans serving as appointed administrators. French administrators were largely bypassed, and their complaints to the Council were ignored. In the referendum of September 28, 1958, the people, under the leadership of the PDG, voted overwhelmingly against accepting membership in the French Community, the successor to the French Union. Guinea's independence was officially proclaimed on October 2. The Territorial Assembly re-constituted itself as the National Constituent Assembly, and Sékou Touré was designated President and entrusted with forming a new government. The Constitution was adopted by the Assembly on November 12, 1958.

THE CONSTITUTION

Basic Principles and Sovereignty

The basic principles on which the Constitution rests are set forth in the Preamble and in the first few articles. Article 1 states that

Guinea is a democratic, secular and social republic. According to President Touré, the democratic character of the Republic is expressed in the rule of the majority; the secular character of the Republic ensures that individual opinions and religious beliefs will be respected; its social character signifies that interests of the society must come before interests of the individuals.

"Work, Justice, Solidarity" is the motto of the Republic. It is explained that "work" means that everyone has the freedom and the duty to work and that his work must be done on behalf of the nation, honestly and worthily. "Liberty" is restricted by the national interest and signifies freedom, not license. "Solidarity" means each for all and all for each.

Sovereignty is vested in the people to be exercised through elections of deputies to the legislative body and through election of the chief executive. Article 3 reads: "National sovereignty belongs to the people who exercise it in all matters through their deputies to the National Assembly, whose members are elected by equal universal suffrage, in direct and secret ballot, or by referendum." Article 22 provides for the election of the President of the Republic by universal suffrage. The Preamble borrows Lincoln's phrase in affirming the principle of popular sovereignty: "The principle of the Republic of Guinea is: government of the people, by the people and for the people."

Few formal limitations are imposed on popular sovereignty in the Constitution. The republican form of government cannot be changed, although there is authorization for limitation of its exercise in the provision that, in the interest of African unity, Guinea may surrender fully or in part its sovereignty to a larger political entity. In practice, the exercise of popular sovereignty takes place under the vigilant supervision of the PDG. Deputies to the National Assembly are elected on a national list and by a majority ballot, and a country-wide support necessary for election can be obtained only with the backing of the party (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

In his commentary on the Constitution, President Touré explains the provision for a single national list by saying that deputies should not be influenced by any regional, ethnic, racial or religious considerations, but should serve only national interests as trustees of the nation as a whole.

Distribution of Powers

Legislative powers under the Constitution are vested solely in the National Assembly whose formal powers in this sphere are qualified only by the provision that the Assembly cannot change the republican form of government. Legislative initiative is reserved to

individual deputies and to the President of the Republic. Actually most legislation is done by executive decree.

Executive powers are entrusted to the President who is elected directly by the people. To explain why the President is elected independently, Sékou Touré states that, in underdeveloped countries especially, it is necessary that all power emanate directly from the people, since they are capable of following in a spirit of sacrifice only directives coming from themselves or from those bearing their express mandate. The President is the head of state and supreme military commander. In the exercise of his executive powers he is assisted by the Cabinet, the members of which he appoints and dismisses. The Cabinet is responsible to the President and not to the Assembly. The President carries full responsibility to the Assembly, and ultimately to the people, for the exercise of the executive function. The administrative division of the country into communes and circumscriptions (in 1959 the circumscriptions were redesignated regions) is provided for in Article 2.

Judicial powers are exercised in the name of the people, with the President as guarantor of the independence of the judiciary. The Constitution does not specify how the judiciary shall be organized, but only that a judicial system shall be established by law. As of mid-1961 no comprehensive reform of the judicial apparatus inherited from the French had taken place, although three higher courts had been established. With respect to procedure, Article 36 requires that court sessions be open except as the law may provide otherwise. Apparently the judicial authorities take as their guiding principle the supremacy of the national interest and bring to the application of justice the pragmatic spirit which permeates all governmental practice.

The Constitution establishes the separation of powers. The President cannot dissolve the Assembly, nor is there any provision for its dissolution—although presumably it could dissolve itself. Similarly there is no provision for deposing the President. Two references to popular referendum—in Article 3, as an alternate method of electing deputies, and in Article 49, on constitutional amendment—introduce the possibility that a referendum as a manifestation of the popular will could be used to dissolve the Assembly or depose the President. Such a contingency, however, is highly unlikely under the one-party system (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

The President is responsible to the Assembly for the general policies of the executive. In theory this responsibility is enforceable through the Assembly's legislative supremacy, its budgetary powers and its right to interpellate the government. In view of the identity of the leadership of party and the government and their unity of action,

however, the separation of powers remains only a constitutional abstraction (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

Civil Rights

An entire section and several additional provisions of the Constitution are devoted to the rights and duties of citizens. The Preamble states that all citizens are equal without regard to race, sex, or creed. Electoral rights are granted to all citizens to be exercised by universal, direct suffrage and secret ballot or referendum. Freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, public demonstration and religion is granted. The Constitution also guarantees freedom from arbitrary arrest and the right of the accused to defense in court. It is provided that all citizens have equal rights to work, rest, social assistance and education. Civil rights are placed under the guardianship of judicial authorities. The guarantee is modified, however, by the repeated provision that the conditions under which civil rights are to be exercised are subject to law.

The Constitution places special emphasis on the need for national unity and provides that "Any act of racial discrimination as well as all propaganda of a racial or regional character shall be punishable by law." The use of one national electoral list is also designed to discourage such division. Offenses under this provision were defined and punishments were provided by decree of the Ministry of Justice in February 1959 (see ch. 18, Public Order and Safety).

Foreign citizens who are "pursued because of their struggle for the defense of a just cause or for their scientific or cultural activities" are granted the right of asylum in Guinea. This provision has been invoked for anti-Portuguese Angolan nationalists and political refugees from Ivory Coast and the former Belgian Congo.

The duties of citizens are carefully delineated. Citizens are obliged to conform to the Constitution and other laws, to pay their taxes and "to discharge their social obligations honestly." Article 48 states that "the defense of the nation is considered the sacred duty of every citizen of the Republic of Guinea." The Constitution does not define Guinean citizenship, and up to mid-1961, no citizenship legislation has been enacted. A decree of March 1959 provides that only Guinean citizens may serve in the Guinean civil service and implies that foreigners may acquire citizenship.

Special Provisions

Much space is devoted in the Constitution to international matters and particularly to the subject of African unity. The Preamble declares that Guinea adheres unconditionally to the Charter of the United Nations and to the Declaration of Human Rights and will

support all efforts for world peace. It affirms the desire for friendship with all peoples on a basis of equality, reciprocal interests, mutual interest and respect for Guinea's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Article 31 declares that the country will conform to the rules of international law.

The goal of African unity is strongly emphasized. The Preamble states that Guinea is resolved to "strive to the utmost to achieve and consolidate the unity and independence of the African Fatherland." It goes on to pledge the nation to combat any manifestation of national chauvinism as an obstacle to African unity and to support any policy which will help to bring about a United States of Africa. Article 34 authorizes Guinea to relinquish its sovereignty in part or whole in combining with other African states in the interest of unity (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

President Touré has asserted that one of the reasons why Guinea chose independence was to be free to act on behalf of African unity which he saw as gravely threatened by the divisive force of colonialism working through the French Community. The people of Africa, he explained, will remain divided so long as they do not have full sovereignty, and so unity must wait on independence.

In the first three years of independence Guinea concluded agreements for union with Ghana and Mali. The Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union, however, was a loose association rather than a strong federation and, although there was provision for the members severally to cede sovereign powers to the union, they had not done so up to the autumn of 1961. The preoccupation with African unity was still strong, but it seemed unlikely that any of the new states would soon surrender their so recently won national sovereignty (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

One of the three basic attributes of the Republic, as set forth in Article 1 of the Constitution, is its secular character. Article 41 provides for the separation of church and state and guarantees secular government and secular instruction in the schools. Behind the principle lies the determination of the national leadership to avoid political cleavage along religious lines and to obviate the possibility of any challenge to itself from religious quarters. Moslem and animist religious leaders constitute a conservative force in the community and are probably the most influential of the surviving traditional groups (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics; ch. 10, Religion).

Except for Articles 16-18 (specifying the budgetary powers of the National Assembly) and Article 44 (pertaining to the right to work, rest, social welfare, education and the right to organize and strike), the Constitution contains no special economic or social provisions.

Amendment

The National Assembly, by affirmative vote of two-thirds of its membership, may amend the Constitution or submit the proposed amendment to popular referendum. Initiative in proposing a change in the Constitution belongs to the President and to the Assembly. No amendment may be made which would jeopardize the republican form of government.

According to available information in mid-1961, the Constitution had not been formally amended up to that time. It appears, however, that changes had been made informally by administrative decree, as, for example, in the series of decrees revising the territorial administrative division of the country established by Article 2.

No provision has been made for interpretation of the Constitution. The Superior Court of Cassation (Tribunal Supérieur de Cassation) has general powers to interpret the law.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

The Presidency

The President stands at the apex of the whole structure of the government. He is the head of state; controls the executive branch and the armed forces; conducts foreign relations; is trustee of the independence of the judiciary and may grant pardons; and has the right to submit legislation to the National Assembly and to initiate constitutional amendments.

The presidency was endowed with broad powers by the Constitution, and these have been exercised to the fullest by President Touré. He not only controls the executive, but also dominates the legislative and the judicial branches of the government. He does so in his capacity both as head of state and as leader of the PDG. As secretary general of the party, he has a decisive voice in the formulation of party policies, and he directs institutions and activities in all spheres of public life.

Legally, any citizen who has reached the age of 35 is eligible to run for president. In practice, the support of the party is essential. The President is chosen for a seven-year term in direct elections based on universal suffrage by absolute majority on the first ballot or by plurality on the second. He may serve more than one term. Sékou Touré was elected President by the National Assembly in 1958 and reelected in January 1961 in the first presidential election held since independence (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

The President forms his own Cabinet, appointing its members by decree. Ministers are individually responsible to the President for the performance of their duties and may be dismissed by the President at any time. The President also appoints all officials in the public ad-

ministration and military service. In practice, ministers and higher officials are appointed by presidential decree; minor officials, by decree of the Minister of Civil Service. The President is responsible for the execution of all laws and signs all government acts, which then require signature by the competent minister. The President may negotiate foreign agreements, subject only to the Assembly's approval in certain cases.

The legislative initiative exercised by the President effectively gives him control over legislation, since most draft laws are submitted by the President—a fact which assures their passage. The proposals of individual deputies are cleared with the presidency. The bulk of actual legislation is done by executive decree and, not infrequently, by administrative fiat, which need not be formally published.

The Assembly

The National Assembly consists of one house composed of deputies elected on a national list by direct, universal suffrage or by referendum. The term of office is five years. As of 1961 the National Assembly had 60 members, elected in March 1957, as deputies to the Territorial Assembly. No new electoral law, as envisaged by the Constitution in Article 5, has been enacted.

The Assembly works through a system of committees (*commissions*), the composition and functions of which it determines. It elects its officers once a year at the beginning of the first session. No detailed information was available in mid-1961 on the composition and work of the committees or on the precise number and functions of the officers of the Assembly. The chief officer of the Assembly is its president. In 1961 this office was occupied by El-Hadj Saifoulaye Diallo, who came to it in the Territorial Assembly elected in 1957. The position ranks immediately below that of the President of the Republic. Diallo, the son of a ranking Foulah chief, discarded his aristocratic privileges to join the ranks of the PDG and early became one of its leading figures. He has a reputation as a skillful, aggressive politician and as a militant left-wing Marxist.

The National Assembly meets in two regular annual sessions of not more than two months each. These begin in March and October. It may hold a special session at any time on request of the President, the government (presumably the Cabinet members in a meeting presided over by the President) or by decision of two-thirds of its members. All meetings of the Assembly are public, but may be closed at the request of the President or the government or by a majority vote of the deputies.

The Assembly is the sole judge of the status and eligibility of its members. Deputies may resign their office. They enjoy immunity

from arrest and prosecution for "opinions expressed or votes taken" during the exercise of their functions. While in office, a deputy may be prosecuted on criminal charges only with the authorization of the Assembly unless he is taken in the act of committing a crime. In such cases the Assembly may require that the prosecution be suspended. Deputies' salaries are set by law. In 1959 they were fixed at what they had been for members of the Territorial Assembly. After the 1957 elections, 58 of the 60 seats in the Assembly were held by the PDG. The remaining two seats were won by the Socialist Party which subsequently merged with the PDG. By 1961 all the deputies were members of the PDG.

Under the Constitution, the Assembly has the sole right to legislate. It approves budgets, initiates expenditure and is charged with controlling the nation's finances. The President of the Republic is responsible to it for the policies of his Cabinet, and it has the power to interpellate and investigate the executive.

Legislative drafts and proposals originating with the President or with individual deputies are studied by the appropriate committees of the Assembly before being submitted to general debate. The domain of legislation is unlimited. A proposal becomes law when passed by a simple majority—a vote not specified in the Constitution but sanctioned by practice. Bills submitted by the government and private bills accepted have priority in debate. International treaties and agreements of certain specified types are not valid unless ratified by the Assembly (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

The draft budget is submitted annually to the Assembly for enactment into law not later than November 30 preceding the year to which the budget applies. Deputies may initiate legislation authorizing expenditures, but such measures must be accompanied by proposals for obtaining the needed funds. The National Assembly checks the accounts of the government each semester and annually (see ch. 25, Public Finance).

Article 19 of the Constitution gives the Assembly the right to scrutinize the activities of the executive through oral or written questions, interpellation, hearings and investigations by committees. Apparently ministers, as well as designated civil servants, may be questioned at debates of the Assembly or by its committees. It is not clear whether the ministerial decree of 1959 assigning deputies of the National Assembly to serve in individual government agencies concurrently with their legislative duties was intended to further the investigative function or only to utilize needed abilities which were not fully occupied in the Assembly. Deputies were assigned to the following ministries (several of which have since been reorganized and renamed): nine to National Defense; eight to Interior and Se-

curity; and two each to Public Health and Population, Economic Affairs and Planning, and Foreign Affairs.

Formally, the Assembly's legislative supremacy, its fiscal control and its investigative authority balance the extensive powers of the executive. Actually there is no opposition between the two branches because both are guided by the policies of the ruling party and both are vehicles of a single leadership.

Cabinet and Executive Agencies

The President directs the work of the executive establishment through the Cabinet. He appoints Cabinet ministers and dismisses them, and they are responsible to him for their actions. Ministers must countersign presidential decrees in their particular spheres of activity. In the event the President's office is vacated, the Cabinet continues to function until a new President is elected. The Constitution does not specify whether, in such case, responsibility would be borne by the Cabinet collectively or by one minister as leader. It is provided, however, that in an emergency the President may delegate his powers to one of the ministers.

Cabinet members may not be arrested or prosecuted without the President's authorization. While in office they may not hold any other position or exercise a profession. Ministers or their designated representatives have the right to attend meetings of the National Assembly and its committees at which they must be heard if they desire.

In the governmental administrative hierarchy, the chain of command reaches directly downward from the President through a chief administrative officer at every level. Each administrative chief is directly responsible for the affairs of his unit to the officer in charge of the next echelon above him.

Various executive controls converge in the agencies of public administration. Most important is the control exercised by the party units at each level (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics). There are the controls personally exercised by the President or by representatives of his office. Some executive departments work under the scrutiny of special inspection units; the police have a general concern with the conduct of all agencies (see ch. 18, Public Order and Safety).

Overcentralization and a shortage of adequately trained and experienced officials have made for inefficiency and an air of improvisation in government operations, especially on the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy. There is much policy but few clear precedents, and rules are subject to change without notice by higher authority. Many routine decisions, avoided or postponed by officials fearful of making mistakes, move slowly upward to higher author-

ity, coming at last to the desk of a minister or of the President himself.

The Council of Government, formed under the Loi Cadre in May 1957, became the first Cabinet of independent Guinea on October 4, 1958. It consisted of President Touré, 11 ministers and 7 secretaries of state (see table 1). Most of the secretaries of state were in charge of elements of the various ministries. The Cabinet formed after the presidential election on January 28, 1961, was composed of 20 ministers. Seventeen headed ministries, one was minister of state without portfolio, one was head of the Bank of the Republic of Guinea, and one—a woman—was Secretary of State for Social Affairs in the Ministry of Labor and Social Legislation (see table 1).

Most of the members of the first Cabinet have continued in the government, although some of them are in different posts. Only two members of the 1958 Cabinet seems to have been dropped altogether. One was a Frenchman; another, the son of a French-nominated canton chief, apparently had been a career administrator in the French colonial service. Abdoulaye Diallo and Michel Collet, who were in the 1958 Cabinet, had moved in 1961 to high diplomatic posts. Diallo was Minister Resident at Accra (Ghana) and Collet was Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations. In August 1961, after a traffic accident, Collet became involved in an altercation with the police which brought a protest to the Secretary General of the United Nations by the 46 countries of the Afro-Asian group.

The executive branch of the government is headed by the President, who is assisted by a personal staff selected presumably for their trustworthiness and their special qualifications in certain critical fields, such as trade unions, PDG financial affairs, and the national women's organizations. This small group of intimate associates is commonly called the President's Cabinet, and the entire office, including the administrative staff, constitutes the presidency.

Almost continuous structural reorganization of the various ministries took place between 1958 and 1961. During this period, Cabinet posts were increased from 11 ministers and 7 Secretaries of State to 17 ministers, 1 Secretary of State for Social Affairs and 1 Minister-Governor of the Bank of the Republic of Guinea. New ministries were formed as certain areas of activity took on added importance. Others were consolidated, such as the Ministry of Technical Education which was absorbed by the Ministry of National Education. New directorates, departments and bureaus were created within ministries, and some agencies were shifted from one ministry to another. There was much redesignating of functions, especially in the economic

sphere. For a time, direction of the whole economy was placed in a Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Plan; later, in a Ministry of National Economy. By 1961 this responsibility was divided among several ministries (see fig. 12). Similar changes took place in some political ministries.

Civil Service

A shortage of trained officials is the main problem of the civil service. After independence most French officials left the country. Of some 4,000 of them, only a few remained by November. The country was virtually without judges, and most of the teachers and doctors had gone.

It was expected that the wholesale French departure would bring public services to a standstill, but to the surprise of most observers and to the pride of the Guineans this was not the case. A handful of Guineans had been trained for government service by the French, and during the year of self-government under the Loi Cadre, others gained experience. The group was small, but it provided a nucleus around which others could be trained while the most essential tasks of government were maintained. Help was also forthcoming from abroad in the form of administrators and specialists in various fields who were temporarily employed by Guinea or sent under the auspices of their home countries—among them, some of the other African states and especially Senegal. Some Frenchmen were invited back, and increasing numbers of technicians came in from the Communist bloc countries.

The School of National Administration was established in 1957 to train administrative officers and magistrates. It was enlarged and developed after independence. A decree of February 1960 placed it under the authority of the Ministry of Civil Service assisted by an administrative council composed of representatives of other ministries. The school was charged with "training of the cadres of government officials and with improving the qualifications of those on the job" (see ch. 9, Education).

The civil service is under the authority of the Ministry of Civil Service. The Ministry, which is in charge of the hiring, discharging, promotion, discipline and training of civil servants, is assisted by a consultative committee composed of representatives of the civil service. All persons in the permanent employ of the government including the highest officials—the military and gendarmerie excepted—are considered servants. Although a decree of early 1959 required that all members of the service be Guinean citizens, a number of foreigners have continued in various governmental capacities.

Table 1. *The Cabinet of Guinea—October 4, 1958, and June 13, 1961*

[Names in italic appear in both cabinets]

1958		1961	
President of the Republic-----	<i>Touré, Sékou.</i> ^{1,2}	President of the Republic-----	<i>Touré, Sékou.</i> ^{1,2}
Secretaries of State attached to the Presidency.	<i>Diakité, Moussa.</i> ¹ <i>Barry, Ibrahima dit Barry III.</i> <i>Cisse, Fodé.</i> <i>Keita, N'Famara.</i> ¹ <i>Drame, Alioune.</i> Baldet, Ousmane. <i>Keita, Fodéba.</i> <i>Diop, Alassane.</i>	Minister of State-----	<i>Diallo, Abdourahmane.</i> ¹ <i>Diakité, Moussa.</i> ¹ of the Republic of Guinea. Minister of Foreign Affairs----- Minister of National Defense and Security. Minister of Finance----- Minister of Interior and Regional and Local Administration. Minister of Information and Tourism. Minister of Justice----- Minister of Public Works and Transport. Minister of Posts and Telecommunications. Minister of Planning----- Minister of Industry and Mines. Minister of Rural Economy----- Minister of National Education. Minister of Public Health and Population. Minister of Labor and Social Legislation.
Minister of Finance-----			
Secretary of State in charge of Customs and Treasury.			
Minister of Interior and Security.			
Secretary of State for the Interior in charge of Information.			
Minister of Justice-----	<i>Camara, Damantang.</i> ¹		
Minister of Public Works, Transport and Town Planning.	<i>Touré, Ismael.</i> ¹		
Secretary of State for Public Works in charge of Telecommunications.	<i>Diallo, Abdoulaye.</i> ²		
Minister of Economic Affairs and the Plan.	<i>Béavogui, Louis-Lansana.</i> ¹		<i>Barry, Ibrahima dit Barry III.</i> <i>Drame, Alioune.</i>
Minister of Production-----			
Minister of Rural Economy, Peasants and Cooperatives.	<i>Mignard, M. J. E. (French).</i> <i>Diallo, Abdourahmane.</i> ¹		<i>Barry, Sory Ibrahima.</i> <i>Camara, Damantang.</i> ¹ <i>Accar, Roger Najib.</i>
Minister of National Education.	<i>Barry, Diawadou.</i>		<i>Cisse, Fodé.</i>

Minister of Technical Education. ⁴ Collet, Michel.
 Minister of Public Health. ³ Accar, Roger Najib.
 Minister of Labor and Social Legislation. ¹ Camara, Bengaly.

Minister-Secretary of State for Social Affairs attached to the Ministry of Labor and Social Legislation. ¹ Keita, N'Famara.
 Minister of Commerce. ¹ Touré Fodé Mamadou.
 Minister of Civil Service. ¹ Tounkara, Jean Faragué.
 Minister of Youth, Arts and Culture.

¹ Member of the National Political Bureau of the PDG at time of appointment.


² Also in charge of Foreign Affairs and National Defense.

³ Minister-Resident in Accra (Ghana) in 1961.

⁴ Deputy Permanent Resident to the United Nations in 1961.

Source: Adapted from Sékou Touré, *L'Experience Guinéenne et L'Unité Africaine*, p. 209, *Agence Guinéenne de Press*, January 30, 1961, p. 23; and *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens*, No. 795, February 4, 1961, p. 352.

A presidential decree of October 8, 1959, set forth in general terms the rights and responsibilities of government functionaries and laid down rules on hiring, promotion and benefits. Civil servants may join labor unions and strike (see ch. 13, Labor Relations and Organization). They may also sue the government for infringement of their rights. Elaborate provisions are aimed at preventing conflicts of interest. Equal treatment for men and women is guaranteed. The responsibility of the functionary for his work is strongly emphasized. He is granted no immunity to the operation of civil and criminal law. Should he suffer property loss or personal injury in discharging his official duties, provision is made for the government to indemnify him. Special attention is given to the importance of protecting government secrets. Special disciplinary boards are established in each ministry



 The Cabinet (called the Council of Ministers when in session with the President) is composed of the Ministers at the head of each of the Ministries mentioned, the President and 13 Ministers (with the exception of the Minister-Governor of the Bank of the Republic of Guinea) each for a personal staff which is also referred to as a cabinet.

(1) Headed by a Minister-Governor with Cabinet rank.

(2) Air Guinea is under this Directorate.

(3) Mx. Léon Gomis, who held this office in 1961, served as a member of the Cabinet although this office is attached to the Ministry of Labor and Social Legislation.

Note: This is not a definitive chart of the Guinean organization from the press and official government publications dated from 1961 to the present.

Figure 12. Organization of the Executive Branch of the Guinean Government as of Mid-1961.

with power to impose penalties ranging from warning to dismissal with forfeiture of pension rights.

To be eligible for appointment to the civil service, an individual must be a Guinean citizen, in possession of his civil rights, not subject to military service, without physical disability, and between the ages of 18 and 30 (35 for those who have been prevented from applying earlier because of military service). Entry is by competitive examinations. The service is divided into five distinct classes, each with its own system of grades and qualifications. Promotion committees for each ministry are established at the Ministry of Civil Service, each consisting of representatives of the appropriate ministry, the Ministry of Civil Service and the trade unions.

Civil service salaries were initially the same as they had been under the French and so were disproportionately high in comparison





Figure 12—Continued.

with the general income level. There was some reduction in civil service pay, and, in 1960, a decree forbade public officials to receive any income—especially pay for services—in addition to their salaries. The ruling applied specifically to the judiciary. A percentage of gross salaries is retained by the government in connection with a retirement plan (see ch. 14, Health and Public Welfare).

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The basic system of local government established under Loi Cadre in 1957 has been retained with some changes (see fig. 13). All the urban communes, except Conakry, were abolished by a decree of August 11, 1959, and placed under the authority of an appropriate circumscription. In September 1959 two special territorial administrative units were created on the same level as the circumscription. Called permanent delegations of the government (*délégations permanentes du gouvernement*), these were established for each of the two major industrial centers, Fria and Kérouané. They were directly



(1) Called Permanent Delegation of the Government in Fria and Kérouané.

Figure 13. Regional and Local Administrative System of Guinea, 1961.

responsible to the Ministry of Interior and Security (as it was then called).

A decree of September 29, 1959, redesignated the circumscriptions as regions. Each region was subdivided into administrative posts (*postes administratifs*) and village communes. Elective officials headed the communes; those in charge of the regions, permanent delegations and administrative posts were appointed. The single urban commune of Conakry was made a region on January 28, 1960. In mid-1961 the country was divided into 26 regions and 2 permanent delegations of the government (see ch. 3, Geography and Population). The village communes, of which in late 1959 there were over 4,000 in 105 administrative posts, were the lowest administrative units.

The commandant or chief of a region (*commandant de région*) is appointed by the President on the advice of the Ministers of Civil Service and of Interior and Regional and Local Administration. The commandant reports directly to the latter. He controls the activities of all government agencies of his region and corresponds directly with ministers in matters which concern them. He is in charge of the local police (see ch. 18, Public Order and Safety).

A general council (*conseil général*) of from 10 to 40 members, elected for a term of five years, advises the commandant and formally controls finances. Draft budgets, presented to the council by the commandant, become law only with the council's approval. The commandant, as a rule, is a member of the local political bureau of the PDG and dominates the council.

Initially many of the commandants served in their home regions where they had a local following. In keeping with the policy of unification and suppression of regionalism, however, wholesale transfers were made in December 1959 and again in August 1960.

Each administrative post is in charge of a chief of post (*chef de poste*) who, like the commandant, is appointed. He is responsible to the Minister of Interior and Regional and Local Administration, but reports through the commandant, his immediate supervisor. There are no elective councils at the administrative post level.

Village communes are under the jurisdiction of administrative posts. Village councils are popularly elected for five years. The member of the council receiving the highest vote becomes the council's president. He has a dual role in representing the government to the village and the village to the government.

President Touré has characterized the function of the village councils by saying that they:

. . . have powers to regulate the social and economic life of the village. The men and women of the village express themselves through the voice of their council . . . and it is through the council acting as intermediary that they develop the social, economic and cultural life of the village.

The councils have from 5 to 15 members depending on the size of the village, which may have 500 inhabitants or as many as 10,000. Village councils may be dissolved by the regional commandant.

Having dissolved a council, he decides when new elections shall be held and supervises them. Villages are created, divided or combined by decree of the Ministry of Interior and Regional and Local Administration.

JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Few changes have been made in the laws and the court system since independence. French civil, penal and commercial legal codes have remained on the books, and the courts have continued to be organized on French lines, but changes have taken place in law enforcement and judicial procedure which have been Africanized. This has meant accommodation to certain indigenous concepts and the abandonment of the principle of the abstract superiority of law. Law and legal action are seen as means of serving the interests of the state. President Touré in a radio broadcast in 1959 set forth the official attitudes.

Let us not confine ourselves any longer within formal considerations of law; our laws are only working tools. As soon as they cease to be so we alter them with the help of new legislation. It is with this revolutionary concept that you should and can, find answers to all problems that directly touch the working masses.

A series of decrees appointing assessors for first and second degree customary courts—after independence designated as “courts of Guinean law”—in the various administrative regions have been published in the *Journal Officiel*. Appointments have been for one year, and, in most cases, the particular customary law in which the assessor was competent has been specified. Normally 12 assessors were appointed for each court in addition to a president. Following French practice, regional commandants or their deputies usually presided in the customary courts.

As of late 1961, there were four Courts of the First Instance—another legacy of pre-independence days. These were located at Conakry in lower Guinea, at Labé in Middle Guinea, at Kankan in Upper Guinea and at N'Zérékoré in the Forest Region. Justices of the peace had been retained, one in each administrative region except in the four which have Courts of the First Instance. The jurisdiction of certain justice of the peace courts had been extended to include civil matters, and it is possible that some of these may eventually be transformed into Courts of First Instance. This happened in November 1961 when the justice of peace courts with extended jurisdiction at Labé and Kankan were made Courts of the First Instance. Labor

Courts, authorized by legislation passed in 1960, are created as needed to adjudicate labor disputes and to pass judgment on violations of the labor code (see ch. 11, Labor Force).

A Court of Assizes (Cour d'Assises) in Conakry has original criminal jurisdiction in major offenses. Its president, who may be a judge of the Court of Appeal or of one of the Courts of the First Instance, is designated by the president of the Court of Appeal. The other members of the court are two judges and four lay assessors. The assessors, chosen from a list of citizens prepared by the government, serve for one year.


The lower judiciary thus apparently consisted, in late 1961, of justices of the peace in 24 administrative regions (including Fria and Kérouané, but excluding Conakry, Labé, Kankan and N'Zérékoré which had Courts of the First Instance), 4 Courts of the First Instance in Conakry, Labé, Kankan and N'Zérékoré, first and second degree courts of Guinean law in all administrative regions, the Court of Assizes in Conakry (see fig. 14).

With independence Guinea was cut off from the higher courts in Dakar and Paris, and it proceeded to create its own higher courts in Conakry: the Court of Appeal (Cour d'Appel), with competence similar to that of the colonial Court of Appeal in Dakar was established on October 15, 1958; the Superior Court of Cassation (Tribunal Supérieur de Cassation), on February 21, 1959; and a special High Court of Justice (Haute Cour de Justice), with jurisdiction in crimes against the State, on April 20, 1959.

The Court of Appeal in Conakry has appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the lower judiciary in civil and criminal cases. It is composed of a president and a number of judges, all appointed by presidential decree. It sits in two chambers—one for appeals in civil cases, the other for appeals in criminal cases. Modeled on the French Court of Appeal in Dakar, it follows French judicial practice. Appeals may be made from its decisions to the Superior Court of Cassation.

The Superior Court of Cassation consists of five members: the president of the Court of Appeal, who serves as president, and four counselors of the Court of Appeals. Its major function is to clarify the law and to ensure unity in its interpretation. Its jurisdiction includes appeals from all of the regular courts—the Court of Appeal, Courts of the First Instance in Conakry and Kankan, justices of the peace, labor courts and the Court of Assizes. The only grounds for appeal are improper jurisdiction or violation of the law.

The Superior Court of Cassation may dismiss an appeal as invalid, or it may set aside a decision of the lower court. If it sets aside a decision on grounds of improper jurisdiction, it directs that the case be retried in a proper jurisdiction. When the Court rules that there



Note: This is not a definitive chart, it is based on the latest available information which is fragmentary. Information on the lower courts is inadequate and confusing. In the first and second degree courts of Guinean law, the appeal channels and the jurisdiction are assumed to be the same as for the customary courts of the first and second degree before independence.

(1) These courts have unlimited civil and no criminal jurisdiction.

(2) These courts have limited civil and minor criminal jurisdiction.

Figure 14. The Court System of Guinea, 1961.

has been a violation of the law in a decision, the procedure is different. If the judgment set aside was made by a Court of the First Instance or a justice of the peace, the case is returned to the same court or justice of the peace for retrial with instructions to conform to the point of the law as interpreted by the Superior Court of Cassation. If the judgment was given by the Court of Appeal, the Superior Court of Cassation itself deliberates and issues a final decision. If the judgment was given by the Court of Assizes in a criminal case, it is sent back for retrial by the Court of Assizes which, however, must sit with different members than those who tried the case originally. Points

of law may be submitted for judgment to the Superior Court of Cassation by the Public Prosecutor; and the Court's interpretations are binding. Appeal to the Superior Court of Cassation is discouraged by the requirement that the party appealing deposit a substantial fee in the lower court which is forfeited if the appeal is rejected.

The High Court of Justice, which is a special tribunal outside the regular judicial system, has jurisdiction in all cases involving a threat to the internal or external security of the state. The President of the National Assembly is president of the court. The other six members are the Ministers of Justice, Interior and Regional and Local Administration, and National Defense and Security (all three *ex officio*) and three members of the National Assembly designated by the President of the Republic. The Director of National Security Police serves as secretary-clerk. No appeal is possible from the decisions of the High Court of Justice. The persons accused of plotting against the Republic in early 1960 were presumably tried by the High Court (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics; ch. 18, Public Order and Safety).

All judges, clerks and magistrates are civil servants. Judges are appointed by presidential decree. No information is available about procedures by which they may be removed. Other judicial officials are appointed by decree of the Ministry of Civil Service on the advice of the Ministry of Justice, which supervises the administration of the judiciary. The Public Prosecutor of the Republic, who is appointed by the President, is attached to the Ministry of Justice. His duties are similar to those of his counterpart in the French system (see ch. 18, Public Order and Safety). Defense attorneys, who are also state functionaries, practice before the Court of Assizes and the Courts of the First Instance in Conakry and Kankan. Notaries are also government employees. As salaried officials, no member of the judicial civil service may accept fees.

CHAPTER 17

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

In the last half of 1961 President Touré and his colleagues had to struggle with both economic and political difficulties, some of which their own policies had created or intensified. The attempt to nationalize trade had been especially disastrous, and the country still felt the effects a year after the experiment ended. Long-term Communist-bloc aid and loan agreements provided technical assistance, a number of construction projects and some barter exchanges; but when the loans came due, repayment appeared likely to obligate export production for a long time.

In the meantime, moreover, food shortages and high prices gradually dissipated some of the popular enthusiasm for the government and its projects which had been created in the first few years after the liberation from France. While the President still could count on strong support from most of the people, the economic difficulties took on a political complexion and led, in the latter part of 1961, to open protests and, for the first time since 1958, to manifestations and disorders.

Another effect of the acceptance of economic and technical help from the Communist countries, and also of the use by the President and his close colleagues of both verbal formulae and political tactics which at many points paralleled those of the Communists, was to permit Communist propaganda, both in its Moscow and Peiping versions, to gain some ascendancy among the people. A dispute in November between the authorities in Conakry and members of the National Union of Guinean Teachers, supported by students in the capital and a number of other towns, took a strongly Leftist turn and suggested that officials sympathetic to Communist extremism and opposed to neutralism in foreign policy were active in some of the mass political organizations.

Some of the executive officers of the teachers union were imprisoned on the accusation of subversion, and student leaders who opposed the Leftist extremists staged counter-demonstrations. Even more important than the evidence of division among students and teachers was a statement made in mid-December to a popular rally in Conakry by President Touré that the student riots had, in the first place, been

fomented by Communists who sought to overthrow him and his government in order to nullify his neutralist policies. He said that an inquiry into the origins of the dispute with the teachers had led to the discovery of a subversive network with connections in Paris, in Dakar and in an Eastern-bloc embassy in Conakry, which he did not name.

There were indications that in the last months of 1961, particularly after the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow, an incipient division among the Guinean leaders between a moderate faction, headed by the President, and an extremist faction, said to include his half brother Ismael Touré, had further developed into so-called "pro-Russian" and "pro-Chinese" groups.

Nevertheless, despite such difficulties, the ruling Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti Démocratique de Guinée—PDG) seemed firm in its broad popular following, and there was no proof that the public dissatisfaction, apparently exploited by the extremists, had significantly weakened the position of the President and his followers. The potential crisis, however, did exist in the division between the leaders, even though the President nominally stood above faction and enjoyed popularity which no other leader or group of leaders could yet effectively contest. The danger was that continued economic hardship and public tension could bring a policy crisis among the national leaders, and force the President to give opponents of his moderation key positions of power. In such a situation, the President's undogmatic Marxism would have to contend with a harshly doctrinaire position which tends to find inspiration in a species of neo-Stalinism and in the example of Communist China.

The dynamics of political life center on the PDG. The sole political party, the PDG is a leadership apparatus which reaches from the executive in the capital down through a pyramidal structure of committees in the regions, towns and villages. The national leaders of the PDG, headed by Sékou Touré as secretary general of the party and President of the Republic, also occupy the highest positions in the government. On lower levels the party militants, whether or not in elective or appointive office, act as the guardians and promoters of official policy.

The PDG was founded in 1947 by a few young labor and political leaders as a branch of the African Democratic Rally (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain—RDA), the inter-territorial, leftist mass political movement which had been organized at Bamako late in the previous year. The RDA and its Guinean offshoot, the PDG-RDA, emerged at a time when Metropolitan France, freed of German military occupation and the authoritarian conservatism of the Vichy regime, was acting to reconstruct its relationships with its Overseas Territories on a more equitable basis. In Guinea, the more liberal atmosphere was to stimulate, but not satisfy, the rising new leaders

who were largely trade unionist in background, Marxist in political outlook and increasingly nationalist in aspirations.

At the outset, the PDG had to compete with groups organized on ethnic and regional lines around certain members of the African elite who had long been little more than creatures of the colonial administration. These organizations, clinging to social ideals, which in two generations of colonial rule had lost most of their relevance, were no match for a party which promised to redress long-standing grievances through mass action. The simple program of the PDG had a powerful emotional impact, and the party attracted an ever-increasing following. Its aims were to achieve the end of colonial exploitation, improved living conditions, equality with Europeans and national self-government within a broader West African entity. The nationalism of the RDA was to be translated in Guinea into an assault on the ethnic barriers which the party saw as dividing the people and rendering them incapable of winning their rights.

The party program brought into focus popular discontent, and it turned half-realized yearnings into specific demands. In party activities, people found a means of self-assertion and a vehicle of social prestige. The party slogans and declarations gave a sense of personal and national pride to the many whose forebears had been held as slaves or serfs by their stronger neighbors and who themselves had been classified as subjects in their own land by a white administration. The people responded enthusiastically to the vigor and charm of the young leadership personified in Sékou Touré, and they showed themselves accessible to the efficient organizational techniques of his lieutenants.

"Independence" became a catchword and has remained one of the most powerful symbols of the new movement. Most importantly it meant equality with the French and an end to the indignities of subject status. It also meant liberation from the restraints of the ossified traditional order, and, for youth and women, escape from parental and male authority. It finally came to mean complete political independence from France. In September 1958 the country in referendum chose national independence by voting overwhelmingly against entering the newly established French Community (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Evident factors in the strength of the PDG are the effectiveness of its leaders; the tightly knit party organization and its efficient techniques of control and propaganda; the absence of any organized political opposition; and, not least, the support, often deeply emotional, commanded by the party among the mass of the people. The party regards itself as the creative instrument of the popular will in the task of making Guinea into a strong, modern nation and bringing about the ultimate emancipation and unification of all Africa.

Party, government, labor unions, the national youth movement and the women's organization constitute the main compartments of the structure within which the country is ruled, the people are mobilized behind official policies and programs, and young leaders and functionaries are recruited and developed. This integrated apparatus not only conveys party decisions and government directives downward, but it channels upward information about popular grievances and preferences. Its components provide the only ladders on which ambitious men and women can climb the organizational pyramid at the apex of which are the national leadership of the party and the government.

The ascendancy of President Touré is unquestioned, but he appears to function as the head of a collective executive rather than as a personal dictator. The leaders around him exercise an important voice in the conduct of national affairs, and most of them have regional support which gives them power in their own right. In the formulation of policy, there is considerable give-and-take between them and the President. Once a decision is made, however, all are expected to support it. Policy decisions are placed before the people and repeatedly explained to them through the channels of the government, the party and the mass organizations. Public discussion is welcomed, but no open disagreement with a settled policy or criticism of the government or its leaders is tolerated. Guinea's leaders bring to the task of government certain Marxist conceptions and a deeply felt African nationalism, but their approach to policy is practical and relatively unhampered by doctrinaire considerations. They tend to seek their major goals by whatever means seem best under given circumstances.

Domestically, the task the leaders have set for themselves is to forge a national entity out of ethnic and regional diversity, to modernize the social life and outlook of the people and to develop the national economy. In international affairs, they seek to emphasize and guard the nation's newly won sovereignty while promoting a broader African unity. They declare that they are "non-aligned" in the Cold War and that they welcome economic and technical assistance from both sides, but they also refer to their policy as "positive neutralism" and direct most of their criticism at Western "imperialism." Violently anticolonialist, they champion the cause of self-determination and liberation of the colonial peoples in Africa and elsewhere.

BACKGROUND

Organized political and labor activity in Guinea dates largely from the end of World War II. Most of the many political groups which sprang up at that time were ethnic or local in character and limited

in their concerns to the special interests of their members. A few socialists had close ties with the socialist parties in Senegal and France but no popular following outside the larger towns. The labor movement took shape under the sponsorship of the French labor confederations. Organized by trade on an AOF-wide basis, the new unions brought their Guinean members into association with other Africans throughout the area. They became the training ground for the young leaders who were to propel Guinea into independence, and they also provided the urban nucleus of popular support for the nationalist movement which was to win the whole country.

By 1946 the numerous local and ethnic groupings had united into four organizations, each representing one of the major regional or ethnic populations: l'Union de la Basse-Guinée spoke for the Soussou and other coastal peoples; l'Amicale Gilbert Vieillard grouped the Foulah of the Fouta Djallon and was dominated by the graduates of the famous William Ponty secondary school in Dakar; l'Union Mandé embraced the Malinké of Upper Guinea; and l'Union Forêsière combined the articulate political elements of the various ethnic communities of the Forest Region.

After the AOF had been granted limited suffrage, the new political organizations began to gain their first practical experience. In the elections to the French Constituent Assembly held in 1945 and 1946, Yacine Diallo, a socialist, was elected from Guinea. The few African representatives soon formed a voting bloc in the Assembly, where they also allied themselves with the French parties, particularly those of the socialist Left and the Center.

On the initiative of the African deputies and with the cooperation of other African leaders in the AOF and AEF, a conference was called at Bamako (then in the French Sudan; subsequently the Republic of Mali) in 1946 with the object of uniting the multitude of small political groups and formulating a common policy for French Black Africa. Out of the RDA most of those participating in the Bamako Conference adhered to the new party, but the socialists clung to their separate territorial organizations which were affiliated with the French Socialist Party.

The Guinean delegates to the Bamako Conference included Sékou Touré but not Yacine Diallo, although the latter had been one of the signers of the manifesto calling for the meeting. Returning to Guinea, they continued their separate political activities—Yacine Diallo as the leader of the socialists and Sékou Touré as leader of the RDA group. The socialists, whose moderate reformist policies appealed to the Guinean teachers and other small officials of the towns, were in the forefront until the death of Yacine Diallo in 1954. The administration, however, held the balance of power between them and the numerous competing regional and ethnic organizations. These, grouped

around the local African elite and favoring a policy of cooperation with the French authorities, became known as the *patron* (employer or boss) parties. The most influential *patron* party was the Foulah-dominated African Bloc of Guinea (Bloc Africain de Guinée—BAG). Politics continued to be dominated by the French, most of whom were the political followers of General de Gaulle's Rally of the French People (Rassemblement du Peuple Français—RPF), until the mid-1950's when the RDA, backed by the developing radical labor movement in the new mining industry near Conakry, began to make its presence felt.

The Guinean section of the RDA, the PDG or PDG-RDA, was established in May 1947. Composed of diverse elements, it was disunited in the first elections to the General Council of the Territory (after 1951, the Territorial Assembly) and to the French National Assembly. The details of the development of the PDG-RDA from 1945 to 1955 are not clear. Sékou Touré, who had risen to leadership in the Guinean labor movement, became secretary general of the PDG in 1952, and with a following of other young leaders, many of them left-wing unionists, he set out to gain a mass following and to create an organizational network extending beyond the towns and into the villages of the rural majority.

The PDG made most progress in the late 1940's and early 1950's among the Malinké of Upper Guinea and the Soussou of the coastal area, but it also made considerable inroads in the Foulah stronghold of the Fouta Djallon. Through the unions, it had a channel to the wage workers, but in the countryside it appealed to the poorer farmers and everywhere its program attracted women and the youth. Ethnic loyalties, deplored by party spokesmen, were nonetheless not ignored in these early organizational efforts. Party emissaries to various parts of the country were of local ethnic origin, and much attention was paid to gaining the adherence of local notables whose prestige and influence rested on hereditary claims. The party made it a point to recognize and exploit local grievances, and it courted the rivals of unpopular chiefs.

Able to grasp the initiative in cohesive communities by undermining or converting the leaders, the PDG also provided a rallying point for people who had no strong local ties. Unlike the *patron* and socialist leaders, many of whom had attended schools in Dakar or even in France, the majority of the PDG militants were locally educated. Mostly young and highly articulate, they were fired with a sense of mission which made it possible for them to accept tight discipline. Working under the close control of the national headquarters, they did not confine their efforts to building party branches but were active in the unions and the new women's and youth groups. Wherever they were, they immersed themselves in the life of the community, taking

part in all of its activities. They even organized an informal system of providing assistance for the needy.

The efforts of the PDG-RDA began to bear fruit in a growing impatience especially in the towns, with the pace of reform and with the regularity with which the system of limited suffrage and the separate French and African electoral colleges returned to office candidates acceptable to the French administration. Protests led to riots and election clashes between the followers of the PDG and the supporters of the conservative allies of the French. Extremist tendencies on both sides were intensified and the authorities, acting to maintain order, moved against the threat from the Left, employing, according to Sékou Touré, arrests, prohibition of meetings and press and mail censorship.

While the PDG was constructing its foundations and meeting official opposition with underground tactics, the other parties dominated the political scene. In 1953, for example, all of the deputies in the European college of the Territorial Assembly belonged to the RPF and the African college consisted predominantly of socialists and Overseas Independents (Indépendants d'Outre-Mer—IOM), a few right-wing members, and, according to Sékou Touré, only two members of the PDG. The IOM was a loose political coalition in the AOF led by Léopold Senghor of Senegal and associated with the French Center Party (Mouvement Republicain Populaire—MRP). In Guinea it included mostly native chiefs and functionaries representing *patron* parties. Of the three Guinean deputies in the French Assembly two were socialists (Yacine Diallo was one of them). The Grand Council of the AOF was composed mainly of French and African functionaries.

The PDG emerged from obscurity in the months preceding the elections to the French National Assembly in January 1956. Under the leadership of Sékou Touré, it campaigned vigorously against the two other parties—the BAG, led by Diawadou Barry and the socialists, whose Ibrahima Barry lacked the stature or prestige to fill the gap left by the death of the “grand old man of Guinea,” Yacine Diallo. The French stood aside from the contest, and the participants fought with every means at their disposal. Violence broke out across the country, and there was bloodshed in Conakry and elsewhere in Lower Guinea as well as many arrests. Many of the riots took the form of tribal clashes between the Soussou, Malinké and Foulah. The PDG emerged victorious, winning two of Guinea's three seats in the French Assembly. It sent to Paris Sékou Touré and his second in command, Saifoulaye Diallo. The third seat went to Diawadou Barry of BAG by a narrow margin. Like the other RDA deputies in the Assembly, Sékou Touré and Saifoulaye Diallo belonged to the parliamentary

group of the Leftist Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance (Union Démocratique et Sociale de la Résistance—UDSR).

In the first election to town councils, held in November 1956, the PDG-RDA gained an overwhelming majority of the seats in Conakry—where Sékou Touré became mayor—and also in Kankan, Kindia, Mamou and N'Zérékoré. Only in Labé was the ticket split equally with the BAG and the socialists. The most telling demonstration of PDG-RDA strength came in the elections to the Guinean Territorial Assembly in March 1957, the first held with universal suffrage and in a single electoral college. Out of 60 seats, the PDG won 56; 3 seats went to socialist deputies from the Fouta Djallon and 1 was taken by an independent. Sékou Touré became a member of the Grand Council of the AOF, while Saifoulaye Diallo was elected President of the Territorial Assembly. By the end of 1957, Sékou Touré was Vice President of the General Council of Guinea, and all members of the Government Council of the territory were PDG-RDA members (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

The party was firmly in power, and it immediately proceeded to consolidate its position by the administrative means which were now at its disposal. The first and most important step was the abolition of the system of chiefs, an action made possible by the network of party committees which had been established in the villages at the time of the party's surface inactivity. The second was the establishment of new administrative posts in the regional administration. These were manned by young PDG members who were thereby interposed between the villagers and the French administrative officers. The actual authority of the French declined rapidly, although the governor and the other French officials tried to direct and control PDG administration (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

Throughout the late 1940's, the PDG had remained in close contact with the Coordinating Committee of the parent party, the RDA. By 1950 Sékou Touré had become one of the more important leaders of the RDA, which was headed by Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast as president of the Coordinating Committee. As the one political party which was represented in all the territories of French Black Africa, the RDA was in a position to bring some influence to bear on Metropolitan France. Outwardly united, it was, however, internally torn by the rivalry of its leading personalities—rivalry which in the late 1950's was to polarize between Houphouët-Boigny and Sékou Touré.

The first major crisis in the RDA leadership took place in 1950 over the break with the French Communist Party, which had deeply penetrated the organization and with which the RDA had maintained a parliamentary alliance in the French Assembly. Houphouët-Boigny, who had initially welcomed Communist support, became concerned

about the damage which the provocative policies of the Communists had done to the organization. In the autumn of 1950 he acted, and the RDA formally severed its Communist connections.

A second crisis was precipitated at the Third Congress of the RDA in September 1957 at Bamako. Houphouët-Boigny sponsored the *loi cadre* and favored federal union between France and individual autonomous territories—which came into effect in 1958 in the French Community. Sékou Touré and some other leaders, on the other hand, denounced the *loi cadre* as decentralizing the administration of the AOF to the point of Balkanizing it and of failing to give it real autonomy. They advocated instead a West African Federation and an Equatorial African Federation and the formation of a loose union with Metropolitan France in which all three would be equal partners. There was considerable support for Sékou Touré's position in the Sudanese, Senegalese and Nigerian branches of the RDA, but no agreement was reached and the platform drafted by the Congress bypassed the issue (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Agitation over territorial status and the relationship with France and disagreement with other leaders of the RDA made the months that followed the Congress a difficult time for the PDG. Dissension developed within its own ranks and its defeated rivals, the socialists and the BAG, renewed their opposition. A new inter-territorial party, the African Regroupment Party (Parti de Regroupement Africain—PRA), was established by Léopold Senghor of Senegal in 1958 on the basis of the old parliamentary alliance of the IOM, and the socialists affiliated with its Guinean branch.

Confronted with General de Gaulle's insistence, when he assumed the French presidency in 1958, on transforming the French Union into the French Community, the PDG took the offensive. In the increasingly emotional campaign that followed, the party once again displayed the scope and effectiveness of its organization. By late summer it had drawn the BAG and the local section of the PRA into a merger with itself, had won over or neutralized most of the local figures who might have opposed it, and had mobilized the popular vote which, in the referendum on September 28, rejected membership in the French Community and set the country on its independent course.

Guinea was alone in its decision. After Houphouët-Boigny advocated that Guinea be isolated by the new French Community, the National Political Bureau of the PDG (Bureau Politique National—BPN) on October 19 announced that the PDG:

. . . solemnly proclaims that it no longer considers itself to be a section of the RDA and that it is henceforth the natural ally of all the sections of the RDA, the PRA, or any other democratic organization which unequivocally declares itself in the struggle for African unity. . . .

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GUINEA

Structure and Operation


The PDG is organized in a three-tiered structure of geographically defined units which roughly parallel the national, regional and village apparatus of the government. At the lowest level of the party are the village committees and those of the quarters into which towns are divided. The more than 4,000 of these committees are grouped into sections—of which there are 43 as compared with the 26 administrative regions of the government. On the third and highest level is the BPN.

Formally, supreme authority resides in the triennial national congresses of the party or in the national conferences which are held between congresses; actually it is wielded by the continuously functioning BPN. The party operates on a strictly hierarchical principle, each official being responsible to an immediate superior. Party officials are also accountable to the membership which elected them. The decisions of higher party organs are absolutely binding on lower ones.

During the years when the PDG was building its strength, it included units organized on ethnic lines, and there were committees for Malinké, Foulah and other groups. Local notables who served the party were also organized in special Councils of Notables. These special bodies were dissolved when the party came to power and their members were taken into appropriate units of the regular vertical organization.

Unity of action between the party and the government is assured by the fact that the same persons occupy the highest positions in both. Party conferences are regularly attended by government officials and by the representatives of the unions and other mass organizations. The chairmen of the village and town quarter committees are ex officio members of the local party executive. In any event, with the exception of outstanding experts in important technical fields, no one could aspire to a position of responsibility unless he was a party member (see fig. 15).

The aims of the basic party organizations are stated to be "to aid the masses to organize themselves for the struggle for realization of the objectives pursued by the party and to apply decisions taken at a congress or a regional conference." The party committees of the villages and town quarters are each elected for one year by the local party membership. Women and youth must be represented on the committees. Candidates for committee membership must be militant party members who have been in good standing for at least three years. The committees must sit once a week. Public meetings are



Sources: Adapted from Sékou Touré, *La Lutte du Parti Démocratique de Guinée pour L'émancipation Africaine*, IV, Conakry, 1959, p. 197.

Figure 15. Relationship of the Democratic Party of Guinea to the Government Organizational Structures, 1961.

also held weekly, at which policies and programs are explained and the whole community is encouraged to discuss national and local problems. Not infrequently committees assume an informal judicial role in bringing up local transgressions and recommending punishment to the authorities who usually follow their recommendations.

The 43 PDG sections are geographically distributed (see table 1). The highest body on the section level is the section conference which meets twice a year. The conference discusses the work of the section's executive committee and formulates policies for its guidance. Attending the conference are the executive committee and three delegates from each village and town quarter party committee within the section's territorial jurisdiction.

The section executive committee is composed of 17 members—two of whom must be women—elected for two years from among the members of the village and town quarter committees of the section. The section committee usually includes such officials as local administrative officers, school principals, police and military commanders, heads of technical services and leaders of the mass organizations. The committee is responsible to the BPN for all political activity in its area. A secretary general, assisted by a political secretary, heads the committee. It has a permanent subcommittee and several working groups assigned to study special problems and make recommendations on them.

Table 1. Sections of the Democratic Party of Guinea

Lower Guinea	Middle Guinea	Upper Guinea	Forest Region
Benty	Dalaba	Bissikrima	Beyla
Boffa	Gaoual	Dabola	Guékédou
Boké	Kouriah	Dinguiraye	Kérouané
Conakry I	Labé	Faranah	Kissidougou
Conakry II	Mali	Kankan	Macenta
Conakry III	Mamou	Kouroussa	N'Zérékoré
Coyah	Pita	Siguiri	Yomou
Dubréka	Télimélé		
Farmoréah	Tougué		
Forécariah	Yambéring		
Fria	Youkounkoun		
Kindia			
Koba			
Manéah			
Ouassou			
Sanoyah			
Victoria			
Wonkifong			

The section committees concern themselves, not only with party activities, but also with the work and effectiveness of all government agencies and mass organizations in their areas. In 1961, for example, the Macenta section committee made periodic inspections of various organizations and administrative posts. At Faranah, committee members held public meetings in the town quarters and adjacent villages to discuss "the meaning of the revolutionary action of the party." The topics treated on these occasions include economic progress, planning, tax collection, schools and the suppression of theft.

Sections are encouraged to maintain close liaison with one another, and regional conferences are held twice a year. These are attended by all members of the section executive committees within the region, all national conference delegates who reside in the region, and three

representatives from each village and town quarter committee within the region. The commandant and other administrative officers of the region, the military camp commanders and the heads of the local co-operatives, unions and other mass organizations are also invited and are expected to attend.

Regional conferences are usually held after every national conference; their primary purpose is to discuss and explain policies. The regional conference held in Gaoual after the 1960 National Conference in Kissidougou, for example, discussed the economic and administrative decisions of the higher body and devoted much time to foreign affairs; it saluted the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, condemned "imperialist manoeuvres" in the Congo and Algeria and reaffirmed its dedication to the national direction of the PDG.

The National Congress meets every three years, but it may be called into special session by the BPN. Composed of the BPN and up to 10 delegates from each party section, the Congress formulates party policy for the next three years and the objectives to be attained in this period.

The National Conference is the supreme organ of the party when the congress is not in session. It meets at least once a year and may be called into special session by the BPN. It is composed of all the members of the BPN and four delegates from each of the party sections. Also expected to attend are the higher executive officials of the national government, deputies to the National Assembly, administrative heads of regions, heads of regional councils and town mayors, ambassadors of the Republic, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the national leaders of the labor, women's and youth organizations, and any other person whose presence may be required by the BPN.

The National Conference discusses outstanding problems of domestic and foreign policy and charts new lines of development. Each is followed by a period of vigorous activity during which the party apparatus disseminates its decisions and checks on the fulfillment of past policies. Thus, after a National Conference in 1958, the BPN conducted a study of the financial and political problems of all the party sections in the country. BPN members conducting the inspection made formal reports and, as a result of their findings, assistance was extended to local party groups in Boké, Boffa, Youkounkoun and Macenta. The National Conference at Kissidougou in November 1960 selected Sékou Touré as candidate for the President of the Republic in the January 1961 elections, and it established vigilance committees for each sector of government activity in order to improve efficiency and foster criticism.

The BPN is the ruling organ of the party. Its 17 members are elected for three years by the National Congress from among the

regular members of the National Conference. The secretary general, who is the head of the party, and his second-in-command, the political secretary, are both selected by the BPN from among its members. The BPN has a standing permanent secretariat and various working commissions to study various problems and to recommend solutions. After the National Conference in 1958, commissions were created in the fields of the judiciary, commerce, communications, finance, education, civil service, the public lands, labor laws, customs, water and forestry. Commission recommendations are submitted to the BPN for approval.

Party funds are derived from annual membership dues, subscriptions, donations, legacies and income from fairs. The finances of all party organs are administered by treasurers and are subject to auditing by accounting commissions.

The BPN conducts annual inspections in which teams headed by BPN members visit a number of party sections. In July 1961 twelve such teams sought to "measure the degree of political maturity" of the sections and to assess their success in carrying out the decisions of the Kissidougou Conference. The teams were charged with checking the following: the political authority of the party and the respect given the administrative agencies in each area; the capacity for political mobilization as evidenced in congresses, parades, sports, arts, fetes and the human investment program; the fulfillment of fiscal and other civil duties by party members; and the general administrative efficiency of the sections. On such an inspection the chairman of the visiting BPN group holds a public conference, after which he confers privately with the section executive committee and inspects the headquarters. Afterward he conducts criticism meetings with the section committee, the governmental administrative services, the unions and other organizations.

President Touré himself frequently goes on inspection trips. On such occasions he may have private discussions with local leaders and give them personal directives, but he and other national leaders apparently always make a genuine effort to win agreement as well as obedience. Commands are resorted to only when persuasion fails.

Public meetings, conferences and discussions, party-organized fairs, fetes, dances, sports and cultural events and parades are important techniques for ensuring mass participation. All are important media for generating interest and support for PDG policies in a people with a love for pageantry, a propensity to act in communal ways, an appreciation for oratory and a tradition of public discussion and consensus. Symbolism and the repetition of slogans are employed to attract and hold popular imagination.

Membership

The requirements for admission into the PDG are simple. The candidate pays his annual dues, which are nominal, and is issued a membership card signed by the secretary general and the treasurer of the local organization receiving him. Certain restrictions apply to the admission of persons who were members of other political parties formerly active in the area. Collective admission is barred. Membership may be lost by voluntary withdrawal or by expulsion. Members have the right to vote in elections for ruling party bodies and to be elected. Officers of village and town quarter committees are elected by direct vote of the local membership. Those of higher bodies are elected by the congresses or conferences to which they are responsible. Party members must obey the decisions of the ruling organs of the party and are pledged to do their best to carry them out.

Punishments which local organizations may impose on individual members for breaches of party discipline include public or private reprimand, temporary suspension, removal from party office and expulsion. The application of the last two penalties must be approved by a general meeting of the members of the local body. Executive committees may be removed by the next higher organ and, pending a new election, be replaced. There is also provision, when circumstances are thought to warrant, for suspending or expelling an entire local branch. Penalties may be appealed to the next higher authority, and, while an appeal is pending, the penalty is stayed. No member expelled for embezzlement, theft, treason, deviationism, subversive actions, malingering, racism or chauvinism may be reinstated or permitted to participate in party work at any level for five years.

The party militants constitute the elite group which interests itself in all aspects of government and community life. In implementing party decisions, party militants are expected to supervise the general fulfillment of tasks allotted to the various sectors of the community and to bring to the party's attention transgressions or deviations. President Touré, speaking of the role of the party militant—the *responsable*—said:

The political *responsable*, who, for example, hears of a teacher reading lessons to the children to the effect that "our ancestors were Gauls or wild people," can denounce the attitude of the instructor to the regional conference. Everybody must follow the party line. A political *responsable* has the right, when he knows that a judicial action has been determined by irrational considerations, to denounce the guilty official. The party has both the right and the duty to question all jurisdictions.

The PDG embraces a sizable portion of the adult population—on the basis of the few regional figures available, perhaps between 30 and 40 percent. In this sense, it is a mass organization. In the pyramid

structure of its executive apparatus and in channeling of authority downward and of responsibility upward, it is also a highly specialized instrument for directing every aspect of national and local life.

Leadership

The core of the national leadership consists of the 17 members of the National Political Bureau of the PDG and a few others. Fodéba Kéita, Minister of National Defense and Security in 1961, was the most prominent in the latter group. Nine of the BPN members hold ministerial posts in the Cabinet.

This handful is led by Sékou Touré, head of the party and of the government. With his dynamic personality, political acumen and ability to win and hold the allegiance of both the public and those around him, he more than any other individual charted the course which led to independence and to the revolutionary changes which are still in process. Coming to prominence in the local labor movement at the end of World War II, he quickly entered the larger political arena of French West Africa without, however, permitting himself to become remote from the Guinean base of his support.

He used to advantage Communist organizational techniques and much of the content of Communist propaganda, but he was careful to identify himself as an African leader serving only African interests. He did not hesitate to disavow the Communists on this ground and to reject the Marxist class-struggle doctrine as inapplicable to Africa. Leader of the French General Confederation of Workers and the PDG-RDA in Guinea, he rose high in the regional councils of both. In 1957 he broke with CGT and founded an independent African labor federation, the General Union of Workers of Black Africa (Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire—UGTAN)—of which he was still president in 1961—and in the same year became Vice-President of the Guinean Council of Government. With independence he was the obvious choice for President of the Republic (see ch. 30, Biographies of Important Personalities).

Little information is available about the personal background of President Touré's lieutenants. All the principal ethnic groups are represented, with the Malinké and Foulah predominating. President Touré himself is a Malinké while Saifoulaye Diallo, the man generally regarded as being second in importance to him, is a Foulah. Most members of the ruling group are young. Few have had any formal higher education, but apparently all attended local primary and secondary schools under the French. A few are graduates of the William Ponty School at Dakar. Most of them, like President Touré, were employed in the colonial administration and entered politics through the labor movement. All were members of the PDG-RDA, and many of them belonged to it from the time of its establish-

ment and ran in elections for the Territorial Assembly and other bodies of the French Union.

Within the BPN there is a division of labor, each member is in charge of a particular section of activity under the overall supervision of Sékou Touré as secretary general and Saifoulaye Diallo as the political secretary. All but two members of the group hold high government office. The two who do not, Mrs. Maforé Bangoura and Mamadi Kaba, are respectively president of the PDG women's organization and of the council of the National Confederation of Guinean Workers.

A rigorous party discipline binds the members of the BPN to accept and loyally work for the decisions that have been formally made. Long association and an apparent basic unity of outlook have helped them to do so. Moreover, they reportedly enjoy wide freedom of expression in their deliberations with differences of opinion usually being resolved by discussion and compromise. There appears to be a loose factional division in the BPN. Those grouped around Saifoulaye Diallo, Fodéba Kéita and Ismael Touré (President Touré's younger half-brother) are said to lean ideologically toward Communism, are uncompromisingly anti-Western and favor a strong pan-African policy. Others have more moderate political views; they seek Guinean advantage in dealing with both East and West without becoming politically aligned with either, and their pan-Africanism is tempered by concern with national development. The ideas and composition of the two groups are said to be fluid, but in late 1961 their differences seemed to be sharpening.

President Touré appears to have succeeded in keeping himself above such factional tendencies, but in late 1961 there were indications that the competition between the two points of view might be sharpening and that pressure on him was mounting. Thus in November, with the Guinean Government's permission, two United States naval ships paying a courtesy call at Conakry were asked to leave on grounds that their sailors had misbehaved. The charges were denied by the American authorities, and according to observers, the incident was manufactured by the proponents of the extreme Left to disrupt the manifestation of good will between the two countries.

Personal ties of friendship, formed during years of association in the labor movement and the party, have made for solidarity among the top leaders. Only two, the President and Ismael Touré, are kinsmen, and the latter reportedly has influence in his own right based on his personal prestige in the Faranah region. Of the top leaders, only Fodéba Kéita—Minister of National Defense and Security in 1961 but not a member of the BPN—is alleged to have once belonged to the French Communist Party.

The second echelon of political leaders comprises perhaps 100 persons. It includes members of the Cabinet and holders of high positions in the national government, the more important ambassadors, the chief administrative officers and party heads in the regions and the leaders of the labor, youth and women's organizations. In the regions, a special effort is made to avoid putting control of the party and government apparatus in the hands of one man.

The leaders of the two opposition parties, which were absorbed by the PDG in 1958, hold positions of responsibility in the Cabinet, but are not members of the core leadership group. In 1961 Ibrahima Barry (Barry III), a socialist and the former head of the PRA in Guinea, was Minister of Finance. One important secondary leader, Alassane Diop, Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, is a Senegalese Wolof by birth.

The men and women of the second echelon of leaders, like those above them, are mostly young. The majority of them are from agricultural families; a few are descended from *evolué* families or the traditional aristocracy. Many, especially those in administrative posts, had technical, clerical or managerial training and experience under the French.

Mass Organizations

The PDG regards mass organizations not merely as auxiliaries but as components of the party, completely subject to its political direction and committed to the service of its goals. The principal mass organizations are the labor unions and the women's and youth groups. The labor movement, which predates the establishment of the PDG-RDA, provided the initial base of organized support for the party and the hard core of its leadership. The women's and youth groups were formed by the party as vehicles for mobilizing these previously unorganized segments of the population. There are some other strategically less important organizations, such as that of the army veterans, which are also party-dominated.

Women's committees are an integral part of the PDG, and through them and their membership in the executive committees, women participate on all levels in the direction of party affairs. The African Democratic Youth Rally (Jeunesse du Rassemblement Démocratique Africain—JRDA), is a separate entity, but it proceeds "in perfect harmony with the political orientation of the party." It is governed by the same general regulations which apply to the PDG, on which it depends for funds, and "should never be considered anything else than a specialized section of the party." The basically political character of labor unions and the unity of labor and the party are emphatically stressed. At the opening of the labor headquarters in Conakry in 1959, President Touré said:

We have affirmed and continue to affirm that in Guinea there will be no barriers between our working people and our political movement. Our realms of labor and of politics are two inseparable movements, and weakness in one will inevitably retard the other. The joint action of the two constitutes the nation's only possibility, its only concrete means, for realizing fully its legitimate aspirations.

Domestically the mass organizations are charged with mobilizing the support of labor, women and youth for official policies and programs. Through informal contacts and cooperative relations with similar organizations in other African countries, they are also unofficial instruments of Guinean foreign policy.

The party early attracted women to its ranks through the promise it held out to them of liberation from their traditional subordination to men. They took an aggressive part in the political battles which preceded the party's advent to power, and Camara M'Balia, a woman killed in the riots of February 1955, has become the national heroine. With legal equality and educational opportunity, women are entering into positions of public responsibility in increasing numbers.

Delegations of Guinean women attend numerous international women's conferences and receive visiting delegations from national and international women's organizations. Their closest ties are with African and Asian groups, and they maintain contact with the Communist-dominated World Federation of Democratic Women.

The JRDA was established by the PDG on March 26, 1959. It is concerned with all questions "of interest to youth." It conducts political and social education courses and is active in sports, theater, folklore, dancing and singing. Its structure parallels that of the party and its members—7 to 25 years of age—are subject to the same rules of discipline. It receives its funds from the party.

The JRDA plays a key role in organizing volunteers for the human investment program. In giving officially approved focus to the recreational activities of young people and in involving them in political work, it serves as a training ground for future party leaders.

The JRDA maintains contact with youth organizations abroad, particularly those in other African countries. In 1961 it participated in various meetings and propaganda campaigns in which it proclaimed its solidarity with the youth of Algeria, Angola, Tunisia, Portuguese Guinea and of all the African countries struggling for independence. It exchanges visits with the Communist-dominated World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the JRDA delegation to the World Youth Forum held in Moscow in August 1961 stopped in Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria on its way home.

Unions were fostered in French West Africa after World War II by the French labor federations. The three French contenders for the allegiance of African labor were the Communist-dominated General

Confederation of Workers (Confédération Générale du Travail—CGT), the Socialist-linked General Confederation of Labor-Workers Force (Confédération Générale du Travail-Force Ouvrière—CGT-FO), and the French Confederation of Christian Workers (Confédération Française des Travailleurs Crétiens—CFTC), affiliated with the MRP. The CGT was ultimately most successful, and by 1955 its Guinean branch under the leadership of Sékou Touré included most of the organized workers in the territory.

From the outset the African labor movement was more political than economic in character, and, as it grew, its leaders began to chafe under the control of the metropolitan federations. The first major step toward autonomy was the formation in 1956 of the General Confederation of African Workers (Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Africains—CGTA), of which Sékou Touré was one of the founders. UGTAN was established by Sékou Touré in 1957 and the Guinean union joined. UGTAN broke with the CGT, stating that it “no longer considered itself as a movement interested exclusively in the interests of one class, but as one sector of the front of the African struggle for emancipation. . . .” Sékou Touré became UGTAN’s first president, a position he still held in 1961 (see ch. 30, Biographies of Important Personalities).

Since independence, the Guinean unions have continued to serve as the most important auxiliary of the PDG. Salaried and wage workers in all fields—public administration, commerce, industry, agriculture, arts and others—are organized in a hierarchy of labor sections, local unions, regional unions, federations and confederations. All are combined in the CNTG, the president of which is the BPN member, Mamadi Kaba. The CNTG, in turn is affiliated with UGTAN, which, as of 1961, remained aloof from both the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). UGTAN has its headquarters at Conakry where it conducts special seminars for foreign workers under the name of the African Workers University (see ch. 13, Labor Relations and Organization).

As of late 1961, there was no evidence of the existence of organized pressure groups in the country outside the framework of the party and its auxiliaries. It seemed, however, that competing interest groups, which could not easily be reconciled under the party umbrella, would inevitably appear as economic development and occupational specialization proceed and as new segments of the population are rendered politically articulate by education. In PDG theory, there is not now any clash of group interest because, under the leadership of the party, all “work for themselves”; should such conflicts arise in the future, it will be the business of the party to resolve them.

ISSUES AND POLICIES

Nationalism

In contrast to some other regions of sub-Saharan Africa, tribal cohesion in Guinea in modern times has been relatively weak. At the time of the French conquest, only the Foulah were united under an integrated hierarchy of chiefs. The Malinké and the Soussou tribes, which had formerly developed systems of central authority, had declined in power and had little effective unity above the level of the village. Local division was even more marked among the various other ethnic communities on the coast and in the Forest Region. The French contributed to the blurring of ethnic loyalties by dividing the country into arbitrarily determined administrative units and converting the chiefs into subordinate officials of the colonial bureaucracy (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

Nevertheless, ethnic identification, based on the sense of common language and tradition, persisted. From the beginning, the labor movement in the AOF cut across ethnic boundaries, but the first political organizations followed ethnic and regional lines. The four major ones in Guinea grouped the coastal Soussou, the Foulah of the Fouta Djallon, the Malinké of Upper Guinea and the various peoples of the Forest Region; there were also numerous smaller ones.

When the PDG-RDA was organized in 1947, it included representatives of the principal ethnic groups and sought to establish itself locally by appealing to ethnic loyalties. Many of the national leaders, like Saifoulaye Diallo, a Foulah, drew their initial support from their ethnic groups. Once established, however, the party attacked ethnic particularism and stressed the basic unity of the people as Guineans and Africans. "Regionalism" and "racial propaganda" were repeatedly condemned and legal provisions against them were strictly enforced.

It is the policy of the government to assign regional officials to areas outside their home regions, and, between 1959 and 1961, wholesale exchanges of commandants between regions occurred twice. The evident intention of the policy is, not only to prevent the growth of personal machines, but also to accustom the people to administration by officials who come to them as Guineans rather than as local men. In a still more basic assault on regionalism, the authorities are sending increasing numbers of students to secondary schools away from their homes (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government; ch. 18, Public Order and Safety; ch. 9, Education).

If the importance of ethnic identity has diminished, kin group loyalties still remain strong. Antagonisms between prominent families—as, for instance, between the Malinké Tourés and Kéitas—may be suppressed or ignored on the national level, but they continue to

manifest themselves in some localities. Ethnic bias, as evidenced in the Malinké or Foulah assumption of superiority in relation to such "lesser" peoples as the Guerzé, also persists even though it is denounced by the national leaders.

Guinean nationalism, as fostered by the party, is made an aspect of the broader concept of African nationalism and is designed to reinforce it. The ideal of future Black African unity is reinforced by an appeal to history and tradition, and Guinea is identified with other West African states in a claim to common descent from the old empires of the region. The revival of the past and the glorification of traditional culture, institutions and heroes serve to establish a claim to cultural equality with Western civilization and to emphasize the thesis of the illegitimacy of European colonial rule. The assertion of African uniqueness and worth makes possible the acceptance and adaptation of knowledge and models developed by the lately dominant Europeans without any sense of dependence or inferiority (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 7, Social Values and Patterns of Living).

Guinean pan-Africanism calls in positive terms for the ultimate political and economic union of all Black Africa in a closely integrated system in which the member states will relinquish as much as necessary of their individual sovereignty in the common interest. The formation in 1961 of the Union of African States by Guinea, Ghana and Mali is presented as a step in that direction, but it remains to be seen how far Guinea's leaders are prepared to go in actually applying the provision in the national Constitution authorizing the surrender of sovereignty to a larger body. Negatively, the pan-Africanism of the PDG has involved an unrelenting campaign against all remaining colonial claims on the continent and the conviction that the "imperialist" powers of the West have retreated from the old colonialism of direct territorial rule only to advance on a new front of "neo-colonialism" or indirect domination by economic means.

Within the PDG there is no evidence of dissent from the general premises of either the positive or negative aspects of pan-Africanism. There does seem to be differences of emphasis. The anti-Westernism of the extremists echoes that of the Communist bloc and they derogate any loose form of association among the African states as a compromise with "Balkanization." The more moderate seem prepared to deal with the West on terms of equality and they are more preoccupied with the problems of national development.

Democracy and Dictatorship

The one-party system, centralized bureaucratic administration and subordination of legislative and judicial functions to the executive all suggest a Communist model. Moreover, the national leaders acknowledge their debt to Marxist principles of political organization

and action. They deny, however, that they are orthodox Marxists or that they are guided by any consideration other than the practical needs, as they see them, of Guinea and Africa. President Touré has put it:

Marxism, like Cartesianism, is for us an analytical procedure, a method of action. We utilize that which appears to us good for the development, the fullest promotion of Africa along lines peculiarly suited to it. . . . In Marxism the principles of organization, of democracy, of control—all that which is concrete and which pertains to given actions—are perfectly adaptable to present conditions in Africa. But we would be misguided if we were to enclose ourselves in an abstract philosophy. I say that philosophy does not interest us. Our needs are concrete.

In its structure, internal discipline and directive role, the PDG resembles the Communist parties of the countries where they are in power. The resemblance is strengthened by much of the language and content of the public statements of PDG leaders and by the party's indoctrination methods. The exposure of President Touré and his closest associates to French Communist influence in the post-World War II labor movement provides an explanation. But it is also true that these men were among those in the RDA who broke with the Communists on the issue of African nationalism and freedom from European tutelage of any kind. Moreover, they rejected the validity for Africa of the concept of class struggle, a central tenet of Communist doctrine.

That position has had important consequences for the PDG, for, if its driving force is a relatively small group of militants in its executive committees, it is, unlike the Communist parties, a mass-membership organization, numbering in its ranks an estimated one-third or more of the total population. Seeing itself as the instrument not of one class but of the popular will, it claims to speak for all Guineans and through them to reflect the interests of all Black Africa. While the PDG expresses its sympathy for the Communist countries and for the peoples it regards as struggling for national liberation, it declares that it is not aligned in the Cold War, and it presents its mission solely in terms of Guinean and pan-African goals.

In the shaping of the present political order, two important non-Marxist influences are apparent: the traditional African background, and the experience under French colonial rule. The organization of political power under the African and the French dispensations was quite different, but in both it was authoritarian. The authoritarianism has persisted, as have certain other features characteristic of the two patterns of rule.

The traditional society after the break up of the early empires—which, in any event, only touched on the territory of present-day Guinea—was a conglomeration of tribal groups and independent vil-

lages or clusters of villages. Government was local and exercised in customary ways within the small community. The authority of the hereditary chiefs was extensive and often absolute, but it was exercised with the advice of council and behind important decisions usually lay the consensus of the community formed in lengthy public discussion of the issues.

The consensus principle was largely ignored by the French in the general administration of the colony, but it was never wholly lost by the people in the management of their own affairs. It has been revived by the PDG in the mandatory weekly meetings which take place under the leadership of the party committees in every village and town quarter in the country. The issues and the limits of discussion are set by the party and the officials of the party and the government are in a position to crystallize and enforce the final decisions—but the public exchanges contribute to the outcome. They help to validate the actions taken and to persuade the people that they are governed not by arbitrary authority but by the popular will.

Adapting Marxist concepts and organizational patterns in the realm of the party, Guinea's leaders turned to French institutional models in constructing the government. Many of the offices and official titles remain the same as they were before independence. More important, the government apparatus is, like its French predecessor, a hierarchically organized bureaucracy. In this statist system, the central authority reaches directly into the local communities and the power of the executive penetrates the legislative and judicial realms. Here again the pattern is neither French, Marxist nor traditional African but a synthesis of all three.

The unitary political system fosters public discussion of party policies which are, by definition, government policies. It does not encourage, and in important matters does not tolerate, debate about settled decisions. That the dictatorial aspect of the party's role has raised some doubts within the party itself is indicated by President Touré's statement:

. . . some of [the militants] . . . feel guilty at speaking of dictatorship. They think it humiliating to affirm that we are and can be nothing else than the instruments of dictatorship, that we do not represent and do not direct two contrary forces, and that, not wishing to be neutralized between liberty and slavery, truth and falsehood, we renounce all systems of equilibrium designed to find the middle term between what serves the people and what injures them. If authority of the state—in a word, its powers—and the dictatorship exercised by the party apparatus emanate from the whole people, then that dictatorship is a popular one and the state is a democratic state. . . .

President Touré is explicit in rejecting other political systems as unsuited to economic and social conditions in Africa and to the "personality of the people." He has said:

Among the several forms of dictatorship exercised by different regimes—personal dictatorship, economic or financial dictatorship, parliamentary dictatorship, or popular dictatorship, we have chosen the last form of the exercise of power because it is the only one which is at once adapted to the conditions and spirit of African society, the only one which can, without shock or disequilibrium, put into motion our evolution.

Holding that the dictatorship of the party is democratic because founded on the popular will, he contrasts this "total democracy," for which he says conditions in Africa are ideal, with democracy based on social class ("bourgeois democracy" and "proletarian democracy"), on religion ("Christian democracy" or "Islamic democracy"), or on a political system ("parliamentary democracy" or "presidential democracy"). An organized political opposition is conceded to be constructive in the "advanced countries," but in Africa, where all forces must be mobilized for the task of development, "systems based on two parties would be a halter on our evolution."

This attempt to reconcile in theory dictatorship and democracy can hardly be of interest outside the circles of the educated minority. It is significant, however, as an aspect of the practical effort which is being made to persuade the people and the rank-and-file of party militants that the demands being made upon them by the national leadership are just because derived from themselves. What is at issue is not a general devotion to democratic institutions—as distinguished from the consensus-sanctioned rule of the traditional chiefs and the supervised self-government of the latter days of French control—but the tendency of a society which is only beginning to achieve national form to resist distant central authority.

The PDG came to power after a decade of effective campaigning against the colonial system, the only centralized administration the whole country had ever known. It can avoid the potential threat which stems from some of the attitudes it fostered against the French, only if it is able to subordinate local group loyalties to loyalty to itself and to the national order it controls.

Internal Strains

The PDG has been remarkably successful in holding its popular following, but there has been opposition, not only in ethnic and regional quarters, but also in the party's own mass organizations. The local communities of the Forest Region, long secured in their autonomy by distance from the more populous centers, have shown restiveness apparently centering on traditional chiefs; official reports have referred to party efforts to isolate "reactionary elements" in Guékédou and Macenta.

The strongest centrifugal tendencies have been manifested in the Fouta Djallon. The PDG was able to establish a popular base in this stronghold of Foulah and Moslem power, especially among the underprivileged former subjects of the Foulah, but in the principal town of Labé on the eve of independence only about 60 percent of the eligible voters went to the polls in the national referendum. Of these, two-fifths voted for the French Community project in opposition to the PDG position. The work of the PDG cadres in the region has been repeatedly criticized by the national leaders, and at the old religious center of Mamou in 1959, a group of newly elected local party functionaries were promptly removed from office by the BPN.

By 1961 matters apparently were still not satisfactory, for the Sixth National Conference of the PDG, which was to be held in Labé that August, was moved on short notice to Conakry with the explanation that unfavorable weather conditions were expected to prevail in the Fouta Djallon.

Potentially more serious than regional recalcitrance have been certain indications of opposition within the mass organizations. The circumstances and significance of the plot which the government declared it had uncovered against itself in May of 1960 are not clear, but the authorities apparently decided to act when a second-echelon labor union leader asked President Touré for permission to form an opposition party (see ch. 20, Subversive Potentialities).

Late November 1961 brought another episode in the mass organizations with the arrest of 12 members of the national teachers union at Conakry on charges of subversion. After the conviction and sentencing of five of them to prison terms of five to ten years, students at Conakry demonstrated for their release. Apparently there was violence and the police, aided by a large JRDA contingent, rounded up the students and put them into custody at Camp Alpha Yaye. The schools were temporarily closed.

The details of what had happened were not available in early December, but the official *Agence Guinéenne de Presse* referred to the "bad ideological influence of certain professors on their students." Linking the disorder with "imperialist" machinations, it asserted:

. . . the plots against our sister republic of Mali, the attacks directed at President N'Krumah [of Ghana], the distressing Syrian secession, which has affected the unity of the United Arab Republic, are only the result of a subversive effort, the crowning achievement of which, in the books of the imperialists and feudalists, remains the liquidation of the Guinean Revolution.

The convicted teachers were accused of having compared present conditions in education unfavorably with those which existed under the French and with having cloaked subversion with a "narrow unionism." Leaflets circulated among the students in Conakry reportedly

contained such slogans as: "Freedom to Make Demands!"; "Down With Reform!" (presumably educational reform); "Liberate Our Heroes!"; "No Country Can Be Neutral Between East and West!"; "We Must Choose One Bloc Or the Other!"; and "Away with the School Subcommittee—Away with the JRDA—Away with the PDG—RDA in Guinea!".

Although it was difficult immediately after the event to assess with assurance what might have been involved, there was nothing to indicate that the more sweeping political slogans were representative of student views generally, and the demonstrators were apparently greatly outnumbered by JRDA contingents which turned out against them. Although they may have been encouraged by concealed disaffected elements, the students as a group probably acted primarily out of a defensive loyalty to the hastily convicted union officials. Verified information is also lacking either for or against the government charge that the officials were involved in a political plot, but their open complaints were about housing allowances and teaching load.

The question of covert political disaffection aside, the demonstrations by teachers and students must be regarded as another symptom of the mounting strain caused by the effort to develop and transform the country. Communist-bloc technical aid and loans have not balanced the benefits lost with the severance of ties with France, and they have mortgaged the proceeds of the Country's export production, including bauxite, for years to come. Before it broke down in late 1960, the government attempt to nationalize trade had brought the movement of goods almost to a standstill. Further food and consumers' goods shortages have been inflicted on a population already living at the subsistence level by wage and price controls, the reduction of imports and the effect on agricultural production of inadequate measures against plant disease.

At the same time that the people have been asked to bear these hardships, they have been pressed to increase their efforts and to welcome profound changes in their personal and social lives. The human investment program with its obligatory volunteer work demands 20 days of unremunerated labor a year on public projects from every able-bodied adult. Farmers are urged to adopt new, and for them unproved, methods and to combine in cooperatives. In the absence of capital, equipment and technical knowledge, the cry for increased production emphasizes the need for people to work harder, and the sixth National Conference of the PDG produced plans for the setting of work norms in agriculture as well as in other fields.

The effort to remake the society and to reconstitute its values relies, not only upon education, but upon law and fiat. The insistent secularism of the government appears to have wide popular support, but

there are indications that the official attitude has been a factor in the resistance the central authorities have encountered in the strongly Moslem Fouta Djallon and the animistic communities of the Forest Region. Information is lacking about the reaction of Guinean Catholics to the nationalization of private schools and the expulsion of Archbishop de Milleville and a number of other clerics, but the forcefulness of the government's measures suggests that it did not feel it could afford to temporize.

The decrees granting women legal equality with men and prohibiting child marriage or marriage without the consent of the principals have been enthusiastically received by women and young people, but they profoundly affect long-established relationships within the family and the kin-structured local community. The shock is felt most deeply by the older generation, but, in suddenly being propelled into new roles in relation to each other and to their elders, the young people themselves pay a penalty of uncertainty and emotional conflict. The new youth also constitute a potential political problem. Organized in the JRDA and groomed in the schools as the "shock force of the Revolution," they tend to outrun the adult leadership and to present it with the task of keeping youthful impatience from changing into left-wing opposition.

The signs of increasing tension in the summer and autumn of 1961 included undocumented but persistent reports of public protests in various parts of the country against food shortages and high prices. At least one riot in or near Labé was said to have been suppressed with bloodshed. From what was known, these manifestations were mainly nonpolitical expressions of particular dissatisfactions—the reaction of people who were being asked to do much too quickly. That a dangerous political potential was there, however, was explicitly recognized by the national authorities speaking through the editorial pages of the *Agence Guinéenne de Presse* at the end of November.

That the teachers union, or more precisely, certain of its leaders, should contest the long inventory of Guinea's achievements during its three years of freedom, is astonishing when the Western powers themselves recognize and respect these advances.

Certainly this seditious movement is not isolated; it is a thing which can be repeated tomorrow under another cover if our militants relax any of their vigilance.

We have previously noted the case of those unscrupulous merchants who are incapable of changing their old dishonest ways and whose places of business are veritable hatching-places of distortions and false rumors.

We can never urge the party committees enough to seek out and isolate these persons . . .

Yesterday, religion and greed! Today, the unions! What will it be tomorrow!

The Three-Year Development Plan, which was in its second year in 1961, was designed within its short span to lay the economic and social foundations of Guinea as a modern nation. A major premise was that a maximum effort could be sustained and would be justified by its rewards. Notable progress has been made in respect to education and some areas of industrial infrastructure, but living standards have not improved and in many areas they have worsened. President Touré faces two dilemmas. One is that Western material and technical aid could ease and perhaps lead to the permanent solution of his economic problems. At the same time, his ability to seek or accept Western assistance has inevitably been affected by his repeated denunciations of Western "neocolonialism." The other dilemma is that, while signs of popular restiveness call for relaxation of the pressure on the people, one element of the PDG desires even stronger measures.

Notwithstanding growing difficulties, there was no indication in late 1961 of a decline in President Touré's popularity in the country at large. He seemed most vulnerable on his left flank to pressure from some of his close associates and, below them, the young radicals of the mass organizations. Disposed on both ideological and practical grounds to lean toward the Communist bloc, these persons are likely to assume a more extreme position under stress and to find closer affinities with Peiping than with Moscow.

ELECTIONS

Little information is available about election laws and practices. The Constitution established universal, direct suffrage by secret ballot, and it provides for general elections for the National Assembly and the President of the Republic. Not mentioned in the Constitution, but authorized by law, are elections for village, town and regional councils.

President Touré came to office by vote of the National Assembly in 1958 and was reelected for a 7-year term in the first general election for the presidency in January 1961. Elections for the National Assembly are to be held in 1962 upon the expiration of the 5-year terms of its deputies who came to office in 1957 when the body was the Territorial Assembly. The deputies are elected on a single national list, a procedure aimed at preventing the formation of the Assembly on ethnic lines and which also makes it simpler for the PDG to select the candidates it wants.

The first local councils were elected in May 1958 when these bodies replaced the chiefs. Regional commandants appear to have the authority to order and supervise the elections of new councils.

The referendum which preceded national independence was held with universal suffrage and under the supervision of the territorial

government which was in the hands of the PDG. Out of the more than 1,400,000 registered voters, fewer than 60,000 voted for continued ties with France. Only in Labé was there a sizable vote for membership in the French Community and, according to President Touré, this was more by way of opposition to the PDG than in favor of France.

With respect to the presidency, the Constitution provides only that candidates shall be citizens and at least 35 years of age. President Touré, the only candidate in January 1961, had been nominated by the unanimous decision of the National Conference held by the PDG the previous November. In this election, the regions were divided into electoral districts, each with a voting bureau established by presidential decree. The bureaus counted the votes and transmitted the results to the commandant of the region who passed them on to the Minister of the Interior. They were then delivered to a special counting commission, composed of the selected deputies of the National Assembly under the chairmanship of the Assembly's President, Saifoulaye Diallo. Of 1,586,544 voters registered at the 2,252 voting bureaus, 1,576,747 went to the polls. All of the 1,576,580 valid votes—167 were voided—were cast for Sékou Touré.

CHAPTER 18

PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

Public order and safety, as of mid-1961, presented no special difficulties to the law enforcement authorities. The people, relatively calm and easygoing on the whole, were not given to premeditated crimes of violence. Riots and other disturbances requiring large-scale police action were rare occurrences.

Statistics on public order are not available, but it is the common impression—substantiated, in part, by the published reports of cases tried in the Court of Assizes—that petty thievery and assaults arising from quarrels are the most frequent crimes. Punishments are harsh, but are not regarded as excessive by the general community. The death penalty may be inflicted, in certain cases publicly, for homicide in connection with theft, robbery or negligence in driving an automobile.

Since 1958 the police forces have been in a process of organization and development. The principal features of the colonial internal security system have been retained. Many members of the new organizations have served in various capacities with French military or police forces stationed in Guinea or elsewhere in Africa and were transferred in grade to comparable positions in the Guinean national police system. The quality and effectiveness of the system were adversely influenced, temporarily at least, by the recruitment early in 1960 of a sizable number of inexperienced men. But in the summer of 1961 it appeared that morale was good, prestige high, and the administration relatively free from corruption. In general the people respect the police—a sentiment apparently based on the high degree of likelihood that arrest, conviction and punishment will follow misdoing. The police do not have a reputation for mistreating arrested persons.

The police function, like all other governmental activities, fits into the context of the political goals of the national leadership. The police are used, whenever needed, to stop acts or agitations that are thought to undermine the prestige of the PDG or to oppose its policies. Without creating a rule of terror, the police have, on occasion, acted promptly and brusquely against persons suspected of damaging or opposing government programs. Suspected saboteurs and sabotage

targets have been subjected to intense surveillance. Moreover, the laws, decrees and ordinances that police are called upon to enforce are, in effect, legalized enactments of PDG policies.

A large number of minor offenses are still dealt with by customary law, administered by family or local councils. No consistent record is kept of these proceedings so that crime statistics are incomplete. Outside the towns, local customs, religious beliefs and family ties operate directly to control conduct. The customary practices, however, seem to complement rather than conflict with the police apparatus and the regular courts. The degree of personal safety and security of property probably compares favorably with that in many parts of Europe and is higher than in many other African countries.

The regular criminal courts, like the civil courts, are handicapped by lack of trained and experienced personnel. Procedures are modeled on those introduced by the French, but they have been accepted by the people as natural and fair.

The penal system operates on the principle that prisoners should be made to work in the process of rehabilitation. Too little time has elapsed to gauge the effectiveness of the system, but it appears that little real attention has been given to the rehabilitation aspect of penal practice. Prisoners work on construction of bridges and roads, on agricultural projects, and in the towns on the cleaning and maintenance of streets.

BACKGROUND

Before independence, maintenance of public order and safety was the responsibility of the French Governor of Guinea at Conakry, who was directly subordinate to the Governor General of French West Africa at Dakar. The police and gendarmerie units consisted mainly of locally recruited forces, supervised by French cadres and serving under overall French command. They were organized, equipped and trained by the French, along lines similar to those of comparable units in other French West African colonies. Qualified Guineans in many instances became noncommissioned officers, and, in exceptional cases, held commissions. Trained in French methods, many of them, by the end of World War II, were serving with French police and gendarmerie units in the other territories of the AOF.

Judicial functions, except those applying to French citizens, were largely decentralized to the administrative district (*cercles*). With little coordination between districts, there were wide variations in judicial methods and standards. In one district a thief might be sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment for stealing a bicycle; in another, the penalty for the same offense might be 6 years' imprisonment.

By 1935 two court systems had been developed: one administered French law and applied to French citizens; the other administered

local customary law and applied solely to Guineans. In addition, under a disciplinary law known as the *Indigénat*, Guinean subjects could be summarily punished without trial by French administrative officers. This law caused much resentment and was criticized even in the French colonial Grand Council at Dakar. It eventually applied only to 12 specific offenses, including manifestations threatening public peace, harboring a person wanted by the police, refusing to answer the summons of a district administrative officer and refusing to fulfill forced labor requirements. The maximum penalty under this law, when it was abolished in August 1944, was 5 days' imprisonment or a fine of 15 francs. Moslem courts did not function in Guinea (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

French law was administered by four courts: the Court of First Instance, at Conakry, which had jurisdiction over all civil cases and minor criminal offenses; the Court of Assizes, also at Conakry, which had jurisdiction over almost all the criminal cases; the West African Court of Appeal, at Dakar, which heard appeals from both of the courts at Conakry; and the Court of Cassation, in Paris, to which, in exceptional cases, final appeals were made.

Customary or tribal laws were administered by a system of five courts known as customary courts (*tribunaux indigène*), because their judgments were based on local customs instead of French law. The system was comprised of customary courts of first and second degree, and customary criminal courts—all of which sat in the administrative districts; a Colonial Court of Appeal at Conakry; and the Supreme Customary Court of Appeal (*Chambre d'Annulation*) at Dakar. They were presided over by French officials since the judicial powers of chiefs and other persons vested with authority by local groups had been abolished in 1912. Civil cases were admitted to these courts only after the competent local chief had attempted to conciliate the contending parties.

The customary courts of the first degree were composed of the district administrative officer and two Guinean assessors (lay judges) who were familiar with the customary law under which a particular case was to be adjudicated. The jurisdiction of these courts included petty offenses and minor civil actions, such as personal disputes and marriage or divorce litigations. Punishments were imposed in accordance with customary law, but in criminal cases the maximum penalty authorized was a fine of 2,000 francs or imprisonment for 10 years, or both.

Customary courts of the second degree were composed of a French official of the district and two local assessors. Their jurisdiction was limited to civil matters, including appeals from the civil cases tried in the courts of the first degree. At least one of the assessors had to concur in the judgment rendered.

The customary criminal courts were composed of a French official and four assessors—two French and two local. Their jurisdiction was limited to serious criminal acts such as murder and kidnapping. Authorized punishments extended to life imprisonment or death, but a death sentence required approval by the President of France. The president of the court was required to designate an official to assist the persons accused of serious crimes—a privilege not otherwise accorded to defendants. All sentences had to have the concurrence of at least half of the assessors.

The Colonial Court of Appeal was composed of the president of the French Court of First Instance, two senior French officials and two Guinean notables. It acted on appeals from judgments of the customary courts of the second degree in civil cases and from judgments of the customary courts of the first degree in criminal cases. It had no jurisdiction over the customary criminal courts.

The Supreme Customary Court of Appeal was composed of the Vice-President of the West African Court of Appeal, two professional councilors, two senior French colonial civil servants and two French-speaking African assessors. Its deliberations and decisions were based solely on the written records of court proceedings (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

The postindependence court system is, in effect, a continuation of the main features of the French system with some modifications, mainly necessitated by the small number of professionally qualified personnel. The system includes: a Superior Court of Cassation (Tribunal Supérieur de Cassation) and a Court of Appeals at Conakry; two courts of first instance, one at Conakry and one at Kankan; a Court of Assizes at Conakry with jurisdiction over all major criminal offenses; and courts of the first and second degree and justice of the peace courts in the administrative regions with jurisdiction over minor civil and criminal offenses (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

THE POLICE SYSTEM

A presidential decree of January 28, 1960, established a General Directorate of Security Services and attached it to the Ministry of Interior and Security. The General Director, under the authority of the Minister, was charged with the coordination and control of the Security Services, which included the Security Police, the Gendarmerie, the Republican Guard and the General Inspectorate of Road Traffic. Moriba Makassonba, former Director of Security Police, was appointed General Director when the Directorate was established and was still in this position in mid-1961.

In a Cabinet reorganization at the time of the currency reform on March 1, 1960, the General Directorate of Security Services was

transferred to the Ministry of National Defense which became the Ministry of National Defense and Security (see fig. 16). The reorganized Ministry of Interior was renamed the Ministry of Interior and Regional and Local Administration (Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Publiques), and the Minister remained in charge of governmental affairs in each administrative region (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

Since the commandant of each region is responsible for law enforcement and the maintenance of peace and order in his area, both ministers are concerned with security problems. The definition of their respective responsibilities is unclear, but the Ministry of National Defense and Security appears to be responsible for the overall command and administration of the security forces and the control of security matters of national interest, while the Ministry of Interior and Regional and local Administration is responsible for the distribution of security forces in local areas and for their commitment in local disturbances.




Figure 16. Organization of Defense and Security Forces of Guinea, 1961.

Security Police

The Security Police (Sûreté Nationale) comprises the civil police forces in all cities and towns. The Directorate of the Security Police is charged with their recruitment, direction, administration and

training. Thus the urban police forces are under the overall control of the central government, but they function under the general supervision of the commandant of the administrative region to which they are assigned. The Director of the Security Police in 1961 was Alpha Camara, an experienced police officer who was appointed to this post by a presidential decree of January 28, 1960. In his last previous position, he was inspector of police of Conakry.

The Directorate of the Security Police occupies a special building in Conakry, the same used by the French for this function. Details of the Directorate's organization are not available. It appears, however, that the commandant of each administrative region has attached to his staff a chief of police who is in charge of the regional police and their operations. The number of police in a region depends upon the size and importance of the urban centers in the area. The Police organization may be subdivided into precinct or town quarter detachments and these, in turn, into police posts, responsible for maintaining local peace and order. The total strength of the forces of the Security Police is estimated to be approximately 1,000 men and officers. Besides being charged with protecting the lives, rights and property of the people, the police also have a countersubversive mission.

President Touré, in 1959, asserted that they may be called upon at need to stop sabotage, agitation and all subversive activity. Other officials have stated that the police are to help protect the "achievements of the revolution." Early in May 1961, when the government nationalized the Guinean Electric Power Company (Energie Électrique de Guinée) and the company which operates Conakry's water supply system, the African Public Service Company (Compagnie Africaine des Services Publiques), the police were ordered to keep under surveillance the installation sites, the lodgings of European employees, water sources and other vulnerable points (see ch. 24, Industrial Potential).

A special section of the Security Police, the Immigration Directorate, checks on the activities of foreigners in the country, including their entry and departure. Detachments from this section are on duty in Conakry at the Port and at the International Airport, and presumably at the customary border crossing points.

Agents from this section examine the passports and other identification papers of incoming and outgoing persons and the questionnaires that they are required to fill out upon entry or exit. They stamp passports and issue temporary residence visas. Special visas are issued to missionaries, businessmen and other foreigners who expect to stay indefinitely in the country.

A special police detachment is assigned to the National Railway Office, and in July 1959 the detachment was augmented by 15 army

veterans who were accepted in this service as auxiliary guards. Presumably the primary duties of the railway police are to guard against theft of property in transit and check on the identity of passengers.

The strong influence of the PDG on the police was illustrated in July 1961 at a meeting of the Police Union (*Syndicat de la Police*) at Mamou. The secretary-general of the Union, Boubacar Diallo, in reporting on its activities, paid homage to the National Political Bureau (*Bureau Politique Nationale*—BPN) and to the government. He then emphasized the educational role (presumably indoctrination in PDG principles) of the police in the Republic and stressed that in the new order police were protectors of the people instead of “oppressors as under colonial rule.”

Police ranks and grades resemble those of the military forces, but with different titles. The police in the capitals of administrative regions and in other large towns are in the charge of a police commissioner (*commissaire de police*). He is usually assisted by a deputy (*adjoint au commissaire de police*) and by one or more police inspectors (*inspecteur de police*). Lower grades include senior sergeant major (*brigadier-chief*), sergeant major (*adjudant*), sergeant (*brigadier*), corporal (*assistant de police*), and private (*agent de police*).

Members of the Security Police have been employed by the judiciary on occasion to make arrests and take depositions in criminal investigations. Members designated for this task may be given the provisional title of judicial police officer (*officier de police judiciaire*).

Gendarmerie

The Gendarmerie, with an estimated strength of approximately 1,500, is charged with the enforcement of law and with the maintenance of public safety and security in the rural areas where about 90 percent of the population lives. It is a paramilitary force. Its commander in 1961 was an army officer, Captain Kékoura Bavogui, who had held this position since April 1959. His previous assignment had been that of commandant of Camp Alpha Yaya, known as the Aviation Camp, at Conakry.

The main force of the Gendarmerie is organized into so-called brigades, at least one of which is assigned to each administrative region. A brigade is composed of 6 to 36 gendarmes, depending upon the importance of its responsibilities. It is ordinarily commanded by a lieutenant who is appointed to his post by presidential decree, presumably upon the recommendation of the General Director of the General Directorate of Security Services with the approval of the Minister of National Defense and Security. In some instances, however, decrees have designated a senior noncommissioned officer for this post.

Besides the regular brigades assigned to administrative regions, some additional units—designated as frontier gendarmerie brigades—are distributed among the administrative regions on the country's borders. The primary missions of the frontier brigades presumably are to assist customs officers in their efforts to prevent smuggling and illegal border crossing.

Conakry has at least three brigades—the Port, the Airport and the City Brigades. A Road Brigade—also based in Conakry—was created in 1959, presumably to assist police in suppressing violations of vehicle speed and license laws in Conakry and in the nearby coastal areas. Another type of gendarmerie unit is the mobile detachment (*peleton mobile*). Seven of these had been established by the end of 1959, two based in Conakry and one each in Dalaba, Kankan, Kissidougou, Labé and Youkounkoun. The detachments apparently operate under the direct control of the Gendarmerie commander and assist him in supervising and coordinating the activities of the various gendarmerie units throughout the country. Two so-called criminal brigades were also organized, one for the Fouta Djallon area and one for Conakry. Members of the criminal brigades make investigations of important cases, but regular gendarmerie brigade members are frequently designated by the Minister of Justice to act as special investigators (*agents verbalisateurs*) authorized to take depositions, collect fines and make special reports in connection with specific infractions.

The system of ranks and grades in the Gendarmerie corresponds to that of the Army. As of mid-1961 the highest rank was that of lieutenant. Lower ranks included second lieutenant (*sous-lieutenant*), senior sergeant major (*adjudant-chef*), sergeant major (*adjudant*), sergeant (*maréchal des logis chef*), corporal (*gendarme troisième class*), private first class (*gendarme deuxième class*), private (*gendarme*). The title assistant private (*auxiliaire gendarme*), used in the French colonial service, was abolished in January 1959 by presidential decree.

Republican Guard

The Republican Guard (La Garde Républicaine) is a paramilitary organization with an estimated strength of about 1,500 men. It reinforces the Gendarmerie in the administrative regions. In Conakry, besides guarding the President's residence, it provides the band and the motorcycle escort that are used in the official welcoming ceremonies for visiting dignitaries.

Little information is available regarding the organization of the Guard's units or its structure of rank. It is probably organized on lines similar to those of the Gendarmerie, with detachments (*peletons*) or brigades distributed among the administrative regions. The Guard was commanded in 1961 by Captain Mamoudou Kéita, an army officer

who was transferred to this post by presidential decree of August 27, 1959. He was previously commander of the Army company at N'Zérékoré.

General Inspectorate of Road Traffic

The General Inspectorate of Road Traffic was established in January 1960 to check traffic law violations and reduce the number of serious traffic accidents which mounted rapidly after vehicles began to be received through foreign aid. The Inspectorate's missions are to control traffic, enforce traffic regulations and impose fines for the use of illegal licenses. It functions on a nationwide basis in cooperation with the Gendarmerie, and it reportedly is assisted by a motorized detachment of about 30 women—all graduates of the Police School at Kankan.

Frontier Brigades

Units designated as frontier brigades were formed in 1959. Information is not available regarding their composition, equipment and total strength. However, orders referring to them indicate that they are organized and staffed in the same way as the frontier gendarmerie units, but that they function as part of the customs service in close cooperation with customs officials. Brigades were assigned to at least 14 of the 18 administrative regions that border on neighboring countries. The brigades apparently are charged with enforcing the customs regulations and with preventing illegal border crossing.

Voluntary Police Auxiliaries

The police and security forces benefit from a cooperative attitude on the part of most of the population, particularly from members of the PDG and its youth section, the JRDA. The political leaders continually urge the people to be constantly alert and ready to "protect the achievements of the revolution." The rank and file are exhorted to report or oppose any dishonest practices, such as theft of property, embezzlement of funds or any other willful act harmful to national economy.

JRDA members are especially encouraged to report derelictions to the local party secretary or to the police. Some JRDA organizations apparently have formed units which assume limited police functions, such as detecting law violations and tracking down suspects. Their effective efforts in this field were indicated in March 1961, when the Minister of Commerce praised them for exposing thefts from a Conakry cooperative, and in June 1961, when PDG leaders in conference at Labé congratulated local JRDA units for their vigilance against lawbreakers. The positive action of the units,

it was announced, brought about arrests which checked thievery in the area (see ch. 20, Subversive Potentialities).

In some administrative regions so-called popular militia (*milice populaire*) organizations have been formed, presumably on a voluntary basis, by local PDG committees to assist in guarding state property. Early in March 1961 the chairman of the PDG committee in a Conakry precinct congratulated the members of his militia unit for their alertness and loyalty. Their efforts, he said, resulted in the arrest of four thieves engaged in stealing cloth—an act of “sabotage against the national economy.”

In June 1961 the chairman of the PDG committee in N'Zérékoré ascribed the notable decrease of theft in the city to the efforts of the popular militia organization which was composed of about 330 men. Each of the large towns in the N'Zérékoré administrative region was said to have its own brigade of popular militia. The prominent role envisaged for the popular militia organizations is attested by their inclusion, along with JRDA units, in parades for visiting BPN regional inspectors.

Recruitment

The ranks of the national security forces—as organized at the time of independence—were filled almost entirely by Guineans who had served in comparable French units. The transfers generally were made without change in grade and included transfers from French units stationed both within or outside Guinea. Assignment orders in February, March and June 1959 listed approximately 275 gendarmes, of whom almost half had been serving outside Guinea, principally in Ivory Coast, Senegal and Mali.

Recruitment has been limited to the lowest grade in each service, except for that of police inspector, which is the lowest commissioned rank in the Security Police. Presumably vacancies in the other grades are filled by promotions within the service or by interservice transfers. Recruitment apparently is no problem. Applicants are given competitive examinations, which are held simultaneously on a specified date at Conakry, Labé, Kankan and Macenta.

To take the examination, the applicant must be a Guinean, an ex-serviceman, under 35 years of age, at least 5 feet 5 inches tall, and physically fit as attested by a medical certificate. The examination includes simple tests in reading, writing, arithmetic and the geography of Guinea. After the tests, the applicants are listed in order of merit as determined by the examining board which, in Conakry in 1961, was composed of 10 school teachers.

Selections for the vacancies to be filled—usually about 150—are made from the applicants at the top of the list, who are then declared by the Minister of Civil Service to be eligible for enrollment

in the National School for Security Agents (commonly called the Police School) at Kankan. They must successfully complete the training course there before they are accepted in the security services.

Police inspectors are qualified by special examinations supervised by the Ministry of Civil Service. The tests and eligibility requirements are determined by the Director of the Security Police. The Police School graduating class and policemen with rank equivalent to that of corporal were eligible to take the tests held in November 1960, at Conakry. The applicants were given a 2-day examination consisting of four 3-hour tests on general police activities, penal law and the handling of criminals, criminal police practices, and the political, administrative and judicial organization of the government. Greatest weight was given to the knowledge of general police activities and criminal police practices.

Training

Most of the officers and noncommissioned officers, having served with French military or security units, presumably have received instruction in French internal security methods. Recruits entering the services since independence have been trained at the Police School, established in 1959 at Camp Soundiata, an Army installation at Kankan. Official orders indicate that recruits entering all four security services pursue the same course. Aside from considerations of economy, the concentration of training in one school permits uniformity of instruction in all of the security services. Little information is available regarding the duration of the course, the subjects given, training facilities or the capacity of the school. About six or eight Czechoslovakian police specialists were on duty at the school in early 1960, presumably to give technical advice and to assist in organizing the curriculum. Modern crime detection facilities are lacking; hence advanced or technical courses in specialized police work would be impractical as the skills learned could not be applied.

The Gendarmerie School for French West Africa, at the time of independence, was located near Labé at Camp Markala. This was renamed Camp El-Hadj Onmar on May 1, 1959, and apparently is no longer a gendarmerie training center. Indications are that gendarmerie training has been included in the instruction for other security forces at the Police School at Kankan.

Equipment

When the French withdrew from the country, they left virtually no equipment for the security services. Hence almost all supplies—including arms—have been acquired since independence. They include, however, much material that is neither new nor of late design. All

four services are provided with some jeep transport. Of the total of approximately 200, most have been assigned to the Gendarmerie and to Republican Guard units, however, while the police in regional administrative centers seem to rely mainly on bicycles.

Wrist and ankle chains and handcuffs are used when conducting prisoners to distant points. Patrolmen are provided with flashlights. Office equipment at a typical police headquarters includes several desks, typewriters, steel filing cabinet, regional maps, a clothes locker and a telephone. Radio communications are seriously handicapped by lack of equipment and trained technicians. For similar reasons, telephone communications are limited mainly to local areas. Telegraph facilities, commonly found in the post offices, are fairly dependable and are generally used for more distant communications.

Gendarmerie and Republican Guard offices are commonly located in or near the barracks of their units—buildings which usually were once used by comparable French units. Motor fuel and lubricant supplies, often all that are available in the town, are stored on the premises.

COURT OF ASSIZES

Persons accused of serious offenses, which in the United States would be classified as felonies, are tried by the Court of Assizes (Cour d'Assises) in Conakry. The Court is composed of a president (who in most instances is a member of the Court of Appeal, but who may be a magistrate from a Court of the First Instance designated by the president of the Court of Appeal), two judges and four assessors, whose functions resemble those of an American jury. The assessors are appointed by the Minister of Justice, who selects them from an annually designated panel of 60 reputable citizens. The panel announced in March 1961 was composed mainly of secretaries and clerks and minor officials in the various ministries and the trade unions. It also included the General Director of the Directorate of Security Services and several doctors and teachers. Among its members were six women.

Procedure in Criminal Cases

A person suspected of committing a serious crime is investigated by the police, whose report is submitted to the public prosecutor who records it and transmits it to an examining judge. He may hear the testimony of witnesses, require further information from the police, order a new investigation or dismiss the charge. If he decides to hold the accused for trial, he returns the record to the public prosecutor with instructions to prepare a list of specific charges.

The case file and the charges are submitted by the public prosecutor to the Attorney General (Procureur Générale) in the Ministry

of Justice. The Attorney General studies the case and takes it before a court of arraignment (*chambre des mises en accusation*) composed of himself or one of his deputies, a president (who is a member of the Court of Appeal), two counselors and a secretary. This court determines whether to refer it to the Court of Assizes or to make other disposition of the case.

The accused person meanwhile has presumably been in the custody of the police, without benefit of counsel. If his case is to be tried by the Court of Assizes, the Attorney General prepares a bill of indictment (*acte d'accusation*) and an order for trial. A lawyer for the defense is designated by the Court. In the summer of 1961, only two lawyers were available and qualified as defense attorneys.

When the Court of Assizes convenes to hear the case, the assessors and judges take an oath. This obligates them to examine carefully the evidence submitted to them during the session; hear the testimony without prejudice from hatred, malice, fear or affection; decide the case with impartiality according to the evidence, the provisions of the law and the dictates of their conscience; and maintain the secrecy of their deliberations even after the conclusion of the trial.

At the trial the witnesses for the prosecution, having been introduced, retire into a waiting room with instructions from the president to refrain from discussing the case among themselves. In the proceedings which follow, the president questions both witnesses and the accused. Apparently the prosecutor and the defense counsel may suggest queries, but a reply is mandatory only to a question asked directly by the president. After each witness is heard, he asks the defendant if he has any questions. As new elements of guilt are introduced, the president must ask if there are any extenuating circumstances favoring the defendant.

After giving the plaintiff, the prosecutor, and finally the defense council an opportunity to speak, the president declares the argument closed. He then reviews the case, indicating the proof needed to support the charges in the indictment. The prosecutor and the defense counsel complete any statements they wish to make pertaining to matters treated in the review, and the Court retires to deliberate. In the course of its deliberations, it may recall witnesses to clarify testimony.

If the Court concludes that guilt has not been proved, it acquits the defendant and releases him. If it finds the defendant guilty, it notifies in turn the Attorney General, the defense counsel and the defendant and retires again to set the penalty, taking into account any extenuating circumstances introduced in the defendant's behalf. When the sentence is announced, the convicted person is informed that if a request for an appeal is to be made, this must be done within three days.

THE PENAL SYSTEM

State-supported penal institutions include the central prison at Conakry and one in each administrative region. Installations and facilities are almost entirely those inherited from the colonial regime.

From 1958 until 1960 general supervision of the prison service was a responsibility of the Ministry of Justice, which provided the funds for the maintenance of the central and regional prisons. By 1961 this responsibility had been transferred to the Ministry of Interior and Regional and Local Administration.

The prison service was extensively reorganized in 1959. An administrative officer in the Court of First Instance at Conakry was made chief of the service, and about 20 new regional prison managers were assigned. Almost half of them had been police commissioners serving in the same administrative regions in which their new posts were located.

Prison administration appears to be generally free from corruption, although information regarding the efficiency of administration, the treatment of prisoners or their living conditions is lacking. Prisoners wear a distinctive blue coverall type of uniform. Their scanty rations are supplemented by food furnished by relatives and friends.

Jails and Detention Rooms

Persons charged with major offenses or detained for long periods are usually kept in a jail until their trial is completed. Most jails are in the vicinity of police headquarters. Persons who commit minor offenses or who are in police custody for only a short period are usually placed in a detention room in police headquarters or in an adjacent building. Political offenders reportedly are sent to army camps for confinement while awaiting disposition of their cases.

Work Camps

The widespread use of penal labor and the hardships endured in work camps were the sources of bitter complaints against the colonial administration. Nevertheless the use of penal labor appears to be continuing into the postindependence period, on a reduced scale, at various places throughout the country. President Touré in 1959 stated that during the colonial period it was used to punish "the workers for independence" and to maintain a low salary scale for Guinean laborers, but he justified it after independence on the grounds that it was used for the benefit of the people in building bridges and roads, increasing the acreage of arable land and constructing sewer and drainage systems. The criminal, he added, will be put to useful work while being given the punishment he deserves, and his humiliation before society will cause him to reform. Instances have been

reported of prisoners being marched in chains through populated areas on their way to and from work projects.

Rehabilitation Measures

Rehabilitation measures are lacking, but the need for them is recognized. President Touré, at the National Conference of the PDG in Conakry in August 1961, recalled that the Three-Year Plan envisaged the construction of a penitentiary having facilities for the re-education of convicts so as to enable them to take their place in society as contributors to the national production effort. The Conference, accordingly, recommended that high priority be given to the penitentiary project, for which approximately \$100,000 had been allocated in 1960. Also recommended was the organization of courses of instruction in all prisons to include training in political, professional, academic, civic and moral subjects.

Fragmentary information suggests that the public attitude towards the ex-convict depends upon the nature of his offense. The convicted thief generally seems to be regarded as a potential thief. The perpetrator of an assault committed under extenuating circumstances, on the other hand, may suffer little stigma after his release. It may be noted that applicants for some of the civil service positions must submit a judiciary report along with their birth, medical and military service records to the examining boards.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS

Treason and other major offenses against the state are regarded by the government as the most serious crimes. Theft, arson and embezzlement involving state property or funds are generally dealt with more severely than are the same offenses against private property. Persons charged with treasonable acts may expect to be tried promptly and, if convicted, to be put before a firing squad as were those who were executed in 1960 after being convicted of plotting against the state. The death sentence also has been inflicted for theft when circumstances have led the authorities to view it as sabotage of the national economy (see ch. 20, Subversive Potentialities).

Among crimes against persons, rape—particularly of minors—is regarded as especially heinous, and homicide committed in avenging a rape is popularly condoned. Heavy sentences have been imposed on offenders for making a false accusation of crime and for the mistreatment of a prisoner. Infanticide cases arouse intense public interest, particularly among women. Both cases of infanticide tried in the Court of Assizes in June 1961 stemmed out of accusations by neighbors against the guilty mothers.

Theft, repeatedly cited by political leaders as a nationwide problem, seems to be the most prevalent offense. Party officials, as late as mid-

1961, were called upon to continue the struggle against theft with increased vigor and firmness.

The National Conference of the PDG at Conakry in August 1961 voted to accord amnesty to all persons who were undergoing punishment, without prejudice to their civil status. Exceptions included those convicted of crimes against state security, murder, poisoning, grand theft, misappropriation of public funds, forgery or the use of forged documents, and carnal abuse of minors under 13 years of age. Offenses other than those listed were apparently classified as less serious.

Types of Punishment

The most common punishments are fines, imprisonment and confinement with forced labor. Information is scanty regarding the penalties attaching to various offenses and the maximum punishments that different courts may impose. Judgments in cases of theft of funds or destruction of property have provided for restitution or compensation to the plaintiff. Punishment for some offenses may include expulsion from specified administrative regions for a certain period of time.

Political Offenses and Punishments

After independence, severe penalties began to be imposed on persons convicted of engaging in political agitation prejudicial to national unity. An order published by the Minister of Justice in March 1959 stated that punishments consisting of imprisonment for from 2 to 5 years and fines varying from approximately 70,000 to 700,000 francs would be imposed on persons guilty of "acts of racism." This offense was defined as any public discussion or the distribution in public places of any writing or posters favoring the predominance of one race or ethnic group over others in the nation. If the offense was committed to gain a public position or to remove someone from a public post, the guilty person would be excluded from the place where his offense was committed for two to seven years. Moreover, the same penalties would apply to persons convicted of "regionalism," which was defined as acts comparable to those of racism, but aimed at promoting the special advantage of one region or of a group within a region to the detriment of national unity.

Typical Criminal Offenses and Punishments

In the first months of independence, the authorities were seriously concerned about the prevalence of thievery which they ascribed to attitudes that developed during the colonial period when theft—particularly of the property of the administration—was popularly condoned. A special ordinance, passed in February 1959, prescribed imprison-

ment of from 3 to 10 years with forced labor for persons convicted of theft; for previous offenders the maximum sentence was 15 years. Armed housebreaking at night or robbery accompanied by threats of violence were made punishable by death. It was also provided that a person who killed a thief while protecting his property would be absolved of any crime. The same order authorized the death penalty for negligent driving resulting in a traffic fatality. After the public execution of a thief in Kindia and another in Conakry in 1959, the death penalty apparently was not again invoked for theft, but as of May 1961 the order had not been revoked.

Despite stringent measures, theft, burglary and robbery in 1961 were the most frequent offenses on the docket of the Court of Assizes. According to published reports of 16 cases tried by this Court in June 1961, 6 were for theft—including burglary and armed robbery—and 5 were for sexual offenses. The other cases included 2 infanticides (by the mother in each instance), a fatal traffic accident, a forgery, and the kidnapping and torture of a young girl.

The amount of money or the value of the items taken in a theft seem to have little bearing on the penalty imposed. A thief who entered a bedroom at night and stole less than \$5 was sentenced to 2 years in prison. Another thief, who had served about 15 years in prison for 12 previous convictions, was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for stealing several sacks of cement. In another case, a homeowner surprised an intruder during the night and took him to the police. Although no theft was committed, the intruder—who had a record of convictions for theft and carried pass keys and a knife—was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment with forced labor.

Punishments for sexual offenses vary widely, depending on the circumstances. In one case, a man accused of having sexual relations with a 14-year-old girl was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment. The judge explained that a light sentence was imposed because the mother did not press the charges and the man promised to marry the girl after his sentence expired. In another case, a girl accused of theft was brought before the village mayor and the vice-president of the village PDG committee for interrogation. The committee vice-president ordered her to be whipped. She "confessed" and was placed in a detention room under a guard who raped and beat her repeatedly over a period of 10 days. Later the real thief was arrested. The chief offenders against the girl were sentenced to terms of imprisonment with forced labor: the plaintiff, to 5 years for false accusation, the committee vice-president, to 5 years for his irregular action in the case; the guard, to 12 months for raping and beating his prisoner.

In still another case, the defendant was accused of raping his young niece and of threatening her with death if she told her mother.

The parents, after holding a family council, demanded the defendant to turn over to them a quantity of palm oil and rice valued at approximately \$100. When the accused failed to comply with the demand, he was reported to the police. The judge reprimanded the parents for attempting to settle the matter without recourse to law and sentenced the defendant to 5 years' imprisonment with forced labor.

In homicide cases, motive and extenuating circumstances seem to have an important influence on the severity of punishment. A murder committed during a robbery brought a sentence of 20 years. A speeding driver who caused the death of two persons and injured three others, was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment, fined approximately \$2,000, and required to pay \$100 for property damages and \$65 for traffic violations. A group of men from the Pita region were charged with the murder of a 70-year-old man who had been molesting their wives; the men were all acquitted.

Two cases of infanticide were tried in June 1961 by the Court of Assizes. In both cases the husband denied parenthood. In one instance, the father, who was the husband's nephew, was held for a later trial and the mother was sentenced to 3 years in prison. In the other case, the father could not be determined, and the mother was sentenced to 5 years in prison.

In the one case of fraud, the defendant had forged signatures on sales documents and on collection notices for typewriters and sewing machines and had succeeded in swindling buyers out of approximately \$140 for each typewriter and \$110 for each sewing machine. He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment with forced labor. A Soviet technician was reportedly expelled from the country in mid-1961 for altering airstrip construction blueprints.

Failure to show respect (by remaining quiet) when the national anthem or "To the colors" are played in public places is an offense punishable by fines from \$20 to \$59 or by imprisonment for from 15 to 90 days. A more serious offense is to deface or show disrespect for the Guinea or foreign flags flown by the government on ceremonial occasions. Infractions are punishable by imprisonment for a minimum of 1 month or a maximum of 2 years. Several British merchant seamen and United States sailors were arrested and charged with this offense early in 1961. The Americans were released after intercession by the United States Ambassador. Two of the British seamen were acquitted, and the jail sentence of the remaining three was reduced from 3 months to 2 months.

Infractions of a noncriminal nature often incur heavy penalties. An order by the Minister of National Defense and Security, published in May 1961, directed the security forces to impound for at least 30 days all nonregistered motor vehicles. The costs were to be at the rate of approximately \$4 per day, or \$120 for the minimum 30-day period.

Smuggling and Blackmarketing

During the colonial period smuggling developed into a flourishing trade. Controls by law enforcement agencies were inadequate or lacking. Some enterprises in Conakry specialized in smuggling, moving goods from the port through distribution branches in the larger towns to tradesmen who were frequently Lebanese or Syrians.

After independence smuggling and blackmarketing continued on a large scale, despite efforts of the newly organized customs service, police, gendarmerie and frontier guards. The trade, which apparently was both into and out of the country, involved a wide variety of consumer goods and food products. The clandestine shipment of diamonds, in which the Malinké were especially active, from the Forest Region to the coast through Liberia and Sierra Leone, was of greatest concern because it affected an important source of government revenue. The situation improved somewhat in 1960 after the organization of a regulated diamond market (see ch. 27, Domestic Trade).

In early 1961 blackmarketing and related activities were denounced by the government as a serious threat to its economic planning. President Touré reportedly stated in March 1961 that illegal imports and exports were increasing, that blackmarketing was widespread and that the Guinean franc—nominally equal to the French franc—was worth only 50 percent of its normal value.

Also in March, the Court of First Instance at Conakry sentenced four merchants to prison terms of from 9 months to 6 years and imposed on them fines ranging from 2 to 6 million francs (247 Guinean francs equal U.S. \$1) for illegal transactions. They were charged with having abused their privileges as licensed members of a government cooperative by selling to unauthorized dealers merchandise bought at reduced prices through the State Domestic Trade Agency (see ch. 27, Domestic Trade).

Members of the BPN, meeting in July 1961, gave special attention to the effectiveness of frontier surveillance and the measures taken against violations of customs laws. The National Conference of the PDG held in August at Conakry passed a resolution calling on all members for increased vigilance in the "struggle against illegal speculations, frontier traffic, money transactions and blackmarketing."

CHAPTER 19

FOREIGN POLICIES

The primary aim of Guinea's foreign policy is to maintain and strengthen the country's independence and economic viability. A long-range policy objective in mid-1961 was to bring about the establishment of a pan-African community in which Guinea would play a leading part—an end for which the country's leaders have indicated they would be willing to relinquish at least some elements of the national sovereignty. In its foreign relations Guinea seeks to cultivate the friendship and the political and economic support of those states sympathetic to its immediate and long-range goals.

President Touré has declared that Guinea's international relations are based, not only on opposition to colonialism and imperialism, but also on "bold actions aimed at their destruction as a system of rule." Any position or action that favors the preservation of such regimes in Guinea, in Africa or in the world, he feels, must be regarded as a manifestation of hostility. He has also asserted that he and his followers are not Communists and that the Republic of Guinea is not a part of any "military or financial coalition." He has said repeatedly that his government is equally well disposed to all peoples and that it will not interfere in the internal affairs of others. He and other spokesmen identify Guinea's position as neutralist and assert that they stand aloof from the Cold War. They have not, in fact, hesitated to denounce many of the activities and viewpoints of both sides in that conflict, although the preponderance of their criticism in 1961 was aimed at the "colonialist" and "imperialist" motives and actions which they attributed to the non-Communist Western powers. A continuation of the neutralist policy was indicated by Guinea's participation in the meeting of the so-called neutral countries held in September 1961 at Belgrade.

The interval since independence has been too brief to permit the formulation of foreign policies based upon comprehensive evaluations of all the factors involved. Up to mid-1961, policies respecting other countries seemed to be improvised and importantly based on the Guinean impression of the attitudes of the leaders of other countries toward Guinea and its pan-African aspirations. The neutralist concept provided a justification, should it be needed, for the acceptance of aid from any quarter.

The new state, thrown on its own resources and in need of extensive material and technical assistance, has signed more economic and cultural agreements with countries of the Communist bloc than with those of the West. Its leaders continue to assert emphatically, however, that their political detachment has not been compromised. Their neutralist stance appears to be calculated to get maximum assistance from countries in both blocs, and its practical results have not been inconsiderable. By mid-1961 Guinea was receiving economic aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union and from both the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the Democratic Republic of Germany (East Germany). It also maintained cordial relations with both Israel and the United Arab Republic (UAR).

Guinean relations with the Soviet Union and its European satellites were friendly from the beginning. The Communist-bloc countries were among the first to recognize the new Republic and offer it aid. Furthermore, many Guinean leaders, including President Touré, were exposed to Communist ideas and methods in the French labor movement in the years before independence and thus acquired a Marxist outlook which serves as an ideological bridge between themselves and the Communist countries.

By contrast, early relations with the United States were formal. Guinean leaders resented what they regarded as undue delay in diplomatic recognition by the United States, and they were apparently disappointed that aid was not promptly offered. President Touré has asserted that he asked President Eisenhower for arms to equip the small Guinean army before he considered acquiring them from any other country. He has said that he accepted Communist offers of weapons only after failing to receive a reply from the United States.

In 1961 the Guinean official attitude toward the United States began to moderate. Public criticism of the American positions on the Congo question and toward Cuba diminished somewhat and high-ranking United States officials were cordially received in Guinea. The change suggested both the desire for closer relations with the United States and the expectation that they could be brought about on terms satisfactory to Guinea.

The development of policy toward other African countries has been influenced by the different points of view held by each. Several distinct groupings representing divergent policies have emerged.

Twelve of the new states, associated with the French Community and led by Senegal and Ivory Coast, have become known as the Brazzaville group because they met at a conference in that city in December 1960, where they announced their belief that a policy of maintaining close ties with Western European countries was necessary for their survival. Guinea joined another group, composed of

itself, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, the UAR and the so-called Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne—GPRA), which met at Casablanca in early January 1961. This Casablanca group, declaring that its members were determined to maintain complete independence, rejected the Western orientation of the Brazzaville states as a surrender of African sovereignty. The basic differences in outlook were later reflected in the conflicting positions of the two groups on the Algerian and Congo issues. The Casablanca group, in its resolutions against colonialism, contended that France should immediately withdraw its military forces from Algeria and grant complete sovereignty to the GPRA. The Brazzaville group favored some settlement that would be satisfactory to both sides. With respect to the Congo, the Casablanca group claimed that the United Nations' leadership was betraying these people in their struggle for independence through policies which favored the perpetuation of colonial rule. The Brazzaville countries supported the United Nations, holding that it was the best organization to deal with the problem.

In 1961 the Brazzaville group became part of a third combination—the Monrovia group—composed of the 12 Brazzaville states (Cameroun, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo Republic [Brazzaville], Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta and the Malagasy Republic) and eight countries outside the French Community (Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo and Tunisia). In their first meeting, held at Monrovia in May 1961, the conferees emphasized their commitment to cooperation among the African states based on "tolerance, solidarity and good neighborliness." They advocated unity of political action without sacrifice of sovereignty and affirmed their support of the United Nations efforts in the Congo. They avoided any explicit question of Western orientation.

The Casablanca countries and the Brazzaville countries in the Monrovia group have all been active in international conferences since they became independent. As a member of the Casablanca group, Guinea has been an articulate advocate of a neutralist pan-Africanism as against any form of partnership with the former colonial powers. The Monrovia countries had not been moved by these arguments by late 1961, however, and had failed to answer an appeal to join the Casablanca group's proposals to coordinate the economic, political and military affairs of the African nations.

Some 50 experts of the Casablanca group's economic commission met at Conakry on July 17, 1961. During the same week about 100 members of the Monrovia group's technical committee (only Ethiopia was not represented) gathered in Dakar. The two conferences produced similar recommendations for economic cooperation within their re-

spective memberships—the creation of an African Economic Development Bank, the harmonization of economic policies and the creation of joint organizations for shipping and telecommunications—but differed in general approach. The Casablanca countries regarded political unity as the necessary framework for economic cooperation whereas the Monrovia states felt that economic cooperation was a realizable immediate goal which hopefully would lead to political unity if not to integration. However, the two groups were close enough together in the kind of economic cooperation each plans within its own circle to suggest that they might be able to combine or coordinate their efforts at least in certain areas. By mid-1961 Guinea had established diplomatic relations with several important states in the Monrovia group and had sent ambassadors to Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo and established a consulate in Sierra Leone.

Guinea's leaders evidently fear a recurrence of the political and economic isolation that followed the sudden French withdrawal from the country after it had voted for independence. Apparently recognizing that a pan-African state is not likely to come into being in the near future, they have worked aggressively for cooperative arrangements with friendly West African countries. A Guinea-Ghana Union was announced in November 1958 as the nucleus for a "United States of West Africa." After numerous diplomatic conferences, in which Mali also took part, a Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union Pact was signed in April 1961 by the presidents of these countries. Other African states or federations were invited to join. By July 1, 1961, representatives of the three signatories had formalized their pan-African objectives in a document publicized as the charter of the Union of African States (Union des Etats Africains—UEA).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

When France brought the area of present-day Guinea under its protection in 1881, it met little immediate opposition from the inhabitants—most of whose chiefs had, over a period of years, come increasingly under French control. Soon after the area was granted administrative autonomy in 1890, however, restiveness began to be manifested, particularly among the people of the Fouta Djallon (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). Open hostility was limited mainly to skirmishes between competing Guinean chiefs, harassment of French administrative officials and occasional assaults on widely dispersed security detachments. A concerted effort to overthrow French rule by force or subversion was never attempted; conflicting interests of the various ethnic groups, linguistic diversity and lack of communication between relatively isolated regions were the major obstacles to common action.

After World War II protests against colonial economic and social discrimination began to be heard and to take organized political form. Popular opposition to French controls became increasingly nationalistic in character under the guidance of a group of young leaders who had been influenced by European political thought and stimulated by the global conflict as a war of liberation. There were similar developments elsewhere in the region. France, under its constitution of 1946, granted parliamentary representation to its West African territories, but this and other concessions did not halt the growth of an anticolonial movement in which the new African deputies played an active role. A Guinean delegation joined those of the other French West African territories at Bamako in 1946 in organizing the African Democratic Rally (*Rassemblement Démocratique Africain—RDA*). The RDA platform called for common political action “for the full implementation of the 1946 Constitution and, as a long-term goal, for the liberation of Africa from an odious tutelage-imperialism” (see ch. 17, *Political Dynamics*). Thereafter the main force of the RDA’s political efforts was directed at ending French authority in the area.

Guinean leaders, more militant than most, were soon aggressively advocating united opposition to colonialism. Those in other colonies generally favored some sort of political association with France on a basis of equality. Relations between France and its Guinean territory rapidly deteriorated as Guinean leaders in RDA and territorial trade union conferences not only attacked French political and economic domination but declared that the French moral, social and cultural influence which prevailed among the educated in the area must give way to specifically African standards.

Opposition to French rule increased in scope and intensity with continued emphasis on grievances. Forced labor on the roads and other public works, nominally abolished in 1946, persisted especially in remote areas and helped sharpen anti-French feeling. There were also vivid memories of hardships suffered under the wartime Vichy regime when Guineans were driven—reportedly sometimes with physical violence—to deliver high quotas of rubber to meet the Nazi-German demand. The Vichy-French officials in Guinea were resented as slave drivers and despised as partisans of Nazi-inspired racial discrimination policies. Other complaints centered on the Guinean tax burden which was angrily contrasted with the special privileges enjoyed by the French. Farmers also complained of being forced to contribute a stated proportion of certain crops to the government at a fixed price. The jail sentences and public whippings imposed for “contempt of French authority” further excited public feeling.

The Guineans felt that in comparison to most other French West African colonies, they were subjected to stricter policies, were granted fewer privileges and were among the last to benefit by reforms. The French, despite their liberal expenditures for port and railway construction and for the establishment of experimental farms, were charged with having neglected Guinea with respect to educational facilities and opportunities. It was indignantly noted, for example, that the only university in French West Africa was in Dakar in Senegal. In addition the Guineans were irked by the appointment of Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast and of Leopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal to the French Cabinet without comparable recognition for Sékou Touré. They also resented the restrictions on trade union development in Guinea (see ch. 9, Education; ch. 13, Labor Relations and Organizations).

POLICIES RESPECTING OTHER NATIONS

Under the French administration Guinean leaders gained little or no experience in foreign affairs and had few opportunities for acquaintance with other peoples and governments. Having elected to break away from France, they found themselves in urgent need of material and technical assistance and with little more than nationalist and pan-African ideals and a profound suspicion of possible assaults on their new sovereignty to guide them in establishing relations with other nations. Close diplomatic ties were soon established with those countries which were first to offer help—notably Ghana, the Soviet bloc, the People's Republic of China (Communist China), the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and Yugoslavia. Frequent interchanges of visits with these countries were marked by much press and radio publicity. The general policy apparently was to accept aid from any country offering it—provided that no compromising commitments were involved. Guinean spokesmen were emphatic in stating that they did not intend that the country should gain its freedom from France only to lose it to another power.

President Touré, during this period, repeatedly stated that Guinea sought "friendship, fraternity and cooperation in the economic and cultural fields with all governments and all peoples of the world." This neutralist policy, he maintained, was the best insurance for African unity which, in turn, was a requirement for a common front against "imperialism and colonialism" and for negotiating with other countries on equal terms. He and his subordinates saw ultimate African unity as the only alternative to a "Balkanized" Africa, the fragmented parts of which, they contended, would be helpless against outside powers.

Guinean leaders have often declared that their neutralist attitude should not be mistaken for one of apathy or indifference. Most of them seem to be concerned not to be labeled pro- or anti-Eastern or Western, and they seek to avoid the impression that their government is subservient to any foreign power. Their vociferous opposition to "imperialism and colonialism," however, has consistently placed Guinean spokesmen on the side of the Communist countries in controversies in international bodies.

Issues and Objectives

In early 1961 the makers of Guinean foreign policy were preoccupied mainly with specific issues involving the activities within two African states, Algeria and the Republic of Congo. Some of the former French and British colonies and the North African states differed in their views of what their relations with their former colonial rulers ought to be and on the manner in which the Algerian and Congo problems should be solved. Out of these differences came the alignment into the Brazzaville, Casablanca and Monrovia groups.

The Brazzaville group, which met for the first time late in 1960 under the leadership of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, President of Ivory Coast, was composed of 11 former French colonies (the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo Republic [Brazzaville], Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, the Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta) and Cameroon, a former French-administered United Nations trust territory. This group, convening at Brazzaville in the Congo Republic, sought a compromise solution of the Algerian and Congo problems which would be acceptable to French and other Western European countries. It also opposed the introduction of Communist-bloc influence into African affairs through the acceptance of economic and technical aid from those nations.

The Casablanca group—Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, the UAR and GPRA—convened early in January 1961. Its leaders were militant neutralists, and the main purpose of their meeting was apparently to rebut the moderate policies advocated at Brazzaville. A statement of principles—the African Charter of Casablanca—was signed at the end of this first conference and a policy of nonalignment with either the Eastern or Western blocs was proclaimed. The foreign minister of the Kingdom of Libya and the representative of the GPRA took part in the discussions but were not asked to sign the charter. Ceylon's Ambassador to Cairo attended as an observer.

A final communiqué, dealing mainly with Congolese and Algerian problems, demanded the restoration of Patrice Lumumba (later killed) to the Premiership in the Congo, the reconvening of the Congolese parliament and the disarming by the United Nations of Colonel

Joseph Mobutu's forces (which the communiqué called "lawless bands"). The signatories further indicated that failure of the United Nations to act on these demands might result in withdrawal of their forces from the Congo. They also pledged full support to the Algerian nationalists and vigorously denounced the referendum which France planned to hold in Algeria. France also was condemned for conducting nuclear tests in the Sahara.

The Casablanca group soon met intensified competition in its efforts to unite the independent African states around its policies. This came from the Monrovia group which was, in effect, an expansion of the Brazzaville group. On May 8, 1961, high-ranking representatives from 20 African countries met in Monrovia for a four-day conference with Liberia's President William V. S. Tubman presiding as chairman. Besides the Brazzaville group, the nations represented were Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo and Tunisia. The conferees passed a comprehensive set of resolutions and agreed to hold their next conference in Lagos in Nigeria at an unspecified date. Meanwhile a technical committee was appointed to prepare plans for cooperation in the cultural, economic, education, scientific, transportation and communication fields. Like the Casablanca group, they resolved to give material and moral aid to colonial territories in their struggles for independence, but they differed with Casablanca in resolving to support the United Nations in its efforts in the Congo and, instead of condemning France for its action in Algeria, they appealed to both France and the GPRA to end the war and come to an understanding which would give Algeria its independence. The conferees went on record as favoring the settlement of disputes between African states by peaceful means including, if necessary, the use of commissions appointed for that specific purpose.

By late 1961 neither the Casablanca nor the Monrovia group had developed sufficiently coherent foreign policies to permit much more than an appraisal of the positions of their individual members on international issues. The Casablanca group lacked homogeneity. Its membership included one monarchy and four republics. Three were sub-Saharan Negro countries and two were Moslem Arab countries oriented by history and traditions to the Mediterranean and the Middle East rather than to the south. Two—the UAR and Ghana—had been within the British sphere; the others had been ruled by France. They had in common their opposition to non-African interference in the Congo, to the French position in Algeria and to the Monrovia group's policy of seeking a compromise solution for both problems. But the fundamental differences in basic political orientation and in ethnic background among the members of the group tended to weaken the forces that drew its members together.

Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union

Guinea almost immediately after independence undertook to establish close ties with other African states. It turned, not to the former French territories which had elected to remain within the new French Community, but to Ghana which was a British colony until 1957. On November 23, 1958, President Touré signed an agreement with President Kwame Nkrumah in Accra, forming a Guinea-Ghana Union which they described as the foundation stone for a "United States of West Africa." The signatories expressed their intention to coordinate their foreign, economic and defense policies, and they invited other West African states to join their union. Guinea received its first foreign aid from Ghana (see ch. 25, Public Finance; ch. 28, Foreign Economic Relations).

President Nkrumah on May 1, 1959, at the end of a three-week visit to Guinea, signed a joint declaration with President Touré announcing agreement on a proposed "Union of Independent African States," apparently a modification of the "United States of West Africa" concept. Each pledged full support for the Union subject to ratification of the scheme by their national assemblies. Other African states or federations, willing to accept the principles of the Union, were invited to join. Economic, diplomatic and cultural relations were to be conducted with other countries whose policies were not prejudicial to Africa's best interest on the basis of "equality and reciprocity."

Each member state could retain its identity and its own constitution. Each could determine its own foreign policy but might, if it wished, be represented diplomatically in other countries by another member. Nationals of the member states were to have visas for travel within the Union. Each member would maintain its own armed forces, but the heads of state would confer on overall defense policies. Sovereignty could be curtailed or totally surrendered in the interests of the Union by agreement of the members. An economic council consisting of representatives of the member states would be charged with determining general economic policies and studying economic and financial problems of the Union or of its members. A Bank of the Union would be established to issue money and support the currencies of the member states.

The understandings between Guinea and Ghana associate two countries differing in historical experience, language and cultural tradition. Guinea is more than 400 miles from Ghana by air and more than 1,100 miles by sea; there is no common border and no rail or highway connections. French-speaking President Touré and English-speaking President Nkrumah must converse with each other through interpreters, although President Touré has taken steps which are designed to make English, in the course of time, the second language of general

communication in Guinea (see ch. 9, Education; ch. 21, Public Information and Propaganda).

The leaders of both countries oppose the "compromise principles" of the Monrovia group, share a belief in pan-Africanism and agree on the necessity for united action in the service of that cause. They differ, however, in their conception of the form which the projected pan-African organization should take. President Nkrumah appears to favor a closely knit league of states, modeled after the UAR. President Touré seems to aim at a loose federation grouped around Guinea. Running through these differences are the personal motives of the two leaders, both proud and ambitious men. Outward harmony has prevailed, but there are elements of discord. President Touré was presumably disappointed when President Nkrumah failed to give full support to Guinea's proposals in the Casablanca conference and was perhaps even more disturbed when he refused, after the 1961 conference to follow Guinea in withdrawing its military contingent from the United Nations forces in the Congo.

The constitutions of Guinea and Ghana provide for the curtailment or complete surrender of sovereignty within a pan-African framework under certain conditions. The flags of both countries consist of the pan-African colors, red, yellow and green, arranged in three stripes of equal breadth—vertical in the case of Guinea, horizontal in that of Ghana.

Guinea's relations with Mali are conditioned by the strong political, commercial and ethnic ties that have existed for centuries between the inhabitants of the upper Niger Valley in Guinea and those of the middle Niger in Mali. Both countries were French colonies (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 17, Political Dynamics). Before the referendum in 1958, the RDA was the dominant political party in both areas. Also active in both were the RDA-linked trade union and youth movements—the General Union of Workers of Black Africa (Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire—UGTAN) and the African Youth Council (Conseil de la Jeunesse d'Afrique—CJA).

Most of Mali's political leaders at the time of the referendum on adherence to the French Community are said to have failed to advocate voting for independence—as Guinea did—only because they were fearful of the strength of the French administration and the opposition of many of the local chiefs. Guinean leaders claimed that Mali's vote to remain in the French Community was largely responsible for encouraging Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the Ivory Coast leader, to give moral support to France's abrupt withdrawal from Guinea after the referendum. However, the chief political figure in Mali, President Modibo Keita, refused to support the Ivory Coast's position and advised the other French colonies to maintain friendly relations with Guinea. Mali's leaders were irritated by the French reaction to

Guinea's decision not to enter the French Community, and they were disillusioned by Houphouët-Boigny's failure to fulfill his promise to organize the territories which had voted to join the Community into a Federation of French West Africa. On Guinea's part, the break-up of the Mali Federation (Senegal and Mali) in August 1960—within a year of its formation—helped to relieve the suspicion that the Federation was a French-sponsored maneuver to increase Guinea's isolation.

President Keita, having asked the French (upon Guinean urging) to remove their troops and bases from Mali, met with the presidents of Guinea and Ghana in Conakry in December 1960 to discuss union. The three leaders reaffirmed their belief in pan-Africanism and condemned several proposals of the Brazzaville group, including a compromise solution of the Algerian and Congo problems and a proposal to organize the African states into federations based on the language of their former colonial rulers.

A committee was appointed to study methods for establishing a Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union and for coordinating the economic, fiscal and foreign policies of the three states. The presidents agreed to meet quarterly (at Accra, Bamako and Conakry in turn) until the union was established.

A Union Pact was signed on April 29, 1961, by the three presidents meeting in Accra. A communiqué announcing the event stated that the three states would strive for "common economic and monetary policies" and arrange for common diplomatic representatives. The leaders indicated that the Union charter included provisions for the admission of other African states or federations into the Union, and that a loose association of states rather than a federated organization was intended.

As a further step toward the pan-African goal so zealously pursued by Guinea's leaders, representatives of the Union prepared a document which they called the Charter of the Union of African States (Union des États Africains—UEA). The charter—published on July 1, 1961, and approved by the Guinean National Assembly in a special session on August 22, 1961—reiterated the principal features of the Guinea-Ghana-Mali Pact. At once more comprehensive and concrete in the steps envisaged, it apparently was designed to have a wider appeal among the African states.

The activities of the projected Union, according to the charter, would be concerned mainly with coordinated approaches to domestic problems; close cooperation in foreign affairs; a defense system providing for the mobilization of the resources of all member states to combat aggression against any one state; and the exploitation of the economic resources of each state for the best interests of the people

throughout the Union. The charter further stated that the chiefs of the member states would meet four times a year, when they would discuss the international situation and prepare directives for their diplomatic missions. The charter also prescribed that in international organizations the delegates of member states would consult with each other and take a common position on the issues before them.

France

In its dealings with France, independent Guinea has been formally polite rather than friendly. The Guinean leaders, in the course of their campaign for independence, aroused a strong anti-French sentiment among the people. This was reinforced after the referendum by a wave of resentment caused by the abrupt evacuation of the French who took with them much needed material, including even telephones, office equipment and general supplies. The French were blamed for the inefficiency of administrative agencies which attempted to carry on with inexperienced supervisors directing untrained subordinates. Since independence Guinean leaders have closely scrutinized French policies, particularly those pertaining to Africa, for indications of any attempts to reestablish colonialism in Guinea or to frustrate pan-African plans. French actions or policies which seem aimed at ties with former colonies still in the French Community or which can be interpreted as manifestations of reluctance to abolish colonial controls—as in Algeria—have been vociferously attacked in Guinea. Denunciation of France, a popular theme among all ethnic elements, seemed, in fact, to be exploited to promote national unity.

Intense bitterness against the French continued to be manifested during the early months of independence. After the first year's struggle with the problems of establishing a new state, however, anti-French feeling gradually moderated. Most of Guinea's leaders were educated in French-operated schools in Dakar, Bamako or Conakry, and the benefits of French culture and of a common French language were generally recognized.

In 1960 about 40 percent of the Guinean students abroad were in France. In 1961, despite repeated denunciations of French colonialism by Guinea's political leaders, more than 40 percent of the country's import trade and about 45 percent of its export trade was with France—a larger volume than was maintained with any other nation. The first Guinean and French ambassadors were exchanged in April 1961, and in July of the same year a cultural accord, signed in Conakry, provided for France's aid in recruiting French teachers for Guinean schools (see ch. 9, Education; ch. 28, Foreign Economic Relations).

West Germany

Guinean relations with West Germany are more cordial than those maintained with any other Western European country. The recognition of Guinea on October 31, 1958, a few weeks after independence, was followed in January 1959 by a visit of high German officials to Conakry and, a month later, by a visit of Louis-Lansana Béavogui, then Guinean Minister of Economic Affairs and the Plan, to Bonn. In November 1959 President Touré stopped in West Germany while on an extended tour on which he was accompanied by the President of the National Assembly, the Minister of Economic Affairs and the Plan, the Minister of Interior and Security and the Chief of Staff of the Army. The group extended its stay for two days to visit industrial plants.

An agreement signed on June 18, 1960, provided for extensive technical aid grants (see ch. 25, Public Finance). By the end of 1960 German technicians were helping to construct modernized installations for processing and refrigerating fish; to improve animal husbandry and veterinary science; and to initiate new public health and sanitation practices. The aid program was marked by close and friendly cooperation; both Guineans receiving training in Germany and German specialists working in Guinea were well received by their respective hosts (see ch. 11, Labor Force; ch. 28, Foreign Economic Relations).

In furtherance of the economic and commercial agreements signed on July 7, 1960, a high-ranking Guinean delegation spent 10 days in West Germany during October observing industrial and commercial installations and discussing processes that might be applicable to Guinea (see ch. 28, Foreign Economic Relations). The delegation, headed by N'Famara Keita, then the Minister in charge of the government's Three-Year Plan, included officials of the Port Administration and of the Ministry of Rural Economy. The group manifested particular interest in the operation of road construction machinery and port equipment and in machines and methods for making such items as bicycles, nails, screws and kitchen utensils.

The Soviet Union and European Satellites

President Touré and his principal associates are Marxist in outlook and hold many of the organizational concepts and political and economic premises which are state dogma in the Communist countries. Accordingly, they approach the Soviet Union and its European satellites, Communist China and Yugoslavia, with a sense of kinship which is lacking in their associations with the Western democracies. Up to late 1961 their relations with the Communist nations were all friendly.

These countries were among the first to provide Guinea with loans

and aid after independence. A commercial treaty, signed with the Soviet Union on September 8, 1960, contained a "most favored nation" clause and included arrangements for Soviet economic and technical aid in furtherance of the Three-Year Plan. A loan agreement, signed on March 1, 1960, provided for large credits to be advanced, and, on June 8, 1960, a cultural accord was signed at Conakry (see ch. 25, Public Finance; ch. 28, Foreign Economic Relations).

Two agreements were made with Czechoslovakia on May 17, 1960, to facilitate trade between the two countries and provide technical and material assistance to Guinea. Similar aid arrangements were made with Poland, East Germany and Hungary.

High-level official visits between Guinea and the Soviet Union and the European satellite countries have been frequent. President Touré visited the Soviet Union in December 1959 and again in September 1960. The President of the Soviet Presidium, Leonid Brezhnev, was in Guinea in February 1961 for five days. Guinea's Minister of Health and Population visited Czechoslovakia in April 1961.

President Touré, in May 1961, was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize for 1960 by the Soviet Union as "an incorruptible loyal son of his people who fought tirelessly for the freedom and independence of his home land." The President in his acceptance speech stressed, perhaps significantly, Guinea's independence and neutrality and proclaimed that the Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti Démocratique de Guinée—PDG) was not a Communist party. Reportedly Guinean leaders, as if to obviate any criticism that they had surrendered sovereignty in exchange for aid, have occasionally criticized some of the activities of Soviet and satellite representatives in Guinea. Specifically mentioned were language difficulties with Communist technicians, most of whom spoke no French, and the tendency of the whole group to bring its own servants and remain aloof from the local people. Unfavorable comparisons have also been made between goods produced by the Soviet Union and its satellites and those made in France.

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia recognized Guinea only two days after independence. The Presidents of both countries apparently consider that they have much in common, and they have worked consistently to develop good relations between their two governments. The Guineans particularly admire Yugoslavia's neutralism, its independent attitude in relation to Moscow and its ability to deal with Western countries on an equal basis.

A Yugoslav good-will mission, headed by the president of the Foreign Trade Office, visited Guinea in May 1959. The next year a

Guinean mission under Bengaly Camara, then Minister of Labor and Social Legislation, went to Yugoslavia. A commercial, scientific and technical cooperation agreement, signed at Belgrade in October 1960, provided for aid to Guinea in the fields of industry, mining research and city planning. Commercial exchanges valued at about \$4 million were envisaged. When President Touré visited Yugoslavia in January 1961 he awarded President Tito the Independence Cross (la Croix de Compagnon de l'Indépendance). He was offered credits to aid the Three-Year Plan (see ch. 25, Public Finance). Two months later President and Mrs. Tito made a four-day visit to Guinea, where they opened a Yugoslav exposition sponsored by the National Export Society for Yugoslav Products. Their reception was marked by great cordiality in Conakry, Kindia, Mamou, Dubréka and the other places which they visited; President Touré personally escorted them on the tour. Within a month a delegation of Guinean women, headed by Mrs. Loffo Camara, Secretary of State for Social Affairs, attended the Congress of Yugoslav Women at Zagreb.

Communist China

Good relations with Communist China have been fostered by several important similarities in the situation of the two countries, different as they are in other respects. Their peoples, though culturally different, are non-white. Their labor forces are predominantly agricultural and both have embarked on an ambitious program of economic construction and radical social change. Finally, both are one-party states which, in forming the national self-image, attribute, in varying degrees, their past tribulations and present dangers to the actions of the West.

Communist China recognized the Government of Guinea on October 8, 1958, only four days after independence. President Touré apparently thought Guinea could learn valuable lessons from the experience of Communist China. In Peiping on September 13, 1960, the leaders of the two countries signed a 10-year friendship treaty providing for economic and technical cooperations. The Chinese Communists agreed to provide interest-free long-term credits and to send agricultural experts to Guinea to assist in improving rice production (see ch. 25, Public Finance; ch. 28, Foreign Economic Relations). Their agricultural exposition, held in Conakry early in 1961, attracted favorable attention. Exhibit items were simple and suited to the needs of unskilled Guinean labor. Moreover, duplicates could be made locally from materials at hand.

President Touré's human investment program has resemblances to the much more extensive Chinese Communist use of volunteer and conscripted labor on large-scale national projects (see ch. 11, Labor

Force). At the same time the Chinese remain less familiar to Guineans generally than do Europeans. Moreover, the Guineans and Chinese differ so much in temperament and in attitudes toward work that this tends to hamper the efforts of the energetic and industrious Chinese specialists in Guinea. Many Guineans have criticized the Chinese for being too zealous in their attempts to propagate their work methods and doctrines. There was also some criticism of the Chinese for bringing their own workmen to set up the agricultural exposition rather than hiring Guinean labor.

However, relations between the two countries have, on the whole, been cordial. Guineans seemed pleased that the Chinese were living and working with villagers even in the remote areas of the country. Guinea was visited early in March 1961 by the Vice-President of the Chinese Communist National Assembly. Later in March a Chinese commercial delegation arrived.

United States

Relations with the United States after a cool beginning seemed to be improving in 1961. The United States did not formally recognize Guinea until November 2, 1958—after more than 20 other nations had done so—and the young Guinean Government attributed the delay to French influence. Guinea's leaders, in their denunciations of colonialism, have frequently criticized the United States for supporting the policies of France, Belgium and Great Britain—the principal colonial powers in Africa.

President Touré's address to the United Nations on October 11, 1960—mainly a discussion of the Congo issue—was a sweeping condemnation of the colonial powers and an indictment of the United States for supporting them and for its "imperialistic" attitude toward Cuba. After the speech he visited Cuba for three days where he signed a cultural accord with Premier Fidel Castro, and, on November 20, sent a special note to President Eisenhower charging the United States with partisanship in the Congo dispute. The next day his half-brother, Ismael Touré, in a speech to the United Nations aimed another denunciation at "American imperialism."

President Touré has nevertheless repeatedly said that he would accept aid from the United States, or any other nation, provided no commitments detrimental to his country's sovereignty were involved and the pan-African cause would be helped. During a visit to the United States in the fall of 1959, he conferred with representatives of the Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation and was apparently pleased with the company's continued interest in the possibility of organizing an international consortium of aluminum producers to undertake the construction of an aluminum plant adjoining the Fria

alumina works—potentially a greater source of income for Guinea than all the Communist-bloc aid combined. On this trip he also concluded an agreement on cultural relations with the United States and another one on the acceptance of a trade mission in Conakry. The bilateral economic agreement, signed on September 30, 1960, provided for United States technical and economic assistance. Special emphasis was placed on aiding agriculture and small industries and on English-language instruction (see ch. 9, Education; ch. 24, Industrial Potential).

Early in 1961 the official Guinean attitude toward the United States seemed to moderate, possibly in the expectation that the new American administration would adopt an African policy to their liking. Permission, refused in December, was given for two United States naval ships to visit Conakry. President Touré, in mid-June 1961, cordially received the chief of the United States Peace Corps and personally conducted him on a tour to Forécariah and other towns in the coastal area. A brief visit to the United States in mid-June 1961 by Alassane Diop, Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, was followed in July by an extended tour of the country by Fodé Cisse, Minister of Labor and Social Legislation.

In public statements President Touré continued to insist, however, that his own views had not changed and that neutralism, nationalism, and pan-Africanism would continue to characterize his country's position. He reiterated his belief that the United States supported the colonial powers in Africa in contrast to the Communist countries—some of which, he remarked, had befriended Guinea.

Others

Israel

Relations with Israel are cordial, and, although most Guineans are nominally Moslem, the country has not been affected by the hostility to Israel felt in the Moslem Arab countries. Most Guineans respect Israel's achievements as a new nation. A Guinean mission composed of important officials from several ministries made an extended tour of Israel in the summer of 1960. The alertness and technical qualifications of the few Israelis in Guinea are much admired, and the Israeli ambassador in office in 1961 was highly regarded by government leaders.

United Arab Republic (UAR)

President Touré and President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt are both articulate neutralists and their personal relations are friendly. They face comparable problems in their efforts to transform the economic and social foundations of their countries. Both talk in pan-African terms, but from different vantage points. Egypt is Arab and Middle Eastern in its closest connections. Guinea is Negro

and sub-Saharan. Islam, deeply rooted in Egypt, is more nominal in Guinea where a pre-Islamic native African tradition lies close to the surface and many persons are still animists. President Nasser's apparent attempt to increase UAR influence south of the Sahara through an Islamic revival there contrasts with President Touré's policy of minimizing the importance of religion in national life.

Such differences condition the views of the two leaders and, although there have been no overt clashes between them, they have been in disagreement on at least one foreign policy question—that of relations with Israel. The Casablanca conference in January 1961, at President Nasser's insistence and reportedly over President Touré's objections, included in its final communiqué, a clause branding Israel as "an instrument of imperialism and neocolonialism, not only in the Middle East, but also in Africa." The action was, in any event, at odds with Guinea's desire for cordial relations with Israel. During President Touré's visit to Egypt a few months later he was eulogized in the Egyptian press which did not, however, mention his proposal that the UAR join the Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union.

MECHANICS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy, like the other important areas of decision-making on the national level, is dominated by President Touré and the small group of men closest to him at the top of the government and the single political party, the PDG. The personal character of President Touré and the wide latitude of his authority give the process and the outcome an air of improvisation. The constitution delegates to the president the power to negotiate treaties. Peace and trade treaties, as well as treaties which change territorial boundaries, involve international organizations, commit national funds or modify legislative acts, can be ratified only by the enactment of law by the National Assembly. Similarly, agreements made with African states to provide for the "association or for the establishment of a community, and involving partial or total relinquishment of sovereignty with a view to achievement of African unity" must also be ratified by the National Assembly (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

In practice, national policy, internal and external, not only originates in the PDG, but is carried out or modified in accordance with directives issued by party councils (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics). All important foreign policy decisions are initiated by the party's highest executive organ, the National Political Bureau (Bureau Politique Nationale—BPN). The transmission of policy to the government constitutes no problem, since the president of the republic is a member of the BPN as well as secretary general of the PDG, and all of the deputies of the National Assembly are PDG members. Formal

government action on PDG decisions accordingly takes on the character of a legalizing formality.

Trade union organizations, particularly the General Union of Workers of Black Africa (Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire—UGTAN), are used by the government to build domestic support for its foreign policies. The leadership of UGTAN has been deeply involved in politics since 1957 when it was organized under the direction of Sékou Touré who was then also chief of the Guinea section of the interterritorial RDA which, after independence, became the PDG. The UGTAN proved to be an effective vehicle for mobilizing the vote favoring national independence in the 1958 referendum (see ch. 13, Labor Relations and Organization; ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

Since independence the National Confederation of Guinean Workers (*Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs de Guinée*—CNTG)—together with UGTAN and other labor organizations—have been at one with the government in all domestic and foreign policies, including the Three-Year Plan, the human investment program, neutralism and pan-Africanism. The potentialities of labor organizations in the foreign policy field were enhanced by the formation of the All African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) on May 1961, with headquarters in Casablanca. Guinea's delegation to the founding conference included high officials of UGTAN and CNTG and the Chief of the Department of African Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Federation's charter advocated "positive neutralism."

The government's policies and interpretations of developments abroad are effectively disseminated and explained to the people through the local meetings of the PDG branches throughout the country. Local party secretaries must hold weekly meetings at which set topics are explained. Information and directives go out from Conakry by radio, telephone, letter and messenger—reportedly reaching into even the most remote villages within 48 hours. By this means the authorities maintain a nationwide program of political orientation. The effectiveness of this network was illustrated in the intensely emotional national consensus on the Congo issue which was manifested at the death of Patrice Lumumba (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics; ch. 21, Public Information and Propaganda).

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ranks in Cabinet prestige and importance with the Ministries of Planning, National Education and Commerce. In the early days of independence President Touré, in addition to his other responsibilities, was in charge of foreign affairs. In January 1961 Louis-Lansana Réavogui (a doctor of medicine and a member of the BPN) was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Ministry, as of mid-1961, consisted of a secretariat, several

departmental chiefs and their assistants and a clerical staff. The principal subdivisions included: the general secretariat, the protocol section and the departments of press and documentation, African affairs, economic affairs and cultural affairs (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

The Ministry's first problem after independence was to recruit a diplomatic corps. In the absence of persons trained or experienced in this field, the Ministry turned mainly to labor organizations, the medical profession and the district administrations for help. A doctor of medicine at Ballay Hospital in Conakry and a staunch party man, Seydou Conté, was first made Ambassador to the Soviet Union (in September 1959) and later (in May 1961) Ambassador to the United States.

DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION

The sizable number of foreign countries which keep diplomatic missions in Conakry is a source of pride to the nation's leaders. By mid-1961 Guinea was exchanging ambassadors or other representatives with 30 countries—Bulgaria, Belgium, Communist China, Congo (Stanleyville), Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Ghana, Great Britain, Holland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Soviet Union, Switzerland, Togo, United Arab Republic, United States, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), West Germany and Yugoslavia. In addition, East Germany, Hungary and Poland were represented by commercial delegations and Cuba by a *chargé d'affaires*.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

In the third year of its independence Guinea belonged to at least six international organizations. Sponsored by Iraq and Japan, it was admitted to the United Nations on December 12, 1958, and its representatives soon were serving in three important special groups of the UN: the Special Economic Commission for Africa, the Technical Assistance Board and the Commission for Technical Cooperation South of the Sahara, which is a subcommission of the Committee on Technical Cooperation for Africa. It also became a member of five specialized agencies of the United Nations Economic and Social Council: the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the International Communications Union (ICU), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

CHAPTER 20

SUBVERSIVE POTENTIALITIES

Subversion, as a covert effort to overthrow the government and institute a new political order, appeared to be a minor threat as of late in 1961. The government seemed to be seriously concerned, however, with manifestations which President Touré, in a speech in mid-December, called subversive. Such manifestations came particularly from leftist elements in the teaching corps and among the executive officials of the National Union of Guinean Teachers who complained that educational reforms imposed unduly heavy workloads without appropriate wage increases. Some concern was shown also with the individual behavior of a relatively small number of disgruntled persons who had lost the power and prestige they formerly held as agents of the colonial regime. But this group, unorganized and without influence, was an irritant rather than a threat within the established order. Other groups had dissatisfactions and grievances stemming from the impact of government policies on tribal or religious customs, and a few held grudges provoked by governmental economic controls. These persons, regarding themselves as victims of injustice, might under certain circumstances become collaborators in a serious subversive movement (see ch. 9, Education; ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

Subversion, as of mid-1961, had not been defined by law, but the leaders of the political hierarchy gave the term very broad interpretations which had great influence in the judicial system (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government). Any act deemed to threaten the internal or external security of the state might be treated as subversive, not by invoking a specific antsubversive law, but by inflicting maximum punishment for the offenses under the ordinary criminal code. The High Court of Justice, the only court concerned with counter-revolutionary crimes, appears to have met only twice: in April 1960 to try a group of persons accused of plotting against the Republic; in November 1961 to try 12 executives of the National Union of Guinean Teachers for subversive activities. Details of these trials or of the composition of the courts were not available at the end of 1961.

The security forces seemed to be entirely adequate in strength and efficiency to meet any internal emergency. Oppressive measures ap-

parently were not required to hold the few dissidents in check. The regime enjoyed considerable success in its efforts to win popular confidence and support. This was accomplished mainly by indoctrination in nationalistic and pan-African concepts and by building up hopes for better living standards based on the premise that, independence having been achieved, the people were henceforth free men working for themselves rather than for "colonial exploiters."

Unlike some of the other newly independent African states, Guinea has virtually no history of revolts or subversion against its rulers. During the late 1800's and early 1900's, when the French were establishing their rule, they encountered stubborn resistance from several chieftains, particularly from Samory Touré, a Malinké, and from Alfa Yaya, the Foulah chief of Labé. These resistance leaders are now held up as national heroes (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). Thereafter, however, the relatively small French security force was needed more to check dissension among the various ethnic groups than to maintain the French in power.

The period of tension between ruler and ruled which occurred after World War II was characterized by increased pressures from the political groups that sprang up at that time and by a form of passive resistance to colonial rule. Some secret organizations may have worked clandestinely to build up an anticolonial feeling, but there were no organized attempts to overthrow the French administration or to drive it out by force or other illegal means. Guinea gained its independence by a referendum arranged by the French who voluntarily, if reluctantly, withdrew their controls.

ATTITUDE TOWARD SUBVERSION

The political leaders regard resistance to government policies as entirely without justification. The Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti Démocratique de Guinée—PDG), with its pervasive organization, has indoctrinated the people to believe that any attempt to overthrow the existing order can come only from agents of the "imperialistic" powers. The majority seems to be convinced that the PDG regime is their only safeguard against forces which seek to destroy Guinea's independence and again subject the country to colonial rule.

The Government

The government looks upon all individuals or groups opposing its policies as actually or potentially subversive, and subversion is regarded as a crime deserving harsh and summary punishment. President Touré—in a speech on October 26, 1958—said that, for counter-revolutionaries, Guinea would have the scaffold as France had the guillotine.

Soon after independence, opposition parties were absorbed into the PDG. Convinced of the supreme importance of political unity in gaining and retaining independence, the party has always been highly sensitive to political opposition and has operated on the principle that, wherever it appeared, it should be met head-on and thwarted as an unjustified attack against the state (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

Accordingly, the secretary of each PDG committee in the villages and towns throughout the country is charged with keeping in close contact with the people in the area of his jurisdiction. He is responsible for preventing the development of situations out of which opposition to party policies and projects might arise. Periodic inspections are made by members of the National Political Bureau (Bureau Politique Nationale—BPN) to determine the effectiveness of his efforts. The party seeks to avoid the formation of social classes or of conflicts of interests between groups and tries to eliminate any special loyalties associated with ethnic origins, regional groupings or religious beliefs. The government, in implementing these policies, makes special appeals to the workers (through the trade unions), to the villagers (through the rural modernization centers and cooperatives) and to young people (through the JRDA).

Subversive developments are discouraged in other ways. Commandants of administrative districts and their subordinates usually serve in areas outside their home districts—a policy which sometimes makes it necessary for them to deal with local people through interpreters. The same principle applies, in general, to the assignment of military and police officials. The Conakry police rosters, for example, include persons from all sections of the country.

To avoid partisanship in local disputes or identification with local groups, transfers are frequent. Corruption and other derelictions—or incompatibility between officials and local councils which would prejudice the people against the government—are causes for the summary relief of the offending officials who are then transferred to other stations where they are kept under observation. Many students are sent to secondary schools in districts away from their homes as a means of assuring that they will acquire a nationalist rather than an ethnic or regional outlook (see ch. 9, Education; ch. 29, The Armed Forces).

The People

Since the people appear to be thoroughly convinced that the regime is their only bulwark against the return of colonialism, any open or clandestine attempt by local disgruntled or dissenting elements to propagate ideas generally regarded as subversive would quickly be reported to PDG committee secretaries. Subversive proposals from

non-African sources would encounter even greater opposition as alien interference.

Effective instruments against subversion are the weekly meetings called by local party committee secretaries in every village and in all town quarters. The meetings are attended by virtually all able-bodied men, women and children in the local communities (see ch. 5, Social Structure; ch. 7, Social Values and Patterns of Living; ch. 16, Constitution and Government). They enable the government to keep its finger on the pulse of the people and to know beforehand whether particular policies are likely to receive strong support or to encounter resistance which might be exploited for subversive purposes.

The Plot of 1960

The attitudes of the government and the people toward subversive activities were disclosed in April 1960 when PDG agents reportedly discovered a plot to overthrow the regime by armed force. President Touré informed the public of the situation by announcing that the Guinean People's Court—presumably the High Court of Justice—had tried more than 40 persons for treason (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government). The Court sentenced 19 to death (8 in absentia) and 22 to long prison terms at hard labor. Six French nationals were expelled, and two fled to Senegal. A Lebanese, who was said to be chief organizer of the plot, reportedly committed suicide in prison. A Moslem *imam* of Conakry was among those who were condemned to death.

According to PDG announcements, some of the instigators of the plot were Guinean citizens who used funds from foreign sources, allegedly French, to recruit "unscrupulous intellectuals, byproducts of the old regime." Some of the plotters were said to possess arms smuggled in from Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Along the borders with these countries, security authorities reportedly seized caches of weapons, ammunition, explosives, radio transmitters and receivers, funds, subversive pamphlets urging people to revolt and correspondence outlining plans to hire some 5,000 saboteurs. A network of spies, President Touré explained to the National Assembly, had been set up in Conakry and in some of the towns and villages.

The PDG reacted vigorously and called on all its members—from the top leaders to the rank and file—for increased vigilance to detect and root out all traitors and "imperialist agents." President Touré made special appeals to various organized groups. In response the CNTG, the women's sections of the PDG, the Moslem Cultural Union, the National Veterans Association and many others adopted resolutions supporting the government's actions and demanding the severest penalties for the guilty.

GROUPS POTENTIALLY SUBVERSIVE

Despite efforts to develop a national consciousness and to unite the people under the leadership of one party, too little time has elapsed since independence to eliminate all traces of opposition. Indications are that certain ethnic, regional, occupational and other groups hold grievances, real or imaginary, against the government or animosities toward each other which, under favorable circumstances, could be exploited for subversive purposes.

No groups are known to be plotting in exile to overthrow the government and establish a new order. The political leaders show some concern, however, about the possibility that certain foreign groups, in collusion with disaffected Guineans (such as those who were close to the former French administration), might attempt to overthrow the regime in the hope of regaining some of the privileges they once enjoyed.

Some concern also is manifested in connection with the estimated 500 Lebanese in the country. A large proportion of them, mostly storekeepers or traders, have suffered from the government's restrictive economic and monetary policies. Many Guineans reportedly suspect that most of the Lebanese, if approached discreetly, could be induced to commit subversive acts—particularly those involving illegal financial deals.

Ethnic

Despite the outward appearance of national unity, a few ethnic groups include persons who bear strong animosities toward the government and resent many of its policies. Particularly disliked are some of the economic practices and the concentration of political leadership in a single party—the PDG.

Elements in certain ethnic groups have grievances against elements in other groups. The relatively aggressive Malinké, conspicuous in the party and the government, are favorite targets for the ill will of some persons in other groups. Many Foulah, proud of their ethnic origin and military history, look with disfavor upon the high Malinké representation in the government. Although they constitute less than 20 percent of the population, the Malinké, in January 1961, held more than 40 percent of the Cabinet posts, whereas the Foulah, comprising more than 40 percent of the population, held less than 20 percent of the Cabinet posts.

President Touré admits the presence of malcontents among the Foulah, but he insists that there is no organized subversive movement among them. He noted their potential threat in December 1958, however, when he warned administrative officials at Labé of the "instability of the Foulah" in the area. He ascribed the situation to the ineffectiveness of the local political leadership rather than to

ethnic traits, pointing out that only in Labé and Mamou were disloyalties apparent. Other predominantly Foulah areas, such as Mali and Youkounkoun, showed party loyalty, he said, by voting overwhelmingly in favor of independence in the referendum. He exhorted the leaders to take remedial action so that "Labé would no longer be a gangrenous area for the party."

In a radio address delivered in March 1959 President Touré chastized officials at Mamou for inefficiency and, more specifically, for "letting the racial myth prevail." The ranking PDG official was denounced because certain former *canton* (subdistrict) chiefs, who were not yet "rehabilitated" and not even members of the party, were elected to responsible posts. President Touré promised that such mistakes would be corrected by radical measures, including transfers for disciplinary reasons, and that racist and religious conceptions would be condemned by the party.

Foulah resentment against the regime's policies was indicated as late as June 1961 when numerous thefts of equipment needed on human investment projects—a possible attempt to sabotage the program—reportedly occurred in the Labé area. Government authorities called a special meeting of the PDG section of Labé to consider steps to be taken to "end the shameful practice of thievery, which is harmful to the government's economic program." During the meeting, the JRDA units in five nearby villages were congratulated for "positive action" in bringing about the arrests of the thieves and their accomplices.

Intertribal hostilities involving fatalities occurred early in 1958 in the Soussou precinct of Conakry as the result of clashes among Soussou, Malinké and Foulah groups. Information is not available concerning the specific causes of these outbursts, but most indications point to Soussou resentment over rising Malinké political influence in the government and the intrusion of Malinké, Foulah and other groups into Conakry where they took over jobs previously held by Soussou.

Regional

The inhabitants of the mountainous Fouta Djallon and of the Forest Region have greater opportunities for subversive action than do those from other areas because of their relatively isolated situation and the relatively greater autonomy that has been accorded them in managing their own affairs. Traditionally they have been less amenable to higher authority than the people of other regions. Their principal contacts with the government under the French were through police or security detachments seeking to intervene in intergroup matters or to enforce regulations which the inhabitants generally resented as unjustifiable impositions. This antagonistic attitude

toward central government control, always susceptible to exploitation for subversive purposes, was encountered by officials of the postindependence regime. Aside from attitudinal differences based on ethnic origins, the economic and social conditions in these areas hamper the effective political indoctrination of the population.

President Touré, when addressing the political leaders of Labé in the Fouta Djallon late in 1958, acknowledged that the weekly market period was the only practical occasion for holding group meetings, since at other times a large proportion of the men are widely dispersed guarding their grazing cattle. In the Forest Region, people are even more inaccessible. Accustomed to managing their own affairs, they are inclined to resent governmental interference with their animist customs.

Party conferences in 1961 on measures for improving the political leadership in these areas indicated that the indoctrination of the local peoples and their chiefs had not achieved satisfactory results (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 7, Social Values and Patterns of Living).

Former French Collaborators

The paramount chiefs, their subordinates and the members of the Moslem religious hierarchy—all of whom enjoyed special privileges under French rule—are usually mentioned by President Touré whenever he is asked about possible opposition to his regime. He contends, with apparent justification, that their influence over the people is negligible. The dissidents in this category do not constitute a cohesive group, and their numbers are gradually dwindling through natural attrition and “political rehabilitation.” Their usefulness would be limited to such tasks as individual agents in a subversive effort conducted by some other group.

Veterans Formerly in French Military Service

Prior to World War II, Guineans returning from military service with the French armed forces, particularly the Foulah of the Fouta Djallon area, tended to find themselves at odds with the people in their home communities. They were critical of the local administration and were themselves criticized as having become outsiders who favored European ways. Many of them used the knowledge acquired during their French military service to exploit their compatriots.

In the case of the veterans of World War II, however, this conflict seems largely to have disappeared, although at the time of independence PDG leaders were apprehensive about the possibility that some of the former military men might enlist in the Guinean Army for the purpose of inciting insurrection and bringing back French rule. Among the measures taken to assure the loyalty of the ex-servicemen

was the formation early in February 1959 of the National Veterans Association, which was placed directly under the Secretary of State for National Defense. Almost all veterans became members. Later in the year President Touré expressed satisfaction with the general attitude of this group, although he directed the BPN to request the people to "increase their vigilance over the activities of the ex-servicemen and to oppose resolutely any threat by them or their supporters."

In the plot of April 1960, no evidence of participation by former servicemen was reported. In fact President Touré, in a speech to the National Assembly, mentioned the National Veterans Association as one of the organizations which had pledged its support to the government and demanded severe punishment for the plotters. On June 1, 1961, the Second Congress of the Association affirmed its unreserved support of the PDG, its loyalty to the country and to the African Community, and approved the government's position on the Algerian, Congolese and Angolan issues (see ch. 29, The Armed Forces).

COMMUNIST ACTIVITY

The Communist countries, having no history of colonialism in Africa, were in a favorable position to win the confidence and good will of African leaders, and they lost no opportunity to present themselves as the staunch friends and benefactors of the newly born African states "struggling to escape the greedy clutches of capitalist powers." Events in Korea, Indochina and Tibet were described to the Guineans as examples of popular resistance to colonial rule and actions in Hungary as righteous Communist countermeasures to Western aggressions.

The one-party system in Guinea precludes the legal formation of a Communist party. Moreover, from the Communist point of view, a party organization would lack qualified and dependable local leaders who had been thoroughly schooled and disciplined in Communist ideology. Many of the PDG leaders, however through their Marxist studies and their experience in the French trade union movement, are familiar with the Communist Party organizational techniques, operational methods and doctrine. Representatives from Communist countries find a friendly atmosphere in the country and enjoy generally good relations with Guinean officials.

After independence the Soviet Union and most of its European satellites, as well as Communist China and Yugoslavia, were quick to emphasize to the Guineans the similarities in their respective political, economic and social viewpoints. Loans and material and technical aid were promptly forthcoming; irksome administrative details were ignored; commitments which might be taken as encroachments on sovereignty were omitted.

Guinean leaders were received with great fanfare in Moscow, Peiping and the capitals of other Communist countries. The Soviet Union, especially, manifested great interest in cultivating the leaders of the key auxiliary organizations of the PDG, particularly the JRDA, and of the CNTG and other groups which have strong influence in shaping government policy. Guineans were repeatedly told that the Communist countries stood shoulder to shoulder with them in the fight against imperialism, colonialism, racial discrimination and unequal alliances; the Communist system was lauded as the only alternative to backwardness, dependency and colonial domination.

The first six countries to arrange trade agreements with Guinea were the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Czechoslovakia, Poland, Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria. The Soviet Union was the first major power to recognize Guinea as a sovereign state; Communist China was the first country to open an embassy in Conakry; Bulgaria was the first to actually send an ambassador.

In all of this, the Communist representatives were careful to avoid any impression that they wished to see a Communist party formed in the country or to interfere with its internal administration or external plans and policies. They avoided injecting themselves into the deliberations of the Casablanca Conference in January 1961 or in the formation, in April 1961, of the Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

Communist encouragement, tutelage and guidance helped to bring the PDG's youth and women's auxiliary organizations and the strong National Union of Guinean Teachers into alignment with corresponding international Communist organizations. The executive committee of the Communist-directed World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) met in Conakry in March 1960 and, in January 1961, the president, vice-president and deputy secretary general of this organization visited Guinea to confer with the High Commissioner of Youth and Sports in the Ministry of Youth, Arts and Culture and with officials in the JRDA. The JRDA and WFDY representatives agreed to exchange delegations and publications, to cooperate on educational, cultural and sports programs, and to participate in common work and vacation projects (see ch. 21, Public Information and Propaganda).

Elaborate and widely publicized preparations were initiated in April 1961 for JRDA representatives to attend the World Youth Forum held in Moscow in July 1961. The PDG used its facilities to popularize the forum among Guinean youths and sent the secretary general of the Dinguiraye section to Moscow early in the year—presumably for liaison purposes.

The Communist-inspired International Women's Day was celebrated throughout Guinea on March 7-8, 1960, by the women's auxiliaries of the PDG local committees. The accompanying speeches, mainly political in nature, were consistent with Communist policies. A two-day holiday was declared for government workers, women workers and students. A year later, March 7-9, 1961, the celebration was marked by the first visit to Africa of a delegation from the International Democratic Federation of Women. The secretary general, as head of the delegation, praised Guinea's position on the Congolese, Vietnamese, Cuban and Algerian questions. A delegation from Communist China, headed by the vice-president of the National Assembly, participated in the ceremonies at Kissidougou. In April 1961 a PDG women's auxiliary delegation attended the Yugoslav Women's Congress at Zagreb, and in June 1961, PDG women were represented at the conference of the International Democratic Federation of Women in East Berlin.

The Third World Congress of Teachers, sponsored by the World Federation of Teachers Unions, was held on July 15, 1960, in Conakry. This was the Federation's first conference held outside of Europe—an indication of the importance attached to the National Union of Guinean Teachers. The two previous Congresses were held in Warsaw in 1957 and in Vienna in 1953 (see ch. 9, Education).

Continued Communist interest in Guinean labor organizations was indicated by a two-week visit in 1961 of an important Soviet trade union delegation headed by the first secretary of the Central Committee of Soviet Trade Unions. The delegation held conferences with various groups of the CNTG and made visits to Kindia, Fria, Forécariah and Iles de Los.

The subversive potentialities of Communist activities were illustrated in November 1961 by the action of the executives of the teachers' union, followed by students' demonstrations (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

EVALUATION OF POTENTIALITIES

The government, as of mid-1961, appeared to be in firm control of the country and capable of coping successfully with any subversive threats in the foreseeable future. Potentially subversive groups lacked organization and effective leadership, while the leadership of the government and the PDG was dynamic, alert and seemingly adaptable to changing situations. Moreover, the officials in the ruling one-party organization were working zealously to keep in close touch with the villagers. Public confidence was acquired and maintained by persuasion rather than by force. In addition, corruption, favoritism and other deficiencies—which are the usual basic elements in the develop-

ment of subversive or revolutionary movements—were minimized by a comprehensive system of inspections and control of local government administrations (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

The most serious subversive threat, as of the end of 1961, seemed to come, not from elements opposed to the basic political orientations of the government and party, but rather from extremists within the party and also within such mass organizations as the teachers union and the youth organization. Such dissidents objected to President Touré's policies as being too moderate, and they desired open alignment with the Communist bloc, apparently seeking to drive the regime to the far Left. Their attitude, insofar as it was expressed in action as in the November teacher-student disorders, presented the President with a personal challenge. Moreover, the dissent took on greater seriousness when the President openly charged that the difficulties were instigated by a subversive network reaching out to Paris, Dakar and an Eastern-bloc embassy in Conakry.

In the last weeks of 1961 it was too early to judge with certainty the gravity of the threat to the President and the moderates, but it was obvious that the strain put on the people by the effort to develop and nationalize the economy, entailing material shortages, presented an opportunity to the extremists of the Left. The President was taking open and vigorous action against his opponents, for example, visiting various parts of the country and talking personally to regional and village committees to learn the exact causes of the dissatisfaction and to set in motion steps to cope with anything which might be exploited for subversive ends.

CHAPTER 21

PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA

In late 1961 domestic public information media were limited but growing. The local press consisted of a few newspapers and periodicals and a mimeographed news bulletin, all published under direct or indirect government sponsorship. Radio broadcasting also was a state monopoly; loudspeakers in public places brought programs to people throughout the country. A powerful new shortwave transmitter for an international broadcasting service, built and financed by the Soviet Union, was completed in September 1961. In October President Touré dedicated a printing plant built for the government by East Germany, which was one of the most modern in Africa, with a capacity of 30,000 bound volumes a day. Domestic film production had begun on a small scale.

French newspapers and periodicals, which completely dominated the field during the colonial period but had gradually disappeared from the newstands after independence, were again put on sale in Conakry in the summer of 1961. A new agreement with France about informational, cultural and educational activities was signed (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

The government made effective use of its expanding information media to explain official policies, foster the development of national unity and loyalty and strengthen and spread pan-African sentiment. The national radio broadcasting system, for example, concentrated on talks by political leaders, reports on economic development, news of party activities and programs of revolutionary songs and poetry. The press emphasized the struggle against colonialism, glorified such figures as Patrice Lumumba and strove to keep hatred of French imperialism alive.

BACKGROUND

Under colonial rule, modern communications media in French West Africa developed on a very limited scale and only reached a relatively small group of French officials and businessmen and literate Africans. Among the remainder of the population, information was spread chiefly by word of mouth. The emergence of an influential domestic press was delayed not only by the low rate of literacy but also by

direct interference from the colonial administration. An official ruling, in effect until the mid-1930's, forbade anyone other than French citizens to engage in publishing activities. Although an indigenous press was permitted to emerge after World War II, the French suppressed those of the new organs which were strongly nationalist in tone.

The impact of the press was even more limited in French West Africa than in other parts of the continent. In the mid-1950's the number of copies of daily newspapers in circulation in Africa as a whole was estimated at 12 per 1,000 inhabitants; in French West Africa the estimated average was 2 copies per 1,000. About half of the principal French West African papers were published in Dakar.

Guinea had only one or two local newspapers at any given time during the colonial period, and the reading public depended almost entirely on foreign—mainly French—newspapers, periodicals and books. A radio station was established in Conakry after World War II, but only a small fraction of the population owned radio receivers or lived in communities which broadcast programs on loudspeakers in public places.

In mid-1958 the Guinean press consisted of less than half a dozen newspapers and periodicals. The one general-interest newspaper was *La Presse de Guinée*, a small, French-language newspaper published three times a week with a circulation of between 1,500 and 2,000 copies. *Journal Officiel de la Guinée* was a publication of the territorial government in which official decrees and notices of civil service appointments appeared. *Études Guinéennes*, a scholarly journal largely devoted to ethnographic writings, was issued under the auspices of the Guinean branch of the French Institute of Black Africa.

A bulletin put out in Conakry by the French Press Agency (Agence France Presse—AFP) had a small list of subscribers. Radio Conakry, operated by the territorial government, depended largely on the Federal Radio Broadcasting Agency of French West Africa in Dakar for its program material. Most programs were in French, but some news-casts were in Malinké, Foulah and Soussou. The few cinemas, which attracted increasingly large audiences, showed foreign films imported principally through French distributors. There was no television.

GOVERNMENT SYSTEM 1958-61

Organization

With independence and the mass exodus of French officials and businessmen, control of the organs of public information passed into Guinean hands. Initially government information activities were centered in the Secretariat of State for the Interior in charge of Information, headed by Alassane Diop, who had been director of foreign

broadcasting services at the Federal Radio Broadcasting Agency of French West Africa in Dakar and manager of Radio Conakry.

Reorganization in the summer of 1960 transferred information activities to a newly established Ministry of Information and Tourism. In January 1961 Diop was made Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, and Bengaly Camara, a former journalist who was at that time Minister of Civil Service, became the new head of the Ministry of Information and Tourism.

The National Broadcasting Agency of the Republic of Guinea (Radiodiffusion de la République de Guinée—RRG) and the National Institute of Research and Documentation (Institut Nationale de Recherches et Documentation—INRD) were placed under the supervision of the Ministry at the time it was formed. In January 1961 the government-supported Guinean Press Agency (Agence Guinéenne de Presse—AGP), under the new title of the National Guinean Press Agency Administration (Régie Nationale de l'Agence Guinéenne de Presse—RNAGP) and the National Printing Office (Régie Nationale de l'Imprimerie de la République de Guinée) were also placed under the Ministry but retained financial autonomy.

The sum allocated to the Ministry of Information and Tourism in the ordinary budget for 1961 was 110.5 million francs (247 Guinean francs equal U.S. \$1). The major individual items in this amount were 35 million for the INRD and 32 million to the RRG. In another section of the budget, 25 million francs was allocated to the RNAGP, including 20 million to the National Printing Office.

Channels

Press

In the initial period after independence, the local press consisted of one small newspaper, *Guinée Matin*, the AFP's daily news bulletin, and the Official Journal (*Journal Officiel de la République de Guinée*). *Guinée Matin* was published four times a week in Conakry from September 1958 to February 1959. The AFP bulletin, which had been established under the French, survived until December 1959. The Official Journal was established in the fall of 1958 and has continued to appear on a regular basis twice each month. It is an official record containing such material as laws, decrees and notices of civil service appointments.

In late January 1960 the AGP began publishing the *Agence Guinéenne de Presse Bulletin Quotidien*. Like the earlier AFP bulletin, it is a daily mimeographed, letter-sized brochure. An estimated 600 copies are printed, and almost all of these go to government officials and foreign diplomatic staffs. Each bulletin contains 15 to 20 news items, carried under the general headings of news of the Republic, news of the African continent and foreign news.

Typical items are reports on PDG and youth group meetings, the arrival of visiting dignitaries, political developments in other African countries and proceedings at the United Nations.

Formal editorials are infrequent, but the selection and treatment of the contents clearly sets forth the government viewpoint. Articles and reports are not identified by author or source, nor is the news consistently dated.

In April 1961 the RNAGP began publication of *Horoya*, a 4- to 8-page paper published three times a week. In addition to national, African and world news, it also carried items of local interest.

Horoya is primarily a vehicle for the PDG, although it is not directly affiliated with it. According to its editors, its primary objective is to spread understanding of the party and to support its goals. Its secondary stated objective is to counteract neocolonialist propaganda, which is described as attempts to spread distrust and discouragement by praising the "generous" aid programs of the former colonialists and by putting the agents of imperialism on the same level with the heroes of nationalism, such as Lumumba.

Two other local publications are *Recherches Africaines*, a scholarly journal put out by the INRD, and *Le Travailleur de Guinée*, official organ of the National Confederation of Guinean Workers which has appeared irregularly since early 1961. *Liberté*, a PDG newsheet which began publication during the final years of French rule, is apparently no longer in existence.

Radio

Because of the low rate of literacy, radio is the most effective formal mass medium of communication. Party committees have provided receivers and public radio loudspeakers in towns and villages in order to bring RRG broadcasts to as many people as possible. Estimates of the number of receivers in use range from 12,000 to 50,000; the radio audience is believed to be well over 100,000 persons. The loudspeaker system in Conakry, said to have been set up by the East Germans, can be used to address particular areas, even particular streets, without being heard in the rest of the city.

The government broadcasting system is equipped with three short-wave transmitters and one medium-wave. One of the shortwave transmitters, with an estimated power of 100 kilowatts, was built for Guinea by the Soviet Union. Soviet, East German and Czechoslovakian technicians supervised its construction which was completed in October 1961. The other transmitters have a combined power of nine kilowatts. They operate on 7125 kilocycles (42.11 meter band), 4910 kilocycles (61.10 meter band) and 1403 kilocycles (214.0 meter band).

In early 1961 RRG carried three daily transmissions, broadcasting for a total of 8 hours daily Monday through Friday and for 11 hours on Saturdays. On Sundays the station carried two transmissions with a total broadcast time of 11½ hours. Weekday broadcasts (except Saturday) were scheduled from 06:00 to 08:00 hours (Greenwich Mean Time), 12:00 to 14:00 hours and 18:00 to 22:00 hours. Saturday broadcasts were scheduled from 06:00 to 08:00 hours, 12:00 to 14:00 hours and 16:00 to 23:00 hours. Sunday broadcasts were scheduled from 09:00 to 14:00 hours and 16:00 to 22:30 hours.

The station broadcasts primarily in French. It also has regularly scheduled programs in the six major native languages of the country—Soussou, Malinké, Foulah, Toma, Guerzé and Kissi—as well as weekly newscasts in English, Portuguese Creole, Portuguese, Wolof (Ouoloff), Bambara and Mandyak.

Each daily broadcast opened with reveille in music and was followed by a 5-minute newscast. News and music were heavily emphasized throughout the day. In early 1961 a total of 1 hour and 20 minutes of news was broadcast daily in French. In addition, an average of 1 hour of the same news was heard on Monday, Wednesday and Friday in Soussou, Foulah and Malinké; on Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday it was given in Kissi, Goma and Guerzé. On Saturdays and Sundays weekly reviews of the news were carried in Portuguese and Portuguese Creole for Portuguese Guinea, Mandyak for Gambia, Wolof (Ouoloff) for Senegal, Bambara for Mali and English for Sierra Leone. The Agence France Presse, the Associated Press (United States), TASS (the Soviet Union), and Chine Nouvelle (Communist China) were the principal sources for foreign news for these broadcasts.

A special 20-minute news program on Saturdays was devoted to a review of items from the *Agence Guinéenne de Presse Bulletin Quotidien*. A special 15-minute program on Sundays covered news of PDG activities.

From two to three hours daily was devoted to music. African music was stressed, and programs of Guerzé, Kissi and Foulah, Senegalese, Sudanese, Ethiopian and Liberian music were featured. Song lyrics were nationalistic in emphasis. Features bore such titles as Freedom Songs, Songs of the JRDA, Epic Songs of African Heroes and Revolutionary Committee Songs. There were also a few programs of Western music, carried mostly on Saturdays and Sundays. For example, 15 minutes of Latin American popular music was carried regularly on Saturday evenings.

Feature programs included advice to mothers, lessons for housewives, discussions of labor disputes and current labor legislation, interviews with delegates to the many conferences held in Conakry, programs on youth activities, talks on African unity and the common

cultural heritage, and English-language instruction. The English lessons were offered daily except Sunday, one-half hour in the morning and one-half hour in the evening. The course was designed for beginners.

The Guinean International Service, "The Voice of the Revolution," began broadcasting on September 28, 1961. Three daily transmissions were scheduled, one in the morning and two in the evening. International programs were to be carried on the home service as well.

Films

Film production is done solely by the government and on an extremely limited scale. Persons who have seen them report that the few documentaries completed in 1960 and 1961 are not of high quality. Film showing, on the other hand, is primarily a commercial operation, although the state has become increasingly involved in this field since early 1960.

In a series of moves extending its control powers, the government has denied commercial movie houses the right to show newsreels, established a National Committee for Censorship of Films and laid plans for an official system of film distribution. The executive secretary of the Ministry of the Interior and Regional and Local Administration was appointed head of the censorship committee; other government and party leaders made up the bulk of the additional members. The government film distribution unit is to be an integral part of the Ministry of Information and Tourism. This new organization would take over the distributorships now held by private French companies, which have a virtual monopoly in the area. It may also take over the theaters which they operate.

Even before the official film distribution unit had begun to be organized, the government made it a practice to distribute documentary films which had obvious propaganda value. A short film of the President's 1959 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, made under United Nations auspices, was widely circulated in commercial theaters. Special showings from mobile units were arranged in communities without theaters.

Other

The huge new government printing plant, built and financed by the East Germans, was completed in the fall of 1961 and began operations immediately. It was named in honor of Patrice Lumumba.

Themes

A number of constantly repeated themes support the national slogan, "Work, Justice and Solidarity" (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics). President Touré constantly calls for the breaking down of ethnic and regional barriers. On January 1, 1959, for example, he said: "The

Political Bureau of the PDG urges all thinking persons to support the development of . . . unity, and to systematically and vigorously struggle against those who cling to regional, religious or racial concepts." He has also declared that class struggle should be rejected in principle and that individualism has no place in Guinean society. In July 1961, speaking to a group of young students, he stated: "We have chosen the freedom, the right, the power, and the sovereignty of the people—not of the individual."

The RRG broadcasts a number of programs of discussion and advice, chiefly directed to women. Daily commentaries on Guinean customs and morality are offered as well as others on such topics as the education of children and principles of public and personal hygiene. A Sunday program stresses the responsibility of the housewife and offers advice on how to be a good hostess, how to please her family and how to plan a budget.

Government development plans are widely publicized in the press and in the speeches of party officials. The people are told of what the government has done for them and what it plans to do. They are reminded that it is essential that they contribute personally to this effort and that waste, laziness and corruption are shameful. The need to pay taxes is stressed and work is exalted.

To promote African unity, the RRG broadcasts programs on African history. Folk tales and legends which glorify such Guinean heroes as Alhamy Samory Touré, who fought the French in the nineteenth century, are featured (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). Other programs are devoted to discussions of current African political thinking. Nearly every major speech by the President contains some reference to the concept of the African "personality" (see ch. 15, Attitudes and Reactions of the People).

WORD OF MOUTH

Until well into the twentieth century, news circulated primarily by word of mouth. As recently as the last decade of French rule, persons in rural areas depended for information almost entirely on visits from itinerant tradespeople, traveling troubadours (griots) and friends, relatives and notables from nearby villages. Such visitors were particularly welcome during the dry season when there was little work to do in the fields, and fresh news and rumor enlivened evening conversations. Gossip and discussion were much enjoyed forms of recreation.

Since independence, PDG leaders have made effective use of informal channels of communication. The weekly party meeting of the PDG, attended by all men and women in the village, provides a forum

where government reports and activities are announced and discussed. At the same time the local party secretary gathers news and rumor which he later carries back to party headquarters. The same process of exchange occurs at gatherings of the party's youth and women's groups and at labor union meetings.

In the cities, the focal points for the origin and spread of rumor and gossip are the cafés, public meeting halls, markets, cinemas and other public gathering places. The pattern is especially marked in Conakry.

FOREIGN PRESS, BOOKS AND FILMS

After independence, newspapers and periodicals published in France became increasingly more difficult to obtain, and by mid-1960 had disappeared altogether. The *New York Times* and other English-language papers continued to come in, however, as did several French-language African newspapers. Among the latter were: *L'Unité* and *L'Echos d'Afrique Noire*, from Dakar; *L'Essor*, organ of the Mali section of the RDA; and the *Courrier Soudan* from Bamako.

French newspapers and periodicals went on sale again in Conakry in July 1961 after an absence of more than a year. They included such publications as *Le Figaro*, *Le Monde*, *France-Soir*, *Paris-Presse*, *Parisien Libéré*, *Combat*, *l'Humanité*, *Elle*, *Echo de la Mode*, *Candide*, *L'Equipe* and others.

Conakry's three French-owned bookstores were taken over by Guineans in 1961. One sold Communist material, and two had little more than school texts and a miscellaneous old stock. A fourth store sold mainly Arabic books.

All feature films shown in the country were of foreign origin. The majority came from France and the United States, some from Egypt. Most popular with townsmen and villagers alike were musicals and westerns.

In 1959 there were 18 commercial theaters; 5 in Conakry, 13 in the principal towns scattered throughout the country. Some industrial and agricultural enterprises also had projection facilities, but used them largely for vocational training. In 1959 the government operated two mobile units which are believed to have attracted 400,000 viewers.

FOREIGN PROPAGANDA DIRECTED TO GUINEA

In late 1961 the active foreign propaganda and information programs were those of the Communist-bloc countries and the United States. France, Great Britain, Egypt and neighboring African countries played a minor role.

Communist Bloc

The countries of the Communist bloc depended primarily on radio broadcasting, the exchange of films and the visits of various delegations to carry its propaganda messages. In addition, they provided extensive technical assistance, which, while not directly a part of the propaganda effort, supported the same aims.

With the growth of Africa's political importance, the Soviet Union, its European satellites and Communist China rapidly increased their radio broadcasting to the continent. Total transmission time to Africa by these countries rose from 3½ hours per week in 1956 to 96 hours and 50 minutes per week in late 1960. Another 66½ hours of weekly program time, which was being broadcast to other areas by the bloc, was also beamed to Africa. Of the total 96 hours and 50 minutes of broadcasting directed specifically at Africa, 42 hours originated in the Soviet Union, 19 hours and 50 minutes originated in the European satellites and 35 hours originated in Communist China. According to program schedules carried in *Horoya*, in late 1961 French-language broadcasts on Radio Moscow could be heard in Guinea 2 hours and 45 minutes a day.

By late 1961 Communist-bloc countries were making greater use of films in the area. In 1960 Guinea agreed to the organization of "Soviet Film Weeks" in major cities, and in 1961 made plans for an exchange of 30 films per year with Communist China. Possible Czechoslovakian production of a short documentary on Guinea was discussed in Conakry in early 1961.

The relatively frequent visits of heads of state from Communist-bloc countries, as well as those of various cultural and technical missions, were occasions for elaborate ceremonies. The highest-ranking Communist visitor in 1961 was Leonid Brezhnev, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who was in the country for a short time in February. Other visitors included delegations from Communist China and North Vietnam in March 1961 and from North Korea in June 1961. Minor officials and private citizens of Soviet-bloc countries visited virtually every town in Guinea. According to observers, they made extensive contacts and impressed the Guineans with their friendliness. Guineans from all walks of life have been invited to visit Soviet-bloc countries, and many have done so. Some Communist literature is available in the country, but since November 1961 circulation of all foreign official publications has been limited by a decree requiring all embassies and foreign agencies to clear all of their printed material destined for the Guinean public with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A Chinese industrial exhibition was held in Conakry from December 28, 1960, to January 12, 1961. According to Radio Peiping, the

exhibition drew an audience of 220,000 persons during that period, including prominent persons from Mali, Ghana, Niger, Senegal and other African areas. When the exhibit closed, the Chinese Government presented the pavillion and the exhibits to Guinea as a demonstration of friendship.

United States and Western Europe

The United States Information Service opened a cultural center in Conakry on July 4, 1960. Its facilities included classrooms where English-language courses could be held and a small library with a collection of English and French books and periodicals. The center operated until March of the following year, when the government denied all foreign governments permission to maintain cultural centers in the country.

Other United States information and cultural activities included the distribution of motion pictures to commercial exhibitors, supervision of a scholarship program for African students and the placement of more than 20 United States, Canadian and Haitian schoolteachers in local secondary schools.

In November 1961, the Voice of America broadcast 80½ hours per week in English and French to West Africa. This total included 73½ hours in English, about one-fourth of which was news, and 7 hours in French. English lessons were offered on the station one hour per day, five days a week.

France and other Western European countries carried on only small-scale activities. Little official French, British or West German printed material was in circulation.

Other

Guinea was the target for propaganda from a number of other countries, including Egypt and Ghana. In June 1960, Ghana and Guinea concluded an agreement providing for the exchange of radio programs and cooperation on news sources. The plan also provided for an exchange of teachers, technicians, artists and youths between the two countries. La Voix de L'Afrique in Cairo began broadcasting to Guinea two hours daily in July 1961. One hour of broadcast time was in the French language, the other in Foulah. In March 1961 Guinea received Marshal Tito as a state visitor, and in April of the same year a Guinean delegation traveled to Rabat, Morocco, for an official visit.

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SECTION III. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 22

CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY

Favored in natural resources but economically undeveloped, Guinea presents a picture of potential wealth and present poverty. About 90 percent of the people live at a subsistence level by working small plots of land with primitive tools and methods. Only three small groups—government officials, wage and salary workers in commerce and industry and plantation laborers—rely primarily on money income.

Relatively neglected among France's West African colonies, the country at the end of World War II was being exploited solely as a primary producer of a few minerals, plantation crops and tropical forest products. The capital city, Conakry, with about 22,000 inhabitants, was more than twice the size of the next largest town. Through its small port the unprocessed exports and the manufactured imports, which were the characteristic features of the economic relationship between the colony and the ruling power, were funneled.

The overseas trade was dominated by a few large French commercial houses, and the limited inventory of imported consumers' goods moved down from them to the retail outlets which were largely in the hands of Syrian and Lebanese traders in the towns. In the villages, in which the bulk of the population lived, people obtained by barter most of what they could not produce themselves. In Conakry and on the coast areas where labor was diverted from agriculture to industrial or commercial pursuits, it became necessary to import foodstuffs, but in the country as a whole the traditional subsistence pattern of village agriculture, animal husbandry, food gathering and hunting persisted.

The country's huge bauxite reserves, which are among the world's largest, its extensive iron ore deposits and its great hydroelectric power resources have only begun to be exploited. The only large-scale industrial operations in the country are of recent date and are carried on by foreign mining concerns. The oldest, the Conakry

Mining Company (Compagnie Minière de Conakry), which has mined iron ore near Conakry since 1953, is owned by the French. Bauxites du Midi, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Aluminum Ltd., of Canada, began shipping bauxite from the deposits on the Iles de Los near Conakry in 1952. It lost its concession in November 1961 after it had announced the suspension, for financial reasons, of an ambitious plan to develop a much larger deposit at Boké.

The bauxite mining and alumina processing installation of the Fria Company at Kimbo began operation in July 1960. One of the largest plants of its kind in the world, it is owned by an international consortium of American, British, French, Swiss and German aluminum companies. Another consortium of British, Swiss, French and West German banking houses agreed, in April 1961, to exploit the Nimba-Simandou iron ore deposits.

These enterprises, together with a few small factories—mainly in Conakry—and the developing exploitation of the diamond deposits in the Forest Region, represent the sum of modern industrial activity in the nation. They are important for their contribution to government revenues and for the opportunities they provide for Guineans to receive some training in modern technology. However, they employ only a minute percentage of the labor force, and, in an important sense, they exist beside rather than as an integral part of the economy.

The central factor in the economy is the initiative taken by the government under the Three-Year Plan launched in 1960. The plan has acquired a status which outweighs its economic significance; it has become a device with which the government and the party rallies the patriotism of the population. It aims at investing 38,912 million francs (247 Guinean francs equal U.S.\$1) over a three-year period to increase agricultural productivity, establish the framework for a series of local processing industries and benefit the population by building schools and hospitals. The financing of the Plan must, for the most part, come from abroad, and up to late-1961 approximately 37,000 million francs (\$150 million) has been made available in the form of loans, grants and technical assistance from foreign countries, largely of the Sino-Soviet bloc. By late 1961, however, the government was engaged in financial negotiations with France, and it was rumored that the United States would shortly announce an aid program amounting to \$15 to \$20 million. In Guinea, there was evidently both a concern that the country had been drawn into too great dependence on the Communist bloc and a positive desire for improved relations with France.

In agriculture, as in industry, the country's economic growth will require foreign capital, equipment, and technical advice and assistance. In both sectors success will depend upon the ability of the government

to modernize the economy and upon the capacity of the people to accept change and master the new skills.

The effort to increase agricultural productivity must overcome a variety of difficulties. Aside from the lack of domestic capital, there are problems of soil improvement, erosion control, irrigation, drainage and prevention of plant and animal diseases. The scattered villages of farmers, animal breeders and fishermen working in family units do not provide the organizational framework for agricultural activity much above the subsistence level. Equipment of all types is needed, but even small machines and modern handtools presuppose the knowledge to use them, and the country suffers from a shortage of trained persons in all fields.

The domestic supply of funds for private investment is negligible. Most of the people subsist on the land and use the little cash that comes into their hands for the essentials they cannot produce for themselves or acquire through barter. In the absence of savings, or any early likelihood that they can soon be accumulated, investment from abroad assumes, not merely a supplementary but a vital role.

A basic need is for the development of transport and marketing facilities as a vital link between the large subsistence sector of the economy and the small commercial sector. Motor roads are few and most of them are unsurfaced; there are only about 450 miles of railway. Until these facilities are extended, transport costs will continue to be high, potential centers of export production will remain undeveloped, the internal distribution of imports will tend to be confined to the coastal area and the exchange of goods between regions will be restricted.

The economic policies of the government have crystallized into the pattern which was set during the first few months of the Republic, although there have been numerous modifications in detail. Often expressing themselves in Marxist language, the country's leaders are by no means orthodox Marxists in their economic analysis. Their primary tenet is that the economy must be "decolonialized," and that "old and anachronistic colonial institutions are to be replaced by national institutions to serve exclusively African interests." This appears to mean that every vestige of French predominance or control is to be eliminated at whatever the cost in compensating advantages. Guinea's departure from the franc zone and its establishment of an independent currency is an example of this attitude. French companies and individuals were prevented by this action from transferring funds freely from Guinea to France, but Guinea also suffered in being cut off from the franc zone exchange reserves and from preferential markets for its agricultural exports.

The second policy tenet of the government is that the economy shall be centrally planned and strictly directed. It strives to control every

facet of economic life in a variety of ways, including the application of pressure through the nationwide organizational apparatus of the PDG. It emphasizes in particular that cooperatives are expected ultimately to play a preponderant role in all fields—mining, power, agriculture, industry and commerce. New industries are to be founded and owned by the state. Private foreign enterprise is to be admitted only when this is regarded as being in the national interest. Existing industries are to be encouraged to accept state participation in their ownership. Subsoil riches are the property of the people, but exploitation through private concessions is not precluded. Where domestic resources are lacking, foreign loans, grants or technical assistance on a government-to-government basis will be sought. Foreign trade is to be under strict state control and subject to long-range state planning in order to prevent the dissipation of scarce foreign exchange reserves.

In order to carry out these policies, the government has set up an elaborate structure of ministries, state enterprises and other agencies which in the course of three years has undergone numerous changes and reorganizations. In late 1961 experimentation was still in progress.

BACKGROUND

In the years preceding independence, such development of resources as had taken place had been largely financed by France, and development programs were administered by Frenchmen. Guinea had its own plan within the General Plan for Modernization and Development of French Overseas Territories inaugurated by French law in April 1946. A first Five-Year Plan, initiated in 1946, was aimed at creating the economic infrastructure—particularly transportation, such as ports, railways, roads and airfields—needed for subsequent development. A second objective of the first Five-Year Plan was to promote revenue-earning schemes which in time would meet the heavy operating and maintenance costs of this infrastructure. Fria was such an undertaking. The second Five-Year Plan shifted emphasis to hospitals and schools, mining and hydroelectric installations, agriculture and research. The third Five-Year Plan, initiated in 1958, centered on the development of agriculture and small processing industries in addition to extension of the infrastructure.

In the autumn of 1958 Guinea's leaders suddenly found themselves with the task of running the country without the institutional apparatus and the specialized skills to do so. A few Guineans had had some experience in elective office or in the lower ranks of the colonial service, but almost all functions requiring professional or advanced technical or managerial training had remained in French hands. The French withdrew administrators, military personnel and technicians.

Some government departments disappeared almost overnight. The removal of supplies and equipment and the termination of work on the great dam on the Konkouré, a hydroelectric project which was to supply power for exploiting bauxite reserves and for overall industrialization of the country, struck a blow at Guinea's hopes for economic development. Other strictly economic problems faced the new state. Its currency was based on the French franc and its banking system tied to that of France. Its free market in France, which had taken between 70 and 80 percent of its exports, was now lost to it.

Stagnation if not chaos threatened unless aid was forthcoming. When the French Government refused to open negotiations looking toward a new economic relationship with its former colony, Guinea accepted technical and material assistance from the Communist bloc and a loan from another new African state, Ghana, with which it formed a union (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies). Aid agreements were also concluded with a number of other countries, among them West Germany and Israel, but not with the United States which Guinean leaders believed had remained aloof in deference to France, its ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

THE THREE-YEAR PLAN

The overall objective to the Three-Year Plan, which formally went into operation on July 1, 1960, but was not well under way until late October, was to increase national income by 8 to 10 percent a year. This growth was expected to create 15,000 jobs and new income from wages of 1.5 billion francs. Heavy emphasis was placed on agriculture, the productivity of which was to be raised by at least 4 percent per year. Eight billion francs was to be invested to increase industrial production sevenfold. A primary concern in this area was to save foreign exchange by the domestic processing of consumer goods which otherwise must be exported in the form of raw materials and then re-imported as finished products.

About a fifth of the planned total investment was to be devoted to social services, with education and public health receiving the larger share. The Plan was described as transitional and was to be followed by at least two successive Five-Year Plans.

The Three-Year Plan is administered by the Ministry of Planning, established by presidential decree in March 1960. Formerly, responsibility for overall coordination of economic planning had been in the Planning Department of the Ministry of National Economy. The new Ministry is organized into four departments: General Planning; Monetary and Financial Planning; Planning Control; and Long-Term Planning. The Ministry's responsibilities include the coordination of the activities in the economic sphere of all ministerial depart-

ments, cooperatives, public and private enterprises in order to insure the harmonious development of the country. It is authorized to guide private investment into channels indicated by the objectives of the Plan. It is charged with preparing both long-term and annual plans and with consolidating the statistical bases for planning the development of the economy and with apportioning and managing the human, material and financial resources needed to carry out the projects initiated under the Plan. Plans established by the Ministry of Planning have the force of law after they are ratified by the government or by the National Assembly.

Assessment of actual accomplishments is difficult. On the first anniversary of the initiation of the Plan, July 1, 1961, President Touré gave this report on the achievements during the year:

Equipment depots have been opened in all regions in order to develop the country's infrastructure. In the sectors of production and social affairs, offices for justices of the peace, schools and hospitals have been built. A 100-kilowatt transmitter for radio and for telecommunications, public loud speakers and a large national printing plant have been installed. Ditches for directing water, hotels with 125 rooms, a stadium with room for 25,000 persons, a motor road, port installations and a fishing port have been built. A polytechnical institute, an airline company and lighterage service have been established. With regard to the country's infrastructure, equipment for 16 new public works has been received and will soon be installed; 73 buses are in service and soon the number will reach 118. Road transport has been augmented by a thousand trucks and the railroad has been modernized with new locomotives and freight cars.

The 20 billions of francs dedicated to agricultural and industrial production will soon show results. The orders for 10,000 tools are delivered in part and will all be received in time for the next agricultural season. Finally, to give an idea of the importance of the new enterprise, 9,000 workers have been recruited since July 1, 1960, to carry out plan operations.

THE ECONOMY—AUTUMN 1961

The economy in late 1961 showed improvement in a number of areas, and a few important projects had been completed. The two major utility companies and the two foreign-owned diamond mining companies had been nationalized. A central bank, a banking system independent of France and a Guinean currency had been established.

The foreign mining consortiums continued to operate under long-term guarantees, not, however, without difficulties and misunderstandings with government officials. The Conakry Mining Company in 1960 shipped more than 700,000 tons of iron ore, almost all of it to West Germany. The bauxite deposits worked by Bauxites du Midi yielded over a half million tons in 1960. Fria, which went into production that year, mined about the same amount, of which 185,000 tons

were processed into alumina. French also discussed negotiating an agreement with the government—caused by the U.S. of Canada—see a temporary suspension of exportation of alumina. The government planned output of 1,500 tons of bauxite and 222,000 tons of alumina annually. The government retaliated by withdrawing its concession, and in November 1961 Bauxites du Midi began to close down its Iles de Los mining operations.

The upswing in both agriculture and mining in 1961 made it the best year for exports in Guinean history, and the trend continued in the first half of 1961. This improvement, coupled with a large reduction in imports, gave the country its first surplus trade balance since World War II. By late 1961, however, an acute foreign exchange shortage was reported. The pattern of foreign trade, almost totally with the franc zone until March 1961, had shifted increasingly to barter agreements with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

The government's recent failure had been its experiment in nationalizing foreign trade and the trade which had created a central internal marketing and distributionally reduced purchasing power. Protective measures, which included the removal of restrictions on trading activities of private firms, were taken by the government early in 1961, but in the meantime it was too early to assess their effectiveness. Unemployment, which had increased after independence with the contraction in basic activity, began to diminish in 1961 as the Three-Year Plan got underway.

Three factors were present in economic progress during the three years of independence: foreign financial and technical assistance, largely from the Sino-Soviet bloc countries; the base laid in productivity by the preceding 10 years of French economic and public and private investment; and successful imports on the part of Guinea's leadership. Immediately on withdrawal from French, loans and a number of long-term agreements for construction of factories, modernization of transportation, and assistance in industry, agriculture and education were negotiated with the Communist countries within the framework of the 15-Year Plan. Many of the projects could be undertaken only as a result of French investment which between 1947 and 1957, amounted to 20 million francs in transportation facilities, development of plantations and irrigation projects, power and mining surveys and research in agriculture, fishing and animal husbandry.

The national leadership has been able to mobilize the human resources latent in the underemployed population. Roads were constructed, trees planted, schools and dispensaries built—all by the unpaid labor of local people under what is known as the human investment

program. At the same time the economic planners pursued policies which were puritanical in their austerity. Imports were cut to a minimum and a self-imposed wage freeze by the labor unions were matched by an almost ostentatious frugality among high officials. A more relaxed attitude toward the personal prerogatives of office seems to be developing, but corruption is severely punished at all levels in the party and the government.

CHAPTER 23

AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL

The government is trying to transform a largely primitive system of subsistence agriculture into a modern system of commercial production for domestic and foreign markets. It uses subsidies, technical education, political exhortation and extensive central planning and control. It is the sole purchaser of export crops; it allocates agricultural equipment and supplies; it controls credit; and it requires that all privately owned and operated agricultural activity conform to the objectives of the Three-Year Plan.

Through these means and by direct appeals, the government exerts pressure on landholders to enter into arrangements for communal ownership or management through the establishment of cooperatives which are expected to play a preponderant role in new agricultural developments. The local apparatus of the PDG keeps the government's wishes before the rural population and mobilizes the inhabitants of even the smallest villages in a succession of projects and campaigns. Farmers are called on to be present at political meetings at least once a week, and, for those whose reluctance to attend cannot be overcome by persuasion or censure, there are fines.

At least 90 percent of the people are directly or indirectly dependent on agriculture, horticulture and animal husbandry for their livelihood. Fishing, hunting and gathering activities are usually supplementary to agricultural pursuits rather than full-time occupations. Agricultural exports include the bananas, coffee and palm kernels produced on plantations owned by Guineans and non-Africans. These contribute substantially to the national income, but it is estimated that the value of food crops consumed in the home is double that of those exported.

The most important food crop is rice. Production in 1960 was estimated at 300,000 tons—50,000 tons short of the domestic demand, which is increasing. The shortage is only partially filled by imports which average 10,000 tons a year. The 1961 National Conference of the PDG, held in August, asked the government to reduce rice imports and to cease importing entirely by the end of 1962. It called on the sections of the party to work for an increase in rice cultivation sufficient to enable the country to meet its requirements and expressed confidence that the government would put the needed agricultural

equipment and supplies in the hands of the rural population by the next harvest. In good years the country is self-sufficient in other staple crops, although most of the sugar and salt consumed must be imported.

The typical unit of the rural economy is not the plantation but the small holding of the village cultivator which provides those who work it with food and a small surplus for clothing, other needs and taxes. Shifting cultivation or bush fallowing, which destroys the forest cover, has been extensively practiced. This method—in which the land is cleared by burning, intensively cultivated for a few seasons and then allowed to revert to bush—leaves the soil exhausted of its nutrients and open to erosion by the torrential rains. Few farmers, with the exception of the commercial planters, are familiar with modern agricultural methods, and only the first steps are being taken to provide the material help, advice and supervision needed to bring about a more productive use of the soil and other agricultural resources.

Stock raising is a traditional occupation among the Foulah and the Malinké of Middle and Upper Guinea. These two ethnic groups own the largest herds of cattle, sheep and goats in the country. These animals are kept in smaller numbers by almost all farmers. Draft animals are rare. Custom and religious beliefs have operated to restrict the direct economic income from livestock and livestock products. Traditionally, for example, the Foulah did not eat meat and refused to kill their cattle, using them instead for dowry payments and as a symbol of wealth and prestige and seeing them as interest-bearing capital in their increase. The Foulah milk their cattle, sheep and goats and thereby provide themselves with curds, one of their major foods.

Other ethnic groups which do slaughter cattle for meat have commonly held that they do so only to make sacrificial feasts on the occasion of births, circumcisions, marriages, funerals or harvests. Sheep and goats, which do not have prestige, also figured in sacrifices. Such traditions affecting economic patterns and food habits have been breaking down in the modern period, but they have by no means disappeared.

Except in the alluvial valleys and deltas of the rivers, most of the soil lies in a thin layer over heavy clay which has a high iron content. The soils map—begun before independence—has not been completed, but it is estimated that 60 to 70 percent of the land surface cannot be cultivated either because it is subject to intense erosion or because the soil has been already destroyed. Some of it which supports a grass cover can be used as pasture to a slight degree. A considerable area, not suited for crops or pasture, could produce trees. Perhaps 30 percent of the land could be kept under cultivation if it were protected

against erosion by the construction of terraces, embankments and permanent borders of vegetation. Without such measures, scarcely 10 percent—the maritime plain, the valleys of the big rivers and the scattered small tracts of bottom land—can be cultivated continuously for any length of time.

Still other factors hold down productivity. There is a high incidence of crop diseases, especially those affecting rice, bananas and coffee. Capital for sprays, education in their use, and research leading to the development of hardier seed strains are needed. Few farmers know of the benefits of fertilizers and sprays, and still fewer have the money to buy them. Funds are also lacking for agricultural machinery, and—even if they were not—most holdings are too small to make mechanization profitable. Agricultural credit is scarce and has shared in the general shrinkage of all types of credit since independence.

Notwithstanding the government's commitment to a policy of controls and planning, the development of agriculture has been retarded by the lack of organization. A central agency responsible for agriculture came into being only in early 1961 when the Ministry of Rural Economy was established. The Centers for Rural Modernization, which had been organized in each of the 26 administrative regions in 1960 and were in effect the beginning of an agricultural extension service, were brought under the Ministry's jurisdiction.

France had attempted to improve Guinea's agriculture through an economic assistance program called the Fund for Economic and Social Development (Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social—FIDES). Between 1947 and 1957 FIDES granted about \$18 million (23 percent of all FIDES development grants to Guinea during the period) for development of agriculture, animal husbandry, horticulture and forestry. FIDES grants financed: the drainage and development of over 10,000 hectares of rice fields in the Niger River marshes and 14,000 hectares in Lower Guinea; the establishment of the quinine plantation at Sérédou; improvement of 1,800 hectares of oil palm groves in Lower Guinea and the Forest Region; immunization of cattle; and pasture improvements through the sinking of wells, soil conservation and forest protection.

The Three-Year Plan, inaugurated at the beginning of 1960, placed great emphasis on agricultural development; the allocation of 10,110 million francs (247 Guinean francs equal U.S.\$1) amounted to more than a quarter of the total budget for the Plan (see table 1). Agricultural productivity was to be increased by at least 4 percent a year, rice production by 15 percent in three years and other subsistence crops by smaller percentages. Production of bananas and palm kernels was to be doubled, and coffee production was to be increased by 30 percent. By the end of the first year 5,962 million francs had been spent. The

human investment program had contributed considerably to the Plan in land cleared for cultivation, trees and crops planted, and nurseries and plantations maintained (see ch. 22, Character and Structure of the Economy).

Table 1. Proposed Expenditures for Agriculture and Livestock Raising Under Guinea's Three-Year Plan
[In Millions of Guinean francs]

Item	Amount
Rice production:	
1 national center of 7,000 hectares ¹ (productivity to reach 20,000 tons by 1963).....	3, 675
Funds to expand research activities at Koba experimental center.....	75
Aid to regional administrations and to cooperatives ²	425
Banana production:	
3 national centers (estimated production 12,000 tons).....	300
Aid to cooperatives (estimated production 20,000 tons).....	570
Coffee production:	
Extension of nurseries; furnishing 15 million plants to farmers; and eradication of plant diseases.....	200
Pineapple production:	
3 national centers (estimated production 30,000 tons).....	920
Aid to cooperatives (estimated production 6,000 tons) ²	30
Peanut production:	
6 national centers (estimated production 25,000 tons).....	150
Aid to cooperatives (estimated production 5,000 tons) ²	60
Animal husbandry:	
7 state farms for forage crops.....	500
Aid to cooperatives ²	200
Laboratory.....	100
Other:	
Furnishing oil palm trees to farmers.....	100
1 national center for cocoa tree production.....	50
Forage for animal breeding centers (36,000 tons of corn).....	80
Increase in quinine production at Sérédou Station.....	50
Protection of forests and reforestation.....	500
1 national center for tobacco production (estimated production 200 tons).....	50
Experimental crops: sugar cane, pepper, cotton, textile fibers (including sisal), rubber.....	50
Laboratory for drying fruits and vegetables.....	25
Rural modernization centers.....	750
General equipment for cooperatives.....	1, 250
Total.....	10, 110

¹ 1 hectare equals 2.47 acres.

² Loans to be repaid.

Source: Adapted from "République de Guinée, *La Planification Economique*, pp. 413, 414.

The Plan called for organizing farmers into cooperatives to cultivate either their own communal holdings or state-owned land. More than 170 agricultural production cooperatives with some 43,000 members were established during the first year of the Plan. Production centers were organized for particular crops, especially those for export. Agricultural research, education and training figured prominently in the Plan.

Fishing and forestry have been little developed and funds have been set aside under the Plan for the organization of a state fishing industry, aid to fishermen's cooperatives, the building of two fish smoking plants and a cold storage plant. Funds were also allocated for reforestation and forest protection.

The Plan depends heavily on foreign aid and technical assistance. Communist China has sent specialists, primarily in irrigated rice culture. The Soviet Union is also assisting with the expansion of the Niger rice fields by 7,000 hectares. A barrage is to be constructed creating an artificial lake which can be used for irrigating in the dry season and thus make possible two rice crops a year. Poland has agreed to provide funds and technical assistance for the establishment of a state fishing industry. West Germany is assisting in setting up a veterinary service and in erecting installations for smoking and refrigerating fish (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies; ch. 28, Foreign Economic Relations).

LAND UTILIZATION

The country is divided into four regions which differ in terrain and climate and lend themselves to different uses. Lower Guinea, the coastal area, is generally flat and wooded and is drained by many rivers. Heavy rainfall and sustained heat suit the region to the cultivation of rice and many other crops. Most of the country's banana plantations are located here. Extensive mangrove swamps along the coast and the high tides which sweep up the river estuaries and flood the adjacent area are, however, natural obstacles to the fullest utilization of the region. The Soussou, the largest ethnic group in Lower Guinea, are primarily farmers. Those living near the shore are, with the Baga, Guinea's professional maritime fishermen. The Soussou also rely heavily on the products of palm trees for subsistence and for a cash crop. Little livestock is raised (see ch. 3, Geography and Population; ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Middle Guinea consists largely of the sandy plateau called the Fouta Djallon. With an average altitude of 3,000 feet, it is gashed in many places by the valleys of numerous rivers which rise in its heights. The Foulah, the major ethnic group of the region, are both stock raisers and farmers. They pasture their herds in the uplands in

the rainy season and in the river valleys near their permanent villages in the dry season. Soils are generally poor except in the river bottoms, and much of the plateau suffers from excessive pasturing and from brush-burning to permit the growth of pasturage. Only fonio (an inferior millet) is planted on the plateau; other crops, of which rice is the most important, are cultivated along the rivers and streams (see ch. 3, Geography and Population; ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Upper Guinea, east of the Fouta Djallon, is grassland or savanna country, stretching to the mountains of neighboring Mali. The dry season is severe and rice, the chief crop of the area, is restricted to the vicinity of the streams and rivers where water for irrigation is available. The Malinké, the major ethnic group, are mainly farmers. Hunting, fishing and gathering are also important. Livestock is kept primarily for prestige purposes. The Malinké may have to drive their herds in search of water in the dry season, but they do not have a traditional pattern of cyclical pasturing which involves leaving their permanent villages (see ch. 3, Geography and Population; ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The Forest Region, lying south of Upper Guinea, is traversed by the Guinea Highlands which rise 1,500 feet or more above sea level. The dense rain forest, which covers most of the area below 2,000 feet, gives way to sparse cover at higher altitudes. The largest ethnic groups are the Kissi, Guerzé and Kono, all of whom are farmers. The Kissi are known as the rice people from their principal occupation; the Guerzé and Kono rely more on root crops, food gathering and hunting. Coffee, introduced into the region about 90 years ago, and the products of the oil palm are important exports which contribute substantially to both local and national income (see ch. 3, Geography and Population; ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

Erosion

Rainfall, deforestation and indigenous methods of cultivation have combined to create a severe erosion problem. Where seasonal dryness permits, the savanna and the forested areas have been damaged for centuries by the practice of brush firing. Each year at the end of the dry season much of the land is cleared by burning it over. The fires consume or injure trees, seedlings and shallow roots. Successive fires and the downpour of the rainy seasons combine to destroy the slim layer of humus. The forest vegetation disappears and the impoverished soil, no longer held by the roots of plants, is washed away leaving the naked rock or the laterite shell which underlies the soil throughout much of the country. Erosion damage is especially great in the Fouta Djallon, in the savannas of Upper Guinea, and in the Forest Region,

around Beyla, Kissidougou and Guékédou, where the forests have been progressively destroyed (see ch. 3, Geography and Population).

Little research has been done on Guinea's erosion problems. The carrying capacity of pastures is unknown, and no standard has been established for the length of time fields can be successfully cropped without regeneration by bush fallowing or its equivalent. There are many unsolved problems relating to the protection of arable land against soil wash and other forms of erosion. Small barrages or simple levees along streams have been partially effective in controlling runoff and more are being built under the Three-Year Plan. The PDG and the government have taken an important step in attempting to persuade farmers to limit brush firing to a minimum. It is recognized that as long as the farmer has only his *daba* or *coupe-coupe* (types of brush knife) to clear the brush, he has no practical alternative to using fire. The authorities believe, however, that the practice can be halted by educating the farmers and stock breeders and by giving them, through the cooperatives, a better clearing tool than fire—the tractor.

Land Reclamation

Mangrove swamps and marshes cover thousands of acres, and parts of these areas could be reclaimed for cultivation. Swamps, here and there cut by tidal creeks, stretch in a tangle of roots and trunks along most of the coast from the Rio Nunez to the Great Scarcies River. Swamps and marshes extend inland for varying distances to a flat, sandy plain which floods heavily in the rainy season. This coastal zone could become an immense rice granary for domestic requirements. Its development, however, requires high embankments to keep out the sea, heavy equipment to clear out the mangrove, desalinization of cleared areas and the construction of a network of drainage canals. A start is expected to be made under the Three-Year Plan.

LAND TENURE

Land tenure is regulated for the most part by custom. The dominant concept is that of communal ownership with family-use rights. The concept of individual ownership of land was introduced by the French administration, but it appears to have been limited to urban property. Large landholdings in the form of plantations were concessions granted by the colonial or territorial government to companies, cooperatives and individuals for a limited period in consideration of a commitment by the recipient to develop the land. The government of the Republic has asserted the principle that ultimate ownership of land rests with the state which grants to individuals and groups only the right to use it.

Traditional land-tenure systems in the country vary from group to group, but all are based on the principles of lineage rights and collective use. A family arriving first on a piece of land or clearing it, is presumed to have obtained for itself and its descendants the right to use it. The right is validated by ritual observances and offerings and maintained by continuous use. When a lineage ceases to use a holding, the land reverts to the local community and may be assigned to other lineages. A member of a lineage group who leaves the community for a time has a right to reclaim a portion of the lineage land when he returns. The chief of the lineage group, as its representative and sole intermediary with the ancestors, traditionally divides the lineage land among the heads of the constituent families of the lineage. How often division takes place varies from one ethnic group to another and also within the groups. In some it is every year; in others every 10 years.

In some cases, the right to use the land may be ceded—in whole or in part, gratuitously or for payment—to other lineages, but not in perpetuity. This practice is considered to be less objectionable to established custom if the rent takes the form of a share of produce, thus putting the transaction in the light of a partnership in cultivation. Outsiders are often permitted to hunt or fish on a piece of land or to cross it, provided their activities are not commercial in character and they pay a certain sum or portion of the catch to the family holding the property.

From the time of the conquest French policy was based on the assumption that property was an attribute of sovereignty belonging to the chiefs and that France, as their successor, had acquired sovereign rights over the land. Actually no chief had any traditional sanction for ceding lands on his own authority. The French, however, proceeding on their own assumption, in 1904 promulgated a decree attempting to legalize their claim which stated that "vacant and ownerless" lands were state property. The French administration placed such property under the control of the French-appointed cantonal chiefs. At the same time, a system of universal land registration was initiated in both rural and urban areas.

In fact, however, no land was without a claimant, although it might appear to be so as a result of the practice of bush fallowing whereby land, after a few years' cultivation, was left to revert to bush. In temporarily leaving such a clearing, a lineage did not relinquish its claim to it. Furthermore, the appointed cantonal chiefs were not regarded by the people as having any real right to make decisions with respect to the disposition of ancestral lands. Popularly viewed as illegal and ignored when possible, by 1925 the system was recognized to have failed everywhere except in the towns.

A series of rulings reinforcing the state's claim to ownership of all land were consolidated in a French decree of November 1935, which extended state control to land not used or unoccupied for 10 years. At the same time official policy was moving in the direction of greater recognition of African customary rights, and only provisional titles to land were granted by the government. In such cases, the concessionaire's use rights were made contingent on how fast and how extensively he developed the property.

In May 1955 the right of the state to vacant and ownerless land was modified by French decree. African customary rights over the land were confirmed, and the procedure for transforming them into private property was simplified. Concessions to use land could be granted only after a formal renunciation of customary rights over the land in question. The Territorial Assemblies were given greater authority to grant concessions, and the state's right to own or expropriate property was restricted to land which could be proved to be vacant. Most titles registered under this law were limited (*titre foncier*).

Independence brought the reassertion of the state-ownership principle. A number of land titles registered under the French were re-examined and withdrawn. In February 1961 President Touré decreed that all property not improved for at least three years must be improved within six months or revert to the state. By mid-1961, however, no national land tenure law had been promulgated and customary usage appeared to prevail in most of the country.

PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES

Farming, horticulture, animal husbandry, fishing, hunting and gathering are the major productive activities. Lumbering, hampered by transportation difficulties, is not well developed. Most farming is still of the subsistence type, although in some areas a surplus over subsistence needs is grown for sale on the local market. Plantations and semicultivated tree crops account for most commercial production. Cattle, sheep and goats are numerous except in the coastal plain. Except for a few donkeys and horses, animals are not used for draft. Fishing, hunting and gathering are ordinarily part-time activities, but they often supply important additions to the village diet and cash income.

Except on the plantations, farming and cattle raising are usually joint undertakings in which the members of a family or larger kin group cooperate to produce a livelihood. Tasks are assigned in accordance with custom to men, women and children. Everywhere women play an important role in the production of food crops, and in some groups women often acquire considerable property of their own by marketing the produce they grow or gather. Plantations are operated with paid labor.

Farming

The largest area is planted in rice, the most important subsistence crop. Of the two variations, dry rice and swamp rice, the dry variety is most common. It is cultivated on mountain slopes by shifting agricultural techniques. Swamp rice is grown on inundated land. Production is insufficient to meet demand, and the whole region of Middle Guinea is without sufficient rice to last from harvest to harvest.

A number of steps have been taken to meet the rice shortage. Under two French Five-Year Development Plans, an experimental area for the development of swamp rice was established in Upper Guinea by introducing flood control measures along the Niger and its tributaries. The project area covers 15,000 hectares. It has 3 operating bases, 3 stations for mechanical equipment (at Siguiri, Kankan and Kouroussa) and a research center at Kankan. The Guinean Government expects to increase this area to 25,000 hectares and, later, to 30,000 hectares.

Fonio is second to rice in area planted. Its ability to grow on poor and thin soils has made it particularly important on the Fouta Djallon plateau. It is estimated that the national production of 97,000 tons in 1960 could be doubled or tripled with the use of chemical fertilizers.

Manioc (cassava) is the third most important food staple, and it is planted after the rice harvest in fields which could not support a more demanding plant. 347,000 tons of manioc were produced in 1960, making it the largest food crop in terms of weight. Corn production in 1960 was estimated at 60,000 tons. Field crops include peanuts, potatoes, yams and taro and many other vegetables.

The bush fallowing practiced throughout most of the country involves keeping a piece of land in production as long as it remains fertile—usually three or four years—and then allowing it to revert to bush, sometimes for many years. Eventually it is cleared by burning for another planting cycle. Fields tend to be small and highly irregular in shape and it is frequently difficult to decide where a field begins and an uncultivated area ends. Few holdings exceed 20 acres. Implements are the hoe, which can work the soil to a depth of four or five centimeters, and the *coupe-coupe* or *daba*. Holes for seed are made by hand. Animals are rarely used for plowing or draft purposes. Ashes obtained from fields burned over after the harvest or from the bush burned in the process of clearing are the usual fertilizer. Men clear the bush, sow and reap; women and girls usually weed and thresh and winnow the grain. Harvested crops are stored in cylindrical straw-roofed huts built in the fields or in dung-sealed baskets placed under the veranda of the farmer's house.

Work in the fields is both collective and festive in character. Working groups are made up of kinfolk and neighbors, the men and boys performing certain tasks, the women and girls others. At planting, for instance, the men dig the holes and the women and girls place and cover the seeds. At harvest, a line of men and boys moves down the field cutting the grain which the women and girls gather into the sheaves. Most collective work is accompanied by drumming and singing, and the principal seasonal tasks are preceded or followed by religious rites, feasting and dancing (see ch. 10, Religion).

Different in character is the cultivation of the kitchen garden *tapade* within the residential compound. Each woman has her own garden in which she grows a variety of crops for home consumption, including peanuts, wheat, barley, peas, beans, yams, sweet potatoes, corn, pumpkins, cucumbers, tomatoes, paprika and pimentos. The produce from her garden belongs to her and surpluses sold on the market can provide her with a cash income. In the Fouta Djallon all crops but fonio are grown in the *tapades*. In many parts of the country the *tapades* are cultivated all year round. These small plots are planted with care and are constantly weeded and manured by the women with the help of their daughters. The woman cultivator has more than an economic interest in these subsidiary crops for her success as a wife and housekeeper depends on her skill in varying the monotony of the starch-based diet.

Horticulture

Tree crops play an important role in the economy. Bananas and coffee, the principal ones, are largely cultivated on plantations for export. Citrus fruits, grown in smaller quantities, are more important in supplementing the domestic diet than as an export crop. Three semicultivated trees—the oil palm, the shea (or *karité*) and the kola—furnish fats and a stimulant for local consumption and for export.

Yields of oleaginous products, coffee and fruit are uneven because of variations in rainfall, poor cultivation methods, lack of pesticides and fertilizers. The French administration made a serious and partially successful effort to increase yields and to improve and standardize quality for the export market.

Plantation Cultivation

Two of the main export crops—bananas and coffee—are produced on plantations. More than half the owners are foreigners who are predominately French, but there are also a number of Lebanese and Syrians and a few persons of other nationality. It was estimated that there were 36,000 laborers on the plantations in 1960.

Banana production has been the more important of the two crops. The cultivated banana was introduced to the area in 1920 by the French who invested heavily to expand production. The number of banana plantations increased rapidly after 1938, and by 1960 there were over 3,000 with a total area of more than 6,500 hectares. At that time, about 46 percent of the banana plantations were in the hands of Guineans, individuals or cooperatives, and it was estimated that more than 20,000 Guineans, exclusive of laborers, were depending on banana cultivation for a livelihood. The banana trees need great care. They take three to four years to mature and must be replanted every five to ten years.

The key banana-producing area is in Lower Guinea, where plantations are scattered in the areas around Conakry, Dnbréka, Forécariah and along both sides of the railroad as far as Kindia and Mamou. Production reached a high of 98,000 tons in 1955, but dropped precipitously to 51,663 in 1960 owing to the widespread occurrence of a fungus disease. Although owners of large plantations are controlling the disease by oil spraying, it is estimated that about 3,200 hectares of bananas in small tracts, mainly belonging to Guineans, have been destroyed. Conquest of the disease is one of the priority goals of the Three-Year Plan. The government is carrying out a program of financial assistance to owners who use good planting stock, proper soil preparation and sprays.

Coffee production increased rapidly after the crop was introduced in 1870. It is grown mainly in the Forest Region. There are some European-owned coffee plantations of as much as 1,000 acres in size, but most coffee is grown by Guineans on farms of about 12 hectares. The total area planted is estimated at 10,000 hectares. Some of the orchards are well cared for, but others must compete with a heavy growth of weeds, grasses and vines.

Coffee production rose from 2,400 tons in 1951 to over 14,000 in 1960. Quality is high. The government is attempting to boost output to at least 20,000 tons by establishing nurseries to supply trees without charge to farmers. Under present conditions a number of hazards limit coffee production. Many plantations have serious nutrient deficiencies, arising partly from the original character of the soil and partly from insufficient use of chemical fertilizers. In addition, a fungus disease is causing considerable damage and a leaf-chewing insect is common in the area. The latter can be controlled with DDT, but most planters do not have funds to buy sprays and spray equipment.

Citrus fruit is grown in Middle Guinea where the number of orange trees in family orchards is estimated at more than 750,000 and plantations cover more than 1,000 hectares. Most of the fruit, an estimated 65,000 tons a year, is consumed locally. Output of the plantations

is sold chiefly in the form of oil of orange. Pineapple production, introduced by the French, is increasing.

Semicultivation

The oil palm grows wild over much of Lower Guinea and the Forest Region. Palm oil and palm kernels provide a cash income to a large number of people in these regions. The oil, which is found between the fibrous exterior and the internal shell containing the kernel, is extracted by crude methods. After the men have extracted the oil, the nuts are cracked by the women and children to obtain the kernels which are sold on the seasonal markets for export to oil extractors abroad. Palm oil is used by Guineans in a great variety of ways—for cooking, to make soap, as a kerosene substitute, as a cosmetic, as a medicine and as a preservative for meat and fish.

Production of kernels was estimated at 27,778 tons in 1960. Most of current production is from unimproved indigenous varieties. The government is trying to increase production by the establishment of nurseries and propagation of plants for distribution.

The shea tree is widely dispersed in the savanna and plateau of Middle and Upper Guinea where it serves the same needs as does the oil palm in Lower Guinea and the Forest Region. The oil-bearing nuts mature from January to March; production is impossible to estimate. The felling of shea trees has been forbidden since 1924, but the law is difficult to enforce.

Kola trees are planted in small clearings in the Forest Region. The trees bear nuts after three or four years, and a mature healthy tree will produce at least 400 nuts a year. The white, red and rosecolored nuts are harvested in the dry season by the men who climb the trees to pick them. They are sold in Siguiri or in markets in Mali or at Bamako. Kola nuts are a symbol of welcome and are offered honored guests in Guinean official ceremonies. The trees themselves, traditionally regarded as sacred, are never cut.

Animal Husbandry

No livestock census has ever been taken, but French veterinarians—who carried out a thorough animal disease eradication program—estimated that in 1958 there were over 1.5 million head of cattle, 339,000 sheep and almost 400,000 goats. Some horses and donkeys are found in Upper Guinea, and pigs are raised in the Forest Region where the peoples are non-Moslems. Poultry is found everywhere and some fowls are owned by almost every household, but flocks usually consist of no more than a dozen birds. Cattle, sheep and goats are exported from Upper Guinea to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo, Ivory Coast and Mali; from the Forest Region they are exported to the Ivory Coast,

Sierra Leone and Liberia. It is estimated that twice as many are smuggled into Sierra Leone and Liberia alone as are shown as legal exports.

Most cattle are of the ancient N'dama strain, small, agile and strong, with lyre-like horns. Their resistance to trypanosomiasis, spread by the tsetse fly, has put them in great demand in other parts of Africa. They can be protected by periodic vaccination from other diseases to which they are susceptible. The small, short-haired sheep and goats are also disease-resistant. Pigs, first brought to the area by the Portuguese, have degenerated through lack of care. Poultry, mainly introduced breeds, are subject to all the common poultry diseases, and production is limited. The Coniagui are, however, known for their fat capons which they sell in the market towns in Middle Guinea and neighboring countries.

Livestock are entirely dependent on grazing. The growing of forage crops and the making of hay are completely unknown; grain is not available as an animal food. During the rainy season, when the grass is lush and palatable, the animals are in excellent condition. The Foulah drive their herds of cattle, sheep and goats from the valley bottoms where they spend the dry season, to the higher levels in the rainy season to take advantage of the lush pasture. During the rainy season, it is customary among other peoples to picket animals (including sheep) on pasturage during the day and enclose them in the compounds at night to keep them out of the cultivated fields. All groups permit their animals to wander at will during the dry season after the harvest to get what little nourishment they can from the scorched grass. At this time most animals are worn out by being almost continually on the move in search of water and pasture. Their capacity to produce milk, meat and manure is reduced and they become more susceptible to disease.

Among the Guerzé in the Forest Region, where vegetation and moisture are sufficient for the animals to eat and drink throughout the year, cattle receive no care whatever. It is reported that this abandonment is so complete that to kill a cow it is necessary to shoot it from a distance like a buffalo.

Commercial production of milk is negligible. Though the Foulah milk their cattle, the women and children who are charged with this task do not properly strip the cows and output averages only about two liters a day even in the rainy season. Milk and curds are an essential part of the Foulah diet so that there is never a surplus for sale outside the area. The Coniagui and Bassari of Middle Guinea and the Guerzé of the Forest Region do no milking, and the Coniagui say that milk contains poison. Other livestock products are little exploited anywhere in the country. Unskillfully tanned hides are used for sandals, knife sheaths and rugs.

The French sought to improve herds both in number and quality by such means as increased pasturage and watering points, cross breeding with animals imported from France, and immunization of animals against the worst epidemic diseases. As a result, herds have steadily increased since the 1930's. The increase, however, led to a destruction of vegetation along the trek routes and contributed to soil erosion. Current measures to improve animal husbandry are being undertaken with foreign help. In 1961 a West German technical mission included a group studying methods for improving cattle raising and a traveling veterinary clinic which was roaming the country vaccinating cattle. A laboratory for production of cattle vaccine was being installed, and scholarships had been established for the study of veterinary science in West Germany.

Fishing

Fish in abundant supply and great variety are found along the coast and in the rivers. Both the maritime and riverine peoples fish for food, and dried and smoked fish are an important source of cash income for them.

Deep sea fishing is carried out by about 2,500 Soussou and Baga, using some 700 canoes or cutters. Their annual catch averages about 4,000 tons. They are handicapped by the smallness and fragility of their boats, the inadequacy of their gear, the lack of scientific data concerning the ocean depths and fish species and the poor organization of marketing and transport.

In 1954 fishing on an industrial basis was begun at Conakry with nine trawlers. They brought in about 2,800 tons of fish in 1956. In late 1960 a team of Polish technicians started preparing the plans for the construction of a fishing port at Conakry which, it was estimated, would cost 150 million Guinean francs and would be equipped to handle 25,000 tons of fish. By March 1961 two trawlers of 25 tons each, built in Poland, were in operation.

Inland fishing is most intensively carried on during the first weeks of the rainy and dry seasons. Baskets, traps, poisons, and hooks and lines are variously used.

Forestry

About 2.7 million acres of national forests represent approximately 4 percent of the country's area. Most of the forests are owned by the government, as they were under the French administration. They are largely located in the Forest Region, the most inaccessible part of the country. As a result of shortage of labor, transportation difficulties and the dispersion of valuable species, the exploitation of lumber has nowhere reached capacity. The most important species are teak, ebony, acacia and rubber. During World War II, when rubber from

the Southeast was cut off from European markets, the tapping of wild trees in the Forest Region reached considerable proportions.

Deforestation has been going on for centuries, but it reached alarming proportions only in the past half century. This was not caused by commercial exploitation of timber, but by the felling of trees for agricultural clearings and by the damage wrought young trees and bushes by the growing cattle herds. Shrinkage of the dense forest area in the Forest Region has been paralleled by progressive decline in the number of trees found in the savanna country.

A Forest Service was established in the AOF in 1923, and in 1935 the forest domain was declared to be state property. Commercial and customary rights to fell trees, collect firewood and plants, and station herds were curtailed and infractions punished. By 1940 a start had been made in reforesting the most depleted areas. Shortages of imported fuel during World War II, however, led to further depletion of the forest resources and resulted in the imposition of heavier penalties for infractions. Fines and imprisonment were sometimes summarily meted out to individuals and groups of families who did not understand the laws and who were simply exercising what they considered to be their traditional rights. The sense of grievance this aroused did not end with World War II, but was sharpened by the continued enlargement of the area classed as forest reserves.

Huge funds for reforestation were allocated in the first two French Development Plans, and about 1,760 hectares were planted in pine, teak and several other varieties. These stands have prospered, but independence has brought a change in national policy. Pressed by farmers and the need to increase food production, the government has modified the emphasis on conservation to permit, under certain conditions, the cultivation of tracts of land within the forests.

Hunting and Gathering

Hunting and trapping yield a supplementary meat supply and help to protect crops and livestock from the depredations of marauding animals. Among the animals taken for food are the antelope, wild boar, monkey, buffalo, hippopotamus, leopard and many smaller species, including wild fowl. The commonest large predator is the leopard. Widely regarded as a royal animal, its skin customarily goes to the leader of the hunting party.

Hunting is done by individual stalking and group drives. Traps include various types of snares, pitfalls and deadfalls. In the dry season, bush-firing is used to drive animals towards traps and snares. Hunters employ bows, arrows and spears, and a few are equipped with firearms. There are few full-time hunters, but in some areas—notably in the Forest Region—certain men, known for their skill in hunting, train apprentices. Such a master hunter must have killed a

dangerous wild animal—a leopard, buffalo or elephant. He initiates the apprentices into the magical and technical secrets of the hunt for a fee, and thereafter remains in a special relationship to them.

An ordinance of September 1960 established fees for hunting licenses and regulated the export of animals and skins. License fees are lowest for those hunting to obtain meat or to destroy marauding or dangerous animals. Higher fees and a differentiated scale of charges applies to hunting for commercial, scientific and sporting purposes. Maximum bags are set for various animals. A graduated tax imposed on exported skins increases sharply with the quantity.

People, mainly the women, gather a variety of edible roots, mushrooms, indigenous fruits, nuts and wild honey. The principal spices, ginger and cloves, are gathered in the forest and, in many instances, meals are supplemented by termites, locusts, crickets, lizards and snails.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

Governmental agricultural policy centers on encouraging the formation of cooperatives of farmers and stock breeders. These are regarded as essential to the organizational framework within which fiscal aid, technical training and other measures can best operate to increase production.

Primary responsibility for the development of farming, animal husbandry and forestry rests with the Ministry of Rural Economy. Established in December 1960, it replaced the section for Cooperatives and Peasant Affairs of the Ministry of National Economy. The Ministry's duties are: to promote the expansion and improvement of agriculture, livestock breeding and forestry; to coordinate and guide these activities within the objectives of the development plans; to implement programs of technical education in all aspects of agricultural production; to organize research in agriculture, forestry and animal breeding and insure the practical application of the results; to guide and control agricultural educational establishments and the development of trained personnel; and to promote and control the activities of producers' cooperatives and the state farming enterprises.

Within the Ministry are the Departments of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Food Processing, Water and Forests, Cooperatives, Agricultural Education, the Quinine Experimental Station at Sérédou, and the National Office of Bananas and Fruits. In each administrative region there is a regional director for rural production in charge of all the Ministry's services in that region. He is also responsible for providing technical assistance to farmers to help them improve the quality and quantity of their produce.

The government maintains a number of National Centers for Agricultural Production and National Farms for Animal Breeding which

are highly mechanized state pilot experiments specializing in the principal types of cultivation and husbandry. In 1960 a Rural Modernization Center was established in each regional administration to demonstrate modern methods of cultivation and introduce new crops.

Credit and Cooperatives

Government credit is available to individual farmers and stockbreeders whose efforts serve the objectives of the Three-Year Plan, but it is intended primarily for cooperatives. All agriculturalists have been called upon to join or form producers' cooperatives which are seen as the best means of modernizing and mechanizing agriculture in the interest of increased production and a higher standard of living. Although cooperatives have been established, and collective fields, farms and plantations are mentioned in various reports, it is not known how far the program has progressed.

Cooperatives are not new in the area. The AOF Government in 1910 established native cooperatives called Provident Societies. Supported by a tax of about 7 francs a year per member, these organizations supplied their membership with agricultural credit, seed, technical information and local transport. Membership was compulsory, and the direction of affairs was in the hands of the European district administrator. In 1931 an agricultural loan fund was set up in each district. Africans were highly critical of these organizations as being too heavily dominated by the French administration and not sufficiently oriented toward improving conditions at the village level. After 1952 the Provident Societies were gradually converted into Mutual Societies for Rural Production (*Sociétés Mutuelles de Production Rurale*), and emphasis was placed on bringing technical assistance to the villages.

Research and Education

Fairly extensive agricultural research has been done since the early 1930's by various institutions: the Center for Fish Study (*Centre d'Etudes des Pêches*) at Conakry; the Rice Research Center (*Centre de Recherches Rizicoles*) at Koba; the Quinine Experimental Station (*Section de Recherche sur le Quinquina*) at Sérédou; and the Institute for Colonial Citrus and Other Fruits (*Institut des Fruits et Agrumes Coloniaux—IFAC*). IFAC was reorganized in September 1961 as the Fruit Research Institute (*Institut de Recherches Fruitières*) and placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Rural Economy. The Quinine Experimental Station at Sérédou—which before independence produced 30 kilograms a day of quinine from 522 acres of cinchona trees and maintained trial planting of pepper, tea and tung—was not operating in 1961. Other research stations are located at

Mamou (rice and citrus), at Kankan (rice) and at Macenta (coffee, rice and oil palm). The government is continuing to support these research centers and experimental stations, but is handicapped by the lack of qualified technicians.

Until independence, there was only one agricultural school in the country. Located at Tolo about 185 miles northeast of Conakry, it had facilities for only 20 students. Both the national budget and the Three-Year Plan emphasize education, and for the first time a coherent system of agricultural education has been established. A National Agricultural School (Ecole Nationale d'Agriculture) with two classes of 20 students each has been opened at Kindia. At Tolo the Practical School of Agriculture and Cooperation (Ecole Pratique d'Agriculture et de Coopération), offering a four-year course, has been expanded to 3 classes, of 25 students each. Near Tolo a Practical Center (Centre Pratique) has been established to train 100 villagers every three months in how to organize and manage cooperatives. At Koba and Kankan mechanics are taught to operate and repair agricultural machinery destined for the Rural Modernization Centers and the light equipment which is to be sent to the cooperatives.

CHAPTER 24

INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL

Guinea is rich in bauxite, iron ore and hydroelectric power potential. Known reserves of bauxite are estimated at one billion long tons, more than a quarter of the world's total reserves, and iron ore reserves, although of low grade, are among the largest in the world. Lacking capital, Guinea must look abroad for assistance in developing its resources, and, with 90 percent of its people illiterate and engaged in agriculture, for much technical assistance as well.

The government, committed to socialist assumptions, envisions an ambitious program of economic development. In the industrial sphere, the initial effort is directed at creating the prerequisites for modern industry—educational facilities, health services, an appropriate transportation system, power sources, adequate food supply and a suitable fiscal system. Because of the magnitude of the effort, the economy will remain predominantly agricultural for a long time.

Mineral resources are just beginning to be tapped. The systematic exploitation of bauxite and iron dates from 1952. Gold has been mined for centuries, but the diamond deposits have been worked only since 1936. Mineral production has been expanding every year. In 1959, for example, the value of exports derived from mines had tripled, as compared with 1958, and in 1960 the first shipment of alumina further increased the contribution made by mining to the country's revenues. Although diamonds and gold are important income earners, they are overshadowed by the long-range potential of the vast iron ore and bauxite deposits.

Guinea is becoming a leading producer of bauxite and wants its own aluminum industry. The realization of this ambition will require the development of the great electric power potential of the country's many rivers and waterfalls, since the processing of bauxite into aluminum requires large amounts of low-cost electricity. The plans drawn up by the French before 1958 for hydroelectric installations at Souapiti on the Konkouré River await capital and technical assistance to be carried out.

In late 1961 the Fria plant at Kimbo, which produces alumina (a powder) from bauxite, was the country's only large-scale manufacturing enterprise and one of the largest in Africa. Fria originally was

conceived as a first step in a larger complex which would include facilities for reducing alumina into aluminum metal. This plan, which the Guinean authorities are eager to see carried out, will require the construction of the hydroelectric installations on the Konkouré.

The future of industrial development is bright, but large obstacles must be overcome. The provision of roads, railroads, ports and harbors, power installations and housing and services for industrial workers—all notably deficient in the country as a whole—will constitute a heavy charge against any program of industrial development.

For at least a decade, Guinea will continue to need much foreign capital and technical assistance. The companies that have been mining and processing iron ore and bauxite are owned by international consortiums of United States, French, British, Canadian, Swiss and West German firms with the capital resources to finance such enterprise. Although the new state has nationalized some foreign-owned enterprises—or requisitioned their installations—and has sought to redefine and restrict the terms under which the consortiums operate, President Touré, in seeking more foreign capital, has offered guarantees of its security.

To compensate in part for its lack of capital, Guinea has had recourse to a human investment program—a system of volunteer labor in which the government supplies the equipment for projects which are carried out by volunteers working without remuneration. Much has been accomplished in the building and maintenance of roads and drainage works and in the construction of public buildings, but the scheme has not so far contributed much in the field of mining and industry. The program has precedent in the *corvée* system of unpaid labor once employed by the French and an example in the Chinese Communist use of volunteer and conscripted labor on such ambitious undertakings as the Yangtze River levees and dams. The high level of underemployment in Guinea lends itself to the human investment program, but the small size of the total labor force imposes narrow limits on what it can achieve.

Almost all industrial activities are directed by European personnel in the absence of sufficient numbers of qualified Guineans. Toward the end of 1961 Frenchmen still predominated in this foreign group, but in the emergency created by the French exodus after independence, Guinea contracted with various countries to supply specialists in training, advisory and operational capacities. Training is one of the most important aspects of the Three-Year Plan; a primary aim is the replacement by Guineans of all foreign staff in both government and private enterprise at the earliest possible moment. The technical training program at Fria is the largest in the country and its graduates, as soon as they are trained, are used by the government to staff its offices, projects and technical schools. The government grants

scholarships to Guineans for foreign training and has welcomed other opportunities for its nationals to study abroad.

The Three-Year Plan reflects the important position of mining in the national economy and the emphasis placed on it in the program for the economic development of the country. Since the mineral surveys completed before independence were not done by the Guinean territorial government, the documentation held in the Guinean Department of Mines is incomplete. To provide the basis for more detailed investigation of the possibilities of mineral exploitation, contracts have been made with various Soviet-bloc countries to send experts to conduct further surveys during 1960-62.

It was planned during the same period to extend diamond prospecting into new areas, and two fully equipped geological groups went to the field in the dry season of 1960-61. A third group began the study of gold-bearing deposits, and a search for oil was initiated by teams of Soviet-bloc geologists and geophysicists.

Under the Three-Year Plan, the administration of diamond-mining concessions was assigned to the chief engineer of the Office for Mines, Geology and Industry at Kankan. The two privately owned companies still in business were nationalized on the grounds that they had not made the most of their concessions, and operations in four diamond fields were mechanized. Steps were taken to increase the output of gold to meet the government's need for currency backing and for money for purchases on the international market. It was planned to mine veins which could not be profitably worked otherwise with convict or military labor or with volunteers under the human investment program. Systematic prospecting for iron was begun on the Nimba-Simandou deposits, which will be worked by CONSAFRIQUE, an international consortium.

The construction called for by the Three-Year Plan made it necessary for the government to open five quarries and to build a road from Lambagny, a village southeast of Conakry, to a beach where sufficient sand for concrete was available to meet Conakry's building requirements for a five-year period. The production and sale of construction materials was made a government monopoly. Although known domestic sources of raw materials for cement are scanty, the Three-Year Plan provided for a cement works to be built in the hope that the intensive geological research program would reveal new supplies. The feasibility of establishing a glass factory was also to be investigated. It was further proposed that the salt produced in Guinea be improved in quality and increased in quantity by clearing salt marshes and mechanizing the refining process.

The government recognized that there was no possibility of creating heavy industry during the period of the Three-Year Plan. It set out to start industries of moderate size which could process agricultural

products and produce the consumer goods which the country has been forced to buy abroad (see table 1). Attention was also given to the modernization of handicrafts.

Table 1. Industrial Installations Proposed in Guinea's Three-Year Plan

- 1 agricultural implement factory—to produce 400,000 implements annually.
- 1 factory for the construction of light machinery.
- 1 factory for making carts and wheelbarrows—to produce 50,000 items annually.
- 1 factory for making cooking utensils—to produce 250,000 items annually.
- 1 factory for making wooden furniture—to produce 60,000 items annually.
- 1 nail factory—to produce 600 tons annually.
- 1 canning plant (at Mamou)—to produce fruit juices and orange essence.
- 1 palm-oil press and soap works (at Boffa).
- 1 peanut-oil press and soap works (at Koundara)
- 1 factory (at Conakry)—to produce dried bananas and banana meal.
- 1 sawmill (at N'Zérékoré).
- 2 fish-smoking plants (at Conakry) with equipment to produce fish meal.
- 2 cold storage plants (at Conakry and Mamou)—each with a 100-ton capacity.
- 1 tannery and shoe factory (at Kindia)—with the capacity of 250,000 pairs of shoes a year.
- 5 slaughter houses (in Middle and Upper Guinea) with refrigeration and drying plants
- 1 cigarette factory.
- 1 pineapple cannery.
- 1 tapioca factory.
- 1 press for local vegetable oils, such as Koura and Mene.
- 1 plant (at Coyah) for extracting salt and chemical products from sea water.
- Rice processing plants (at Kouroussa, Siguiri, Dragueda, Damissakoura, Kankaran and Kaba)—with a total annual capacity of 50,000 tons.

Source: Adapted from République de Guinée, *La Planification Économique*, pp. 363, 364.

A large portion of the funds allocated to the Three-Year Plan was for the purchase of power equipment. Immediate interest was the construction of small power dams which could be built without the use of heavy equipment rather than in the building of the large dams which would eventually be needed.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Not until the end of World War II was any real start made in the industrial sphere. Until then the nearest approach to industrial activity was some small-scale mining and the elementary processing of a few agricultural crops. In 1949 there were only seven small soap factories in the area, and these compared with two or three 10 years earlier. The first sawmill was built during the war at Mamou by the Water and Forest Service to supply lumber which could no longer be obtained from outside. By 1945 about a dozen mills were in operation at Kindia, Kissidougou, Macenta and N'Zérékoré.

Before World War II only small quantities of easily accessible gold, iron, diamonds and salt were mined—principally by Africans for domestic needs. The Guinean Company for Diamond Mining Société Guinéenne d'Exploitation des Diamants—SOGUINEX) began to work the diamond fields of the Forest Region in the 1930's. Signiri in northeastern Guinea averaged about four tons annually and provided nearly three-fourths of the AOF's total gold exports. Until 1940 all gold had to be sold to the Bank of France (Banque de France); from 1940 to 1944, to the AOF government; and after 1944, to the Central Fund for Overseas France (Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer—CCFOM). A far greater quantity than was sold legally, however, was smuggled abroad, hoarded or made into jewelry.

French mining law was based on the principle that ownership of surface land and of the subsoil were separate. The AOF government reserved to itself all mineral rights as national wealth belonging to the public authority. A decree of 1899, however, confirmed the traditional rights of Africans to extract minerals and forbade the granting of mining concessions in areas where such rights were habitually exercised. Although successive mining decrees confirmed these rights, particularly for surface deposits of gold and salt, Africans had no claim to the subsoil. In 1946 Guinea became an Overseas Territory (Territoire d'Outre-Mer) and coproprietor with the AOF of the subsoil.

Mining law in the AOF—as it applied to non-Africans and corporations—evolved over 50 years, but was not codified until 1954. The law as it developed was based on governmental control through the issuance of short-term permits for prospecting and long-term concessions for exploitation of mines. No individual or company might prospect or mine without government authorization. Although a permit might be granted to a foreign individual, neither a permit nor a concession was ever granted any corporation not constituted under French law; three-fourths of the directors of such companies had to be of French nationality. Supplementary regulations to the 1954 law limited the areas which could be prospected and mined and the duration of permits. Ore exports were taxed according to their market value.

The development of Guinean mines and hydroelectric resources dates from 1946, the year the French Parliament voted the Development Law which was aimed at modernizing the territorial economies. The Ministry of Overseas France (Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer) was directed to draw up plans for a development program to be financed from the Fund for Economic and Social Development (Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social—FIDES) and the Central Fund for Overseas France. Between 1947 and 1957 FIDES invested \$34.4 million in the development of Guinea.

Surveys of the country's hydroelectric power resources were begun in 1942, but systematic and intensive field studies did not get under way until 1947. The Mining Bureau for Overseas France (Bureau Minier de la France d'Outre-Mer), established in 1948, was given the responsibility for mining policy, research and prospecting throughout the Overseas Territories. A geological map of Guinea, begun in 1917, was still the only one in existence by 1961. Billions of francs and smaller amounts of foreign capital were expended in prospecting and brought such finds as the iron deposits in the area of the Monts Nimba. Hydroelectric power development, however, awaited the growth of cities and heavy industry.

Before World War I, an American company became interested in the accessible iron ore deposits near Conakry, but it was 1949 before the Conakry Mining Company (Compagnie Minière de Conakry), in which French and American capital participated, was organized. Backed by almost \$2 million granted to the French Government by the United States Economic Cooperation Administration in 1950, and by an equal sum in Metropolitan francs, the railway from the mine to Conakry and a quai for the loading of ore on freighters were rapidly completed. The company shipped its first ore in February 1953.

Exploitation of the bauxite deposits on the Iles de Los also began about this time. They had been discovered in 1912—only a few years in advance of those at Boké. Although the Bauxite du Midi was granted bauxite rights in the Boké area in the 1920's and, in the mid-1930's, acquired additional rights in the Iles de Los, World War II halted development of the sites. In 1949, with the aid of its parent company, Aluminum Ltd., of Canada, Bauxite du Midi began operations on the Iles de Los. The first ore shipment was made in September 1952. The company had from the beginning been interested in the less accessible, but vastly greater, deposit of high-grade ore near Boké, the alumina content of which was 55 percent as compared with 50 percent on the Iles de Los. Bauxite du Midi's concession at this site covers an area of about 1,100 square miles. Although Aluminum Ltd., of Canada planned to invest \$150 million in developing the deposits—a project which included the construction of an alumina plant—these plans were shelved for the time being in August 1961.

In the early 1940's Pechiney (Pechiney Compagnie de Produits Chimiques et Electrometallurgiques), France's largest aluminum producer, began looking for bauxite and hydroelectric sites in Guinea as well as elsewhere in French West Africa. In 1951 it joined forces with Ugine (Société d'Electrochimie, d'Electro-Metallurgie et des Aciéries Electriques d'Ugine) a second French aluminum producer, to form SAREPA (Société Africaine de Recherches et d'Études pour l'Aluminium) for the purpose of intensive prospecting. The combine

discovered deposits estimated at over a billion tons of bauxite ore in the Kindia-Dabola region close to the Konkouré River near Kimbo. In 1957 SAREPA organized an international consortium, the Fria International Company for Alumina Production (Fria Compagnie Internationale pour le Production de l'Alumine), to exploit the find. The consortium is usually referred to as Fria, and this is also the name of the village near which it is located.

Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, the United States member of the Fria consortium, holds 48.5 percent of the stock and has 34.6 percent of the votes on the board of directors. Other participants are Pechiney-Ugine [of France], 26.5 percent; the British Aluminum Company, 10 percent; Aluminum Industry Corporation (Aluminum Industrie Aktiengesellschaft [of Switzerland]), 10 percent; and United Aluminum Works Corporation (Vereinigte Aluminum Werke Aktiengesellschaft [of West Germany]), 5 percent. The enterprise is managed by Pechiney-Ugine which has a majority of the voting stock. Shareholders have the right to purchase alumina from the Fria plant in proportion to their stock holdings. The original agreement for mining the bauxite and producing alumina was made with the AOF government and with the Guinean territorial government. Sékou Touré, as deputy governor general of the territorial government, was a signatory to the original agreement.

The agreement took the form of a contract between the company and the governments with a duration of 75 years and an option to renew for a further 25 years. The company agreed to mine bauxite in accordance with general practices, give priority to employment of local labor, develop professional and technical training, comply with Guinea's welfare legislation, respect the trade unions, build housing facilities for its employees and to contribute toward medical and educational facilities and to the Regional Development Fund. On its part the AOF Government, with the concurrence of the Guinean territorial government, granted to Fria the bauxite concession for the stipulated period and guaranteed the stability of general, legal, economic and financial conditions, the free movement of funds within the foreign exchange regulations, freedom of marketing and the right to repatriate capital and profits. Further, the government agreed that there would be no new restrictions imposed on management or supervision and no hindrance to the movement of foreign technicians in the company's employ. President Touré has indicated on numerous occasions that Guinea will honor this agreement as long as the company carries out its obligations.

After independence, the consortium decided to complete the installations it had begun. This decision is cited by Guineans as an act of confidence on the part of the consortium in the word of the Guinean Government that the consortium could proceed in accordance with

the terms of the agreement. Though Fria had obligated to complete its installations by April 1964, it was ready to begin operations by April 1960.

The Fria installation was originally conceived as a first step in the industrialization program for Guinea, known as the Souapiti Project. This plan also included development of hydroelectric power at Souapiti on the Konkouré and an aluminum-reduction plant at Kimbo—as well as the bauxite and alumina operations at Kimbo and Boké and their supporting facilities. An earth dam was to be constructed on the Konkouré River above Kaleta Falls and an underground power plant installed, thus providing an annual capacity of more than 3,000 million kilowatt hours—enough power for the projected aluminum reduction plant at Kimbo, for other industrial users and for the public as well.

Overall capital cost of the project has been estimated at approximately \$200 million; construction would require five to six years. By early 1958 the engineering studies were substantially completed and a detailed feasibility report prepared and submitted to the World Bank in support of a proposed loan of \$70 to \$80 million to be guaranteed by the French Government. When Guinea became independent, the French Government withdrew its support and the proposed World Bank loan was shelved.

NATURAL RESOURCES

Guinea, still not completely surveyed, is one of the richest areas in West Africa in known mineral wealth. Coal and petroleum are lacking, but the hydroelectric potential is an undeveloped substitute for these industrial fuels. Water is plentiful and the development of the electric power potential would make possible, not only an aluminum industry, but the processing of iron ore and the production of chemicals as well.

Minerals

Gold occurs in alluvial and residual placer deposits in the Bouré and Tinkisso Rivers, north and northwest of Siguiri and in the Nian-dan-Banié range where three separate lodes have been discovered. Diamonds are found in the Macenta and Kérouané districts in the alluvial gravels of the Makona River and its tributaries on the border of Guinea and Sierra Leone. The principal known occurrences are located midway between Kissidougou and Beyla (see ch. 3, Geography and Population).

Iron ore deposits rank among the largest in the world. Those on the Kaloum Peninsula in the vicinity of Conakry cover some 42,500 acres and are estimated at no less than 200 million tons of ore of roughly 52 percent metal content. The ore is low in phosphorous

content, high in chrome (1 to 1.5 percent), nickel (0.1 percent), and alumina (10 percent). These characteristics, which complicate smelting, have delayed exploitation of the deposits. Other high-quality deposits are located in the Monts Nimba area, straddling the border with Liberia, and at a number of smaller sites west of the Fouta Djallon (see ch. 3, Geography and Population).

Bauxite is found almost everywhere in the soils of lateritic origin which cover so much of the country. High temperatures and the alternation of wet and dry seasons favor the chemical reactions which lead to bauxite formation, and the heavy rains tend to wash away many of the other minerals from the bauxite.

The Iles de Los, Boké and Kimbo deposits have attracted most attention. Total reserves on the Iles de Los are estimated at between four and five million tons. The Boké site, the richest in the country, has over 700 million tons; Kimbo, about 300 million tons. Of the other known deposits, those at Dabola and Kindia are potentially important because they are adjacent to the Conakry-Niger Railroad and a highway and also near falls which could be harnessed to produce electricity.

Power

Of the numerous rivers and tributaries, at least eight have a high electric power potential: the Konkouré, the Fataha, the Kolenté and the Kogon which empty into the Atlantic; the Bafing, the Tominé and the Gambie (Gambia) which flow northward from the Fouta Djallon; and the Niger which flows northeastward from Upper Guinea (see ch. 3, Geography and Population). The government estimates the hydroelectric potential of these rivers to be 12.6 billion kilowatt hours annually, and the development of hydroelectric power has high priority in the government's economic plans.

The greatest power potential is provided by the Konkouré and its tributaries which have 17 waterfalls and rapids varying in drop from 80 to 1,350 feet. The potential energy of the Konkouré River system alone is estimated to be 30 percent of that of the other seven rivers combined. On the Fataha, Kolenté and Kogon Rivers hydroelectric possibilities exist, but limited watershed areas in their short upper reaches and their slow descents across the flat coastal plain give them low priority in plans for electric power reduction.

The Bafing and the Tominé Rivers have watersheds of about 6,500 square miles each and a total hydroelectric potential approximately one-third of that of the Konkouré. The Bafing's 200-mile course within Guinea has seven waterfalls and rapids with drops varying from 100 to 800 feet. The river's average descent is more than five feet per mile. At a point near the Mali frontier, conditions are particularly favorable for a large dam and power plant.

The Tominé (called the Corubal after it crosses the boundary with Portuguese Guinea) and its principal tributary, the Koumba, have a total length of almost 240 miles within Guinea. Their five principal waterfalls (three on the Tominé and two on the Koumba) vary in height from 150 to 500 feet. Conditions for hydroelectric exploitation are limited, however, except above their confluence in Gaoual where it would be feasible to construct a dam across each river and divert water from both into a single major installation.

The Gambia (Gambia) offers some possibilities for electric power exploitation, but little information is available regarding its potentialities. Maps indicate that the river and its tributaries within Guinea have numerous waterfalls. At least three on the Gambia itself are more than 200 feet in height. Land formations, however, seem to be unfavorable for dam building.

The Niger basin in Guinea covers an area of approximately 33,800 square miles—or more than 35 percent of the country's total area—and the volume of water carried by the river and its tributaries is greater than that of any other river in the country. The granite bedrock south of the Dinguiraye-Kouroussa-Kankan line is suitable for retaining water in large reservoirs. The watershed area of the upper portion of the system, however, is less than 400 square miles in area—too small to provide water for sustained hydroelectric operations. On the lower levels the stream flows slowly over a relatively level plateau with a fall averaging only 20 inches per mile, and the banks are too low for power dam construction.

As of late 1961, only the Konkouré had been used for the production of electricity; the country's sole hydroelectric station was located on this river at Grandes Chutes approximately 70 miles northeast of Conakry. This station generated power for Conakry and Kindia. In 1959 the station's output was about 20 million kilowatt hours. Conakry also had a diesel power unit for standby use. Diesel generators served Mamou, Coyah, Labé, Kankan, Macenta, Dalaba and Boké and operated only at night. Of these, Conakry was by far the largest consumer. Inadequate maintenance, resulting from lack of equipment and trained personnel, caused frequent power failures. Three 2,000-kilowatt generators were operated by Fria for plant and staff housing needs. Total output of all diesel generator stations in 1959 was about 1.5 million kilowatt hours.

Existing facilities were inadequate to meet demand and the government announced in July 1960 that it had allotted the equivalent of \$54 million for the improvement of power-generating facilities as part of the Three-Year Plan (see ch. 22, Character and Structure of the Economy). Apparently most of this was to be spent on small generating plants for towns without electricity. Yugoslavia has contracted

to construct a hydroelectric dam 10 miles from the one which now provides Conakry with electricity. It is expected that the dam will start producing power in July 1963.

The Souapiti Project, if it were carried out, would quadruple 1961 generating capacity. In April 1960 Guinea declared that it intended to go ahead with the construction of the Konkouré dam with the help of other nations. After the French had refused to turn over to Guinea their blueprint of the Souapiti Project, the United States was asked by the Guinean government to build the dam. It indicated in July 1960 that, if permitted to resurvey the site, it would consider financing the project with the support of such international agencies as the World Bank. By mid-1961 the Guinean government had not replied. Unconfirmed reports indicated that the Communist-bloc nations were interested in providing the aluminum-reduction plant, but that they were making their financial and technical assistance contingent on the nationalization of Fria.

MINING

In late 1961 Guinea had more mineral workings than any other part of former French West Africa. The largest share of industrial capital invested in the country was in bauxite and iron mining, and the investors were almost entirely non-African. African investment, by individuals and by family or larger kinship groups, was largely confined to the mining of gold or diamonds. Mining royalties and taxes paid by mining groups or companies—the latter usually subsidiaries of international consortiums—contributed a significant share to government revenue. Minerals formed a considerable part of total exports and were important in diversifying an economy otherwise almost exclusively rural.

Gold

Most of the gold workings are along the Niger River and its tributaries in the Siguiri area, which since 1905 has been reserved exclusively for African miners. Indigenous exploitation is primitive and is characterized by traditional techniques and semireligious practices (see ch. 10, Religion). During the dry season each year, between 80,000 and 100,000 miners take some 30,000 ounces of gold out of the deposits. Some work veins in the bedrock, but most prefer to wash free gold out of the gravels near the rivers or in the river beds. Mine shafts are about two feet in diameter and up to 60 feet in depth: they may be only a dozen feet apart and connected by a maze of untimbered galleries.

These dangerous methods fail to obtain about half of the gold-bearing material. Tools are simple—a pointed pick for gold-bearing quartz, an edged one for loose earth, a ratchet and a calabash on a rope

for pulling up the earth. The work is usually done on a family basis, the men doing the digging and the women and children washing the excavated material.

Gold mining by Europeans has been confined to a little dredging on the Tinkisso River. Total production in 1959 was 250 tons valued at 46 million French Colonies of Africa (Colonies Françaises d'Afrique—CFA) francs (approximately \$186,000 at the official rate of 245 CFA francs to the U.S. \$1).

Diamonds

Diamond mining began in 1936 near Kissidougou in southwestern Guinea. The open workings are about 14 miles off the road between Macenta and Kérouané. Another site is west of Beyla. Commercial exploitation of the area began in 1955 and increased with the discovery in 1959 of new alluvial fields with a high percentage of stones of gem quality. Guinea and Ghana have severed relations with the Diamond Distribution Consortium (DeBeers), making them the only diamond-producing countries to sell their output independently. They are said to lean heavily on the demand of the United States for industrial diamonds for defense stockpiling.

Most diamonds are taken from small hand-dug pits. Inefficient panning probably loses up to 50 percent of the diamonds in the workings. The miners, of whom there were an estimated 41,000 in 1959, work in small groups—usually two or three laborers and a foreman. Foremen are largely Guinean; most of the laborers come from Mali. Operations are supervised by government-appointed overseers. Though the diamonds used to be sold through a series of intermediaries, the government has declared that sales other than to it are illegal.

Prior to March 1961, two diamond-mining companies were in operation: the Beyla Mining Company (Compagnie Minière de Beyla), a French company; and SOGUINEX, a subsidiary of DeBeers. At that time both concerns were nationalized by presidential decree and incorporated into the National Enterprise for Research and Exploitation (Enterprise Nationale de Recherche et Exploitation) which was given a monopoly for the mining, transport and appraisal of diamonds. It was reported that the French personnel of the nationalized companies were being replaced by technicians from the Communist bloc. The companies were assured that they would be compensated for the loss of the concessions.

Approximately two-thirds of the diamond output consists of industrial stones. Production increased from about 53,000 carats in 1938, to 257,000 in 1956 and to 643,000 in 1959. It is expected to rise further when modernization programs are completed. Production, however, has always been difficult to estimate since individuals work most of

the deposits and smuggling has been widespread. Before 1959 most of the domestic production was said to have been smuggled into Mali, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ghana and official figures for Guinean diamond exports showed no more than \$1 million annually.

In the early months of 1959, the government created a diamond exchange in Kankan to attract legitimate diamond buyers to Guinea and also took fiscal and legal steps to discourage smuggling. The flourishing new legal market has attracted Dutch, Belgian, Israeli and United States buyers. Nevertheless, it was believed that as much as half of the local production might still be leaving the country clandestinely. The value of the annual legal export in 1960 was reported to have been between \$8 and \$9 million; most buyers believe that \$20 million a year in diamond exports (both legal and illegal) would not be an unreasonable estimate.

Iron Ore

The only large-scale iron-mining company in 1961 was the Conakry Mining Company. Its operation was highly mechanized, and only the richer and easily accessible surface ores were being worked. Charges were fired in the crust and a giant digger loaded the broken material into 25-ton trucks which carried it to a crusher. The material was later screened and loaded into 65-ton railway cars with bottom doors. The rail haul was about five miles over a company railway to a special wharf where belt conveyors could fill a 12,000-ton ship in less than 24 hours.

Almost all the ore was exported to West Germany which is equipped to give it the special processing it requires. East Germany received 17,000 tons in 1960 and Poland contracted for a large quantity for 1961.

Annual production, which in 1957 rose to over a million tons, could probably be increased to 3 million without additional capital investment. Each of the three ore-bearing layers on the site can be worked by open-pit methods. Both the company and the government are looking for ways of profitably exploiting the deep layer of 48-percent ore. Production fell to 342,000 metric tons in 1959 as a result of a decline in world market prices, but rose to 727,000 tons in 1960. The government hopes for further increases in production and plans to double Conakry's 1961 ore loading capacity of 1,200,000 tons.

Several mining groups are said to be exploring the possibility of exploiting the iron ore deposits in the Monts Nimba near the boundaries with Liberia and Ivory Coast. In mid-April 1961 the government signed an agreement with the international consortium, CONSA-FRIQUE, for the prospecting and exploiting of the Nimba-Simandou deposits. The duration of the concession is 50 years. The government has insisted that a railway be constructed to carry the ore to the

port of Conakry, which the consortium estimated would cost between \$75 and \$100 million. Other smaller deposits are being worked by African blacksmiths for making tools and utensils.

Bauxite

Bauxite production in 1960 totaled 1.4 million tons, of which half was exported from the Iles de Los by Bauxite du Midi; the other half, mined at Kimbo, was shipped by Fria in the form of alumina. Operations at both sites are highly mechanized.

On the Iles de Los the bauxite is excavated with power shovels, crushed, washed and dried. Ships of up to 20,000 tons are loaded by conveyor belts at a wharf on Kassa Island where the main diggings are located. Deposits are also being worked on Tamara Island, but crushing and washing is done on Kassa. Most of the ore goes to Canada. Operating at an estimated 50 percent of capacity, Bauxite du Midi has had an annual production of about 300,000 tons valued at \$1,500,000. It is estimated that five years' production at full capacity would exhaust these deposits.

Bauxite du Midi has been interested mainly in the larger and higher quality deposit at Boké where the annual yield was expected to reach 1,500,000 tons. The company was planning ultimately to process one-third of the ore at a plant with a capacity of 220,000 tons of alumina per year. The plan included an 85-mile railroad line from Boké to the coast connecting with Port Kakandé (Dougoufissa), a new deep-water port at the mouth of the Rio Nunez. In early 1961 Aluminium Ltd., of Canada was negotiating with Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation and Reynolds Metals Company (both of the United States), Pechiney and the United Aluminium Works Corporation (of West Germany) toward the establishment of a consortium to finance the project on which a start had been made, including the construction of housing and of road and rail facilities. In August 1961 work on the project was halted and it was put on a care and maintenance basis because of the group's inability to solve certain problems of financing.

INDUSTRY

Guinea's only large-scale manufacturing plant in 1961 was the Fria alumina plant at Kimbo. There were also a few small factories for processing local crops and producing a few consumer items, but their importance to the national economy was negligible.

Alumina Production

Alumina is produced by mixing raw bauxite (after it has been crushed and dried to remove moisture and impurities) with caustic soda. The mixture is subsequently chemically dissolved and reduced

electrically to aluminum. Two tons of alumina powder make about one ton of aluminum. Construction of the Fria plant, an extremely modern and complex chemical facility with a capacity of 480,000 tons of alumina a year, was completed in April 1960; the motor roads and rail line connecting Kimbo and Conakry were finished in 1958.

The first shipment of alumina was made on May 2, 1960. Production in 1960 was 185,000 tons, of which 171,000 were exported. Of this amount, 60,000 tons went to France, 54,000 to Cameroun (where Pechiney-Ugine are the main shareholders in Edéa, an aluminum reduction plant), 37,000 to Norway (where the Aluminium Industry Corporation of Switzerland contributes to an aluminum reduction plant) and 20,000 tons to British Aluminium Ltd.'s plant in Quebec Province, Canada.

The Fria plant covers an area of about 173 acres. Near it is an airport for light planes and a community with housing for 7,000 persons. These modern facilities and the social services available to Fria personnel contrast conspicuously with those prevailing in the rest of the country. The plant produces its own steam and electric power. Fria also maintains a water purification system, repair and workshops and technical training school for employees (see ch. 9, Education). About 8,000 workmen were employed on the construction of the enterprise; the operating force in 1961 numbered about 840 Guineans and 340 Europeans.

The Fria complex represents a capital investment of more than \$150,000,000. If conditions warrant, a considerable additional amount is to be invested over the next several years to expand plant capacity to 1.44 million tons of alumina powder annually. The French had plans for building a smelter to convert the alumina into aluminum, a process which requires large amounts of electricity since 15,000 to 20,000 kilowatt hours are consumed in producing a ton of aluminum. However, this project awaits the construction of hydroelectric facilities on the Konkouré. The installation's planned capacity would be sufficient to produce 150,000 to 190,000 metric tons of aluminum metal annually.

Although several French-owned private companies were nationalized after independence, Fria in 1961 did not suffer the same fate. It was, however, subjected to constant harassment and was able to continue operations only as a result of elaborate and detailed negotiations with the government. The United States Government announced in February 1959 that the Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation had purchased investment guaranty contracts with the International Cooperation Administration insuring its investment in Fria. One guaranty against expropriation covered its capital stock investment of \$19.8 million. Additional guaranty coverage was pur-

chased covering initial loan commitments and interim financing, bringing the total insurance coverage up \$72 million.

Processing of Agricultural Products

Guinea has limited facilities for processing agricultural products. The only canning company in the country is in Conakry. Known as COPROA, it cans pineapple in various forms—sliced, crushed and juiced. In 1959 it processed 2,500 tons of fresh pineapple, of which three-fourths was supplied by its own plantation at Forécariah 35 miles southeast of Conakry. The remainder of its requirements came from the surpluses of local exporters. In 1959 it was reported that the plant was operating at approximately one-third capacity. It employs about 200 persons.

Outside the city limits of Conakry is a small plant which makes about 90 tons of facial and laundry soaps annually, using palm oil imported from Ivory Coast. An oil and soap plant located at Guékédou in the Forest Region produces about 200 tons of palm oil and 150 tons of soap a year.

Near Labé in the Fouta Djallon a small French enterprise industry extracts oils from oranges, lemons, lemon grass and jasmine for use in soap and perfumes. The annual output of oil, which is of high quality, was 260 tons before World War II, but this had fallen to 179 tons valued at \$336,000 in 1957.

Other Processing Plants

The New African Plastics Company (Nouvelle Société Africaine des Plastiques), founded in 1954 at Conakry, is owned by the Guinean government; a Frenchman is reported to be the minority stock holder. It manufactures plastic tubes and sheets, extrusions, polyethylene bags for packaging bananas, and plastic shoes and sandals. The plant also transforms the sheet plastic into such finished consumer products as raincoats and protective covers. In 1960 it employed approximately 250 workers. Another division of this firm, employing 100 workers, manufactures oil and plastic-base paints. A third division of the firm does angle-iron and sheet-metal work, usually in the construction of sheds and warehouses, and has developed a low-cost basic structure suitable for housing.

A gelatin chlorate explosives plant in Conakry supplies the mining industry with approximately 10 tons of explosives a year. It is said that production could be increased to 50 tons.

The SOBRARGUI Company in Conakry manufactures soft drinks and ice cream. It has been bottling beer imported from Dakar and Senegal, but in 1960 it was constructing its own brewery.

HANDICRAFTS

A generation ago most of the people relied on handicrafts to supply both essential and luxury goods. The basic crafts—woodworking, metalworking, basketry, leatherworking, weaving and pottery making—were practiced through the country. Methods and products were basically the same throughout the area, but there were local variations in technique.

Handicrafts have steadily declined because of the competition of the imported manufactured goods offered in local shops or sold by peddlers. This invasion, already complete in the major towns, is less advanced in the more remote villages, but the new ways are steadily displacing the handicraft tradition everywhere.

Where handicrafts survive, traditional processes have tended to show little modification. The principal innovation has been in the substitution of imported for local raw materials—scrap iron for locally produced iron metal work, or rubber tires for raw hide in sandal making. Some new tools have been introduced, a notable item being the sewing machine.

In villages in the Forest Region the smith is the only full-time artisan. All other crafts are carried on by persons who devote most of their time to farming. The more developed communities of Middle Guinea have smiths, potters, weavers, leatherworkers and carpenters. Crafts tend to be hereditary, craftsmen ordinarily getting their helpers from among their relatives. However, in some of the more physically demanding trades—smithing, for example—apprentices unrelated to the smith are often taken on. Men plying the same craft may congregate in the same quarter of a town or large village. Some villages have become known for particular skills, such as pottery making or woodworking. Almost all handicraft products are consumed in the community in which they are made, and they are more apt to be exchanged or bartered than sold.

The smith—always a man—formerly smelted local ore with charcoal in an earthenware furnace to make the iron he worked with, but, except in the most remote places, he now uses industrial scrap or iron bars bought in the town market. He uses a simple furnace with a hand-operated forced draught and a few tools to make hoes, hatchets, *coupe-coupes* (brush-cutting knives), sewing needles, woodworking planes, adzes and his own tools. A skilled man may reproduce some European articles, such as pocket knives with hinged blades, repair imported firearms, bicycles and sewing machines, and make jewelry of silver, copper, aluminum or gold.

Woodworkers, whose skills are also practiced by some smiths, produce benches, chairs, stools, beds, storage chests and other furniture, as well as wooden bowls, mortars and pestles and, perhaps, dug-out

canoes. A specialized type of woodwork is done in the Fouta Djallon and includes the making of musical instruments and a variety of wooden vessels and lids out of soft wood.

Basketry is limited to a few types; among the most common are large shallow containers used to winnow rice and bell-shaped cages used for keeping and carrying poultry. Fiber from the raffia palm is woven on a simple loom to make matting, bags and cases. Raffia is also plaited into ropes, strings and necklaces. Basket making and raffia work are not generally professional crafts, although individuals may achieve considerable skill.

Leatherworkers are notably makers of luxury goods—sandals and slippers, amulets, bags, and bindings and cases for the Koran. The center of the craft is the Foulah area of Middle Guinea.

The making of pottery is exclusively a woman's specialty, but men dig and carry the clay. Locally made pottery has been largely replaced by European imports. In some areas potters work without a wheel; elsewhere a primitive earthenware wheel is employed. Pots or bowls of various shapes and sizes are made. The commonest form is an unglazed hemispherical bowl with a turned out rim, carefully shaped and finished, and ornamented inside or out. Pottery is used for such purposes as mixing, cooking and storage; one type, made with perforations, serves for steam cookery.

STRUCTURE AND OWNERSHIP OF INDUSTRY

All the large-scale mining and processing operations in the country in 1961 were carried on by international corporations, but some of the subsidiaries were incorporated as Guinean companies. There seems to have been no Guinean interest in investment in the parent companies, but in January 1961 the workers at the Southern Bauxite Company struck demanding representation on the Board of Directors of the company. The strike was finally settled by President Touré—the company agreeing on a program of promotion for Africans, including the training of Africans for foremen.

With the exception of Fria, the Conakry Mining Company, the Southern Bauxite Company and a few French companies, the government owned and operated all industries. It also owned and operated the new factories being established under the Three-Year Plan.

Until 1960 electricity was furnished by the Guinean Electric Power Company (Energie Électrique de Guinée). In January 1961 the government, which held 25 percent of the company's capital (200 million CFA francs or approximately \$810,000), nationalized both this enterprise and the African Public Service Company (Compagnie Africaine des Services Publiques) which supplied Conakry with water. The French personnel were asked to leave the country. At the same time,

however, President Touré announced that the shareholders would be paid all the amounts to which they were legally entitled and that all bonds and contracts underwritten by the companies would be respected. In March the two privately owned diamond mining companies, SOGUINEX and the Beyla Mining Company, were nationalized with the same assurances of reimbursement to shareholders. Although individual African gold and diamond miners still received permits to carry on their operations, controls were tightened and the miners were closely supervised by inspectors of the Office of Mines, Geology and Industry of the Ministry of National Economy (now the Ministry of Industry and Mines). Under the law of March 1, 1959, creating the diamond exchange at Kankan, and one of March 1, 1960, requiring the deposit of all gold with the Bank of the Republic, all diamonds and gold must be sold to the government.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

The whole sphere of industry is dominated by government. Mining and mineral processing, the only large-scale industrial activities, remain in private hands, but virtually all other industrial enterprise is government owned and operated. Except for the role granted the mining consortiums, the authorities base their plans for the country's industrial development on state initiative rather than private enterprise.

The principal control and planning body is the Ministry of Industry and Mines which includes the Department of Mines, Geology and Industry (Direction des Mines, de la Géologie et de l'Industrie) which coordinates and directs all mining activities. This department consists of a Mining Division, a Geological Division, an Industrial Division and a Mineralogical Laboratory. The department is headed by a director named by presidential decree. He is assisted by a technical advisor with the title of deputy to the director who, in mid-1961, was an engineer put at the disposal of the Government of Guinea by the Government of Poland. The divisions within the department were headed by Czech specialists whose services were tendered by the Czechoslovakian Government.

The department has an Office for Mines, Geology and Industry at Kankan which has jurisdiction throughout Upper Guinea and the Forest Region. The diamond subdivision at Kérouané, operating under the Kankan Office, represents the Department of Mines, Geology and Industry in all that relates to the production of diamonds. The diamond subdivision is authorized to organize and supervise all diamond-working operations, and it has 24 commissioners and 113 overseers on its staff to carry out these functions. It also operates the diamond exchange. At Boké the department is represented by an inspector

whose duty it is to authorize all expenditures and receipts pertaining to the development of the bauxite deposit by the Southern Bauxite Company.

The two nationalized utilities were placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. The African Public Service Company was renamed Water Distribution of Guinea (Distribution d'Eau de Guinée). Its function is to undertake all projects connected with well digging, the transportation and distribution of drinkable water and water drainage. The Guinean Electric Power Company has been renamed the National Electric Company (Société Nationale d'Électricité) and has been directed to undertake all projects and operations in connection with the production and distribution of electric power throughout the country.

CHAPTER 25

PUBLIC FINANCE

The public finance system has been in a state of transition since the country became independent. Largely an inheritance from the French administration, it has been simplified and adapted to the needs of a small African state which is no longer able to call on the financial resources of the French Community.

After World War II Guinea operated at a deficit and was subsidized in various ways by France. With sovereignty, the Guinean government assumed the burden of the expenditures previously made by the government of French West Africa, (Afrique Occidentale Française—AOF) or by France—and also began to collect taxes and make assessments which were previously the prerogatives of the AOF. Increased revenues, derived from the exploitation of mines and the export of minerals and ores, have helped to meet rising governmental expenditures. However, these earnings, together with those derived from the sale of agricultural products abroad, were insufficient to finance the imports of capital equipment required to carry out the Three-Year Plan for development of the economy announced by President Sékou Touré on July 1, 1960. A new source of funds appeared in the form of loans from Communist-bloc nations, Ghana and West Germany, and, as of late 1961, such loans totaled \$131 million (see ch. 28, Foreign Economic Relations; ch. 24, Industrial Potential). Meanwhile Guinea's debt to France for loans and subsidies in the past was being negotiated.

Guinea owed France at least \$97 million and the assumption by the new state of expenditures for defense, internal security and diplomatic representation required far larger government expenditures than Guinea as a colony had ever been called on to meet from its own revenues. Although defense, including internal security, became the largest item in the budget, expenditures for education and health rose steadily after independence, and, in the 1961 budget, these two items together equaled the amount budgeted for defense.

As of late 1961, the tax system had been recast in many ways. The "minimum levy" (formerly called the head tax), which bore particularly heavily on the peasantry, had been abolished and replaced by a regional tax. Import and export duties and royalties from mining

concessions were the most important sources of government revenue appearing in the budget. The government was able to meet rising expenditures by revenues received from Fria, Bauxites du Midi and Conakry Mining Company (Compagnie Minière de Conakry) in the form of: export duties on their shipments of alumina, bauxite, and iron ore; import duties on materials brought in by them; royalties for their mining concessions; and rents on the land on which they constructed installations. Fria alone was reported to pay, in taxes of various kinds, the equivalent of roughly a quarter of the annual budget. Exports of gold and diamonds, the mining of which had been nationalized, also added a large sum to government income (see ch. 24, Industrial Potential).

A government office was established in July 1960 to study taxes and tax collection. President Touré has repeatedly declared that the payment of taxes was the first duty of the citizen. Describing the accomplishments of the first year of the Three-Year Plan, he announced that the people had paid up five years of tax arrears in the first few months of the 1960 fiscal year. Nonetheless, government revenues remained insufficient to finance the Plan.

The Three-Year Plan (1960-62) was designed to increase national income by 8 percent a year, and the budget was set at 38,912 million Guinean francs (\$156 million). Of this amount 10,000 million was expected to come from the national budget, 6,000 million from "human investment" (i.e., labor contributed by the people), and the remainder from foreign loans. On November 22, 1961, President Touré declared that the financing of the Plan was assured although no contribution had been made from the national budget. Of the total estimated cost, he stated that about \$131 million had been promised in loans from the Soviet Union, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, East Germany and Ghana. Another \$12 million loan was granted by West Germany. These funds, he said, would be used to buy the equipment needed for the Three-Year Plan. This statement is, however, dubious since substantial amounts of foreign credits have been used for consumer goods and other credits may not be drawn against during the time period of the Plan.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Although the government of the AOF was established in 1895, it was almost 10 years before a system of public finance was set up in Guinea. In 1897 the forced labor tax and the head tax, fixed at 2 francs for all Africans of both sexes above eight years of age, were introduced throughout all the territory that had been pacified. About the only way an African could obtain the money to pay his taxes was

by collecting wild rubber. The chiefs were informed by the French administrators that they were expected to deliver the head tax and furnish labor for public works or be punished or demoted. Some initial resistance to the law was put down with armed force. By 1900 surpluses derived from the head tax made it possible to begin construction of the Conakry-Niger Railroad.

A French decree in 1904 authorized Guinea and the other colonies of the AOF to establish their own autonomous budgets. Thereafter, colonial public finance, that of the AOF and of France itself were all interrelated, without clear demarcation either as to source of revenue or object of expenditure. All budgets, those of the AOF and of the constituent colonies alike, were in appearance regularly balanced. In the case of the AOF budget, however, this end was achieved through steadily increasing contributions from France, while the colonial budgets received rebates and subsidies from the AOF.

Guinea's budget was drawn up by its governor in consultation with its Council of Administration and was referred to the governor general and the AOF Council of Government in Dakar for approval (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 16, Constitution and Government). There it was reviewed by the governor general and the Council of Government and, with the concurrence of the Minister of Colonies in Paris, its acceptance was announced by decree of the governor general. Indirect taxes were established by the Council of Government and approved by decree of the governor general. Direct taxes were levied by the colony's governor in consultation with the Council of Administration, subject to the approval of the governor general and the Council of Government in Dakar.

Under the French Public Finance Law of 1904, each colony was to meet all its expenditures, including those for its gendarmerie, out of its own budget, to which, in principle, all local revenues accrued. The law provided that subsidies might be granted to colonial governments. Military expenditures remained the responsibility of Metropolitan France which could require reimbursement in full or in part through special levies.

The first major change in the system was made during World War II under the Vichy regime, when the scope of the AOF budget was widened at the expense of those of the constituent colonies. By a decree of January 8, 1942, financial responsibility for "all services of economic and social interest," including expenditures for the colonies' police and gendarmerie and for their finance departments, was assumed by the government of the AOF. To defray its increased costs, Dakar took over the collection of customs, export and import duties and other indirect taxes. Only the less lucrative direct taxes remained to defray the expenses of the colonial governments. In Guinea, tax requisitions, still based largely on the head tax and the

system of forced labor, were greatly increased in the name of the war effort. The rise could be met by the people only through intensified exploitation of wild rubber. The colonial government, however, became increasingly dependent on subsidies and rebates allocated by the AOF.

After World War II, under the 1946 French Constitution, Guinea became an Overseas Territory of the French Union with an elected assembly, known after 1952 as the Territorial Assembly. An elected Grand Council (Grand Conseil) was also established for the AOF (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 16, Constitution and Government). Within the new structure profound changes were also made in the budgetary mechanism. The Grand Council, which received wide financial powers, reviewed the budget of the AOF prepared by the governor general and, after providing for "obligatory" expenses, apportioned the remainder of the revenues collected by the AOF among the eight Overseas Territories, of which Guinea was one. The obligatory expenses included: the operating costs of the AOF government and public services; the costs of the courts, the police, institutions of higher education and scientific research; the operation of all financial and fiscal offices and the administrative inspection services throughout the AOF and its constituent units; and servicing of the AOF debt. The budget was put into effect by order of the governor general after it had been passed by the Grand Council.

The chief administrative officer of each territory presented its budget to the Territorial Assembly which was required to vote on each section of it. The budget was divided into obligatory and optional expenses: the obligatory expenses consisted of allocations of funds to pay off debts, the salaries of administrative officials and costs for maintenance and operation of the courts and the police services.

Both the Grand Council and the Territorial Assemblies were handicapped by the failure of the law to define more clearly the governmental functions of the AOF in relation to those of the territorial governments and the revenues and expenditures pertaining to each. Because of these loose provisions, public finance in the AOF and the territories became even more confused. In practice, the budgetary expenditures of the AOF amounted to twice as much as the combined budgets of the eight territories, and funds left over from the revenues of the AOF were simply divided among the territories without any established criteria.

The Territorial Assemblies, unlike the Grand Council, could collect their revenues only as direct taxes. Any increase in the head tax, the major source of direct revenue, was felt so acutely by the people (thereby hurting the chances of the assemblymen for re-election) that the territories were forced to get from the AOF budget each year subsidies and rebates to meet about 42 percent of their recurrent expenses.

The division of financial responsibility for the AOF's public works program was similarly confused. Its first special budget for public works was set up in 1903 with funds lent by France. From 1932 until after World War II, no more such loans were made; the French Treasury simply guaranteed payment of commitments made by the AOF government to finance its own public works programs from local resources.

In 1938 the loans budget was formally replaced by a special public works budget and in 1946, after the establishment of the French Union, many of the operations it had been financing were taken over by the AOF's Special Budget for the Economic and Social Development Plan (Budget Special du Plan de Développement Economique et Social). This was financed exclusively by the Fund for Economic and Social Development (Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social—FIDES), which was in turn supplied with funds from the Central Fund for Overseas France (Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer—CCFOM). Both funds were administered by French government agencies, operating in Paris, and were financed from the budget of Metropolitan France (see ch. 26, Banking and Currency System).

In much the same way the supplementary AOF budget to finance railway construction and operation, created in 1930, underwent various transformations. In 1942 it was superseded by an AOF transport budget, which, in 1943, also provided for the ports, including Dakar and Conakry. In July 1946 the railroads and ports were placed under a separate administration and budget. In 1948 the ports of Dakar and Conakry were removed from the Railroad Administration and each given an individual administration and an AOF budget.

Defense expenditures were largely met by France although periodically the AOF contributed to the maintenance of France's armed forces. Thus, from 1932 to 1942, French West Africa yielded a total of 69 million francs to France's military establishment while receiving, during the same period, 346 million francs from the Ministries of the Colonies, the Navy and the Air Force to pay for its own defense expenditures. After the establishment of the French Union, however, under the laws of May 9, 1946, and March 21, 1948, France assumed responsibility for the salaries of a large number of high officials serving in West Africa, for some of the outlay involved in reorganizing the AOF's courts of justice and for expenditures for its gendarmerie.

The changes in the AOF budget had repercussions on the Guinean budget which fared less well than before. Although its burdens had been lightened in 1942 by the transfer of certain charges to the AOF budget, it was at the same time deprived of the income it would have received from indirect local taxation. Moreover, some of the former

charges were later reimposed without the restoration of compensatory revenues. For many years the main charges against the Guinean budget had been the cost of local administration and of the economic enterprises managed by, or belonging to, the colony. But in 1945 the budget was extended to cover social welfare services, primary education and agricultural development, which only three years before had been carried by the AOF.

To meet these expenditures, Guinea had only small, inelastic sources of income consisting of direct taxes of which by far the most important was the minimum levy, formerly a direct head tax. Other resources were: an income tax instituted in 1942; charges for issuing commercial patents and licenses; business, real estate and professional taxes; and the parish tax (*taxe vicinale*) set up in 1944 to replace the labor-allowance tax and which could be paid in lieu of labor service.

In addition to the rebates and subsidies which Guinea received from the AOF to help balance its annual budget, France contributed \$78.7 million between 1948 and 1958 from both public and private funds to carry out development projects. For the last few years before independence, Guinea also received an annual subsidy of \$16.5 million from France for administrative and military costs.

THE BUDGET OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

Guinea's first Constitution and its first national budget as an independent state were both approved on November 30, 1958. Under the Constitution, budget estimates are entrusted to the National Assembly. Expenditures are proposed by deputies of the National Assembly, but no increase in expenditures may be considered without provision for raising the revenue to cover the increase. The national budget must be voted before November 30 of the year preceding the new fiscal year which begins on January 1.

The Constitution also places the National Treasury under the control of the National Assembly and requires that a statement of accounts be made at the end of each half-yearly period for the preceding six months. The final accounts of the preceding year must be examined and approved by the Assembly during its October session (see ch. 16, The Constitution and Government).

The actual preparation and administration of the national budget are functions of the Ministry of Finance within which are the Budget Department, the Treasury, the Officer for Inspection of Finances and the major revenue-collecting agencies—the Direct Tax Office, Customs and the Office for Registration and the Issuance of Official Stamps. The Minister of Planning is in charge of the Three-Year Plan budget, manages the Plan's account at the Bank of the Republic of Guinea,

allots credits and deposits plan funds to the account of the regional administrations (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

The national budget must provide for expenditures previously covered by Metropolitan France (for the army, diplomatic service, justice and defense) and by the AOF (for customs, education, the railroad and the ports). On the other hand it receives revenues which formerly went to the AOF budget. (No taxes or duties were collected in Guinea for the budget of the French Republic.) In principle, therefore, the national budget includes the total revenues and expenditures of the country except for those included in budgets of subordinate public bodies (chiefly local government authorities), for certain autonomous public services (Office of Posts and Telecommunications; the Guinea National Railway and the Conakry Port Authority) and for the Three-Year Plan. The national budget may include grants to balance these separate budgets although until 1961 no grant had been made in the national budget in support of the Three-Year Plan.

The national budget is supported mainly by tax income. The budgets of the autonomous public services have their own revenues augmented, if need be, by grants from the national budget. The Three-Year Plan investment budget is funded by foreign loans and credits (see ch. 28, Foreign Economic Relations).

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES

The National Government

The national budget covers the operating expenditures of the presidency, the National Assembly, diplomatic representation, national defense and the government agencies. It also includes expenditures for public works, maintenance of public services, subsidies to public offices and private organizations, grants for scientific research and scholarships, deposits to special funds and interest on the public debt (see tables 1, 2 and 3). The principal items of the budget are allocated between personnel costs and outlays for equipment.

Each annual budget of the Republic up to 1961 was successively larger, showing that important changes were taking place in the structure and activities of the government. Despite extensive reorganization in government administration and repeated pleas by President Touré to government departments to economize, expenditures mounted steadily. The 1959 budget stood at 7,461.1 million CFA francs (\$30.2 million at the official rate of 245 CFA francs to the \$1)—over 2,000 million CFA francs more than the 1958 budget. The 1960 budget totaled 8,255.8 million Guinean francs (\$33.3 million) and that for 1961 was estimated at 8,745.2 million Guinean francs (\$35.4 million).

Table 1. National Budget of Guinea for 1959

[In millions of CFA francs]

National Assembly	75. 0
The Presidency	77. 0
Foreign Affairs	77. 0
National Defense	700. 0
Secretariat of State for General Administration	16. 6
Secretariat of State for Information	81. 2
Ministry of Interior and Security—Administration	17. 1
—District Administration	234. 9
—Police	735. 5
Total	987. 5
Ministry of Justice	165. 8
Ministry of Finance (including Customs and the Treasury)	349. 5
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning	39. 3
Ministry of Production	348. 2
Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Town Planning	264. 8
Ministry of Education for the 1st and 2nd Degrees	670. 4
Ministry of Technical Education	213. 3
Ministry of Public Health and Population	875. 1
Ministry of Labor and Social Legislation	59. 4
Ministry of Rural Economy and Cooperation	26. 0
Secretariat of State for Posts and Telecommunications	6. 7
Miscellaneous expenses (including maintenance of government buildings, the water and electricity system, government garage and vehicles)	628. 2
Maintenance of roads, navigation channels and airfields	420. 0
Scientific research and scholarships	112. 0
Refunds to various agencies of government	600. 9
Deposits to special accounts and funds	152. 9
Subsidies to public offices and private organizations	347. 6
Public assistance, loans and advances	35. 0
Servicing the public debt	107. 0
Total	* 7, 436. 4

* Total listed expenditures in the budget do not correspond to the published total of 7,461.1 million CFA francs.

Source: Adapted from République de Guinée, *Budget National de la République de Guinée—Exercice 1959*, pp. 6-14.

Table 2. National Budget of Guinea for 1960

[In millions of Guinean francs]

National Assembly	72. 5
The Presidency	102. 7
Foreign Affairs	99. 2
National Defense	928. 7
Ministry of the Civil Service (replaced Secretariat of State for General Administration)	20. 8
Secretariat of State for Information	139. 0
Ministry of Interior and Security—Administration	22. 6
—District Administration	239. 0
—Police	847. 5
Total	1, 109. 1
Ministry of Justice	170. 3
Ministry of Finance (including Customs and the Treasury)	355. 0
Ministry of National Economy (incorporating the former Ministries of Economic Affairs and Planning and of Production)	398. 6
Ministry of Town Planning, Transport and Telecommunications (incorporating the former Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Town Planning and the former Secretariat of State for Posts and Telecommunications)	264. 6
Ministry of National Education (incorporating the former Ministries of Education for the 1st and 2nd Degrees and of Technical Education)	1, 436. 3
Ministry of Health and Population	1, 081. 7
Ministry of Labor and Social Legislation	52. 3
Ministry of Rural Economy and Cooperation	27. 7
Miscellaneous expenses (including maintenance of government buildings, the water and electricity systems, government garage and vehicles) ..	464. 0
Maintenance of roads, navigation channels and airfields	423. 8
Scientific research and scholarships	82. 0
Refunds to various agencies of government	430. 0
Deposits to special accounts and funds	365. 0
Subsidies to public offices and private organizations	53. 5
Public assistance, loans and advances	35. 0
Servicing the public debt	114. 0
Total	8, 225. 8

Source: Adapted from République de Guinée, *Journal Officiel*, 2^e année, No. 1, January 1, 1960, p. 3, 4.

Table 3. *National Budget of Guinea for 1961*

[In millions of Guinean francs]

National Assembly	72. 0
The Presidency	337. 0
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	210. 0
Ministry of National Defense and Security (incorporating the security functions of the former Ministry of Interior and Security)	2, 076. 0
Ministry of Civil Service	34. 9
Ministry of Information and Tourism (replacing the Secretariat of State for Information)	110. 5
Ministry of Interior and Regional and Local Administration (incorporating the functions—other than security—of the former Ministry of Interior and Security)	171. 8
Ministry of Justice	125. 3
Ministry of Finance (including Customs and the Treasury)	411. 0
Ministry of National Economy (including the former Ministry of Rural Economy and Cooperation)	196. 2
Ministry of Planning (incorporating the former planning functions of the Ministry of National Economy)	55. 0
Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Telecommunications (incorporating the functions of the former Ministry of Town Planning, Transport and Telecommunications)	333. 3
Ministry of National Education	1, 830. 0
Ministry of Public Health and Population	1, 356. 2
Ministry of Labor and Social Legislation	44. 0
Miscellaneous expenses (including maintenance of government buildings, the water and electricity systems, government garage and vehicles) ..	429. 3
Maintenance of roads, navigation channels and airfields	450. 0
Scientific research and scholarships	219. 0
Grants	65. 0
Contributions to international organizations	50. 0
Subsidies to public offices and private organizations	26. 5
Special funds	50. 0
Servicing the public debt	92. 2
Total	8, 745. 2

Source: Adapted from République of Guinée, *Budget National de la République de Guinée—Exercice 1961*, pp. 18-39.

President Touré presented the 1959 budget as transitional, stating that the public finance system would be recast when new policies could be worked out (see ch. 26, Banking and Currency System). He explained that the increase of 2,000 million CFA francs over the 1958 budget resulted from the nation's newly independent status and that the budget represented an effort to translate into financial terms immediate, practical requirements, including provisions for defense and internal security, radio and other information activities (see table 4). He noted that other increases were necessitated by the development of the role of the presidency, of the National Assembly and of regional administrations and pointed out that the allocation for social services, health and education was vastly greater than it had been under the

French. New expenses, he thought, could be supported by curbing less essential activities. Meanwhile, economies were claimed in expenditures on material and equipment.

The 1960 budget is said to have been drawn up by the Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti Démocratique de Guinée—PDG) in a secret session of party executives at which President Touré reported that the “revolutionary spirit” had enabled the country to meet and overcome the financial crisis caused by secession from the French Community. This budget does not appear to have been published in full, but only as a summary of expenditures and revenues presented to the National Assembly after audit by the Ministry of Finance. The categories of expenditures, however, were largely those of the 1959 budget.

Table 4. New Expenses in the 1959 Budget of Guinea Over Budget of 1958

[In millions of CFA francs]

Item	1959	1958
Foreign Affairs.....	77. 0	None
National Defense.....	700. 0	None
Public Safety (Police and Ministry of Interior and Security)...	755. 5	465. 3
District Administration (in Ministry of Interior and Security)...	8. 5	None
Justice.....	165. 8	71. 5
Customs and Treasury.....	234. 9	None
Office of Posts and Telecommunications (including subsidies)...	166. 7	None
Radio.....	26. 3	None
Roads.....	420. 0	184. 0
Subsidies to the Conakry-Niger Railroad.....	140. 0	None
Labor Inspection.....	10. 0	None
Meteorology.....	38. 5	None
Airports.....	12. 6	None
Quinquina Experimental Station.....	60. 0	None
Total.....	2, 815. 8	720. 0

Source: Adapted from République de Guinée, *Budget National de la République de Guinée—Exercice 1959*, p. 9.

The 1961 budget, which was published in full, showed important changes both in government organization and in fiscal policy (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government; ch. 26, Banking and Currency System). The increases in the entries for the presidency and for foreign affairs, as well as the entirely new entry in the 1961 budget, “contributions to international organizations,” resulted from Guinea’s increasingly active role in the international sphere. Expenditures of the presidency rose from 77 million CFA francs in 1959 to 102.7 million Guinean francs in 1960 and to an estimated 337 million Guinean francs for 1961. Funds allocated to foreign affairs in the same years increased from 77 million CFA francs (1959) to 99.2 mil-

lion Guinean francs (1960) to an estimated 210 million Guinean francs (1961).

Defense, including internal security, constituted the major single item in the 1961 budget, but expenditures allotted to education and health were, together, greater. Expenditures of the security departments and the defense agency totaled 1,687.5 million CFA francs in 1959 and 1,776.2 million Guinean francs in 1960. In the 1961 budget the Ministry of Defense and Security, which incorporated the security departments of the former Ministry of Interior and Security, was allocated 2,076 million francs (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government; ch. 29, The Armed Forces; ch. 18, Public Order and Safety). Outlays for education more than doubled from 883.7 million CFA francs in 1959, or about 12 percent of the total budget, to an estimate of 1,830 million Guinean francs in 1961, or about 21 percent of the total budget (see ch. 9, Education). Expenditures on health also rose from 875.1 million CFA francs in 1959, or about 12 percent of the total, to an estimated 1,356.2 million Guinean francs in 1961, or about 15 percent of the total (see ch. 14, Health and Public Welfare).

The Public Services

Expenditures in the budgets of the autonomous public services, such as the Conakry Port Authority and the Guinean National Railway, were itemized under an operational budget and an equipment budget. Budgets for both these public services showed increases, particularly for equipment. The Conakry Port Authority appeared to operate at a profit (61 million CFA francs in 1959), but the Guinea National Railway showed a deficit which was met by a grant from the national budget. Expenditures of the Office of Posts and Telecommunications rose from 360.8 million CFA francs in 1959 to 400.5 million Guinean francs in 1960 and to an estimated 491.8 million Guinean francs in 1961. These increases, which went largely into the extension of services to the interior and into the development of such new services as air mail, were met by higher charges for telephone, telegraph and postal services.

The Regional Administrations

Expenditures itemized in the budgets of the regional administrations included their operating expenses and those of the General Council; salaries and other payments to all administrative personnel; maintenance of public buildings, roads, bridges and secondary airfields; and the operating costs of regional enterprises. Expenditures of the regional administrations varied. In 1960, for example, the expenditures of the Kankan region totaled 11.3 million Guinean francs; that of the N'Zérékoré region, 12.1 million; that of the Beyla region, 27.4 million.

The Three-Year Plan

The total cost of the Three-Year Plan, estimated at 38,912 million Guinean francs, was divided into: 14,161 million, or about 36 percent, for the expansion of government installations and communications facilities (cited as "infrastructure"); 18,390 million, or about 47 percent, for increasing production in agriculture and industry; 6,211 million, or 16 percent, for social services, including education and public health (see table 5). A contingency fund of 150 million Guinean francs was also provided. No information was available in mid-1961 as to actual expenditures under this budget, but 23,500 million Guinean francs in credits were allocated to the Plan in August 1960 for the period from July 1, 1960, to June 30, 1961, of which 9,400 million were to be spent on "infrastructure, including transportation," 10,200 million on agricultural and industrial production, and 3,300 million on social services.

Table 5. Budget of the Three-Year Plan for the Development of Guinea
[In millions of Guinean francs]

Item	Budgeted Amount
1. Infrastructure:	
Government buildings and equipment to extend government services and efficiency	6, 744
Airport and port installations	1, 322
Road extension, maintenance and improvement	1, 155
Stadiums and sports centers	490
Transport installations and equipment, including railways	4, 225
Extension and equipment for telephone service	225
Total	14, 161
2. Production:	
Improvement of agriculture and livestock raising	10, 110
Introduction of industries and expansion of industrial production	8, 280
Total	18, 390
3. Social Services:	
Housing and youth services	771
Education	3, 680
Public health	1, 760
Total	6, 211
4. Contingency fund	150
Grand total	38, 912

Source: Adapted from République de Guinée, *La Planification Economique, L'Action Politique du Parti Démocratique de Guinée*, Vol. V, p. 423

SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE

Up through mid-1961, government revenues were derived from taxes, from payments for the use of state lands and from concessions granted for the exploitation of mining properties. Revenue mounted from 7,461 million CFA francs in 1959 to 8,226 million Guinean francs in 1960 and to an estimated 8,745 million in 1961 (see table 6). The tax system was revised in important respects, and a number of direct taxes were transferred from support of the national budget to the budgets of the regional administrations.

In 1959 indirect taxes yielded 66 percent of total revenues; direct taxes, 30 percent. These estimates were based, however, on taxes and duties in force on October 1, 1958. Later the duty on petroleum products was raised, as was the rate schedule of taxes on salaries and wages retained at the source. The most important direct tax, the minimum levy or head tax, was abolished and other direct taxes, such as business licenses and taxes on personal property, buildings, dwellings and vehicles, were transferred to the regional administrations. The system of assessing the principal indirect taxes—import and export duties, surtaxes and fees—was much simplified and this major source of government revenue assumed even greater importance. In 1961, 85 percent of the estimated revenue was derived from indirect taxes and only 10 percent from direct taxes.

The assessment and levying of taxes continued to present the new state with difficulties. The Tax Office, established in July 1960, was directed, not only to audit the tax registers, check the tax receipts against the registers and investigate tax disputes, but also to study the tax structure and methods of tax collection.

President Touré in announcing the abolition of the minimum levy declared that “under the past regime the payment of all taxes was accompanied by humiliation, injury, nay even bodily services and imprisonment.” He went on to remind his hearers, however, that “just as the national constitution, the government, and the National Assembly recognize the rights of the citizens of the Republic, so also they set forth duties . . . all men and women, young and old, ought freely and spontaneously to pay their taxes.”

Indirect Taxes

Indirect taxes included import and export duties, excise taxes, a tax on petroleum products, taxes on the value of commercial transactions and on production, stamp duties and registration fees.

Import and export duties, formerly administered by the customs service of the AOF, were collected by the Guinean customs service. Most raw materials, produce and merchandise imported into or ex-

Table 6. *Estimated Revenue of the Guinean Government for 1959, 1960 and 1961*

[In millions of francs]

	Revenues		
	1959 (CFA francs)	1960 (Guinean francs)	1961 (Guinean francs)
<i>Indirect Taxes:</i>			
Import duties	3, 270	3, 412	4, 310
Taxes on alcohol, tobacco, cigars, cigarettes	140	250	200
Tax on petroleum products	280	350	590
Export duties	673	550	700
Surtaxes on exports and imports	150	255	148
Taxes on commercial transactions and production	230	372	1, 250
Stamps and registration fees	152	255	262
Total revenues from indirect taxes	4, 895	5, 444	7, 460
<i>Direct Taxes:</i>			
Minimum levy and regional taxes	1, 320	1, 320	(1)
Taxes on income and profits	509	714	840
Personal property and dwelling tax	60	60	(2)
Property tax	99	99	(2)
Licenses	153	151	(2)
Surtaxes on income, profits and licenses	21	28	(2)
Miscellaneous taxes (on firearms, vehicles with or without motor, dogs, etc.)	87	55	* 35
Total revenues from direct taxes	2, 249	2, 427	875
Total revenues derived from all taxes	7, 144	7, 871	8, 335
<i>Other Revenues:</i>			
Revenues from state lands and mineral concessions	109	109	207
Revenues from industrial activities and other services	173	146	123
Repayments of loans and advances	35	100	80
Total	317	355	410
Grand Total of Revenues	7, 461	8, 226	8, 745

¹ Minimum levy (head tax) was abolished and the regional taxes diverted from the national budget to support the 28 regional administrative offices.

² Taxes diverted from the national budget to support the 28 regional administrative offices.

* All but the apprenticeship tax diverted from the national budget to support the 28 regional administrative offices.

Source: Adapted from République de Guinée, *Budget National de la République de Guinée—Exercice 1959*, pp. 4, 5, 15-18; République de Guinée, *Journal Officiel*, 2^e année, No. 1, January 1, 1960, pp. 3, 4; République de Guinée, *Budget National de la République de Guinée—Exercice 1961*, pp. 4-12.

ported from Guinea were taxed but, after December 1960, there was only one duty to pay in place of the three different charges previously levied. Both ad valorem and specific tariffs were in force, although there was no statement in the enabling legislation concerning the base for the ad valorem tariffs (the base is commonly cost plus insurance plus freight—CIF). The new rate schedule was said to average 10 percent more than the aggregate of previous charges.

Certain imported items, such as seed potatoes, rice, aviation gasoline, tires, books and magazines, were exempted. Assessed duties varied from 2 percent of the value on such necessary food items as sugar and salt, to 5 percent of the value on milk and milk products and to 50 percent of the value on luxury foods and wines. Cigarettes were assessed at the rate of 30 percent of the value plus an additional Guinean franc for each cigarette. Regular gasoline was assessed at 11 Guinean francs per liter, kerosene at 2.25 Guinean francs per liter and fuel oil at 26 percent of its value. With the exception of luxury fabrics, which were assessed at 50 percent of their value, duties on textiles ranged between 20 and 30 percent. Duties on most types of machinery averaged 10 percent of their value. Information was lacking in mid-1961 on export duties, but it was reported that agricultural products were exempt and that duty on minerals varied from over 1,000 Guinean francs per ton for alumina to 700 Guinean francs per ton of iron ore.

Petroleum products were taxed, not only when they were imported, but also at each transfer in the distributive process. Gasoline and kerosene were taxed at the rate of 5 Guinean francs per liter, fuel oil at 3 Guinean francs per liter, and diesel oil and lubricants at 15 Guinean francs per liter. Other consumption taxes were imposed on alcohol, alcoholic beverages, wines and beer, cigarettes and other tobacco products. Taxes on alcoholic beverages were assessed by the bottle and varied between 2.5 Guinean francs for beer to 150 Guinean francs for 100 proof distilled liquors. Wines were taxed at 15 to 25 Guinean francs per bottle, depending on the alcoholic content. No information was available in mid-1961 with respect to the domestic tax on cigarettes or other tobacco products.

Another type of indirect tax was that imposed on wholesale and retail sales. Producers and sellers of grains, bread, flour, milk and milk products were exempted. Other food producers and dealers were assessed at the rate of 7.5 percent of their total sales each year. Local producers and sellers of other types of commodities were assessed at the rate of 6.25 percent of total sales and all businesses selling services were assessed at the rate of 3.8 percent.

Stamp duties on legal documents and charges for registration provide an easy way of collecting revenue, a practice which France in-

roduced into Guinea as well as its other colonies. In 1961 many legal documents required the use of special stationery, sold by the government, on which the government seal was imprinted. Bills, commercial paper, identity cards, permits of all kinds—all required stamps which cost a few francs. Deeds, wills, marriage contracts and commercial contracts required both registration and special government stamps. From sales of such stamps and stationery, and from registration fees, the government collected much revenue.

Direct Taxes

The remodeling of the tax code applied particularly to direct taxes. In place of the abolished minimum levy, a regional tax rising to a maximum of 500 Guinean francs was established to provide funds for the administration of the 28 regions. Taxes and surtaxes on personal property, dwellings, buildings, firearms and vehicles, as well as charges for licenses, were transferred from the national budget to the regional budgets. The regional administrations were made responsible for their collection.

The most important direct taxes collected by the national government were an income tax and a tax on business profits. Of minor importance was the tax on apprenticeship (classed under miscellaneous taxes) also assessed by the national government (see table 6).

All persons living in Guinea had to pay an income tax except that exemptions were accorded to foreign diplomatic and consular officers whose countries gave Guinean official representatives the same exemption and to those Guineans whose salaries and wages were taxed at the source. All income from whatever source in Guinea had to be reported. Deductions from gross income were permitted on a graduated percentage scale for a wife and up to three children. The tax was progressive, rising from 2 percent on incomes between 101,000 and 200,000 Guinean francs to 60 percent on incomes over 5,001,000 Guinean francs.

All monthly salaries and other payments were taxed at the source. The tax on monthly salaries was 5 percent for earnings equal to or lower than 30,000 Guinean francs and 10 percent for all earnings over that figure. This tax replaced one which had previously taxed employees at 5 percent and employers at 3 percent on salaries paid.

Taxes on business profits were levied at the rate of 25 to 30 percent on big companies, 20 to 25 percent on small companies and 10 to 15 percent on artisans. All businesses and individuals who paid a profits tax, except for persons working in their homes and artisans and businesses earning less than 50,000 francs, had to pay an apprenticeship tax. This tax was fixed at 2 percent on the total of all

types of payments, in cash or kind, which were included in the general expenses of the enterprise.

Other Sources of Revenue

Other government revenues consisted of payments for mining concessions, for use of the public domain, for lumbering and other uses of the state forest land, for hunting in the public domain and for rent of buildings owned by the state. Returns from mining and quarrying concessions were a steadily increasing source of revenue—from 19 million Guinean francs in 1960 to 141 million in 1961—and were expected to rise even more with the increasing exploitation of iron and bauxite deposits (see ch. 24, Industrial Potential). Royalties were charged at the rate of 1,196.05 Guinean francs per ton for bauxite, 550 Guinean francs per ton for iron ore, 2,877.10 Guinean francs per rough carat for jewel diamonds and 707 Guinean francs per rough carat for industrial diamonds.

THE PUBLIC DEBT

The size of the public debt was not known in mid-1961. In the 1961 budget it was listed at 92,200 million Guinean francs, but this figure included only funds set aside to meet contractual guarantees made by the government of the Republic and pensions and life annuities to military and civil employees and their heirs. It did not include loans listed in the 1959 budget totaling 4,600 million CFA francs from the Caisse Centrale pour la France d'Outre-Mer—CCOM (Central Fund for Overseas France) nor loans totaling 19,200 million CFA francs from within the French Union before 1957. The status of these debts was uncertain since negotiations with France concerning the terms of settlement were still going on.

Various foreign loans and credits were used to finance equipment purchases for the Three-Year Plan. Ghana provided 10 million pounds sterling (\$28 million) at 2 percent on a long-term basis immediately after Guinea became independent. Granted to help the country over its initial financial difficulties, most of the loan was allocated to the Three-Year Plan.

The Soviet Union has granted credits amounting to the equivalent of \$56 million for 12 years; Czechoslovakia, \$10 million for 10 years; Hungary, \$2.4 million for 4 years; Poland, \$5 million for 5 years; East Germany, \$5 million for 5 years. All carry 2.5 percent interest. Communist China granted \$24 million worth of credits for 20 years without interest; Yugoslavia, the equivalent of \$5 million worth of credits for 5 years at 3 percent. A United States loan of \$1 million for the import of foodstuffs was to be repaid in local currency over

a long period at a low rate of interest, the proceeds to be used either as grants or loans to finance projects designated by the Guinean government. West Germany made a grant of credits valued at \$12 million for 5 years; the rate of interest was still under negotiation in mid-1961. Morocco granted a 10-year credit of 10 million dirhams (\$2 million) for the purchase of equipment.

CHAPTER 26

BANKING AND CURRENCY SYSTEM

Guinea has its own currency based on the Guinean franc (see table 1). It also has its own banking system centered on the Bank of the Republic of Guinea (Banque de la République de Guinée). Both were established on March 1, 1960. Giving the country an autonomous financial system, they show the government's determination to regulate, on an independent base, the economic and financial affairs of the nation and to give it a stable currency.

Guinea is the only one of France's former West African colonies which is outside the franc monetary zone. Its currency is not convertible with that of any other country and its export is prohibited. The problem of its relation to the French franc and to the French Colonies of Africa franc (Colonies Françaises d'Afrique—CFA—franc), the currency formerly in use, has not been resolved, but Guinea's trade with neighboring African states and with France does not appear to have been hampered. Foreign exchange derived from bilateral trade agreements and special arrangements for payment in foreign currencies for Guinean exports have reduced the need to make the Guinean franc convertible (see ch. 28, Foreign Economic Relations).

Moreover, barter still prevails in the countryside and, except for Conakry and such towns as Kindia and N'Zérékoré where French military detachments with large monthly payrolls were stationed in the past, money is not in general use except for the purchase of those items not produced in the villages. It is variously estimated that the country is from 5 to 15 percent monetized (see ch. 27, Domestic Trade).

The establishment of an independent currency and of the Bank of the Republic is regarded by the government as "the final liquidation of the foreign economic domination which had taken place under colonialization." The decision to take this action was made in the Fifth National Conference of the PDG held at Dalaba in February 1960 in order "to complete the Guinean revolution" by establishing a "special monetary zone."

On the first anniversary of the birth of the Guinean franc, President Sékou Touré declared that "it is just to attribute to this decision an

Table 1. Exchange Rates Established by the Bank of the Republic of Guinea,
March 1, 1960

	<i>Equivalents in Guinean Francs</i>	
<i>Foreign Currency:</i>		
100 CFA francs.....		100
100 French francs.....		5, 000
1 United States dollar.....		247
1 pound sterling.....		691
100 West German marks.....		5, 880
<i>Checks and Travelers Checks:</i>	<i>Purchase Rates</i>	<i>Sales Rates</i>
100 CFA francs.....	97	103
1 United States dollar.....	239	255
10,000 French francs.....	4, 850	5, 150
1 pound sterling.....	670	712
100 West German marks.....	5, 703	6, 056
100 Swiss francs.....	5, 476	5, 814
<i>Banknotes:</i>		
100 CFA francs.....	95	103
1 United States dollar.....	235	255
10,000 French francs.....	4, 800	5, 150
1 pound sterling.....	660	712
100 West German marks.....	5, 650	6, 056
100 Swiss francs.....	5, 425	5, 814
<i>Gold:</i>		
1 kilogram of fine gold.....	272, 155	

Source: Adapted from United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce. *Basic Data on the Economy of the Republic of Guinea.* (World Trade Information Service, "Economic Reports," Part 1, No. 60-35, Washington, August 1960, p. 9-10.)

historical importance, comparable if not indeed superior, to the decision taken in favor of independence in 1958" (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). On this anniversary, the Guinean franc was celebrated at rallies throughout the country as "that instrument of Guinean economic liberation which placed the country even further in the forefront of the true liberation of Africa" and the Guinean monetary zone was extolled as that "monetary zone which is the African zone *par excellence*."

Moussa Diakité, the Governor of the Bank, made a radio address on July 9, 1960, in which he announced that eventually the Guinean franc would be guaranteed by the Ghanaian pound and stated that:

... our country, liberated from the domination of the franc zone and organizing a new special zone, indicates with this stroke its willingness to cooperate, thenceforth ... with all the countries of the world without France acting as middleman ... It considers that the special zone, which it hopes to establish with an independent currency, will constitute the base for a future African zone which will gradually come to include all the African countries which liberate themselves completely from the currency zones of the imperial powers ...

The Governor concluded by describing the hoped-for union of the African states as the expression of the aspirations for independence and of unity among the African peoples.

Establishment of a common currency and the setting up of a central reserve bank to back this currency were important features of the proposed union of Ghana, Guinea and Mali. But in mid-1961, with Ghana refusing to leave the sterling area and Mali still in the franc zone, the details of the proposal had not been worked out (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

In order to mobilize the country's scanty financial resources, the Bank of the Republic of Guinea was given a virtual monopoly over all banking functions at the time of its establishment in March 1960. ~~Four of the five French banks formerly operating branches in Guinea~~ were liquidated and the business of the fifth was greatly reduced. In March 1961, three special banks were established under the jurisdiction of the Bank of the Republic—a loan bank, an external trade bank and a bank for agricultural development—and various functions of the Bank of the Republic were transferred to them. Other than financial legislation establishing the organization, administration and operating regulations of the banks, no information was available in mid-1961 about their activities, deposits, loans, assets and liabilities.

One of the major functions of the Bank of the Republic, as ~~announced by President Touré, is to:~~

. . . assiduously pursue the development of a spirit of saving in order to draw to itself all the disposable funds of the nation. The volume of funds is far from corresponding to the day-to-day needs of the Republic and even further from the requirements of economic development. . . . Our objective is to induce saving by all, even in the smallest amounts. . . .

Savings have been negligible in the past; the French and other foreign entrepreneurs sent most of their earnings to their home countries. Among the Guineans themselves, few have had enough income to save and, in the traditional subsistence economy, there has been no background for the practice. Insofar as he does save, the Guinean does so for such short-range needs as shoes, a suit, a bicycle or marriage payment. For the average person, banks are unfamiliar and dubious institutions, and, when reserves are not invested in cattle or a wife's ornaments, the chief depository of a man's savings continues to be the floor or roof of his hut, and his hoard may be in the form of gold or uncut diamonds.

BACKGROUND

The bank of Senegal (Banque du Sénégal), established in Dakar in 1893 at a time when the area had not yet been brought completely under French control, was the first bank in French West Africa (see

ch. 2, Historical Setting). Barter and savings in the form of livestock and small hoards of valuables persisted in the area, but the operations of the bank contributed to familiarity with coins and, later, with bank notes and cash savings.

In 1901 the Bank of Senegal was liquidated and replaced by a commercial institution, the Bank of West Africa (Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale—BAO) which was established by a decree of French Council of State (Conseil d'Etat). The BAO had its headquarters in Paris and was initially capitalized at 50 million French francs, of which 30 percent was held by the French West African Government at Dakar. Government control of the BAO was exercised by a government commissioner (*commissaire du gouvernement*) in Paris and an administrative censor (*censeur administratif*) for each branch and agency, but neither the French Government nor the territories participated in the actual administration of the bank or in the profits it realized.

Although the BAO was a commercial bank, it was given the exclusive privilege of issuing currency for French West Africa, and it soon set up a branch in each of the colonies. One of the first was established in Conakry. The original decree of 1901 gave the BAO the issuance privilege for 20 years, but from 1921 to 1955 successive decrees continued the privilege for shorter and shorter periods. In 1955 the BAO lost its exclusive right to issue banknotes the privilege being transferred to the Central Bank of the West African States (Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest) which was controlled by the French Ministry of Finance.

In addition to issuing money, making loans and dealing in exchange, the BAO participated in the establishment of industrial commercial and agricultural enterprises. It also gave financial support to the Agricultural Credit Funds (Caisses de Crédit Agricole) and to the Provident Societies (Sociétés de Prévoyance), which in Guinea provided credit for the development of the banana plantations and the native cooperatives.

The BAO remained the only commercial bank in French West Africa until 1921, when the Parisian African Commercial Bank (Banque Commerciale Africaine) established branches in a few major towns and began to play an important role in financing exports. In 1939 the National Bank for Commerce and Industry (Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie), the General Credit Bank (Société Générale de Crédit) and the Lyons Credit Bank (Crédit Lyonnais) established branches in French West Africa. These four banks and the BAO carried out practically all the commercial banking operations in Guinea until 1960.

In 1922 the French Government began to construct throughout French West Africa a network of savings banks, branches of the

Savings Fund (Caisse d'Épargne) of Metropolitan France, and an extension of the Metropolitan postal savings system. The West African postal savings system was under the supervision of the Director of the Postal and Telecommunications Service (Directeur du Services des Postes et Telecommunications) with headquarters at Dakar. A decree of 1936 authorized the transfer of funds between the Savings Fund of French West Africa (Caisse d'Épargne de l'A.O.F.) and the National Savings Fund (Caisse Nationale d'Épargne) in France. The Guinean branch of the system began operations in Conakry in 1923. Local management of the Savings Fund in the territories was in the hands of the Postal Service (Service des Postes) and deposits and withdrawals could be made by post or telegram. In each territory the Savings Fund maintained a central postal check bureau holding the current accounts of the individuals living in the territory.

Movements of funds into and out of French West Africa were unrestricted until 1939. During that year the French regulations governing foreign exchange, the buying and selling of gold and monetary transfers between France and foreign countries were applied to the area and the French West African Exchange Office (Office des Changes de l'A.O.F.) was established with headquarters at Dakar.

An important credit institution was added to the French West African financial structure by an ordinance issued in December 1941 by the French Committee of National Liberation (Comité Française de la Libération Nationale). This established the Central Fund for Free France (Caisse Centrale de la France Libre) whose principal task was to furnish funds to the Free French Committee for the continuation of the war (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). In its management of the credits at the disposition of the Free French, it made an important contribution to financial order in those territories under Free French control. Its functions and the area of its operations were established on a permanent basis by a French Government ordinance of February 1944 when it was renamed the Central Fund for Overseas France (Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer).

In accordance with the 1944 ordinance, the Central Fund became a chartered public institution, autonomously financed and governed by the same regulations applying to credit and banking establishments. It had a deposit account at the French Treasury in Paris where it also maintained accounts for postal checks and current savings accounts—functions which it was authorized to perform for the Savings Fund of French West Africa.

In French West Africa the Central Fund kept current accounts with the BAO and with each of the principal banks. It financed a number of public works projects and mixed companies (Société

Mixte) which combined both public and private funds. In Guinea the most important of these was the Mining Company of Conakry (Compagnie Minière de Conakry) established in 1947. The Central Fund also supplied financial assistance to the Guinean Company for Mining Research and Exploitation (Société Guinéenne de Recherches et Exploitations Minières—SOGUINEX) organized in 1936 (see ch. 24, Industrial Potential). In 1955 the Central Fund financed the Guinean Credit Fund (Crédit de Guinée) which was capitalized at 100 million CFA francs. This fund made loans at low interest rates to farmers, farmers' cooperatives, small businesses and artisans. It also lent money to individuals for home building and the purchase of semidurable household items.

When Guinea opted for independence in 1958, French financial institutions had been operating in the country for almost 60 years. The 5 private banks had over 17 branches. The postal savings system and the Guinean branches of the Savings Fund were active, and the Conakry branch of the Central Bank of the West African States was responsible for the issuance of the currency. The Central Fund was a large investor in a number of enterprises and the country's major source of credit. As a member of the franc zone, Guinea had unrestricted access to franc drawings, but all other exchange transactions were subject to French exchange controls (see ch. 28, Foreign Economic Relations).

The circulation of currency in French West Africa had increased markedly over the last 60 years, though less so in Guinea than in the other territories. It usually fluctuated widely with the seasons and with the ups-and-downs of foreign trade. Until December 1945 the franc in the area, although issued locally by the BAO, had the same value as the franc circulating in France and in other parts of the French Empire. After the Liberation of France in 1944, the rates established for the franc in relation to the dollar and the pound sterling were extended throughout Overseas France (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

During the war, however, prices had risen much higher in France than in French West Africa. On the ground that the economic consequences of the war justified a sharp devaluation of the money used in France, but not in French West Africa, the CFA franc was established by decree of December 25, 1945. Its value was fixed at 1.70 in relation to the Metropolitan franc until October 1948, when one CFA franc was made equivalent to two Metropolitan francs. The value of the CFA franc, like that of the Metropolitan franc, was guaranteed by the Bank of France and the French Treasury. Since the CFA franc was pegged to the Metropolitan franc, the successive devaluations of the latter also affected the CFA franc.

From its inception, the CFA franc was under sharp attack by French West Africans. It failed signally to check the inflation it was designed to prevent. The situation became progressively more acute after 1949 as prices in France began to soar and trade in French West Africa was freed of most of its wartime controls. Many merchants in French West Africa profited by the Metropolitan-CFA franc relationship to impose excessive markups on goods, with the result that the already high cost of French products was doubled to the African consumer.

French West Africa's deputies to the Constituent Assembly in Paris and the General Council in Dakar unanimously condemned the creation of the CFA franc on the grounds that it was unjustified by current economic conditions and that it would increase the cost of living. Their protests were renewed as prices climbed. The devaluations of the Metropolitan franc in 1948 and 1949 were offset quickly in French West Africa by a further rise in prices. Furthermore, criticism of the CFA franc, although ignored by the authorities, was accompanied by frequent rumors that the CFA franc was to be devalued. These rumors encouraged capital transfers from French West Africa to Paris, the speculative hoarding of stocks and large-scale clandestine dealings with the dollar and sterling zones.

Opponents of the French Government's financial measures were divided as to which course to follow. Some went so far as to propose leaving the franc zone, one group wanting to link the CFA franc with a hard currency. Another group proposed creation of an autonomous money for French West Africa, and still another suggested a return to the prewar use of the Metropolitan franc.

THE BANKING SYSTEM

The Bank of the Republic of Guinea is an autonomous public institution, capitalized at 500 million Guinean francs, a sum which can be increased and which was entirely subscribed by the government. Its headquarters is at Conakry where on March 1, 1960, it took over the functions previously performed by the Guinean branch of the Central Bank of the West African States. Within a short time branches of the Bank of the Republic of Guinea took the place of the French private banks which were in operation at the time. As of March 1, 1961, there were 17 such branches located in the administrative regions of Conakry, Kindia, Boké, Fria, Forécariah, Mamou, Labé, Signiri, Kankan, Kérouané, N'Zérékoré, Macenta, Guékédou, Kissidougou, Youkounkoun, Dabola, and Beyla. President Touré promised that branches would continue to be opened until each of the administrative regions had its own branch. In March 1961, he also announced the establishment of an agricultural development bank, an

external trade bank and a loan bank. A savings bank, formerly a branch of the Savings Fund of French West Africa, has continued to be operated by the Office of Posts, Telephones and Telegraph (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

The Bank of the Republic of Guinea is administered by a governor, with the rank of minister, and a director general. They are advised by an Administrative Council, consisting of the Minister of National Economy, Minister of Public Works and Transportation, the Minister of Finance, two vice-presidents of the National Assembly and four prominent men representing the public. The councillors can only advise at meetings of the Administrative Council which the governor and the director general also attend as members (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

The Bank of the Republic has the exclusive privilege of issuing currency and is responsible for controlling the activities of any private banks. It makes loans and holds on deposit all the funds of the state enterprises, the cooperatives, the Savings Fund and the Social Security Fund. It is, in fact, the comptroller and cashier of the country and collaborates in formulating both the government's development plans and its monetary and fiscal policies.

The fundamental role of the Bank of the Republic, as stated by President Touré, is to keep the volume of money in circulation constantly adjusted to the value of the products on the market. Within the conditions stipulated by the Bank's statutes, this adjustment is made chiefly by increasing and decreasing the volume of credit. Through the loans, which it authorizes to state enterprises, cooperatives and private companies, it exercises a decisive influence on the development of the national economy.

In March 1961, the newly created National Credit Bank (Crédit National) was assigned management of the branches of the Bank of the Republic of Guinea. It was authorized to receive deposits of current accounts, long-term deposits and savings deposits. Interest to be determined by the President would be paid on long-term and savings deposits. The National Credit Bank was further authorized to make short-term loans to traders presenting sufficient collateral and medium-term loans for housing construction, and to participate in financing state enterprises, cooperatives and the industrial and commercial projects included in the Three-Year Plan.

The National Credit Bank discounts short-term commercial paper under certain circumstances, and it rediscounts medium-term commercial paper for commercial banks and other financial institutions. Government enterprises are charged 2.5 percent for short-term discounting and 3 percent for medium-term discounting. Private enterprises are charged at the rate of 2.5 percent for short-term and 4 percent for medium-term discounting.

The National Bank for Agricultural Development (Banque National de Développement Agricole), also established in March 1961, was charged with: the administration of funds allocated to finance the general problem of agricultural development; making medium- and long-term equipment loans for undertakings which would contribute to increasing agricultural production; providing short-term financing for marketing domestic produce; and controlling, jointly with the technical services of the Ministry of Rural Economy, the use of authorized loans.

Short-term credits to agricultural, industrial and commercial enterprises are granted for 9 months; medium-term credits for 1 to 5 years; and long-term credits for 5 to 25 years. All credits must be secured by crops before harvest, stocks of merchandise, real estate, personal property or securities. Long-term credit is granted only to organizations or persons engaged in activities which are part of the Three-Year Plan. Both the National Credit Bank and the National Bank for Agricultural Development reserve the right to a voice in the direction of enterprises receiving loans and the right to exercise physical control over real or personal property or securities.

The third special bank created in March 1961, the Guinean Bank of Foreign Commerce (Banque Guinéenne du Commerce Extérieur), was charged with: carrying out all foreign banking operations and all accounting under commercial agreements; applying foreign exchange regulations; and serving as a Foreign Exchange Office. Its principal function was to contribute to the development of foreign commerce by assisting in the search for foreign markets for Guinean produce, organizing a central service for commercial information and facilitating the finance of export and import operations.

Five French banks had branches in Guinea on March 1, 1960: Lyons Credit Bank, the National Bank for Commerce and Industry, the BAO, the General Credit Bank and the African Commercial Bank. A year later only the BAO, its operations much reduced, was still open. Statistics are lacking, but the activities of these banks in Guinea were only a small part of the total business of their home institutions. It is known that in 1959 they were seriously overloaned, their largest creditor being the Guinean Government.

Immediately after the institution of the new monetary system, the French branch banks found themselves in a very uncertain position, the government having suspended all payments between the franc zone and Guinea in the absence of a payments agreement. More or less isolated from the parent organizations and with their operations localized, they were unwilling, pending clarification of their position, to undertake any but the most essential operations or those forced on them.

On August 1, 1960, the private banks were ordered by the government to maintain on deposit in the Bank of the Republic an account equal to 50 percent of their short-term deposits in return for Government of Guinea treasury notes or other government debt instruments. The BAO already held more than this amount because of its traditional role of issuing money, but the other banks refused to comply and were liquidated by government decree on August 10. Representatives of the Bank of the Republic were installed in the liquidated banks to carry out the formality of transferring clients' accounts to the government institution and, thereafter, these offices carried on business as branches of the Bank of the Republic and later of the National Credit Bank. The new managers are, however, new to the banking business, and checks drawn on accounts held in branch banks in the interior are not always honored in Conakry.

THE CURRENCY SYSTEM

The basic unit of currency is the Guinean franc of 0.0036 gram of fine gold. It is divided into 100 *centimes* (cents). The Guinean franc was established by the government as the sole legal monetary unit for use within the country on March 1, 1960. The CFA franc (245 to US\$1) was exchanged for the new Guinean franc at the rate of 1 to 1. The currency consists of paper money in denominations of 50, 100, 500, 1,000, 5,000 and 10,000 francs and of coins in denominations of 5, 10, and 25 francs. Issuance of the currency is a monopoly of the Bank of the Republic of Guinea.

Guinea is known to have had currency difficulties since the Bank assumed the issuance monopoly. For example, large bills have been frequently in short supply in the interior and foreign teachers have been paid huge sums (up to 86,000 Guinean francs) in 50 and 100 franc notes.

President Touré has stated on a number of occasions that the currency is backed by gold. Gold, which has been mined in the country for centuries, must be sold only to the government. The President has also stated that the gold reserve is used on international markets to make needed purchases when the nation does not have the required foreign exchange. The only external backing which the Guinean currency appears to have is about 10 billions of CFA francs previously in circulation. This did not provide the government with readily convertible reserves, since the CFA franc was backed only to the extent of about 35 percent by French metropolitan assets. Meanwhile the French suspended all financial transfers between the franc zone and Guinea. Guinean currency has been reported to have suffered severe devaluation in unofficial dealings. Although United States dollars, the pound sterling, West German marks and Swiss francs became available to the government during 1960, neither the

total amount nor the amount available for currency backing is known (see ch. 28, Foreign Economic Relations).

The relationship of the new Guinean currency to the franc area has not yet been clarified. In April 1960, immediately after the announcement of Guinea's withdrawal from the franc zone, the Finance Ministers of France and of the West African States of the French Community which use the CFA franc (Niger, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali and Mauritania) met in Paris to formulate a common policy regarding their future monetary relations with Guinea. The communiqué released at the end of the meeting stressed the hope that negotiations would soon be opened to reestablish normal financial and economic relations.

Several of the Community states which have a common border with Guinea—Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Mali—had already begun to impose border controls on trade with Guinea, but all the Ministers expressed a desire to negotiate with Guinea in a spirit of conciliation. The following July, financial negotiations between France and Guinea were opened in Conakry, but were later broken off by the French. They were resumed later in the year and at the end of 1960 a Guinean Government account was opened with the Bank of France (Banque de France) and a reciprocal account in the name of France at the Bank of the Republic of Guinea. Through mid-1961 negotiations proceeded in the hope of establishing normal financial relations which had been severed at the time the Guinean franc was created (see ch. 28, Foreign Economic Relations).

FOREIGN EXCHANGE

Until Guinea's withdrawal from the franc zone, transfers of money and commercial paper to and from countries of the zone were free of restrictions, and Guinea's foreign exchange was pooled with that of other territories of the French Union in the Franc Zone Stabilization Fund in Paris. After 1958, however, President Touré entered into a number of bilateral agreements setting up blocked accounts on behalf of Guinea in countries with which Guinea trades.

When the Bank of the Republic of Guinea was established, an Office of Exchange Control (Office des Changes) was created within it which was given absolute control over all foreign exchange owned by the government and by residents of the country. All residents and companies were obliged, as of March 1, 1960, to declare to the Office of Exchange Control all foreign exchange, gold and precious stones owned by them, wherever located. They were also obliged to declare all foreign assets of whatever kind located outside Guinea. Other decrees provided that no foreign exchange, precious metal or precious stones could be exported without prior authorization of the govern-

ment and that only the Bank of the Republic of Guinea was authorized to deal in foreign exchange.

Import and export of Guinean currency were strictly forbidden and the exchange values for other currencies were established by the Bank of the Republic of Guinea (see table 1). The bank specified that payments for exports and for services would be accepted only in the listed currencies. Special rates could be given for individual transactions involving very large sums.

As a consequence of the monetary reform of March 1, 1960, foreign exchange obtained from the export of ore and alumina began to go into the coffers of the Guinean Office of Exchange Control and no longer into the Franc Zone Stabilization Fund in Paris. Although the government was known to have holdings of foreign exchange, the actual value of the holdings had not been made public. Just as relations to the franc zone had not been clarified by mid-1961, so the question of whether convertibility of the Guinean franc would be achieved, and by what mechanism, remained unanswered. In March 1961, all foreign exchange functions of the Bank of the Republic of Guinea and the Office of Exchange Control were transferred to the newly created Bank of Foreign Commerce.

CHAPTER 27

DOMESTIC TRADE

The least developed sector of the national economy is internal marketing. Most commodities move through traditional channels about which little is known other than that they operate seasonally and haphazardly. The only organized distributive system the country has ever known was created under the French by European companies engaged in the procurement and shipment of export products and trade in imported goods. After independence the government attempted to replace this foreign apparatus with a state monopoly, the State Domestic Trade Agency (Comptoir National du Commerce Intérieur).

The failure of the Agency to operate with even minimum efficiency had serious repercussions throughout the economy, and in 1961 it was abolished by order of President Touré. Private firms were invited to trade freely throughout the country in competition with a number of commercial enterprises owned and operated by the government.

The larger part of domestic trade takes the form of barter within single villages or among neighboring ones. With the exception of plantation crops grown for export and the products of a few small industries, most production—which consists of foods, livestock products and some locally-made consumer goods—is for home use; only a fraction of it enters the cash economy by being sold on the village and town markets. Although there is a flow of produce from the villages to the towns in which women play an important role, very little information is available on the volume or structure of this market. Certain commodities, such as kola nuts, livestock and dried fish, often move long distances over traditional trade routes from one region to another or into neighboring countries. The majority of such trade is carried on by Malinké from Upper Guinea (the Dioula). In the Forest Region, most of the trade in coffee is in their hands.

Trade in imported non-African processed foods and manufactured consumer goods has declined since independence because the government has curtailed the amount which may be imported. At Conakry goods are imported by both private firms (still mainly foreign) and public agencies and are either sold at wholesale or retail or shipped to branch outlets in inland towns. Some of these imports, having

passed through the hands of a number of intermediaries, are finally offered for sale in the local markets side by side with local produce.

Only a few thousand persons are entirely dependent on trade for a livelihood. Among them are about a thousand Lebanese, Syrians and non-African representatives of European firms who operate on a larger scale than the Guinean trader. Many more thousands of Guineans, most of them women, engage in trade as a part-time activity, selling their own produce in the markets or vending small stocks of local or imported miscellaneous merchandise in the hope of making a few francs.

The distribution and transportation system is rudimentary and the government has recognized that this is a deterrent to the development of the economy. In the Three-Year Plan, 1,322 million Guinean francs (247 Guinean francs equal U.S. \$1) were allotted to the modernization of ports and airports; 1,155 million to maintenance and extension of the road system; and 4,225 million for trucks, buses and other transportation equipment, including 1,300 million for re-equipping the railway (see table 1). It was also planned to give each village its own warehouse and retail store.

The Plan barely got under way by the end of 1960 but, with technical assistance and equipment from the Communist-bloc countries and with labor supplied by the human investment program, some progress had been made by mid-1961. A national airline had been established and was in full operation. Conakry airport and port were being modernized. The equipment needed for a road program had been delivered and road building was under way. Modern equipment for the railway had been delivered and was in use. In addition to roads, bridges and airport runways 178 state retail stores and 19 storage sheds had been constructed with human investment labor.

In contrast, the government's attempt to reorganize and control domestic trade was a major failure. The replacement of the well-established trading companies with an inexperienced government bureaucracy created chaos in inventories and in the flow of goods in customary trade channels. Unrealistic price controls drove both imported goods and some domestic products off the internal market. The situation steadily deteriorated, and the distributive system was near the point of breakdown by late 1960. Serious shortages of food and other consumer goods occurred in many parts of the country. Thousands of tons of imports piled up on the docks at Conakry and only a small percentage moved inland. In spite of price controls, shortages led to sharp price increases and a decline in purchasing power. President Tonré intervened in March 1961 to reorganize the responsible government agency and reopened domestic trade to private

Table 1. *Proposed Expenditures for Transportation in the Three-Year Plan of Guinea*

[In millions of Guinean francs]

Item	Amount
<i>Airport and Port Installations:</i>	
Airport at Conakry (elongation and repair of runways).....	540
Equipment for airports in the regions.....	230
Construction of a fishing port at Conakry.....	150
Massive repair of the main port at Conakry.....	36
New quays at the port of Conakry.....	32
Construction of large warehouses at the port of Conakry.....	125
Lighterage equipment.....	209
Total.....	1,322
<i>Roads:</i>	
Equipment for public works services.....	600
Improvement of the road network.....	525
Establishment of 10 road maintenance centers.....	30
Total.....	1,155
<i>Transport:</i>	
Establishment of Guinean airlines (aircraft, spare parts, maintenance shops).....	500
Establishment of shipping lines.....	2,000
Study of extending railroad to Mamou and laying 15 km. of rail.....	175
Purchase of 100 freight cars.....	270
Purchase of locomotives.....	280
Purchase of rails.....	400
Equipment for the Office of Road Transport.....	200
Reconstruction of the motor vehicle park.....	300
Construction of a railroad station at Conakry.....	100
Total.....	4,225
Grand total.....	6,702

Source: Adapted from République de Guinée, *La Planification Économique*, pp. 410-412.

enterprise. In the autumn of 1961, it was too early to predict the result of the reforms.

The government continues to market all export crops itself. All agricultural produce destined for export—coffee, bananas, palm kernels, peanuts, orange essence—must be sold to GUINEPORT, a state enterprise which has a monopoly of export sales. Coffee is sold to government-designated buying agencies in the coffee-growing area and

shipped on to Conakry to be cleaned and graded by a government coffee-control office. Through the Banana Federation (Fédération Bananier), the government also receives all bananas for export. Corn, millet and rice are allowed to move freely but, in order to prevent speculation, the government maintains control over rice shipments.

BACKGROUND

In 1889 the French Company of West Africa (Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Occidentale—CFAO), a Marseilles firm, established a branch headquarters in Conakry and opened agencies (*comptoirs*) at Dubréka, Boffa and Boké. Other trading companies quickly followed, and by 1896 there were 22 of them in major centers of the colony. All were organized along the same lines with a central agency consisting of a general store and warehouses in the capital and trading depots in the bush, serving as branches of the agency. The trading depot was both a purchasing agent and a general store. All operated in the same way, importing cloth and European products which they traded for rubber for export. As time went by they added other products, such as palm kernels and coffee, to their exports.

Representatives of the great trading companies bought export produce at low prices from the Guinean producer and sold him cheap factory-made goods at the highest price the traffic would bear. In the interior, some of them operated on the company store principle, granting credit against which the Guinean producer could draw supplies and requiring him to meet his debt by delivering his produce regardless of the price offered. Under this system, the usually illiterate Guinean was at the mercy of the trader. The companies, as the major exporters and suppliers of imports, determined the flow of trade and dominated the economy until Guinea became independent. Only bananas did not pass through their hands, being marketed by cooperatives.

In 1958 seven big companies dealing along the coast of Africa carried out more than four-fifths of Guinean trade. All had branches in Conakry and agencies in the interior. Their commercial activities were diverse and extensive. They imported sundry articles, cloth and manufactured goods which they sold either directly in their own shops or to Lebanese or European retailers who, in turn, supplied them with trade products. Their own shops had sections for hardware, equipment, food, textiles and clothing. Often each company had two shops, one for Europeans and the other—with African salesmen—for Africans. They also represented European and American industrial firms and carried on supplemental banking activity by granting short-term credit to retailers. While operating in much the same manner,

each had a specialty or an economic policy a little different from that of the others.

The CFAO was the oldest and the most powerful. Eventually it had branch agencies at Kindia, Kankan, Mamou, Boffa and Boké. In Conakry, in addition to its general stores, it operated a bookshop and a garage. The CFAO and the Commercial Company of West Africa (Société Commerciale de l'Onest Africain—SCOA) jointly financed purchasing enterprises in the Forest Region and the Franco-Liberian Transport Company (Compagnie Franco-Libérien de Transport) which had the monopoly of transit through Liberia. SCOA had shops in Conakry, Kindia, Mamou, Signiri and Boké and represented the Delta and Farrell navigation companies.

The Company of the French Niger (la Compagnie du Niger Française) was a subsidiary of the British firm of Unilever which operated similar subsidiaries under different names in other French territories. It operated a retail shop in Conakry, but was mainly interested in the purchase of palm kernels. The Union of Overseas Agencies (L'Union des Comptoirs d'Ostre-Mer—UNICOMER), a relatively late arrival on the scene, was organized in the merger of a number of smaller companies which had been in business in the territory for many years. In addition to its own commercial activity, it represented Citroen, an insurance company, and air transport between Conakry and Kankan.

Paterson and Zochonis (P.Z.), Charles Peyrissac and Chavanel and Son (Chavanel et fils) were smaller companies. P.Z., the Guinean branch of a Greek-English Manchester firm, dated from 1898 and the other two from the beginning of the twentieth century. In addition to the sale of cloth and clothing, P.Z. represented Lloyds and the Elder Dempster Steamship Line. Charles Peyrissac and Chavanel and Son of Bordeaux operated trading depots: Chavanel at Kindia, Mamou, Kankan, Onasson and Boké; Peyrissac at Kindia, Kankan and Signiri. In the import of manufactured products, Peyrissac specialized in hardware and electrical equipment. Both firms sold insurance.

Syrian and Lebanese merchants played an important role in Guinean trade. Their entry dates from the late nineteenth century and the establishment of the Guinean branches of the great companies. The Lebanese and Syrians served the great trading houses in the interior, exchanging cloth and merchandise for local produce. Once a Lebanese or Syrian had amassed a sufficient sum in this activity, he set up his own shop in Conakry or Kankan, trading on his own account against the day when he could return to Lebanon or Syria to retire on his African profits. Aiming to make as much money as possible with slender means in a short time, this group acquired the reputation of abusing "the improvidence of the African" and prac-

tiating usury. Over the years, the colony of Middle Easterners in Guinea steadily increased, almost monopolizing retail trade in the interior towns and playing an important role in the Conakry market. Some of the Lebanese firms acquired a power and credit standing sufficient for them to compete with the great companies trading in coffee and palm kernels; others established transport companies.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

One of the first, and at the time most popular, steps taken by President Touré after independence was to declare the nationalization of domestic trade. This was accompanied by the requisitioning of some of the installations of the large foreign trading companies and incorporating them into a system of national stores and warehouses. The system was placed under the charge of the State Domestic Trade Agency which the government established early in 1960. In addition to operating retail and wholesale outlets, the Agency was responsible for the purchase of domestic products and for their sale to wholesalers and retailers, controlling the quality of domestic produce, distributing all imported goods and controlling prices. The Agency was the concrete expression of the determination of the PDG to control rigidly and systematically the distribution of consumer goods and to maintain a strong price stabilization policy.

Difficulties were encountered immediately. The Agency lacked sufficient funds to stock stores and warehouses, especially with consumer goods. The men put in charge often had neither experience nor competence, and some were dishonest. The foreign merchants who remained in the country had no choice but to slow down their activity since only the Guinean Foreign Trade Agency (Comptoir Guinéen du Commerce Extérieur) could import, while the merchants were required to make their purchases from the bottleneck of the State Domestic Trade Agency. The small African trader, with no margin of capital, was still harder hit. Both groups sold on the black market all they could buy under cover from dishonest officials. Finally rumbles of public dissatisfaction began to be heard.

In August 1960 President Touré threatened severe action against black marketeers who, he stated, were numerous. He attacked the fishermen in particular for selling at unreasonably high prices. He denounced those who bought sugar from the State Domestic Trade Agency at 45 Guinean francs a kilo and sold it in the interior at almost twice the price and those who stocked rice in order to resell it on the black market or in neighboring countries. He also noted that government officials responsible for purchasing bananas were paying producers less than the price fixed by the government and were retaining the difference.

At the Kissidougou conference of the PDG in October 1960, there were frank comments from all quarters on bad distribution of essential goods. There had been queues in the shops and shortages were plaguing both the Conakry dweller and the villager.

The shortages got worse and in February President Touré called on the PDG to assist the BPN in stamping out the corruption and black marketing which were endangering the national economy. He then made an unannounced personal inspection of the main commercial branches of the State Domestic Trade Agency and many officials were arrested (see ch. 18, Public Order and Safety). He found, moreover, that as a result of negligence, 12,000 tons of merchandise were piled up on the piers at Conakry—an amount that would have needed 3,000 trucks to move. All available trucks were requisitioned to transport cooking oil, sugar, milk, textiles and salt to the towns and villages of the interior.

President Touré, in a speech in March 1961, recounted the failings of the state commercial system. Inefficiency and corruption were widespread. There were not enough vehicles and warehouses. Perishable goods arrived in totally unmanageable quantities to be thrown in the sea while in the interior they were unobtainable. Black market operations were general, and illegal exporting and importing were increasing. In summary he said:

It must be frankly acknowledged that economic and commercial activities are so infinitely varied that no single organization, even when staffed by experts, can possibly act for the whole of a nation when it comes to visualizing the various needs of that nation. . . . [his aim had been] to use methods which would be successful in meeting our country's needs while at the same time reducing the number of unnecessary middle men. . . . [But the results had been different; there had grown up a new set, a]. . . . whole host of dishonest traffickers exploiting one aspect or another of our life.

He announced both the abolition of the State Domestic Trade Agency and the reorganization of the Ministry of Commerce. He insisted, however, that the statist and nationalist principles previously declared to govern the commercial sphere remained valid and that their application had only been postponed until the means were at hand to apply them, incompetence corrected and corruption eradicated.

The 297 government stores were to remain in business, but the number would be reduced in the urban centers and increased in the countryside; they would have greater autonomy in choosing their inventories. Private trading companies and individual merchants were invited to resume their activities in domestic trade. Regulation was to continue, but henceforth all licenses, currency arrangements, price controls and import policies would be dealt with by the Ministry of Commerce, which would not discriminate between public and private enterprise.

All persons wishing to engage in trade were required to apply in writing to the Minister of Commerce. It was required that applications be accompanied by: proof, in the form of a property title or a lease or rental agreement of at least two years' duration, that the applicant possessed a shop; a certified cash ledger covering a period of at least three months' business activity; and two photographs of the applicant, one of which would be affixed to his identity card as a merchant. Upon verification by the commandant of the region, these documents were to be forwarded by him with his recommendation to the Ministry of Commerce which would make the final determination. Once granted an authorization, the merchant must have it entered in the tax rolls. With the receipt from the tax office for this entry, he must have his name entered on the Commerce Register and open an account at the Bank of the Republic of Guinea. After all these formalities, the merchant would receive his identity card permitting him to carry on his business. Regulations and requirements of the same type were applied to companies and cooperatives engaged in trade.

In August 1961 the National Conference of the PDG went on record as favoring the establishment of autonomous state commercial enterprises in each administrative region in place of the regional agencies (*comptoirs*). These would be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce, but would orient their activities toward the region and be under the immediate control of the regional authorities. The role of these enterprises would be essentially that of the small wholesaler. The Conference recommended the reorganization of the retail distribution network by the establishment both of regional stores, administered directly by the regional authorities, and rural stores in the form of consumer cooperatives which would be administered by the villagers. It was emphasized that these measures would parallel the efforts of private traders and would be given priority in those centers where private enterprise was nonexistent or inadequate. In order to facilitate the commercial sale of cattle and the provisioning of the population with meat, the Conference recommended the organization of weekly markets in the principal cattle-raising regions and of direct commercial channels between the stockbreeder and the butcher by the establishment of cooperatives. The Conference called on all militant party members to be vigilant in the struggle against illicit speculation, smuggling, fiscal fraud and the practice of clandestine trading operations.

The Ministry of Commerce

The control of domestic trade rested with the Commerce Department of the Ministry of National Economy until January 1961, when this Ministry was abolished and a Ministry of Commerce created. In

March its functions were greatly expanded. The Ministry of Commerce was made responsible for: developing the nation's commercial policy; exercising control over the direction and operation of both domestic and foreign commerce, and, in a general manner, over all commercial activities within the country; promoting and implementing all measures relating to the development of import and export programs in conformity with the requirements of the Three-Year Plan; and the domestic distribution of imported merchandise or that which was manufactured or produced in Guinea. The Ministry was further authorized to supervise all national commercial enterprises, to establish price policy and to insure that the activities of all merchants conformed to the law.

Within the Ministry of Commerce, the Department of Control (Direction du Contrôle), the Department of Price and Distribution (Direction des Prix et de la Conjoncture) and the Inspectorate of Prices and Inventories (L'Inspection Générale des Prix et Stocks) were made responsible for carrying out these functions. The Department of Control was authorized to control all the activities of national commercial enterprises and of the private sector. Its agents were instructed to inspect both state and private commercial enterprises for conformity with government directives or regulatory measures and, when indicated, to report to the Minister with recommendations for remedial action in the spheres of both foreign and domestic commerce. The Department of Price and Distribution was authorized to keep a check on the flow of goods in the internal and external markets, to study price structure and distribution problems and to develop practical measures for regulating, stabilizing and fixing prices. The Inspectorate of Prices and Inventories was given responsibility for controlling prices, rents, transport and service charges and, if necessary, for initiating legal action for infractions of price and inventory regulations. The Inspectorate is headed by an inspector general who has authority over all inspectors and controllers. In each region, a controller is placed under the authority of the commandant of the region.

National Commercial Enterprises

A series of presidential decrees established several specialized national commercial enterprises to replace the disbanded State Domestic Trade Agency. The new enterprises were placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Control of the Ministry of Commerce. Each could import certain categories of commodities and equipment on terms of equality with private firms and was permitted to sell at wholesale to public agencies, private trading companies and individual licensed merchants.

The state enterprises and their respective areas of responsibilities were: the State Enterprise for the Import of Textiles and Clothing (Entreprise Nationale d'Importation d'Articles Textiles et d'Habillement—SONATEX), dealing in textiles and clothing; the State Enterprise for the Import of Agricultural Implements and Supplies (Entreprise Nationale d'Importation de Matériel et Produits pour l'Agriculture—AGRIMA), dealing in implements, engines, equipment, and other items needed in farming, animal husbandry and forestry; the State Enterprise for the Import of Building Materials (Entreprise Nationale d'Importation de Matériel pour le Bâtiment—BATIPORT), dealing in all types of building materials; the State Enterprise for the Import of Technical Equipment (Entreprise Nationale d'Importation du Matériel Technique—EMATEC), dealing in equipment of all types and their spare parts; the State Enterprise for the Import of Miscellaneous Merchandise (Entreprise Nationale d'Importation des Marchandises Diverses—DIVERMA), dealing in all types of merchandise outside the province of the other state enterprises; and the State Enterprise for Food Products (Entreprise Nationale d'Alimentation Générale—ALIMAG), dealing in the importation and sale of food products. The latter was also authorized to purchase and sell domestically produced foods. GUINEXPORT was charged with the purchase and export of all Guinean agricultural produce. A similar state enterprise, PHARMAGUINÉE, under the Ministry of Public Health and Population, was established to deal with all imports and sales of foreign medicinal products.

Also set up under the supervision of the Ministry of Commerce was the National Petroleum Office (Office Nationale des Hydrocarbures—ONAH). Along with private companies, this organization was authorized to import petroleum products, to establish the sale price of petroleum products with the concurrence of the Ministry of Commerce and to supply depots and service stations.

The State Enterprise for Lighterage, Transport and Maritime Consignment (Entreprise Nationale de Transport Routier d'Acconage, de Transit et de Consignation Maritime—ENAT), also originally established in the Ministry of Commerce, was later transferred to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. Its responsibilities included lighterage, the loading and unloading of ships, transit, warehousing and consignment and transport of shipments by sea.

Price Control

In January 1959 prices of all imported merchandise at wholesale and retail were blocked at the levels which obtained on December 26, 1958. Importers were ordered to declare within eight days their inventories of imported merchandise, listing the origin of the goods and the prices they had paid. These statements were to be sent to the

Section for Control of Prices and Inventories (Service du Contrôle des Prix et Stocks) of the Commerce Department of the Ministry of National Economy. In February it was announced that no sales could be made from these inventories until confirmation of the sale price had been made by the agents of the Section for Control of Prices and Inventories and by the police. The effect of the announcement was to drive items off the shelves and onto the black market and to curtail further purchases of imported goods by the retail merchants.

From time to time in 1960 prices on various items of consumer goods were decreed, but no overall price control law was put into effect. Some of these controls proved unfortunate. Meat prices, for example, were set so unrealistically that there was widespread smuggling of meat into neighboring countries where better prices could be obtained, and meat fell into short supply, especially in Conakry.

In December 1960 minimum prices to the producer were set for a number of agricultural products: coffee at 95 Guinean francs per kilogram; peanuts at 18 Guinean francs per kilogram; palm kernels at 15 Guinean francs per kilogram. Purchases could be made competitively by the regional branches of the State Domestic Trade Agency and by private buyers who had special authorization from the Ministry of National Economy for resale to the State Domestic Trade Agency. The result was that private buyers could not effectively compete.

Later in December, minimum prices to be paid the producer and maximum prices to be charged the consumer were set for all types of domestic rice. Purchases and sales were reserved exclusively to the regional branches of the Domestic Trade Agency. Throughout the country, the price which could be paid to producers for white rice was fixed at 30 francs a kilogram and the maximum sale price to consumers at 45 francs a kilogram. The price of red rice to the producer was put at 25 francs a kilogram and the maximum sale price to the consumer at 40 francs a kilogram. The price which could be paid to the producer for paddy rice for seed was fixed at 20 francs a kilogram and paddy rice sold for commercial purposes was pegged at 17.5 francs a kilogram. President Touré, a few months later, blisteringly denounced those who were illegally exporting rice or selling it on the domestic black market.

Meat prices in Conakry were raised in April 1961, and another attempt was made to control prices on imported products. Permitted markups on imported goods by wholesalers were established which ranged between a low of 5 percent for high tension electrical equipment and powdered milk to a high of 11 percent on certain imported textiles. The retailers markup, also very low, ranged from 8 percent for condensed and powdered milk to a high of 14 percent on some finer textiles. By another decree prices were stated at which imported

rice, flour, sugar, peanut oil and salt were to be sold at each stage in the distributive process and to the consumer (see table 2).

Table 2. Price Controls on Sale of Certain Foods in Guinea, April 1961
[In Guinean francs]

Transaction	Imported rice ¹	Flour ¹	Sugar ¹	Peanut oil ²	Salt ¹
From State Foreign Trade Agency to regional agencies and wholesale merchants.....	33. 5	37. 0	56. 0	115. 0	15. 0
From regional agencies and wholesale merchants to state retail stores and retail merchants.....	36. 5	40. 0	59. 0	118. 0	17. 0
From state retail stores and retailers to consumers.....	40. 0	45. 0	65. 0	125. 0	20. 0

¹ Per kilogram.

² Per liter.

Source: Adapted from République de Guinée, *Journal Officiel de la République de Guinée*, 3^e année, No. 9, May 1, 1961, p. 129.

It is doubtful that these measures have been entirely successful. Complaints regarding the cost of living and shortage of commodities were made to PDG leaders in their inspection tours around the country during the summer of 1961. In various towns there have been reports of party sections meeting with merchants and the producers in attempts to solve the problem of price rises and commodity shortages.

STRUCTURE OF WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE

With the abolition of the State Domestic Trade Agency in March 1961, merchants were again permitted to operate at wholesale within the country. They were in competition, however, with a large number of state enterprises. The European trading companies and the Lebanese and Syrian merchants, previously confined to domestic trade, were permitted to import, but they were required to sell all export produce to GUINEXPORT at prices set by the government.

Retail trade is carried on both in shops and open markets of the towns and larger villages. The shops are owned almost entirely by Lebanese and Syrians, although there are some government-operated retail stores and a scattering of Guineans who retail beer, canned foods and some bazaar goods from their huts. Most typically, Guinean produce is sold in open markets by women.

There are one or more Lebanese shops in every town; Conakry has about 50. They have long supplied the people with almost all their cottons. In front of their establishments there are usually one or two seamstresses with their sewing machines; the second story of the shop

ordinarily serves as living quarters for the merchant's family. The shop ceilings are high and the walls are lined with shelves piled with rolls of vividly colored, cheap cotton cloth. The stock may also include canned goods, a little hardware, bazaar trinkets, cheap cosmetics, combs, pens and perhaps a few pairs of shoes. This family enterprise may sometimes employ a Guinean or two.

Open markets are found in the towns and villages and at crossroads. Some are open daily, others weekly, and some are seasonal. Certain markets offer all types of produce of the locality in season; others, such as the palm-kernel market held in April among the Kono of the Forest Region and the fish market at Boulbinet in Conakry, are specialty markets.

Produce is displayed both in its raw form or at a stage of preparation which makes it easy to transport or sell—for example, the "monkey bread" of the baobab fruit, the green powder of the baobab's pounded leaves and the dried cups of Guinean hibiscus. Grains may be sold unprocessed, husked, or as flour. Produce may be laid out on basket trays, on leaves or in calabashes. Some of the women sit at short-legged tables with their wares laid out before them.

There are those who sell their products regularly and are at the market whenever it is open. They usually specialize in one product—palm oil, dried fish, eggs, rice, fruits, wood or kerosene. Others have a varied inventory. Stocks of the individual trader are typically small; one woman may be selling salt and a few fresh or dried pimentos; another, a few gourds, some peanuts and mushrooms; another, potato leaves cooked like spinach, some wild fruit and peanut or palm oil; still another, some grilled termites and a few peppercorns.

There are no advertising agencies and very little use is made of advertising. The only advertising possible is of the placard and poster type, which is common, and notices occasionally published in the Conakry newspaper, *Horoya*. Normal hours of business are from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 3 p.m. to 7 p.m. The metric system is used throughout the country.

TRANSPORTATION

Most of the products which enter into trade are at some stage carried by people along the network of tracks which are the major communication routes other than the roads connecting the principal towns. The tracks are for the most part impractical for vehicular traffic. Generally oriented from north to south, they have branches and crossroads and are the important arteries for the flow of indigenous food supplies. Some of them have been—and remain—ancient trading routes for salt, dried fish, kola nuts, chickens and livestock. Animals are used for transport only in Upper Guinea and they are few

in number. They are used for riding or packing; carts or wagons are rare. Long-haul carriers are usually men, but local carriers are more likely to be women. Women with their headloads of market produce are a common sight in both town and countryside.

Lack of transportation and storage facilities severely limits the volume and scope of internal trade. Manufactured and imported goods, except for small items such as razor blades, combs, kerosene lamps, mirrors and flashlights, are distributed almost entirely in urban centers. The most extensive movement of goods is along the Conakry-Kindia-Mamou route which is served by both a black-top road and a railroad combining to make it the backbone of the transport system. Imported products are shipped over this route from Conakry to the interior, and it carries the regional production of the western Fouta Djallon and of such coastal centers as Dubréka, Boffa and Boké. The market of Conakry absorbs the surplus of this coastal area and receives livestock from the area around Téli-mélé. Much of the produce of the Gaoual and Youkounkoun districts apparently is marketed in Senegal and that of the N'Zérékoré district goes over the new road to Liberia.

Transport facilities—roads, railways, harbors, and airfields—are inadequate, separately and collectively, to meet the needs of a developing economy. Ordinary improvement and maintenance efforts are made difficult by torrential monsoonal rains and by the terrain, which varies from the marshes and tropical tangle of the coast to the eroded plateaus and broken ridges of the interior.

In Lower Guinea, the coastal rivers and swamps, rain-swollen during the wet season, hamper north-south land communications. The rises of the Fouta Djallon impede communication between the coast and Upper Guinea. The dense vegetation south of the savannas has retarded penetration into sizable areas of the Forest Region.

The construction of new roads and the improvement of existing ones have been given high priority by the government, which is undertaking the task with its human investment program and sizable amounts of Communist-bloc aid (see ch. 11, Labor Force; ch. 24, Industrial Potential).

Roads and Road Transport

The road network, according to Guinean authorities, totals about 10,000 miles. This figure is somewhat misleading, however, if the roads are compared to those in the United States or Europe. The nearest approach to a highway is the 80 miles of asphalt-surfaced, all-weather road between Conakry and Kindia. The remainder of the system is unpaved, with less than 1,000 miles of it ballasted with rock or gravel. A heavy rain makes many sections impassable for several days because of flooding, destroyed bridges, washouts or land-

slides. Even if the roads were passable all year round, they would present a difficulty in the need to travel long distances over roundabout routes to get from one place to another.

The most important route starts at Conakry and runs northeastward for about 425 miles to the Mali border northeast of Siguiri, where it connects with the Mali road to Bamako. About 20 miles out of Conakry, a branch road runs northwest along the coast of the boundary with Portuguese Guinea, via Dubréka, Boffa and Boké. Another branch goes southeast down the coast, through Forécariah to the boundary with Sierra Leone, where it joins the road to Freetown. At Mamou, about 130 miles (190 by road) northeast of Conakry, a branch runs north to Labé in the Fouta Djallon, thence northwest to the Senegalese border and on to Dakar. At Dabola, about 200 miles (285 by road) northeast of Conakry, another branch extends southeast through the Guinea Highlands via Faranah, Kissidougou, Guékédou and Macenta to N'Zérékoré in the Forest Region; several sections of this road are impassable during the wet season. At Kouroussa, about 300 miles (385 by road) northeast of Conakry, the road branches again to go southeast to Kankan and south to N'Zérékoré, via Kérouané and Beyla. From N'Zérékoré a road runs southeast about 40 miles through the Monts Nimba to Ivory Coast and onward to Abidjan. Another road out of N'Zérékoré goes to the Liberian border about 45 miles to the southwest and thence to Monrovia. The N'Zérékoré-Guékédou road extends westward to the Sierra Leone border where it connects with a road to Freetown. Thus the country has roads connecting with the capitals of all of the neighboring countries, except Portuguese Guinea. In addition to the roads, there is an uncharted network of trails.

By mid-1961 steps had been undertaken to improve the roads and road transport. Several teams of Soviet engineers had begun surveying the road network and over 600 million Guinean francs worth of road building equipment had been delivered from abroad. Early in 1961 work had begun on over 1,600 miles of new roads and several hundred miles were scheduled for completion by July.

As new buses and trucks have been delivered by the Soviet-bloc countries, the National Office of Public Highway Transport of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport has inaugurated new transport services within the country. A regularly scheduled bus service began operations on March 2, 1961, between Dabola and Kissidougou, Kankan and Kissidougou, and Kankan and N'Zérékoré; another began functioning on June 25, 1961, between Mamou, Dabola, Pita and Labé. With the requisitioning by the government on August 4, 1961, of the installations and vehicles of the firm of Jules Burki, trucking and warehousing at the ports of Conakry and Benty and into the interior as far as Kissidougou also became a government operation.

Railways and Harbors

The railway system, the Guinean National Railway (Chemin de Fer Guinée), consists of a 414-mile main line from Conakry to Kankan and a 90-mile branch, constructed and operated by Fria, which connects Conakry with Kimbo. Both lines are single track and narrow (meter) gauge. The main line was built by the French in furtherance of a plan to develop Conakry as a commercial port serving the hinterland by connecting with river traffic on the upper Niger. Construction was begun in 1900. Service was opened in 1904 over the section between Conakry and Kindia which soon became an important banana-growing center. By 1910 the line had reached the Niger at Kouroussa; the final section to Kankan on the Milo River was completed in the next four years. Although highest elevation of the roadbed is only 2,346 feet, the steep grades and sharp curves necessitated by the mountainous terrain through which it passes made its construction a major engineering achievement. At a number of places, the tracks had to be placed on narrow ledges cut out of the sides of precipices.

The branch line, which joins the main line about 18 miles east of Conakry, was built in 1958 to connect the Fria Company alumina plant at Kimbo with the port of Conakry. Funds and construction advice were provided by Fria which maintains and operates the line. The government is the sole owner and operator of the main line.

The railway has always suffered from a serious operating deficit and the French administration had, on a number of occasions, considered abandoning it. The independent Guinean Government has no such intention, although it represents a drain on the national revenue. In 1956 a major modernization of the railway was completed with changeover from steam to diesel locomotives, but much of the equipment and rolling stock was pre-World War II and needed replacement.

After independence, the railway deteriorated seriously in efficiency, with breakdowns and line blockages becoming more and more frequent. The Soviet Union agreed to undertake modernization of the railway as part of the technical assistance agreement signed in March 1960, and by January 1961, some 40 Soviet engineers were studying the railway's reconstruction. In October 1961 the Soviet Union announced that its engineers had begun survey work for extending the railway from Kouroussa about 200 miles northeast to Bamako in Mali.

Conakry has one of the best natural harbors in West Africa. Situated on the northern side of Tombo Island and on the western tip of Kaloum Peninsula, it is sheltered from westerly winds by the Iles de Los, and currents in the harbor are moderate. These natural advantages have been enhanced by the construction of a north-south break-

water about 2,500 yards long and 800 yards offshore to the northwest of the port area.

In mid-1961 the harbor and port could accommodate simultaneously four ships of 26-foot draft and two ore ships of 36-foot draft. Port equipment consisted of 12 cranes with capacities up to 30 tons and 3 floating cranes with capacities up to 115 tons, exclusive of Fria's alumina-loading facilities which are of the most modern type. In addition to storage capacities for 100,000 barrels of refined petroleum products, there were 200,000 square feet of warehouse storage and 90,000 cubic feet of cold storage. The port was capable of handling up to 3 million tons of cargo per year and improvements were in progress that would raise this capacity by a million tons. Further breakwater and wharf construction and dredging are planned under Communist-bloc aid programs.

In 1961 the total number of ships calling at Conakry port was less than in the past. Ships from Eastern European, Russian and Polish ports delivered cargoes of 5,000 to 10,000 tons at a time. The liners from France and to South Africa and the French banana boats, which formerly had served the port of Conakry, now delivered and loaded only small quantities on their way to or from other ports.

Other year-around harbors for ocean-going vessels could be constructed in the estuaries of several rivers. The principal sites are at the mouth of Rio Nunez—which could serve the bauxite-processing developments near Boké envisaged at one time by Bauxites du Midi—and at the mouth of the Mellacorée River at Benty where, in 1961, there were berths for two banana ships of 21-foot draft. A number of other coastal villages—such as Boffa and Dubréka—might be described as fishing ports, but their development into freight-handling ports was not being considered in 1961.

Airlines

The only airfield capable of handling international traffic is at Conakry. Its 600-foot runways have been extended, under the supervision of Soviet specialists and technicians, to about 7,300 feet to accommodate jet aircraft—a project which involved the reclamation of swamp land. Further lengthening to 10,000 feet was under way in mid-1961. In 1960 airfields at Boké, Kankan, Kissidougou, N'Zérékoré and Labé had runways about 4,600 feet long. These were to be extended to about 5,600 feet.

As of mid-1961 there were emergency fields at Kindia, Gacual (dry season only), Kouroussa, Signiri, Kérouané, Beyla, Macenta and Kimbo. The Kimbo field, which has a 2,600-foot runway, belongs to Fria. Only the field at Conakry is practical for use after heavy rainstorms.

A national airline, Air Guinea (Air Guinée), began operating on a regular schedule on October 17, 1960, with four Ilyushin-14 aircraft purchased from Czechoslovakia and manned by Czech crews. As of that date, the French airline, Air-Sea Transport Union (Union Aero-maritime de Transport—UAT), ceased all operations on interior routes in Guinea although it continued its international routes connecting Guinea with many points in West Africa. By the end of 1960 Air Guinea had acquired two Ilyushin-18's financed by the Soviet Union.

Air Guinea was established as a government-owned company by Presidential decree in April 1961 and placed under the jurisdiction of the General Directorate of Civil Aviation in the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. The Directorate's functions included the carrying out of all studies, enterprises and operations directly or indirectly relating to air traffic within the Republic. Although Air Guinea, in mid-1961, still confined itself to routes within Guinea, plans had been made to fly regional international routes eventually.

Guinea was served by four other foreign airlines in addition to UAT—Air France, Ghana Airways, Czechoslovakia Airways and KLM. Air France connected Conakry with Paris, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Dakar (Senegal), Freetown (Sierra Leone), Monrovia (Liberia) and Abidjan (Republic of Ivory Coast). Ghana Airways connected Conakry with Accra (Ghana), Freetown, Monrovia, Abidjan and Bathurst (Gambia) and provided a feeder to the British Overseas Airways Corporation's West African service. In July 1960 Czechoslovakian Airways inaugurated a route which connected Guinea with Rabat (Morocco), Zurich and Prague in once-weekly flights.

CHAPTER 28

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Foreign trade is subject to strict government control and long-range planning to prevent the dissipation of scarce foreign exchange reserves for purposes which do not advance the overall economic plan on which the country's development depends. President Touré sees dependence on European currencies and industrial markets as neocolonialism and believes that a massive effort must be made by all Africa to break out of its role as primary producer and develop an African market for its own products. Accordingly Guinea has helped to make a common economic policy the cornerstone of the Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union and of the program of the Casablanca Charter signatories (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

The government's plans for economic development require resources far greater than the country can muster and it has had to look abroad for financial assistance. The Soviet Union—followed by other nations of the Communist bloc—stepped in to fill the gap left by the French withdrawal in 1958. Guinea's declared policy, in accepting such assistance, is one of strict political neutralism. President Touré has announced on numerous occasions that aid will be accepted from any source without regard to political alignments or power blocs so long as it comes without political strings and does not compromise his country's sovereignty and neutrality.

Coffee, bananas and palm kernels have been the major exports, but minerals have assumed a more and more important export role since 1950. Imports have consisted largely of consumer goods though importation of capital equipment has steadily increased since World War II. A consistent though declining deficit in the ratio of exports to imports was balanced before independence by the investment of French public funds in Guinean development projects. Since independence Guinea has drastically curtailed imports of consumer goods in order to devote foreign exchange and credits to the importation of capital goods required by the Three-Year Plan for the development of the economy.

Before independence foreign commerce was largely oriented toward the French franc zone, but since 1958 it has shown a shift in the direction of increasing trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc—especially

with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless in 1960 the franc zone supplied nearly half the imports and continued to take the greatest share of exports. No statistics on overland trade with contiguous African countries are available, but it is thought to be substantial (see ch. 27, Domestic Trade).

In 1960, for the first time since World War II, a favorable balance of payments was reported. The balance, however, was based solely on receipts and shipments of merchandise and did not include capital movements or withdrawals on loans. The favorable balance on the merchandise account resulted from two factors—a great increase in exports of diamonds, bauxite, iron ore and alumina and a drastic curtailment of imports. The surplus of exports over imports existed only in dealings with the West, however, for Guinea had a heavy deficit in respect to its balance with Eastern Europe and China. This trading account deficit represented almost entirely imports of capital goods for the Three-Year Plan received from Communist countries under trade, aid and long-term loan agreements.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Before 1959 Guinea's trading account was included in the overall balance of payments for French West Africa and, from 1950 onward, showed a chronic deficit which was covered by the Franc Zone Stabilization Fund in Paris. Through the 1950's, however, the deficit steadily declined as exports increased. Nonetheless, in acquiring independence, Guinea lost the main markets for its exports and the chief source of supply for its imports. In 1959, with the withdrawal of French aid, it found itself lacking financial reserves and foreign exchange and was hard put to meet its trading deficit. Abandoned by France, the government quickly concluded a series of barter agreements with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and East Germany (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 25, Public Finance; ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

Although the government published a balance of payments account for 1959, it was in many respects an unsatisfactory statement of the country's payments position. It was simply a tabulation of receipts and expenditures with respect to various countries and monetary zones with no reference to capital movements. The franc zone was excluded. When adjusted to include the franc zone merchandise account, payments appear to be balanced at 15.9 billions French Colonies of Africa francs (Colonies Françaises d'Afrique—CFA—francs)—approximately \$65 million at rate of 245 CFA francs to U.S. \$1—with unrecorded outward transfers of about 296 million CFA francs. However, a massive outflow of capital, totaling at least 3.5 billion CFA francs, took place between October 1958 and March 1,

1960, when Guinea left the franc zone. Though the bulk of this movement occurred in 1959, it is not reflected in the so-called balance of payment for that year.

Again for 1960, the balance of payments account covered only shipments of merchandise which showed a surplus of exports over imports of 1,290 million Guinean francs (approximately \$5.2 million at rate of 247 Guinean francs to U.S. \$1). Shipments to all countries other than the Sino-Soviet bloc were valued at 10,490 million Guinean francs and imports from them at 6,874 million. Shipments to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries were valued at 3,111 million Guinean francs and deliveries from them at 5,437 million—representing a trading account deficit of 2,326 million Guinean francs. Most such deliveries are, however, covered by long-term loans. Although shipments to and from the franc zone were included in the 1960 accounting, no data was given on capital movements or on withdrawals from foreign credits—information which is closely guarded by the government.

With regard to the franc zone, Guinea is known to have a credit against France of approximately 6.5 billion CFA francs collected at the time of currency exchange and another billion CFA francs in pensions to veterans of the French military forces which Guinea has paid since the suspension of monetary transfers between the two countries. France has a claim against Guinea of approximately 2 billion French francs in the form of outstanding credits at the time of the referendum in 1958. During early 1961 an interim solution of the problem was reached when current accounts were opened in the Bank of France for Guinea and in the Bank of the Republic of Guinea for France for current clearances “without reference to events before March 1, 1960,” the date of Guinea’s withdrawal from the franc zone. This arrangement is expected to permit the resumption of normal trade.

PATTERN OF FOREIGN TRADE

France and the franc zone have long held a predominant position in Guinea’s foreign trade. This position has, however, been declining since 1952 as Guinean exports increased. Between 1952 and 1956 imports from the franc zone fell in percentage of total value from 83 percent to 76 percent; exports from 88 percent to 69 percent. During the same period, trade with the dollar, sterling and other monetary zones increased; imports from 17 percent to 24 percent and exports from 12 percent to 31 percent. Relative trading positions with the various zones remained much the same through 1958.

In 1959, 61 percent of Guinean exports were shipped to the franc zone, and 69 percent of imports were supplied by it. Exports to the dollar, sterling and other monetary zones fell to 25 percent, while

imports from these zones sank to 13 percent. During 1959, however, as a result of barter agreements, trade with the Soviet bloc rose from zero to 14 percent of all Guinean exports and to 18 percent of all imports.

In 1960, notwithstanding Guinea's withdrawal from the franc zone early in the year, France and the franc zone supplied 37.4 percent of Guinea's imports and took 40.8 percent of Guinean exports. Imports from the Soviet bloc rose to 44.2 percent and exports to the bloc countries to 22.9 percent. On the other hand, though imports from the dollar, sterling and other monetary zones showed only a slight rise (to 18.4 percent), exports increased to 36.4 percent.

Exports

Bauxite, diamonds, iron ore, bananas, coffee, palm kernels and, since 1960, alumina are the principal exports (see table 1). Exports have risen in value from 4,874 million CFA francs in 1958 to 8,928 million in 1959 and to 13,601 million Guinean francs in 1960. This rise is largely the result of the new importance assumed by mining in the Guinean economy. In 1959 mineral exports accounted for just over 27 percent of all exports; in 1960 this percentage reached 46 percent. In absolute terms, the value of mineral exports rose from 2 billion CFA francs in 1959 to 6.3 billion Guinean francs in 1960.

One factor was the increase in diamond exports through legitimate channels which went from 153 million CFA francs in 1958, to 2,450 million in 1959. This development was the result, not only of increased productivity, but also of the organization of a regulated diamond market and the establishment of more stringent measures by the government to prevent smuggling into neighboring countries as well as a certain amount of smuggling into Guinea from Sierra Leone. In 1960 the value of diamond exports fell to 1,758 million Guinean francs.

In 1960 two other factors contributed to the upswing in the value of exports; the market for iron ore improved to such an extent that production was the second best in Guinean history, and the Fria International Company for Alumina Production began making shipments. Even though alumina shipments did not begin until July, their total value of 2.63 billion Guinean francs accounted for 19 percent of all Guinean exports in 1960 even though production at Fria had not reached designed capacity (see ch. 24, Industrial Potential).

Although the relative value of agricultural exports fell from 60 percent in 1959 to 38 percent in 1960, all but bananas and coffee showed an increase in absolute value of about a billion Guinean francs in the first nine months of 1960 in comparison with the same period in 1959. Banana exports have been declining steadily since 1955 as the

Table 1. Principal Exports of Guinea for 1959 and 1960

	1959 ¹		1960	
	Metric tons	Value ²	Metric tons	Value ³
Coffee.....	15,000	2,503	16,024	2,117
Bananas.....	57,000	1,570	54,684	1,147
Palm kernels.....	22,700	906	22,968	919
Diamonds (carats).....	643,000	2,450	-----	1,758
Bauxite.....	302,000	503	704,835	1,128
Iron ore.....	167,315	232	726,893	690
Alumina.....	-----	-----	171,376	2,631

¹ Preliminary figures.

² In millions of CFA francs, 245 of which equal U.S. \$1.

³ In millions of Guinean francs, 247 of which equal U.S. \$1.

Source: Adapted from U.S. Government sources.

result of a leaf blight. Coffee exports declined in value in 1960 by 200 million Guinean francs in spite of an increase in tonnage. Most of the rise in value shown for agricultural exports can be attributed to a valuation above world market prices of shipments to the Soviet-bloc countries (see ch. 23, Agricultural Potential).

Exports to the Sino-Soviet bloc were nearly all agricultural products—mainly bananas and palm kernels; the only important mineral was iron ore shipped to East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Heavy exports of bananas to the bloc countries illustrates the shift in direction of trade since independence (see table 2). Of the bloc countries, the largest customer was East Germany which was followed in importance by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The most important purchases by the franc zone were alumina, coffee and other agricultural products. French purchases of bananas

Table 2. Guinean Exports of Bananas, 1958-60

[In metric tons]

Countries	1958	1959	1960
France.....	73,819	27,784	4,997
Algeria.....	6,715	6,183	3,088
Morocco.....	1,485	469	312
East Germany.....	936	19,244	22,902
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.....	-----	6,614	11,528
Czechoslovakia.....	-----	4,405	7,376
Other.....	-----	-----	1,460
Total.....	82,955	64,699	51,663

Source: Adapted from "Guinée", *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens*, 17^e année, No. 795, February 4, 1961, p. 352.

fell to 4,997 tons in 1960 in comparison with 27,784 in 1949 and 73,819 in 1958. Mineral products in general were exported to other monetary zones: bauxite mainly to Canada; alumina to dollar and sterling areas and West Germany, Norway, and Switzerland; iron ore to West Germany and Britain; and diamonds to Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg Customs Union), Switzerland, Israel and Great Britain (see ch. 24, Industrial Potential).

Imports

In the late 1950's the principal imports were rice, sugar, plain cotton textiles, machinery, tools and hardware, electrical appliances, petroleum products, cement, bicycles and motorcycles. These products made up 51 percent of Guinea's total imports by value in 1959 (see table 3). Rice, flour, sugar, hardware, petroleum products, bicycles and motorcycles in particular either doubled or tripled in tonnage imported between 1950 and 1959.

Table 3. Principal Imports of Guinea for 1959 and 1960

	1959 ¹ Total	1960 ²			
		Franc Zone	Sino- Soviet Bloc	Others	Total
Dairy products.....	172	73	85	28	186
Rice.....	550	75	341	-----	416
Flour.....	267	-----	70	39	109
Sugar.....	522	28	336	29	393
Tobacco products.....	162	145	9	29	183
Cement.....	301	15	238	23	276
Petroleum products.....	436	139	192	642	973
Chemical products.....	148	103	63	62	228
Paper and cardboard.....	142	166	68	3	237
Plain cotton textiles.....	557	211	524	368	1, 103
Clothing.....	251	158	163	19	340
Shoes.....	200	82	83	1	166
Common metals.....	334	159	123	25	307
Metal articles.....	1, 138	151	36	37	³ 206
Tools and hardware.....	153	72	137	7	216
Machinery.....	2, 179	353	224	161	738
Electrical appliances.....	621	304	144	43	491
Automobiles.....	182	64	260	19	343
Trucks.....	277	107	180	49	336
Automotive spare parts.....	260	73	41	29	143
Motorcycles-bicycles.....	65	30	52	9	91

¹ Values for 1959 given in millions of CFA francs, 245 of which equal U.S.\$1.

² Values for 1960 given in millions of Guinean francs, 217 of which equal U.S.\$1.

³ As given in source.

Source: Adapted from U.S. Government sources.

In 1960 a drastic reduction in imports from 15.3 billion CFA francs in 1959 to an estimated 12.3 billion Guinean francs brought severe domestic shortages. Tonnages of hardware and other manufactured metal articles were cut to less than an eighth of 1959 imports; machinery and equipment to a quarter of 1959; electrical appliances to less than half the 1959 figure. Flour was cut by 78 percent, rice by 55 percent, and automotive parts by 39 percent. On the other hand, tonnages of imported paper and cardboard were increased by 83 percent; petroleum products by 75 percent; plain cotton cloth by 47 percent (see ch. 27, Domestic Trade).

Though the franc zone still remained an important supplier of Guinean imports, the Sino-Soviet bloc countries contributed the largest share of sugar, rice, cement, textiles, machinery, automobiles and trucks. Of the Communist countries, Czechoslovakia was the largest contributor followed by the Soviet Union, East Germany and Poland.

FOREIGN AID AND LOANS

The first foreign assistance accepted by Guinea after independence was a loan of \$28 million at 2 percent interest granted by Ghana on November 23, 1958. The purpose of this loan was to help Guinea bridge the financial difficulties which resulted from its separation from France. A number of development projects begun by France had been left unfinished and the independent Guinean government could not finance their completion. Guinea also needed to replace construction machinery and other equipment withdrawn by the French.

Assistance from other African states included loans from Morocco and the United Arab Republic (UAR). On April 23, 1961, the Moroccan government granted Guinea a 10-year credit of 10 million dirhams (approximately \$2 million) to be used for the purchase of equipment in Morocco. Agreements on trade, payments and technical cooperation were signed in Cairo between the UAR and Guinea on May 16, 1961. The agreements provided for trade exchanges up to E£2 million a year, facilities to open trade centers, the exchange of technical missions and scholarships for vocational training. Under a supplement to the trade agreement, the UAR loaned Guinea E£6 million, repayable over seven years with interest at 2.5 percent, to finance purchases of machinery, tools and the cost of technical assistance. Repayments are to be made in the form of exports from Guinea to the UAR. A separate exchange of letters provided for the establishment of a joint company, financed equally by the two governments, to carry out construction, communications and irrigations projects in Guinea.

As soon as Guinea became independent, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland recognized Guinea and within

a few weeks trade missions from all four countries visited it. Barter and trade agreements were signed which, in return for needed assistance, committed some 50 percent of Guinea's exports to the Communist bloc. Within a short time agreements were also signed with Communist China, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania.

The Soviet Union granted Guinea credits totaling \$56 million at an interest rate of 2.5 percent for a 12-year period. Most of these credits are for projects under Guinea's Three-Year Plan. The Soviet Union agreed to finance a number of specific projects: a polytechnic institute for 1,500 students; a short-wave radio transmitter; a hydroelectric station; buildings for the Guinean National Assembly; dairy farms; a cement plant; a printing plant; a tannery; a cannery; modernization of the port, airport and railway; improvement of the road network; a minerals survey of the country; dam construction to irrigate 7,000 hectares of rice; and a number of industrial projects. All construction materials and other items not available in Guinea were to be shipped from the Soviet Union. In 1961 Russian Ilyushin jets were taking off from the Conakry airstrip built by Soviet engineers. The Soviet Union has also supplied numerous technicians, including schoolteachers, mining and civil engineers and airplane pilots.

Communist China in September 1960 granted a long-term, interest-free loan of \$24 million for development projects. This loan was to be used principally to cover the costs of Chinese technical assistance experts, machinery and the training of Guineans. It is repayable (in the form of Guinean goods or agreed currency) in equal annual installments over a 10-year period to begin in 1970. The agreement between the two countries stipulates that Chinese technicians working in Guinea will not have a standard of living exceeding that of Guinean personnel of the same rank. A separate trade and payments agreement announced at the same time provides for an annual trade between the two countries of \$4,860,000 in both directions. In September 1961 an additional loan equivalent to \$35 million was granted. Under this agreement Chinese technicians and engineers would help Guinea build a new national assembly building, a hydroelectric station, paper factories, a tobacco factory and other projects.

Czechoslovakia granted a credit of \$10 million at an interest rate of 2.5 percent for 10 years. It has financed the establishment of the national airline and is contributing complete equipment for various industrial plants, a radio station and trucks and tractors. It is also supplying numerous technicians, including economic advisors, doctors, teachers, airport operating personnel and crews for the new airplanes.

Poland has given a commercial credit of \$5 million for 5 years at 2.5 percent interest and has agreed to finance and grant technical assistance for the establishment of a state fishing industry. Two

modern trawlers have been delivered and a number of technicians are instructing Guineans in their operation. Other Polish technicians include mining engineers, doctors and teachers (see ch. 23, Agricultural Potential).

East Germany has granted a credit of \$5 million for 5 years at 2.5 percent interest, mostly to finance commercial operations. It is also financing and supplying technical assistance for the construction and operation of the national printing office and a radio transmitter. In addition, it has sent other specialists, including teachers and radio engineers (see ch. 21, Public Information and Propaganda).

Hungary has granted a credit of \$2.4 million for 4 years at 2.5 percent interest. It is building a glassware plant and has agreed to conduct a survey of potable water in a number of remote areas of the country. Hungarian buses are in operation on the streets of Conakry, and Hungary has also sent farm machinery and telecommunications equipment. It has supplied a few technicians, mainly teachers and mechanics.

No information is available on the amount of the Bulgarian and Rumanian credits. Bulgarian doctors and nurses have been working for almost a year in various regions of Guinea and others are to be sent by mid-1961, as well as a group of 10 specialists in hydraulic engineering, a group of architects and a group of mining engineers.

Guinea and Yugoslavia have signed an agreement for the construction of a new hydroelectric dam at a spot known as "The Great Water Falls," 60 miles from Conakry. The dam will be built 10 miles from an existing dam which provides Conakry with electricity but not in sufficient quantity. The construction of the dam, which will be over 45 feet high and 1,250 feet wide, will be carried out by a Guinean civil engineering firm with Yugoslav technical help. The dam will start producing power in July 1963. The Yugoslav government also granted a \$5 million credit for 5 years at 3 percent interest and has agreed to give scientific and technical assistance to industry, mining and geological research.

West Germany has granted credits up to \$12 million, repayable in 5 years, for the purchase of capital equipment. West Germany has also agreed to cooperate with Guinea in prospecting to determine the mineral wealth of the country. In addition, a technical assistance grant of about \$1 million was made in late 1960 to finance the establishment of a veterinary service, the building of slaughterhouses, installations of smokehouses for fish, an agronomist for Sérédou to study the market for quinine, and nursing, hospital and laboratory assistants. Outside of these agreements, six diesel trains, including carriages and engines, have been ordered from West Germany.

In 1959 the United States furnished 5,000 tons of rice and 3,000

tons of wheat flour and in 1960 made \$1 million worth of surplus agricultural commodities, consisting of rice, wheat flour and milk, available to Guinea. These latter shipments were to be paid for in local currency. At the end of September 1960 an agreement was signed with the United States which, in the main, provided for the training of English language teachers in Guinea and for 150 Guinean students to be sent to the United States for further training.

The Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union

The Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union came into being formally as the Union of African States (Union des Etats Africains—UEA) on July 1, 1961, with publication of the Union's charter. It was the culmination of a series of meetings beginning in November 1958 between President Touré and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, joined—after August 1960—by President Modibo Keita of Mali. Although joint communiques following each meeting forecast various measures leading to economic unification, no official action other than consultation took place before the issuance of the charter (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

Article 4 of the charter provides for the establishment of a common economic orientation and includes directives for economic planning which aim at the complete decolonialization of the institutions inherited from the colonial regime and the organized exploitation of the countries' wealth in the interest of the populations. An Economic Commission of the Union, made up of five members from each state, is charged with coordinating and harmonizing economic and financial policies in conformity with directives mutually agreed on by the heads of the states. The Commission is enjoined to hold two annual sessions and immediately to transmit its recommendations to the heads of the states. The first session of the Commission—held in Conakry in July 1961—was attended by representatives of the nations which had signed the Casablanca Charter as well as the delegates representing the UEA.

The Economic Committee of the African Charter of Casablanca

In July 1961 delegates from Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, the United Arab Republic and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne—GPRA) met in Conakry to consider closer economic integration among their countries. All were members of the Economic Committee of the African Charter of Casablanca (Comité Economique de la Charte Africaine de Casablanca). The Committee was provided for by the charter which was signed in May 1961 (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

At the opening session of the meeting President Touré defined the Committee's objective to be "the renovation of the African economy in the struggle against underdevelopment" and continued with this statement:

Africans are at the mercy of the fluctuations on the international markets of London, New York and Amsterdam which oppose the unconditional liberty and effective sovereignty of the people of our countries. Among our countries we must develop an African market by establishing the principle of preferential and reciprocal purchases after coordinating our production. The first problem is to initiate strict cooperation immediately. The second is to coordinate our economies. . . . It would be utopian to think that we can easily industrialize our countries within the narrow framework of the international markets, and it would be even more utopian to think that we can develop markets for our industries in the highly developed countries. At the same time, industrialization is the only recourse for the real social liberation of our peoples. . . . On the basis of these realities, both positive and negative, we must study, at the level of the states which have subscribed to the Charter, the formulas best adapted to our economic self development.

Four working groups were set up to study various problems and to make recommendations to the Committee. Each group had a particular problem, or a group of related problems, to study. These included: the establishment of a customs union; the evolution of a common planning policy for the development of industry; the coordinated exploitation of the natural resources of the member countries and technical and economic cooperation among them; the creation of an African economic development bank; financial relations between the Casablanca powers and various monetary zones; the establishment of a payments union; questions of transport and telecommunications, postal service, meteorology and navigation.

The Committee recommended: ending customs barriers and quota systems among the Casablanca countries for five years beginning January 1, 1962; the adoption of a policy for most-favored-nation treatment in commercial dealings with each other; reciprocal consultations for the purpose of securing the adoption of common policies before international organizations; and common action to increase Africa's share in international technical and economic aid and to secure a narrowing of the differential between the price of primary products exported and manufactured goods imported. Also recommended were the creation of the following: a Council of African Economic Unity (Conseil de l'Unité Economique Africaine) to study common development problems and to coordinate economic policies; an African Development Bank; an African Payments Union; an African Postal Union; and an African Telecommunications Union. These proposals were to be further discussed in Tangiers in

November. A conference on formation of a joint air and shipping line was to be held in Cairo in September.

Senegal

On June 9, 1961, after more than a year of negotiations, agreements for the reestablishment of economic and trade relations between Guinea and Senegal were signed at Dakar. The agreements represented a policy decided upon by the PDG at its economic conference at Kankan in April 1960. A payments agreement provided that an account be opened in the name of Guinea at the Development Bank of Senegal where sales of Guinean goods in Senegal and of Senegalese produce in Guinea would be recorded. A similar account was to be opened by Senegal at the Bank of the Republic of Guinea. The agreement was to last for a year, after which a balance sheet would be drawn up and a settlement made in goods and currency by the debtor nation. A second agreement listed products to be exchanged—mainly local produce. To avoid suspension of payments, each country could grant the other interest-free credit up to \$1 million.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

The government has been experimenting with a system of overall control of foreign commerce, and a new reorganization was announced in June 1961. In addition to its functions relating to internal trade, the Ministry of Commerce was given primary responsibility for carrying out and promoting all measures relating to the development of import and export programs and for dealing with all problems arising from sales and purchases in foreign markets. Within the Ministry, the Department of Programs and Commercial Agreements (Direction des Programmes et Accords Commerciaux) and the Department of Price and Distribution (Direction des Prix et de la Conjoncture) have the major functions relating to foreign trade. The Department of Programs and Commercial Agreements is authorized: to develop annual export and import programs; to pave the way for the negotiation of commercial agreements and keep commodity exchanges up-to-date within the agreements; and to grant export authorizations and import licenses within the quota set by the commercial agreements on the one hand and the import quota requirements on the other. The Department of Price and Distribution is directed to follow the price movements and supply information on developments in international markets for export and import products.

At the same time the Guinean Foreign Trade Agency (Comptoir Guinéen du Commerce Extérieur), which had held a monopoly of foreign trade since its establishment in 1958, was dissolved and replaced by new specialized national trading agencies set up along com-

modity lines. These are: GUINEXPORT—for the export of all products except minerals (which will continue to be shipped directly by the producer under an exist permit); ALIMAG—for the import of food; SONATEX—for the import of textiles and clothing; EMATEC—for the import of technical material and equipment; TRANSMAT—for the import of transport material; BATIPOINT—for the import of construction materials; LIBRAPORT—for the import of books and paper; AGRIMA—for the import of agricultural supplies; and DIVERMA—for the import of miscellaneous merchandise. In announcing the establishment of these agencies, President Touré stated that they were not to be regarded as government trading monopolies. He further stated that the private trader was essential in providing an accurate and reliable gauge of economic demand and ensuring its effective satisfaction. Accordingly, the Minister of Commerce was authorized to grant import licenses to private and public sectors alike.

Much had been expected of the Guinean Foreign Trade Agency. With the exception of mineral products, which were exported under exit permits authorizing direct shipments, the Agency had been given the sole right of export and import and was empowered to negotiate barter agreements. At the time of its establishment, the government claimed that the Agency was necessary in order to dispose of the country's agricultural products and to purchase necessities in view of the uncertain economic and monetary situation following independence. It also claimed that the barter agreements avoided foreseeable difficulties with the Bank of France. In practice, however, the Agency could not handle the amount of business involved; its operations were marked by poor planning of imports and underpurchase of many essentials.

To correct defects in planning, a National Council for Import and Export Programs (conseil National des Programmes d'Importations et d'Exportations) was established by a decree of August 1, 1961, for the purpose of developing annual schedules of imports and exports. The Council's functions include: the study of export estimates submitted by GUINEXPORT and by firms producing iron, bauxite and alumina; the study of import estimates submitted by individuals, by public and private firms and by public services; and the presentation, on the basis of these estimates, of a national program of exports and imports for the year for implementation within the framework of the directives of the Three-Year Plan and the state funds available for payments.

According to the decree of August 1, the Council is to be composed of the following: the Minister of Commerce, who is Chairman; the Minister-Governor of the Bank of the Republic of Guinea; and Minister of Rural Economy; the Ministry of Industry and Mines; the Minister of Public Works and Transport; the Minister of Posts and

Telecommunications; the Minister of National Education; the Minister of Public Health and Population; the Minister of National Defense and Security; the Director of the Exchange Office (from the Bank of Foreign Commerce); the Director of the National Office of Bananas and Fruits (from the Ministry of Rural Economy) and (from the Ministry of Commerce) the Director of Programs and Commercial Agreements, the Director of Price and Distribution and the Chief of the Bureau of Research and Statistics.

Foreign Exchange

The export of Guinean money is prohibited and all foreign exchange must be deposited with the Bank of Foreign Commerce (Banque de Commerce Extérieur) which assumed the functions of the Exchange Office of the Bank of the Republic of Guinea in June 1961. The Bank of Foreign Commerce conducts all banking operations with foreign countries and administers exchange controls; only its governor can authorize the use of foreign exchange (see ch. 26, Banking and Currency System).

Foreign Investment

President Touré has stated on a number of occasions that private foreign investment is welcomed providing it conforms to the economic policy of the state and is calculated to have a favorable balance of payments. These provisions were incorporated in the Foreign Investment Law of May 13, 1960. Investors may either participate with the government in mixed enterprises on an agreed basis or organize themselves into private Guinean companies in accordance with Guinean company law. In the latter case they will be granted neither a monopoly nor special privileges. Each investment must be the subject of a separate decree of the Council of Ministers and no tax concessions may be granted new companies. Foreign investors, whether companies or individuals, are forbidden all political activity and all forms of interference in the internal affairs of Guinea. Recruitment of personnel outside Guinea is subject to government approval.

Transfer of profits, amortization funds and foreign workers' savings must be in conformity with exchange control regulations and authorization for transfer will be granted according to the state of the balance of payments. Although the decree authorizing the investment fixes transferable quotas for profits and amortization funds, neither unlimited permission to transfer nor most-favored-nation treatment can be granted. There is no guarantee in the Investment Law against expropriation, but authorized investors are guaranteed against "exploitation" (*spoliation*) and are protected by the state. However, in case of vital necessity for the country's economy, the government reserves the right to repurchase private enterprises for the

private portion of a mixed enterprise "under conditions which will be fixed by agreement between the parties."

The government's recognition of the need for foreign investment was illustrated in April 1961 when agreement was reached with the foreign banana planters whereby they were permitted to repatriate a certain percentage of their profits. In return, they were asked to redouble their efforts in order to realize the objectives of the banana program (see ch. 23, Agricultural Potential).

International Organizations

In 1961 Guinea was a member of the United Nations and of several of its specialized agencies in the economic field, notably the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Commission for Technical Cooperation South of the Sahara, a subcommission of the Committee on Technical Cooperation for Africa (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

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SECTION IV. MILITARY BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 29

THE ARMED FORCES

The country's military establishment consists of an infantry force of about 3,000 men organized into three or four battalions and supplemented by miscellaneous smaller units. The Army is completely subordinate to civil authority in theory and in practice. Its estimated strength of approximately 3,000 is slightly more than one-tenth of 1 percent the total population of 2,800,000. The estimated total strength of all the armed security forces (including the 1,500 Gendarmerie, the 1,500 Republican Guard, the 1,000 Security Police and a small number of men in the General Inspectorate of Road Traffic) amounts to about 7,000 men—approximately one-fourth of 1 percent of the total population. There is no air force or navy (see ch. 18, Public Order and Safety).

Most of the officers and men are former members of the French army units stationed in Algeria and other parts of Africa. After independence almost all of the Guineans then serving with such French units chose to return home. Those who were integrated into the Army of the new Republic retained their rank, seniority status and pension rights; scales of pay and allowances also remained the same. Few new men have been recruited. A conscription law was passed soon after independence, but by the end of 1961 it had not had to be invoked; all members of the Army were volunteers. A reserve system is provided by law, but none is in operation; more than 10,000 well-trained repatriated former servicemen could be called up if needed.

The Army appears to be a reliable arm of the government having good discipline and morale. A number of factors have contributed to this circumstance—the background of military training, the volunteer character of the service and the fact that the men enter the new Army with grades and rates of pay equal to those they had in the French service and with generally better prospects for advancement. Many officers were suddenly propelled to positions of responsibility and prestige. There are no indications of political ambitions among the

officers. Factionalism appears to be absent, and ethnic differences do not seem to have a divisive influence.

The Army is completely dependent upon foreign sources for weapons, ammunition and unit equipment. As of late 1961, they were being acquired from Communist-bloc countries which were also giving technical advice on training and organizational matters. No plans seem to be under consideration for domestic production of military matériel of any type. A new officers' candidate school was opened in April 1961.

Since its establishment in 1958, the Army has been engaged primarily in administrative tasks, such as the receipt and distribution of new equipment, construction projects in garrisons and human investment projects in cooperation with civilian groups. Meanwhile certain organizational steps have been taken and some training has been accomplished (see ch. 11, Labor Force; ch. 12, Forced Labor).

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Geographically the country has an important strategic advantage in relation to many of its neighbors. It is as close to important centers in the Western hemisphere and Western Europe as it is to many points on the African continent. Moreover, the air distance from Conakry to Natal, Brazil, is only 1,850 miles—less than that to Gibraltar or Léopoldville. The air distance to Paris or to Cairo exceeds that to Rio de Janeiro by nearly 300 miles.

Strategic plans for the use of military forces in the area would be greatly influenced by terrain, weather and logistic considerations. Ground forces in particular would have to be equipped to cope with the climatic extremes of the wet and dry seasons and to operate in terrain ranging from the insect- and snake-infested coastal swamps and the jungles of the Forest Region to the deeply gorged plateau of Middle Guinea (see ch. 3, Geography and Population).

Concealment of troops and supplies would not be difficult in the densely wooded coastal zone and in the Forest Region. In the Fouta Djallon some cover would be available in the brush on the uplands and under the trees along the narrow streams, but the construction of protective entrenchments would be made difficult by the thin soil covering. In the savannas of Upper Guinea the tall grass would provide fairly good concealment from ground observation but not from aerial reconnaissance. In most of this area the open and rolling terrain is suitable for cross-country movements in special vehicles. Large-scale air-drops would be feasible in this region, but they would be remote from critical objectives.

As in most of the neighboring coastal countries, the terrain lends itself to ambush and the hit-and-run tactics of guerrilla warfare. Thus the local inhabitants, familiar with the countryside and accus-

to the climate, would have a decided tactical advantage over an invading force.

Most of the people in each of the four natural geographic regions live on a subsistence basis, depending mainly on local resources and requiring little from outside. Hence the loss of any particular area would not necessarily bring about capitulation of the whole country.

RELATION TO THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

Manpower and Matériel

Sufficient manpower is available to fill the ranks of the armed forces on a peacetime basis. It is estimated that about 710,000 men are between the ages of 15 and 49, and that about 355,000 of these are physically fit for military service. It is further estimated that the total manpower needed to maintain the economy at its subsistence level is 576,000 and that about 288,000 of these are physically fit for military service (see ch. 11, Labor Force).

Plans for military mobilization apparently have not been developed. Any attempt to expand the armed forces on a large scale would soon cause a grave disruption of the economy unless liberal aid from foreign sources were available. The economy has no excess capacity with which to supply sufficient food to widely distributed concentrations of manpower.

In the event of war, even a 20 percent increase in the number of able-bodied men required to maintain the economy on a subsistence level in peacetime would require about 57,500 additional able-bodied men for the working force. This would raise to 345,500 the total of able-bodied men engaged in essential nonmilitary work, leaving a surplus of about 9,500 available for military service. On this basis, any mobilization of manpower for military units, in excess of 9,000 to 10,000 physically fit males, would impose a corresponding decrease in the number of persons engaged in activities essential for maintaining the country's economic standard.

All matériel, including weapons, ammunition and transportation, must be imported. The country has no armament industry. Only food, clothing, a few tools and some articles of individual equipment can be obtained from local sources. But in prolonged combat operations, even using simple weapons, the lack of sufficient manpower to replace battle casualties would soon become a limiting factor in determining the size of the military establishment.

Military Budget

The annual budgetary allocation for the military security forces rose about 70 percent during the first three years of independence.

For the fiscal year beginning January 1, 1961, the Ministry of National Defense and Security was allocated 2,076 million francs (approximately \$8.4 million at the rate of 247 Guinean francs to U.S. \$1), or almost 24 percent of the national budget of 8,745 million francs. Only two other ministries—the Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Public Health and Population—individually received more than 10 percent of the total budget, but together their allocation (21 percent and 15.5 percent respectively) amounted to 36.5 percent. The fact that the expenditure for military and security purposes was less than that for education and health reflects the government's estimate of its needs (see ch. 25, Public Finance).

There were no indications in mid-1961 of any popular feeling that the upkeep of the military establishment constituted an unduly heavy tax burden. The frugality of military expenditures was evidenced by the fact that much of the new construction and improvements at military garrisons was being accomplished by servicemen themselves, using their own labor and equipment. In the face of an obvious threat to the nation's sovereignty, the national leaders undoubtedly could count on the willingness of the people to make great sacrifices in defense of the country.

Administrative expenses absorbed 3.4 percent of the funds allocated to the Ministry of National Defense and Security in the fiscal year 1961; the remaining 96.6 percent was distributed as follows: 1,267 million francs, or 61.0 percent, to the Army, military school and the Gendarmerie (including civilian personnel); 408.3 million francs, or 19.6 percent, to the Republican Guard; and 332.5 million francs, or 16.0 percent, to the Security Police and General Inspectorate of Road Traffic. Since almost 83 percent of the Ministry's allotted funds were expended on personnel salaries, allowances and travel expenses, it is evident that the cost of equipping the armed forces is not an important budgetary expense.

MISSIONS

The three-fold mission of the Army is to insure domestic order, to guard life and property and to defend the nation's sovereignty. It is, in effect, a reserve force held in readiness to support the Gendarmerie, Republican Guards, Security Police and General Inspectorate of Road Traffic in emergencies (see ch. 18, Public Order and Safety). In addition the Army is called upon to participate in the human investment program by aiding in the construction of new roads, bridges and buildings, in the creation of new plantations and in the cultivation of crops, particularly on state farms. Military units have also been used on emergency relief missions to areas stricken by fire, floods and devastating storms.

The country's leaders have repeatedly stressed the importance of the Army's countersubversive role in upholding national sovereignty and in "preserving the achievements of the revolution." They credit Army intelligence agents working in collaboration with the Security Police and PDG committees with uncovering much of the evidence in the plot against the government in 1960 (see ch. 20, Subversive Potentialities).

ORGANIZATION

All the major ethnic groups are represented in the Army. In an effort to subordinate regional or ethnic ties to loyalty to the nation and in order to protect the service from family or local pressures, persons of all ranks are occasionally transferred on an individual basis from one station to another.

Army strength is distributed among seven camps located at various points throughout the country (see table 1). All camps, except possibly the one at Koundara, a village near Youkounkoun, were formerly used by French military units during the colonial period. The French names for the camps were dropped in May 1959 and the camps were renamed for popular heroes (and in one case—Camp M'Balía—for a heroine) in the history of the area's resistance to foreign domination (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 15, Attitudes and Reactions of the People).

The Ministry of National Defense and Security is organized into two main sections: the General Staff of the Army, responsible for military affairs; and the General Directorate of Security Services, concerned with public order and safety (see ch. 13, Public Order and Safety). The General Staff is composed of less than 20 officers and possibly several civilians. In mid-1961 the Chief of the General Staff was Lieutenant Colonel Noumandian Kéita, formerly a captain in the French ground forces. He was appointed to this post soon after independence and was promoted from major to his present rank on March 1, 1961. Captain Kaman Diabi was assigned as his assistant in April 1961 (see ch. 30, Biographies of Important Personalities).

The Chief of the General Staff directs the activities of the National Bureau of Recruitment which compiles the statistical records of the annual Guinean youth contingents liable to military service. In 1959 the Bureau was situated at Kindia. Another important function of the General Staff was to administer the procurement of Army equipment and matériel. In 1961 this included the procurement of armament through the Czechoslovakian aid program. The General Staff also collaborated with Czechoslovakian military advisers in training programs and organizational policies.

As of March 1959 the country was organized militarily into two regions. The First Military Region, with headquarters at Kankan,

Table 1. Disposition of Guinean Army Strength, 1961

Location	New Name (Guinean) of Camp	Old Name (French) of Camp	Estimated Garrison Strength
Conakry	Almamy Samory	Mangin	1 battalion — 600
Conakry	Alpha Yaya ¹	Brosset	2 companies — 300
Kankan	Soundiata	Archinard	1 battalion — 600
Kindia	Kémé Bouréme	Gallieni	1 battalion — 600
Koundara	M'Balia		1 company — 100
Labé	El-Hadj Oumar	Markala	1 battalion — 500
N'Zérékoré	Béhanzin	Hequet	2 companies — 300
Total			3,000

¹ Sometimes called Aviation Camp.

Source: Adapted from République de Guinée, *Journal Officiel de la République de Guinée*, 1^{re} année, No. 9, May 1, 1959, p. 283 and No. 18, September 1, 1959, p. 542; 2^e année, No. 23, November 15, 1960, p. 370.

presumably had jurisdiction over Upper Guinea and the Forest Region, including Camp Soundiata at Kankan and Camp Béhanzin at N'Zérékoré. The second Military Region, with headquarters at Kindia, presumably was responsible for Middle Guinea and Lower Guinea, including Camps Almamy Samory and Alpha Yaya at Conakry, Camp Kémé Bouréme at Kindia, Camp El-Hadj Oumar at Labé and Camp M'Balia at Koundara. The First Military Region was commanded by Captain Mamadou Diallo and the Second by Captain Namory Kéita.

THE MILITARY AND CIVIL ORDER

The Constitution makes the President of the Republic Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. A presidential decree of October 7, 1959, prohibits the use of the Army to quell domestic disturbances except on orders from the Minister of National Defense and Security. The commandant of an administrative region may authorize such intervention if he thinks the gravity of a situation warrants it, but he must immediately report the circumstances to the Minister. The use by the military of firearms to re-establish order requires authorization by the President of the Republic.

Publicity about military units and leaders is focused on their contribution to the economic development program, rather than on their military function as such. Army personnel of all ranks are repeatedly reminded of their obligation of loyalty to the government and service to the nation.

On the highest level, the policy of civilian control of the Army has meant the merging of the civil and military leadership. Thus in

July 1960 Lansana Diané, a member of the National Political Bureau with no previous military experience, was given the rank of general and put in command of the battalion sent to the Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville). Moreover, military officers are frequently drawn into PDG activities. In August 1961, for example, the Chief of the General Staff, his assistant and the commanders of all the military camps, except Camp M'Balia near the boundary with Senegal, were included in the group of top-level government and trade union officials who attended the annual conference of the PDG at Conakry. The Chief of the General Staff was also among the high government officials who were invited to attend the Second National Congress of the JRDA at Conakry in September 1961.

FOREIGN INFLUENCE

The influence of French military training remains apparent. Most of the officers and noncommissioned officers have attended French military schools of various types. Some have served in French units in combat. The concepts of military discipline, duty and proficiency acquired through this experience are important factors making for the reliability of the new Army.

The influence of the Communist-bloc countries presumably is increasing with the acquisition of arms and other matériel from them and the presence of some 50 Czechoslovakian military advisers. Information regarding the scope of this influence is lacking, but it is likely to be strong in such areas as training techniques, supply and maintenance procedures and organizational structure.

MILITARY ALLIANCES

The government has not signed any military pact. In September 1961 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis-Lansana Béavogui, attended the conference of nonaligned powers held at Belgrade. Qualifications for admission to the conference included an agreement to renounce military pacts or any bilateral treaties which risked involvement in great power conflict.

The Casablanca Charter, signed in January 1961 by Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic—and supported by the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic—pledged the signatories to coordinate their military, political and economic activities. Committees were appointed to initiate plans for carrying out the agreement. The military committee, composed of the Chiefs of the General Staff of each of the participants, met at the Military Academy in Cairo from July 15 to the end of the month in what was announced as the first conference of the African High Command. Its stated

purpose was to make plans for safeguarding the independence of African states and for their common action in the event of aggression against any part of the continent. The organization of a joint command reportedly was discussed, but no decisions were published (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

Another document with important military implications is the Charter of the Union of African States in which Guinea, Ghana and Mali strengthened their association and broadened its terms of reference with the object of making it the vehicle of a larger African unity. Ratified by the Guinean National Assembly on August 22, 1961, the Charter states that its adherents will regard aggression against one as aggression against all, and it indicates their intention to organize a system of joint defense. Guinea's Constitution sanctions the subordination of its own forces to a pan-African command if necessary in the interest of African unity (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

QUALITY OF MANPOWER

The Guinean soldier, as of late 1961, had not been tested in battle, and his probable combat behavior must be inferred mainly from the records of World War I and World War II when Guineans fought in French units under French officers. In both wars their performance was creditable, and some of them were decorated for valor in combat.

The most serious problem in connection with the country's available military manpower is the general lack of education and skills needed for the maintenance and operation of modern weapons and equipment. Until this situation is remedied by schooling and training, the armed forces will be limited mainly to units equipped with basic infantry and artillery weapons. The health and stamina of the potential recruits are of concern to the military authorities, but should not pose a serious problem in the event of a general mobilization. Although the incidence of some of the endemic diseases has been significantly reduced by public health measures initiated by the French and continued by the Republic, malaria, tuberculosis, and syphilis remain prevalent in the general population. These would probably be present in newly mobilized units notwithstanding efforts to screen out the physically unfit before induction.

THE CONSCRIPTION LAW

Since independence, the number of applications to enlist in the Army has far exceeded vacancies. A presidential ordinance published in October 1959 nevertheless created a conscription system generally patterned after that established in 1912 by the colonial administration. The ordinance stipulates that all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 19 and 49 are liable for military service. It prescribes

three methods for obtaining recruits: by conscription of annual contingents; by enlistment; and by reenlistment. Conscription has not had to be employed, however.

Military obligations are successively: 12 months of active duty; 4 years of availability for service; 15 years in the first reserve; and 8 years in the second reserve. Active duty service theoretically is to be devoted exclusively to military instruction, but, in the national interest, it may be devoted to work on economic development projects. Extra time accrued on active duty through enlistment is deducted from the service required in the succeeding military status periods.

The civilian commandant of each administrative region is charged with preparing annually a list of men in his region who have reached the age of 19 during the year. Names are listed in three categories: students or former students of Guinean secondary, technical or professional schools; all others living in Guinea; and those living in foreign countries for educational or other reasons. Two copies of the list are made; one is kept in the regional capital and the other is sent to the National Bureau of Recruitment.

The military status of the men on each regional list is determined by an examining board composed of the following: the commandant of the administrative region (who serves as chairman); the president of the general council or a councilman; a member of the council of the municipality or village where the board is sitting; an officer or other representative of the local military region; a doctor appointed by the Minister of Public Health and Population; and a commander of the National Bureau of Recruitment or his representative. The Minister of National Defense and Security schedules the visits of the examining boards to different places in the region.

After an interview by the board and a physical examination in its presence, men are classified in 4 categories: those fit for active service; those having minor physical defects or ailments but fit for active service; those with curable ailments; those deemed permanently physically unfit for service. Youths in category 4 are exempted from service. Those in category 3 are notified to appear before the board a year later; upon the third successive appearance before the board they must be placed on the active list or exempted from military obligations. The making of a false statement to an examining board is a punishable offense.

The names of students attending secondary, professional or technical schools and reaching the age of 18 during the year, are entered on a special list prepared by the Ministry of National Education in accordance with information received from school directors. The specially listed students are given certificates of deferment which are valid until graduation. If a youth leaves school before receiving a diploma, his name is entered on the regular list.

The names of young men living in foreign countries are entered on the lists of the administrative regions in which their parents or guardians reside, and pertinent information about them is transmitted to the National Bureau of Recruitment by administrative region commandants. The Minister of National Defense and Security, if he decides that a youth should be called to military service, is authorized to forward appropriate orders to the senior Guinean diplomatic representative in the country where the youth is residing. It is provided that the government pay the cost of the draftee's transportation home.

Upon receiving the findings of the examining boards, the National Bureau of Recruitment is responsible for issuing necessary orders calling the physically fit to active duty. Voluntary enlistments have made it unnecessary for the board to do so, but annual contingents, if called, would be ordered to report on either March 1 or September 1. Active duty service is reckoned from the date the recruit reports to a military assignment center or joins a detachment en route to an assignment center. Failure to report would be dealt with as desertion.

Upon induction, the recruit is given a serial number which he retains throughout his military service. His aptitudes are recorded in the National Bureau of Recruitment and, as far as possible, taken into account in making duty assignments.

Upon release from active duty, the soldier is given documents defining his obligations in case of mobilization. These papers must be presented on demand by military or civil authorities. In time of peace those who have completed their active duty training may be recalled for training periods—up to 4 months for reserve officers and up to 12 months for noncommissioned officers and men.

In case of national emergency, all or part of an annual class of recruits may be retained in service for as long as needed for the defense of the country. Volunteer noncommissioned officers and men may also be retained beyond their normal period of enlistment.

Enlistment periods vary according to the choice of the recruit or soldier. He may agree to serve a term of 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 years. Noncommissioned officers may reenlist until they have reached the maximum age for their grades, the upper limit presumably being 50. Privates and privates first class may reenlist until they have a maximum of 15 years of service.

A number of women, estimated at less than 100, have been permitted to enlist in the Army. To be considered, an applicant must be a Guinean citizen of not less than 19 years of age, unmarried or, if a widow or divorcee, without dependent children. The enlistment period is from 2 to 5 years. On an initial enlistment the authorities may terminate a recruit's service at any time during a 6-month probationary period.

MORALE FACTORS

The surplus of volunteers suggests that Army morale is good. Evident factors in this are economic security, relatively good pay, opportunities for advancement in grade, special housing privileges and special allowances for travel, rations and clothing. The national leaders have praised the Army, but not lionized it. Indications are that the military have the respect of the people. No doubt the efforts of servicemen on public works, agricultural projects and disaster relief missions have contributed importantly to this attitude.

Extra pay is provided for certain assignments which involve special expenses or responsibilities. Monthly allowances, designated responsibility allowances, were authorized in April 1960. These were 15,000 francs for the Chief of the General Staff; 10,000 francs for the assistant to the Chief of the General Staff; 5,000 francs for officers in charge of major staff sections, for supply and personnel officers and for commanders of military regions; 3,000 francs for commanders of isolated units; and 2,000 francs for garrison finance officers.

Army and Gendarmerie personnel, in April 1961, were provided with special monthly allowances to cover the extra expenses incident to their duties. For married officers this amounted to 4,500 francs; single officers, 3,000 francs; married noncommissioned officers, 1,500 francs; single noncommissioned officers, 1,000 francs; lower grades, 500 francs.

As of July 1, 1961, the daily ration allowance, exclusive of rice, was 95 francs for troops stationed at N'Zérékoré and at Koundara (near the Senegal boundary). At all other garrisons it was 85 francs. For troops serving in isolated groups of 6 men or less, the allowance was 200 francs per person. Rice is presumably furnished in kind by supply officers, and its cost is not included in the daily allowances.

A special allowance, designated as a monthly risk indemnity, was authorized in March 1961 for Republican Guard officers. The scale of payments was announced as the same as that paid to equivalent ranks in the Gendarmerie. Married personnel in the Army, Republican Guard, Gendarmerie and civil service receive family allowances in the form of payment for prenatal and maternity care and for the maintenance of each dependent child. Allowances also are provided for young service couples during their first 2 years of married life.

The rank structure in the Guinean Army is similar to that of the United States (see table 2). As of mid-1961, however, the highest rank held by an officer on active duty was that of lieutenant colonel, held only by the Chief of the General Staff. In July 1960, the rank of general was conferred on Lansana Diané, a BPN member with no prior military experience, who was placed in command of the Guinean battalion which served from July 1960 to February 1961 in the Re-

public of the Congo (Léopoldville). After his return to Guinea, he continued to be addressed as general, despite his appointment as commandant of the Labé administrative region—a civilian post (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government).

Provisions for granting decorations or awards for specific military achievements have not been made. However, the Cross of the Companion of Independence (Croix de Compagnon de l'Indépendance), commonly called the Independence Cross, is given to service people on the same basis as to other citizens in recognition of outstanding performance of duty in the "struggle for independence."

Service personnel and civilians are authorized to wear certain decorations received from the French government, including the Legion of Honor, the Military Medal, the War Cross (1914–18 and 1939–45) and other medals of World War I and World War II.

Table 2. Rank Structure in the Guinean Army, 1961

Guinean	United States Equivalent
Officiers Généraux.....	General Officers.
Général d'Armée.....	General.
Général de Corps d'Armée.....	Lieutenant General.
Général de Division.....	Major General.
Général de Brigadé.....	Brigadier General.
Officiers Supérieurs.....	Senior Officers.
Colonel.....	Colonel.
Lieutenant-Colonel.....	Lieutenant Colonel.
Commandant.....	Major.
Officiers Subalternes.....	Junior Officers.
Capitaine.....	Captain.
Lieutenant.....	First Lieutenant.
Sous-Lieutenant.....	Second Lieutenant.
Sous-Officiers.....	Noncommissioned Officers.
Aspirant ¹	No equivalent rank.
Adjudant-Chef.....	Chief Warrant Officer.
Adjudant.....	Warrant Officer.
Sergent-Chef.....	Sergeant First Class.
Sergent.....	Sergeant.
Hommes de Troupe.....	Lower Grades.
Caporal-Chef.....	Corporal.
Caporal.....	Private First Class.
Soldat.....	Private.

¹ Literally: Candidate.

Source: Adapted from République de Guinée, *Journal Officiel de la République de Guinée*, 3^e année, No. 12, June 15, 1961, p. 154.

The Army was still untried in 1961, and the only martial heroes were nineteenth-century leaders who had fought the French. Written about in school books and praised in songs and stories, they included such figures as El-Hadj Omar, a Toucouleur who established his authority over the Upper Niger area in the 1950's, and Almany Samory

Touré, a Malinké from the Kérouané area who led a uniformed army against the French in the 1890's (see ch. 2, Historical Setting; ch. 15, Attitudes and Reactions of the People).

After independence the inscription on the monument to the war dead, erected in Conakry under French rule, was altered to read: "The Republic of Guinea to All the Martyrs of Colonialism." In the capital of each administrative region a monument to the "martyrs of colonialism" has been erected in commemoration of the efforts of local resistance leaders. Wreath-laying ceremonies are held at the monument on holidays and on the occasion of official visits by state or foreign dignitaries.

TRAINING

Most of the officers and men entered the Army with training in basic military subjects received in French colonial units. Many of them had attended French noncommissioned officer schools or been given specialized training courses. Some of the best noncommissioned officers were sent to the overseas officers' candidate school established in 1956 at Frejus, some 70 miles east of Marseilles. After 2 years there, they spent a third year at a school of arms, such as the one at St. Maxient about 100 miles north of Bordeaux, which offered an infantry course for overseas and European noncommissioned officers seeking commissions.

Some Guinean soldiers presumably attended the military preparatory school at St. Louis in Senegal or one of the five other military schools in West Africa, which were established to provide a small annual contingent of noncommissioned officers and officer candidates. All ranks participated in the regular French troop-training programs, which included instruction in such basics as the use and maintenance of weapons and tactical exercises for small units.

Since independence, training considerations have apparently been overshadowed by administrative matters. Much time has been consumed in receiving and distributing the matériel acquired from the Communist-bloc countries. Troop labor is used in the various garrisons on such projects as asphaltting roads and building storehouses, living quarters, mess halls, schools and dispensaries. Military units are also used extensively on the human investment program projects, particularly those requiring mechanical skills and equipment such as road and bridge construction and state farm tractor operations.

Army recruits, like those of the Gendarmerie and the Republican Guard, are presumably trained at Camp Soundiata near Kankan. In view of the presence of Czechoslovakian advisers and equipment, emphasis probably is placed on familiarizing them with Czech weapons.

An officers' candidate school, *Ecole Militaire*, was opened on April 15, 1961, at Camp Alpha Yaya in Conakry, with President Touré present at ceremonies. The school reportedly can accommodate more than 100 students, but its entering class was limited to 30 noncommissioned officers. Those who successfully complete the first year are to be certified as officer candidates (*aspirants*). Candidates for the 1962-63 school year are to be recruited from young men who have completed their second cycle of studies and hold a baccalaureat diploma (see ch. 9, Education). Two-year and four-year courses are envisaged. In addition to the customary military subjects, a political course is to be included in the curriculum.

During 1961 some members of the armed forces were receiving military training in Czechoslovakia.

LOGISTICS

Transportation, terrain and weather create unusual difficulties with respect to supply, distribution, troop movement and evacuation. Logistical problems would be paramount in any military operation in the country. In the wet season, troops and supplies moving on the largely unsurfaced roads would encounter washed-out bridges, inundated areas and long stretches of deep mud. In the dry season, poor visibility caused by haze and smoke from brush fires would slow vehicles and contribute to accidents. At all seasons, the constricted gorges in the mountains would hamper traffic. Many bridges are crudely constructed, narrow and of low tonnage capacity.

Even in peacetime the roads are kept passable only through constant attention, and plans for supplying combat troops by the use of trucks would have to include special provisions for road maintenance. Local labor is generally unskilled and without experience in the operation of power equipment. Brush, trees and rocks are the usual road-building materials. There are few stone quarries. The limited railway and air transport facilities are also subject to heavy maintenance costs because of climate and lack of replacement parts, shops, and technicians (see ch. 27, Domestic Trade).

The Army Quartermaster (*Intendant Militaire*) is responsible for the procurement of locally produced supplies. He provides merchants with lists of the items to be purchased for Army use and invites them to submit sealed bids.

The *Journal Officiel* of April 1, 1960, published such a list which included footwear, raincoats, field uniforms, mattress covers, wool blankets, spoons, forks and pocket knives; information regarding quantities and specifications was not given. Bids were to be submitted not later than April 9, 1960, to the Army Quartermaster at Camp Almamy Samory in Conakry.

CHAPTER 30

BIOGRAPHIES OF IMPORTANT PERSONALITIES

CIVILIAN

The dominant figure in the country, as of mid-1961, is President Touré. It was he who led the country to independence and has since presided over all the major decisions affecting its national life. His magnetic personality overshadows all others in the relatively small group of men who occupy the top positions in the ruling political party and the government bureaucracy. The articulate center of this collective executive, he influences, persuades and arbitrates more than he dictates. In his pronouncements to the nation on subjects ranging from the status of woman and popular work habits to foreign affairs, he has been able to set the terms of both the process of government and the public response to it. Those around President Touré include some able and vigorous leaders with views which at points seem to diverge from his own; thus far, he has no apparent competitors.

The most striking characteristic of the country's leadership is youth. In 1961 only one member of the small group of key personalities was more than 50 years of age. Almost half of them were under 40; the youngest was 32. Their formal education, in most cases, is limited to that obtained in French secondary schools in Guinea or Senegal. About a third of them attended l'Ecole Normale William Ponty in Dakar. Only three took advanced courses in France, and these were in law or medicine. Highly educated intellectuals or theorists are lacking.

Another common characteristic is the rural background of most of the group—a political asset in this country of agricultural villages and towns. Most of the national leaders got their early training as civil servants in the French colonial administration. Many rose to the highest positions open to Africans in the fiscal and judicial services. Most of them became active in the labor movement or in the political organizations that developed after World War II. Some of them were among the founders of the CNTG, the RDA and the PDG. Their association with each other dates back, in most instances, to their common experiences in labor union or political organizations during the pre-independence period (see ch. 13, Labor Relations and Organization; ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

With politics playing such a prominent role in the national society and with the single-party government, membership in the PDG is a requirement for leadership in the country. Moreover, selection for membership in its top executive body, the BPN, is, in effect, the party's method of recognizing outstanding qualifications in some particular field of political activity. More than half of the key personalities are in this select body. Most of the few members of the BPN who are not regarded as key figures are engaged full-time on political administrative work. But all key figures have risen to leadership through their own efforts in gaining a sizable following in their home localities, rather than through wealth, nepotism or hereditary privileges.

The three major ethnic groups are represented among the country's top personalities, without a controlling majority from any group. But the Malinké are in the lead, closely followed by the Foulah, with the Soussou and other groups trailing.

With one or two possible exceptions, all the top leaders are Moslems, but religious issues have not been a factor in their advancement. Although freedom of religion has been emphasized, a person having a non-Moslem faith probably would encounter difficulties should he attempt to attain leadership on a national basis.

ACCAR, Roger Najib. Minister of Public Health and Population since January 1961.

Of Lebanese extraction, he was born on December 27, 1918, at Faranah. He studied medicine and surgery—presumably at Dakar—and holds a certificate for having completed special studies in tropical medicine.

After a brief period as deputy surgeon in a Dakar clinic, he became chief surgeon in the Ballay Hospital at Conakry. He is a former member of the Conakry municipal council and of the Guinean Territorial Assembly.

In the first postindependence Cabinet, he was appointed Minister of Public Health and has continued in that position. Early in 1961 the ministry, under the new title of Ministry of Public Health and Population, was given the added responsibility of compiling vital statistics and preparing special studies on public health problems. Accar, in addition to his administrative duties, apparently devotes some of his time to the practice of medicine and surgery (see ch. 14, Health and Public Welfare).

BARRY, Diawadou. Minister of Finance since January 1961.

Son of an influential rural Foulah family, he was born in 1917 near Dabola. After his education in the administration department of l'Ecole Normale William Ponty at Dakar, he became a civil servant in the French colonial administration. He soon advanced to the

position of chief clerk in the French West African Finance Service. He was subsequently bureau chief of the Electrical Office at Abidjan (Ivory Coast), an accountant for the administration at Conakry and, from 1947 to 1952, chief finance clerk of the territorial General Council in Conakry.

After resigning from the civil service, Barry was active in politics from 1952 to 1957 as leader of the Union of Guinean Progressives (Union Progressive Guinéenne—UPG)—the principal pre-independence party opposing the PDG. During this period he was a member of the Territorial Assembly and, for one year, of the French Parliament.

The UPG was disbanded after independence, and Barry and most of his followers joined the PDG. In the first postindependence Cabinet, he served as Minister of National Education. He has been in the Cabinet ever since and reportedly retains a strong personal following in the Fouta Djallon, especially among the Foulah.

BARRY, Ibrahima dit Barry III. Minister of Planning since 1961.

Born in 1925 at Bantignel in the Pita administrative region of Foulah peasant parents. After graduating from the administration department of l'Ecole Normale William Ponty in Dakar, he completed a literary course at Aix en Provence near Marseilles in France and studied law in Paris.

He entered the fiscal branch of the French colonial administration and rose high in the African service as a tax specialist. On occasion he acted as defense counsel in court cases.

He entered politics in the early 1950's, becoming a prominent member of the UPG. He was an unsuccessful candidate for deputy in the French National Assembly in 1954 and again in 1956. After independence he joined the PDG and was assigned to the President's office as Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. He became Minister of Justice in 1960 and Minister of Planning in 1961.

He is generally regarded as one of the more moderate members of the Cabinet. A firm believer in President Touré's nonalignment policy, he seems to be apprehensive lest the acceptance of foreign aid from any source might lead to foreign control.

Barry III (as he is commonly called) visited the Soviet Union in August 1961 at the invitation of the Soviet Committee of State Planning. In an interview with a Soviet radio-television correspondent after his return to Conakry, he stated that the purpose of the trip—his first to a Communist country—was to familiarize himself with state planning methods and expressed his gratitude for the opportunity to do so.

BÉAVOGUI, Louis-Iansana. Minister of Foreign Affairs since January 1961; member of the BPN.

Born December 28, 1923, at Mucenta. His father, a Malinké, was a clerk-interpreter in the French colonial administration.

Educated at l'Ecole Normale William Ponty and the African School for Medicine and Pharmacy, he began his career as an assistant medical officer at Guékédou, later becoming chief medical officer at Kissidougou. He became secretary general of the subsection of the RDA at Kissidougou and soon was elected mayor of the town. In May 1956 he was appointed Minister of Economic Affairs and the Plan in the territorial government and held this position in the post-independence Cabinet until January 1961, at which time he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the BPN, he has been chairman of the Committee on Economic Affairs since early 1959.

In connection with his ministerial duties, he has visited numerous foreign countries. He went to West Germany in February 1959 and to the United States the following November. Subsequently he went back to West Germany on a tour of industrial plants. Early in June 1961 he headed the Guinean delegation at a meeting of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee in Cairo. Later in the month he accompanied President Touré to the quarterly meeting of the Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union states held in Bamako (Mali). In July 1961 he was in charge of the Guinean group of specialists attending the three-day conference of the Economic Committee appointed by the African states of the African Charter of Casablanca at Conakry and presided over the sessions. He also led the official party which went to Havana to attend the July 26, 1961, anniversary celebration of Fidel Castro's attack on Moncada Barracks. At the end of August he headed the Guinean delegation attending the meeting in Cairo of the Casablanca Charter signatories, preparatory to the Belgrade conference of nonaligned countries held early in September. Addressing the Belgrade conference on September 4 as Guinean representative and spokesman, he proposed, among other things, the adoption of resolutions: denouncing colonialism; calling for the elimination of all military bases on foreign territory; the admission of Communist China to the United Nations; and the appointment of three deputies to take over the functions of the Secretary General of the United Nations (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

CAMARA, Bengaly. Minister of Information and Tourism since January 1961; member of the BPN.

Born on July 8, 1919, at Conakry of Soussou parents. His father was a civil servant in the French colonial administration. After attending a primary school for boys in Conakry, he took a course in bookkeeping and was employed by a commercial firm.

In 1947 he joined the RDA and, after the PDG was formed, he became managing editor of its newspaper, *Liberté*, holding that posi-

tion until the paper ceased publication. Meanwhile, he became active in the labor movement, serving at various times as secretary general for several unions, including the nonaffiliated Union of Public Works Employees. He was elected to the Territorial Assembly, presumably from Conakry, in 1957. Since independence he has served continuously in Cabinet positions; as Minister of Labor and Social Legislation in 1958; as Minister of Civil Service late in 1959; and as Minister of Information and Tourism in 1961. He is president of the BPN Labor Rationalization Committee which is charged with giving political guidance to labor unions and harmonizing their activities with PDG objectives. In October he was a member of the Guinean governmental delegation that represented the PDG at the twenty-second congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in Moscow.

He works aggressively to expand the activities of his ministry and appears to have close relations with Communist press representatives in the country. In 1961 he made at least three trips abroad. In May he led a delegation to the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, and in June he attended the Second International Film Festival at Moscow. That spring he arranged with the Chinese Communist Film Corporation to exchange documentary films and to distribute 30 Chinese films annually in Guinea (see ch. 21, Public Information and Propaganda).

CAMARA, Damantang. Minister of National Education since January 1961; member of the BPN.

Born in 1916 at Mali of Malinké parents. His father was an interpreter. After finishing his formal education at the French higher primary school (Ecole Camille Guy) in Conakry, he entered the French colonial administration as a clerk. In competitive tests he qualified as a secretary in the offices of court registrars and public prosecutors. Later he qualified as a clerk of court.

His earliest political affiliation was with a Malinké organization which, in 1947, united with RDA. He resigned from the Malinké group in 1948 when it decided to quit the RDA. He became a member of the executive committee of the RDA organization in N'Zérékoré and eventually of the BPN. He served as Minister of Civil Service in the territorial government from May 1957 until October 1958. Since independence he has served continuously in the Cabinet: as Minister of Justice in 1958; as Minister of Interior and Security in 1959; and as Minister of National Education in 1961. In the latter post his major problems include the elimination of illiteracy and the expansion of the school system (see ch. 9, Education).

For foreign advice and guidance, Camara has gone mainly to Communist countries. In June 1961 he sent two groups of educators on two-week observation and orientation trips to Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. During June he received a delegation from North

Korea headed by the North Korean Minister of General Education. In September a delegation from the Ministry of National Education visited North Vietnam and Communist China in connection with cultural agreements with these countries. He has employed many foreign teachers, including a sizable number from France as well as some from the Communist block (see ch. 9, Education).

CAMARA, Loffo. Secretary of State for Social Affairs, in the Ministry of Labor and Social Legislation, since 1961; member of the BPN.

Mrs. Loffo Camara is one of the two women in the BPN, the other being Mrs. Mafory Bangoura, president of the PDG Women's Section. Information is not available regarding Mrs. Camara's date and place of birth, her educational qualifications and early career. She apparently began her public service working in a Ministry of Public Health center for the care of mothers and children. Later she became Secretary for Women's Affairs in the CNTG.

In 1960 Mrs. Camara was chief midwife in the Ministry of Public Health and Population. In the Cabinet reorganization announced in January 1961, she was appointed Secretary of State for Social Affairs. In this position she holds the rank of a minister, but her office is attached for administrative purposes to the Ministry of Labor and Social Legislation headed by Minister Fodé Cisse.

In the BPN Mrs. Camara is a member of the Committee on Social Affairs, under the chairmanship of Damantang Camara, Minister of National Education. In March 1961, when President and Mrs. Josip Broze (Tito) of Yugoslavia visited Guinea, Mrs. Camara, at the head of a group of prominent PDG women, made an official call on Mrs. Tito. A month later she led the Guinean delegation at the Congress of Yugoslav Women in Zagreb.

CISSE, Fodé. Minister of Labor and Social Legislation since January 1961.

Born in 1917 at Dubréka in a rural Malinké family. He was educated at l'Ecole Normale William Pontry in Dakar. After about a year of additional study in Paris, he entered the French colonial administration and became an administrative officer. In 1955 he was chief of the Gaoual administrative region (then a *circonscription*) and president of the Gaoual section of the RDA.

After independence he was appointed a secretary of State attached to the President's office. In the Presidency, under President Touré's general supervision, he was concerned mainly with organizing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recruiting diplomatic personnel and opening embassies abroad. In 1960 he was appointed Minister of Labor, and when in 1961 the Secretariat of State for Social Affairs was brought under his jurisdiction, his title was changed to Minister of Labor and Social Legislation.

Cisse is alert, vigorous, forceful and outspoken. He does not speak English, but Americans who have conversed with him in French say that he took pains to make himself understood by articulating slowly and clearly.

DAIKITÉ, Moussa. Minister-Governor of the Bank of the Republic of Guinea since March 1960; member of the BPN.

Born in 1927 in a village near Kankan of Malinké parents. He attended secondary school at Bamako (Mali). He began his career in the French colonial administration as court clerk at Kankan. Later, at Abidjan (Ivory Coast), he was in charge of the office responsible for supply procurement and tax collections.

He helped to organize the RDA in 1946, and 10 years later was elected deputy mayor of Kankan. In 1957 he was elected deputy from Kankan to the Territorial Assembly and soon became a member of the Supreme Council for Overseas France at Dakar. He served on the Council until Guinea became independent. He was appointed Secretary of State for Civil Service in the first Cabinet formed after independence. On March 1, 1960, when President Touré established a national currency and created the Bank of the Republic of Guinea, he appointed Daikité as its governor with the rank of minister, making him at 33 one of the youngest Cabinet members. In June 1961 he accompanied President Touré to the quarterly meeting of the Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union states at Bamako (Mali). In August he headed an economic mission to Dakar for consultation on the fiscal aspects of the trade agreement signed with Senegal early in the year. He has been active in the BPN since 1958, when he was a member of the Organization Committee which was charged with establishing new PDG sections throughout the country. In mid-1961 he was serving on the Economic Committee.

An able administrator and a meticulous specialist in economic and fiscal affairs, he is generally regarded as one of the more influential PDG leaders. He is national inspector of PDG accounts—an indication of the party's confidence in his trustworthiness and competence.

DIALLO, Abdoulaye. Minister-Resident of the Republic of Guinea in Ghana since January 1961.

Born on January 1, 1917, at Konsondongon, near Dabola, of Foulah parents. Receiving a diploma from the administrative section of l'Ecole Normale William Ponty in 1937, he remained in Dakar an additional year to complete a course offered by the Post, Telegraph and Telephone organization. His first assignment was as a comptroller in the post office at Bamako (Mali). Several years later he entered into labor union activities and in October 1945 he became secretary of the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Union for the Sudan (which

became the Republic of Mali in 1960). Backed by the French Communist-controlled CGT, he soon was engaged in full-time labor organizing activity. He was successively secretary of the Sudanese Labor Union Confederation and of the Joint Labor Union Committee of French West Africa and Togo. By 1949 he was a vice-president of the Communist-sponsored World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). He at first opposed, but later supported, Sékou Touré's efforts to persuade the African unions to break away from their French and international affiliations and form the UGTAN. In 1957 he was a member of the UGTAN steering committee (see ch. 13, Labor Relations and Organization).

When the first African government was formed in the Sudan, he was appointed as its Minister of Labor. He vigorously campaigned against joining the French Community in 1958. Disappointed by the Sudan's overwhelming vote in the referendum favoring the Community project, he resigned as Minister of Labor on September 28 and returned to Guinea where, within a month, he was appointed Secretary of State for Public Works in charge of Telecommunications.

Soon after the Guinea-Ghana Union was announced in November 1958, he was appointed Minister-Resident in Accra (Ghana) to further the Union's pan-African objective (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies). Since his election as secretary general of the All-African People's Conference in 1959, he has frequently visited foreign countries in connection with Union or Conference affairs. In January 1960 he presided at the All-African People's Conference at Tunis. In June 1961 he accompanied President Touré to the quarterly conference of the Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union signatories held at Bamako (Mali). In August he accompanied the delegation headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis-Lansana Béavogui, to a meeting in Cairo of the Casablanca Charter signatories. After this meeting, the attending delegations proceeded to Belgrade to take part in the conference of the nonaligned countries held there in September (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

Diallo is a fervent pan-Africanist and a persistent and forceful advocate of the All-African labor union movement initiated in May 1961 at Casablanca. He advocates an All-African Trade Union Federation, without ties with either the Western-oriented International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) or the WFTU (see ch. 13, Labor Relations and Organization).

DIALLO, Abdourahmane. Minister of State without Portfolio since January 1961; member of BPN.

Born in 1902 at Dalein, near Labé, in a Foulah farm family. After completing his secondary education at l'Ecole Normale William Ponty, he studied pharmacy at the School of Medicine in Dakar.

His first employment was as chief pharmacist at the civilian hospital in St. Louis (Senegal). This was followed by successive positions as deputy pharmacist at the St. Louis Colonial Hospital, as chief pharmacist in the field hospital at Ziguinchor (southwestern Senegal), and finally as pharmacist in the Ballay Hospital at Conakry.

In 1946 he helped organize the PDG section of the RDA, and he was a founding member of the BPN. Later he became secretary of the union for African employees of commercial, industrial, banking and insurance enterprises. In the first African government for the territory of Guinea, formed in May 1957, he was appointed Minister of Rural Cooperatives. He remained in the post after independence with the new title of Minister of Rural Economy, Peasants and Cooperatives, and presumably held the position until this ministry was abolished in December 1960 (see ch. 23, *Agricultural Potential*).

His appointment as Minister of State without Portfolio gave him more time for purely political matters. He is commonly referred to as the Dean of the BPN and he serves on its General Political Committee. He is the oldest Cabinet member and the only one with grey hair. He reportedly maintains friendly contacts with the plantation operators and workers.

Since independence he has made several official trips outside the country. In June 1960 he represented Guinea at the Second Conference of Independent African States at Addis Ababa. In August 1961 he headed a delegation to Abidjan to attend the Ivory Coast's independence celebration.

DIALLO, El-Hadj Saifoulaye. President of the National Assembly; member of the BPN.

He was born in 1916 near Labé. His father, a member of a noble Foulah family, was a canton chief. After receiving his early education in schools in Labé and Timbo, Diallo attended l'Ecole Camille Guy in Conakry and finally l'Ecole Normale William Ponty in Dakar.

Like many other Guinean leaders, Diallo began his career as a clerk in the French colonial administration, in which he was shifted from one post to another for his left-wing political activities. From 1944 to 1947, he served at Niamey (Niger) where he helped to form the RDA and became the secretary general of the Niamey branch. From 1947 to 1949 he worked in Conakry, where he was political secretary of the RDA. From 1949 to 1955 he was at Bobo Dioulasso (Upper Volta) and became secretary general of the RDA branch there. Transferred to Mamou (Guinea) in 1955, he finally left the French colonial administration to devote full time to politics.

He won two elections in 1956—in January as deputy for Guinea to the French National Assembly and in November as mayor of Mamou. Other political successes followed. In March 1957 he was

elected to the Guinean Territorial Assembly. He soon became its president—a position he continued to hold when this body became the National Assembly of the Republic. Meanwhile, in May 1957, he was elected a member of the Grand Council of French West Africa.

Throughout, notwithstanding the high position of his family, Diallo staunchly supported Sékou Touré in his successful efforts to strip the local chiefs of what remained of their political powers. Moreover, with his large following in the Fouta Djallon area, he undoubtedly played an important part in mobilizing the referendum vote by which the country rejected membership in the French Community (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics).

Diallo's positions as president of the BPN General Political Committee and political secretary of the party attest to the regard of other PDG leaders for his political strength and acumen. He is commonly regarded as the second ranking figure in the government and most likely successor to President Touré. An indefatigable party worker, he is said to be socially rather reticent and aloof.

He is frequently seen among the dignitaries representing the BPN on ceremonial occasions. He headed the Economic Mission to the Soviet Union which, in August 1959, negotiated a loan of \$35 million to Guinea for industrial development. He accompanied President Touré in June 1961 to the second quarterly conference of the Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union at Bamako. In October 1961 he headed the Guinean governmental delegation which represented the PDG at the twenty-second congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in Moscow. Observers commonly link him with Fodéba Kéita, Minister of National Defense and Security, and Ismael Touré, Minister of Public Works and Transport, as standing politically to the left of President Touré (see ch. 19, Foreign Policies; ch. 28, Foreign Economic Relations).

DIOP, Alassane. Minister of Posts and Telecommunications since January 1961.

Born on April 8, 1922, at Dakar (Senegal), a Wolof (Oulof), of a Senegalese people whose language is related to that of the Foulah. His father was a civil servant. After completing his general education at l'Ecole Normale William Ponty in Dakar, he studied radio engineering. In his first important position he was head of the foreign broadcasting services of the Federal Radio Broadcasting Agency of French West Africa at Dakar; later he became manager of the Conakry Radio Station.

Upon the advent of independence, he was made Secretary of State for the Interior in Charge of Information—a post he apparently held until his appointment, in January 1961, as Minister of Posts and Telecommunications. He is unique among the Cabinet members in

not having been actively engaged in political or labor activities during the pre-independence period. He is one of the country's few radio technicians. He visited West Germany in 1959 and the United States in June 1961.

DRAME, Alioune. Minister of Industry and Mines since January 1961.

Born in 1929 at Périnet near Mamou. His father was a Foulah farmer. After attending a secondary school at Dakar, he completed a law course at the University of Paris. He was active in student politics at Dakar and at Paris, and upon his return to Guinea in 1955, he became a prominent member of the RDA.

Meanwhile he worked as a civil servant in the French colonial administration, specifically as a tax inspector in Conakry. He was appointed Minister of Finance in May 1957 when the first African Cabinet was formed in Guinea. He continued to hold this position in the postindependence Cabinet until January 1961, when he was appointed Minister of Industry and Mines. In October he was a member of the Guinean governmental delegation that represented the PDG at the twenty-second congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in Moscow. He is the youngest member of the Cabinet; he received his first ministerial appointment at 28.

KÉITA, Fodéba. Minister of National Defense and Security.

Born February 19, 1921, at Siguiri. His father was a male nurse. After attending l'Ecole Normale William Ponty in Dakar, he taught school for a short time. In 1948 he went to Paris to study law at the Sorbonne. During this period he augmented his income by writing poetry and short stories. Reportedly he became a staunch supporter of Marxist policies; also his political outlook was strongly influenced by his introduction into French Communist and left-wing circles. A talented singer, dancer and banjo player, he eventually gave up his law studies and organized the *Ballets Africains*, a troupe of West African singers, dancers and instrumentalists. The group toured more than 20 countries.

Kéita's poems were so nationalist and anticolonialist in tone that they were banned in French West Africa from 1951 on. His musical compositions—many of them put on phonograph records—and his writings, however, helped to make him a well-known and popular figure in Guinea, particularly among the young people. The dance group he organized has continued in existence under state auspices as the Ballets Guinéens, and, drawing upon talent from all parts of the country, it has won an international reputation (see ch. 8, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

He was appointed Minister of Interior and Security in the first Guinean Cabinet formed by President Touré after independence. When the security agencies were transferred to the Ministry of National Defense in 1960, he became Minister of National Defense and Security.

Despite his lack of experience in the French colonial administration or in the pre-independence political and labor movements, Kéita is regarded as one of the strong men in the Cabinet.

As Minister of Interior and National Security in 1959, he visited the United States and seemed to be favorably impressed with his reception. He accompanied President Touré in November 1959 to West Germany where they spent two days inspecting industrial plants. His political views appear to be to the left of those of President Touré, but more moderate than those of Ismael Touré or El-Hadj Saïfoulaye Diallo. He is not a member of the BPN.

KEITA, N'Famara. Minister of Commerce since 1961; member of BPN.

Born in 1924 near Kindia of rural Malinké stock. After completing his secondary schooling at Dakar, he studied law, accounting and bookkeeping.

He entered the French colonial administration service in 1947 as a court clerk and process server for the justice of the peace at Macenta. In the same year he joined the RDA at Macenta and became interested in the labor movement. From 1949 to 1951 he was secretary general of the Macenta branch of the CTG while continuing to work in the office of the justice of the peace. In 1953 he moved to Conakry as chief of the administrative secretariat in the public prosecutor's office and served in this capacity until 1956, when he was elected mayor of Kindia. Meanwhile, in 1954, he had been elected to the PDG steering committee and held this position until 1958, when he became a member of the BPN and was selected as secretary of its organizational activities.

After independence he was appointed by President Touré as secretary of state attached to the Presidency (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government). Under the President's general supervision, he was concerned mainly with organizing the country's new army (see ch. 29, The Armed Forces). In March 1960 he was appointed Minister of General Planning, with responsibility for the operation of the government's Three Year Plan. In January 1961 he was appointed Minister of Commerce and charged with taking steps to meet the difficulties which had been steadily mounting in the nation's commerce. He was immediately and energetically engaged in arranging economic agreements with various foreign countries. In May a commercial accord was signed with the Soviet Union and a trade and payment

agreement with the United Arab Republic. In June commercial agreements were signed with North Korea, Senegal and Bulgaria (see ch. 16, Constitution and Government; ch. 22, Character and Structure of the Economy).

Besides being one of the most active members of the government, he is generally regarded by his colleagues as the most competent one among them in the economic field, as indicated by his appointment in 1961 as secretary of the BPN Economic Committee. He is a staunch advocate of work and self-help and asserts that these, rather than outside aids, should be main factors in the country's economic development. He reportedly regards Communist China as a prime example in this respect.

TOUNKARA, Jean Faragué. Minister of Youth, Arts and Culture since January 1961; member of the BPN.

Information regarding the date and place of Tounkara's birth, parentage and education is not available.

As the minister in charge of the PDG youth organization, the JRDA, he holds an important position in the government. He reportedly began his career as a schoolteacher, but by 1957 he was secretary of the Territorial Assembly, and, after independence, he continued as a member of the National Assembly. He served on the committee of assemblymen who drafted the Constitution which was adopted on November 10, 1958. About 1959, however, he was appointed executive officer in charge of the Conakry administrative region. He was made Minister of Youth, Arts and Culture in January 1961 when President Touré formed his new Cabinet. Meanwhile he had become a member of the BPN and was appointed Secretary of its Social Affairs Committee under the chairmanship of Damantang Camara, Minister of National Education.

In 1961 he undertook to harmonize the activities of the JRDA with those of the Communist youth organizations. On his initiative, a group of nine Guinean youths attended the World Youth Forum in August 1961 at Moscow. On their way home, they stopped in Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria.

TOURÉ, Ismael. Minister of Public Works and Transport since 1961; member of the BPN.

Half-brother of President Touré, he was born in 1925 near Faranah. Their father, a Malinké, was a small farmer. Completing his secondary education in Guinean schools, Ismael Touré went to France to study and there qualified as an electrician. Back in Guinea he worked in the Meteorological Service and became chief of the meteorological station at Kankan.

He began his political career in 1956 when he was elected to the Kankan municipal council. He was elected deputy for Faranah to the Territorial Assembly in March 1957, and two months later he was appointed Minister of Public Works in the territorial cabinet. He continued to hold his cabinet position after independence, but under President Touré he assumed additional responsibilities with the new title of Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Town Planning. His ministry was redesignated in 1960 as the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Telecommunications, and, in January 1961, as the Ministry of Public Works and Transport.

In the months just preceding independence, he was editor of the PDG-RDA periodical, *Liberté*. After independence, as a member of BPN, he was made responsible for PDG press activities. As of mid-1961, he was secretary of the BPN Labor Rationalization Committee, charged with giving political guidance to labor unions.

A zealous nationalist and party worker, he is one of the most powerful men in the government. Since independence he has traveled extensively. In January 1960 he led the Guinean delegation to the second All-African Peoples Conference at Tunis. In November 1960, speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on the Congo issue, he bitterly attacked what he called United States imperialism. Observers usually associate him with Fodéba Kéita and El-Hadj Salfoulaye Diallo as representing the left wing of the national leadership.

TOURÉ, Sékon. President of Guinea since 1958; president of UGTAN since 1957; secretary general of PDG since 1952; member of BPN.

Born on January 9, 1922, at Faranah of a modestly situated Malinké farmer and a Foulah mother. His family is related to that of Almany Samory Touré, the famed nineteenth-century leader of Guinean opposition against French colonial rule. His wife is the daughter of a French doctor and a Foulah woman. Their son, born on March 12, 1961, was named Mohamed in a Moslem ceremony.

He received his primary education at a school for Koranic studies in Kankan and, later, at a French school. In 1936 he entered l'Ecole Georges Poirer, a technical school in Conakry. He completed his secondary education by correspondence.

He obtained his first regular job in 1940 as a clerk for Niger Française, a French business firm. In 1941 he passed an examination qualifying him for a position with the French Posts, Telephone and Telecommunications (PTT) Service. He soon became involved in the labor movement. He showed great aptitude as an organizer and leader, and by 1945—at the age of 23—he was secretary general of the PTT Workers' Union. Meanwhile, he established contacts with lead-

ers in the CGT and the WFTU. Moreover, his interests expanded into the political field. In 1946 he helped organize the RDA at Bamako (Mali) under the leadership of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, now President of the Ivory Coast.

During this period, he transferred to the Treasury Department as a clerk accountant and shortly became the secretary general of the Treasury Employees Union. Political activities and the labor movement increasingly occupied his time. Seeing no future for Guineans in the French colonial service, he quit the Treasury Department and in 1948 was elected secretary general of the Territorial Union of the CGT. He continued to enlarge the scope of his activities in the labor movement, and, in 1950, he became secretary general of the CGT unions in French West Africa, including Togo (see ch. 13, Labor Relations and Organization).

His union activity propelled him into politics. In 1952 he became secretary general of the PDG section of the RDA, and his effectiveness in helping to organize a series of successful strikes in 1953 brought him wide popularity among Guinean workers. That year he was elected to the Territorial Assembly from Beyla. His only political defeat occurred in 1954, when he lost the contest for a vacant seat as deputy in the French National Assembly to his opponent Diawadou Barry. However, in the next election for deputy, in January 1956, he won by a large majority. In the municipal elections of November 1956, he became mayor of Conakry, a further confirmation of his political strength.

Meanwhile, he viewed with apprehension the ties between the Guinean and the French labor movements and the growing influence of the WFTU. He regarded some of the Marxist premises of these foreign organizations as unsuitable for Africans, among whom, he maintained, no class struggle existed. He also felt that African interests were being ignored or sacrificed by a European leadership. In January 1957, he organized the UGTAN and became its first president (see ch. 13, Labor Relations and Organization).

His advancement in the political field continued. In May 1957 he became a member of the Grand Council of French West Africa. In the discussions about what should be the relationship between the former African colonies and France, differences developed between him and Houphouët-Boigny and other leaders, with Sékou Touré insisting on full autonomy and, finally, complete independence. Later in 1957 he became Vice President of the General Council of the Territory—a position virtually equivalent to that of head of state. In the Referendum of September 28, 1958, Guinea, under his leadership, was the only territory to vote against joining the French Community.

After independence he accepted his former political opponents into the ranks of the PDG, thus transforming almost all of them into supporters. He gave some of them positions of high responsibility and he strove with remarkable success to unite the country behind the party's program. A record of his activities is, in effect, a record of the country's achievements in economic, political and foreign affairs (see ch. 17, Political Dynamics; ch. 19, Foreign Policies).

As President he has traveled to many foreign countries and has also received numerous official foreign delegations in Conakry. In 1959 he visited the United States, England, West Germany, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Tunisia and Morocco. In 1960 his tours included Communist China, Cuba, and—for the second time—the Soviet Union and the United States. In January 1961 he visited Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In February he was host to Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In March he received President and Mrs. Tito of Yugoslavia. On August 13, 1961, at an elaborate public ceremony in Conakry, he was presented with the Lenin Peace Prize by Professor Dimitri Skobeltsyne, Director of the Scientific Institute in Moscow.

MILITARY

The most important military personality is Lieutenant Colonel Noumandian Kéita who holds the highest position in the Army hierarchy, Chief of the General Staff. Appointments to general officer ranks have been authorized by law but none have been made, except in the case of General Lansana Diané, who was placed in command of the Guinean battalion sent to the Republic of the Congo in 1960 but resumed his political career immediately on his return (see ch. 29, The Armed Forces). The lack of emphasis on rank is consistent with the government's policy of keeping the military establishment firmly under civilian control and employing it on economic development projects.

With a few possible exceptions, all officers had some service with French units before independence. None of them attained a rank higher than that of captain, however, and are therefore without previous experience with the command and staff problems of a military establishment on the national level. Hence the officers in the key staff and command positions are all relatively low in rank for the responsibilities associated with comparable assignments in most other armies, and they lack specialized training in staff planning or troop leadership.

BARRY, Siradio. Captain. Commander of Camp Kémé Bouréme in 1960.

Entered the Army as a first lieutenant on February 1, 1959, and was assigned to the First Military Region with headquarters at

Kankan. Was subsequently assigned as commander of Camp Kémé Bouréme at Kindia. Was awarded the Cross of the Companion of Independence (*Croix de Compagnon de l'Indépendance*), commonly called the Independence Cross, on October 2, 1960. Promoted to captain as of March 1, 1961.

BAVOGUI, Kékouma. Captain. Commander of Gendarmerie since 1959.

Entered the Army as a first lieutenant on February 1, 1959, and was assigned to the Second Military Region and appointed commander of the company at Camp Brosset (Later Camp Alpha Yaya) in Conakry. On April 13, 1959, he was placed on detached service with the Ministry of the Interior and assigned as Commander of the Gendarmerie. On October 2, 1960, he was awarded the Independence Cross. Promoted to captain as of March 1, 1961.

DIABI, Kaman. Captain. Member of the General Staff since 1959; Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff since April 1961.

Entered the Army as a first lieutenant on December 30, 1958, and was appointed as aide (*officier d'ordonnance*) to President Touré and as assistant to the Chief of the General Staff. Promoted to captain as of January 1, 1959. In September 1960 was assigned to the office of the Minister of National Defense and Security, but continued to serve as aide to President Touré until April 1, 1961, when he was replaced in that position and resumed his duties as assistant to the Chief of the General Staff.

DIALLO, Louis. Captain. Member of the General Staff since 1959.

Entered the Army as of June 1, 1959, as a first lieutenant and was placed at the disposition of the Chief of the General Staff. After serving a short period as Commander of the Republican Guard, he was transferred on August 27, 1959, to the office of the Secretary of State for National Defense (later changed to Ministry of National Defense and Security). Promoted to captain as of March 1, 1961.

DIALLO, Mamadou. Major. Commander of Camp Soundiata in October 1960.

Entered the Army as a captain on February 1, 1959, and was assigned as Commander of the First Military Region with headquarters near Kankan. Was awarded the Independence Cross on October 2, 1960, at which time he was serving as Commander of Camp Soundiata at Kankan. Promoted to major as of March 1, 1961.

DIANÉ, Lansana. General (inactive). Commandant of the Labé administrative region since February 1961.

Was appointed general and assigned to command the battalion that was placed at the disposal of the United Nations forces in the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) in July 1960. He returned to Guinea with the battalion on February 8, 1961, and was assigned as commandant of the Labé administrative region, a nonmilitary post.

Has been an active worker in the PDG since its organization. As head of a parliamentary delegation, he visited Bulgaria and Prague in 1959. Is also a prominent member of the National Political Bureau, serving on its Labor Rationalization Committee and on one of its committees assigned to make annual inspections of PDG regional organizations. In 1961 he was secretary general of the Guinean Health and Live Stock Breeding Workers Union (Syndicat National des Travailleurs des Services de Santé et de l'Élevage de Guinée). In October 1961 he was a member of the governmental delegation that represented the PDG at the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at Moscow.

FOULAH, Henri. Captain. Executive Officer (Chef de Cabinet) in the Ministry of National Defense and Secretary in August 1960.

Entered the Army as a first lieutenant late in 1958 or early in 1959 and was assigned to command the battalion at Camp Gallieni (renamed Camp Kémé Bouréme) near Kindia. Was transferred to Conakry and assigned to the General Staff, effective February 1, 1959. On August 6, 1960, he was appointed Executive Officer in the Ministry of National Defense and Security. Was awarded the Independence Cross on October 2, 1960. Promoted to captain as of March 1, 1961.

KÉITA, Mamadou. Captain. Commander of Republican Guard in October 1960.

Entered the Army as a first lieutenant on February 1, 1959, and was assigned to command the company at N'Zérékoré. Was transferred to the Ministry of Interior and Security on August 27, 1959, to serve as Commander of the Republican Guard. Was awarded the Independence Cross on October 2, 1960. Promoted to captain as of March 1, 1961.

KÉITA, Namory. Major. Member of General Staff since 1960.

Entered the Army as a captain on February 1, 1959, and was assigned as Commander of the Second Military Region with headquarters near Kindia. He subsequently was appointed to the General Staff and, on October 2, 1960, was awarded the Independence Cross. Promoted to major as of March 1, 1961.

KÉITA, N'Gaye. Captain. Commander of Camp Alpha Yaya in October 1960.

Entered the Army late in 1958 as a first lieutenant and was assigned to command the Republican Guard. Promoted to captain as of January 1, 1959. Was commander of Camp Alpha Yaya at Conakry on October 2, 1960, when he received the Independence Cross.

KÉITA, Noumandian. Lieutenant Colonel. Chief of the General Staff since 1958.

Entered the Army as a captain, his former rank in the French ground forces. Has been Chief of the General Staff since its organization. Promoted to major as of January 1, 1959. In 1959 he accompanied President Touré on a visit to the United States and to West Germany, where they spent two days visiting industrial plants. Was awarded the Independence Cross on October 2, 1960. Promoted to lieutenant colonel as of March 1, 1961. Attended a 15-day conference of the Chiefs of Staff of the Casablanca Charter powers, which convened on July 7, 1961, at Cairo. This meeting was described as the first conference of the African High Command (see ch. 29, The Armed Forces).

KOUROUMA, Souma. Captain. Commander of Camp El-Hadj Oumar in 1960.

Entered the Army as a first lieutenant on February 1, 1950, and was assigned to command a company stationed at N'Zérékoré. Later in the month he was transferred to Labé and placed in command of the company at Camp Markala (renamed Camp El-Hadj Oumar). Was awarded the Independence Cross on October 2, 1960, at which time he was Commander of Camp El-Hadj Oumar. Promoted to captain as of March 1, 1961.

SOUMAH, Abou. First Lieutenant. Commander of Camp Almany Samory in October 1960.

A former student in the Infantry Section at St. Maxient, a French training school for noncommissioned officers preparing for commissions, he entered the Guinean Army as a second lieutenant on September 1, 1959, and was placed at the disposition of the Chief of the General Staff. Was Commander of Camp Almany Samory at Conakry when he was awarded the Independence Cross on October 2, 1960. Promoted to first lieutenant as of March 1, 1961.

TOUNKARA, Boubacar. First Lieutenant. Commander of Camp Béhanzin in October 1960.

Entered the Army as a warrant officer (*adjudant*) late in 1958 and was assigned as commander of the company at Labé. Promoted to

second lieutenant on January 1, 1959; in February was transferred to Conakry to command the troops at Camp Mangin (redesignated Camp Almamy Samory). Subsequently he was assigned as Commander of Camp Béhanzin at N'Zérékoré. Was awarded the Independence Cross on October 2, 1960. Promoted to first lieutenant as of March 1, 1961.

ZOUMANIGUI, Kékoura. First Lieutenant. Aide (*officer d'ordonnance*) to President Touré since April 1961.

Entered the Army as a warrant officer (*adjudant*) late in 1958 and was assigned as acting battalion commander at Kankan. Promoted to second lieutenant on January 1, 1959, and later was assigned as Commander of Camp M'Balia at Koumdara near the Senegal boundary north of Youkounkoun. Was awarded the Independence Cross on October 2, 1960. Promoted to first lieutenant as of March 1, 1961. Appointed aide to President Touré on April 1, 1961.

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SECTION IV. MILITARY BACKGROUND

RECOMMENDED FURTHER READING

Among the sources consulted in the preparation of this section the following are recommended as additional reading.

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GLOSSARY

- AATUF*: All African Trade Union Federation. Formed at Casablanca in 1960; pan-African in concept; opposes trade union affiliations with non-African organizations.
- AEF*: Afrique Equatoriale Française (French Equatorial Africa).
- AGP*: Agence Guinéenne de Presse. A mimeographed news bulletin published daily except Sunday in Conakry by the National Guinean Press Agency.
- AGRIMA*: Entreprise Nationale d'Importation de Matériel et Produits pour l'Agriculture. A national trading agency for the importation of agricultural supplies.
- ALIMAG*: Entreprise Nationale d'Alimentation Générale. A national trading agency for the importation of food products.
- AOF*: Afrique Occidentale Française (French West Africa).
- BAG*: Bloc Africain de Guinée (African Bloc of Guinea). A pre-independence conservative political party dominated by the Foulah.
- BATIPORT*: Entreprise Nationale d'Importation de Matériel pour le Bâtiment. A national trading agency for the importation of construction materials.
- BPV*: Bureau Politique Nationale (National Political Bureau). The top executive agency of the PDG.
- CFA*: Colonies Françaises d'Afrique (French Colonies of Africa).
- CFTC*: Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (French Confederation of Christian Laborers). A labor union affiliated with the French Popular Republican Movement, a Catholic liberal party.
- CGT*: Confédération Générale du Travail (General Confederation of Workers). A French labor union, Communist dominated.
- CGTA*: Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Africains (General Confederation of African Workers). An African offshoot of the CGT.
- CGT-FO*: Confédération Générale du Travail-Force Ouvrière (General Confederation of Labor-Workers Force). A socialist-linked French labor union.
- CNAG*: Compagnie Nationale Air-Guinée (Guinea National Airways Company).
- CNTG*: Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs de Guinée (National Confederation of Guinean Workers). Guinean union encompassing all regional unions and federations.

DEG: Distribution d'Articles de Commerce. (Distribution)

A company which distributes various types of goods.

DIVERMA: Entreprise Nationale d'Importation et d'Exportation

Diverses. A National trading agency for miscellaneous merchandise.

EMATEC: Entreprise Nationale d'Importation et d'Exportation

Matérielle. A national trading agency for the same material and equipment.

ENAT: Entreprise Nationale de Transport, de Transit et de Coopération Maritime.

Lighterage, Transport and Maritime Cooperation.

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

FDIF: Fédération Démocratique Internationale des Femmes.

International Democratic Federation of Women-oriented Federation.

FIDES: Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Économique et Social (Fund for Economic and Social Development).

FLN: Fédération de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Federation). An Algerian Federation.

GPRV: Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic).

GUINEAEXPORT: A national trading agency for all products except minerals.

ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization. An agency of the United Nations Economic and Social Council.

ICFTU: International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

IFAC: Institut des Fruits et Agrumes Coloniaux (Institute of Colonial Citrus and other Fruits). A French organization for the promotion of citrus fruits.

IFAN: Institut Français d'Afrique Noire (French Institute of Black Africa). French organization for West African studies in the fields of physical science, ethnology and economics.

ILO: International Labor Organization.

INRDP: Institut National de Recherches et de Documentation (National Institute of Research and Documentation). A French organization for research in the social sciences and humanities.

IONM: Indépendants d'Outre-Mer (Overseas Independent Movement). A political coalition in French West Africa during the period of independence but with retention of ties with France.

JRDA: Jeunesse du Rassemblement Démocratique Algérien (Youth of the Algerian Democratic Rally). The youth section of the Rassemblement Démocratique Algérien.

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